Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most breadwinning. There is no consensus on whether this state of affairs, and the informal norms that encourage it, are matters of justice to be tackled by state action. Feminists have criticized political liberalism for its alleged inability to embrace a full feminist agenda, inability explained by political liberals’ commitment to the ideal of state neutrality. The debate continues on whether neutral states can accommodate two (...) feminist demands: to enact policies aimed at dismantling the feminization of caregiving, especially childrearing, and to compensate women for some of the disadvantages they incur by being primary care-givers. I contribute to this debate with three arguments in support of policies meant to de-gender care-giving and compensate care-givers. The first appeals to equality of opportunity to positions of advantage and justifies policies that prevent or mitigate statistical discrimination and implicit biases. The second draws attention to a possible causal relationship between the specialization of women in early childcare and misogyny; since the latter is incompatible with political liberal justice, it yields the conclusion that political liberals ought to further investigate the causal hypothesis with the aim of establishing or refuting it. The third argument concludes that legitimate childrearing prohibits adults from socializing children or, at least girls, into gender norms; it justifies duties of justice on the side of parents, educators, and economic agents, and state policies meant to offset foreseeable breaches of some of these duties. (shrink)

Abstract The aim of this paper is to discuss which stance towards the allocation of labor and leisure would be defensible from the perspective of modern liberal political theory. There is a long tradition in philosophy defending an ideal of leisure, but this tradition has been rightly criticized for being too perfectionist. A liberal perspective seems more attractive in not dictating how much time people spend in labor or leisure, but leaving this choice to individuals. The question is whether this (...) is possible. After scrutinizing the traditional philosophical defense of leisure I focus on Robert Goodin and his collaborators' recent proposal to think about labor and leisure in terms of ?temporal autonomy?. I show that their concept is a great improvement over the older philosophical theories, both in its conceptualization of labor and leisure and in its ambition to leave labor/leisure choices to individuals. Nonetheless, it contains an important unresolved ambiguity about whether discretionary time maximization is a desirable end. Since the exercise of one's temporal autonomy can undercut the temporal autonomy of others in society, this leads to a dilemma. This dilemma can be resolved either in a libertarian or in a sufficientarian direction. I provide a cautious defense of the sufficientarian conception of temporal autonomy, because it accounts for the intuition in the older tradition of leisure that it is important not to be overwhelmed by the demands of labor, while also retaining the liberal emphasis on individual choice. (shrink)

This article presents a blueprint of a feminist agenda for the twenty-first century that is oriented not by the telos of gender parity, but instead evolves as an ‘immanent critique’ of the key structural dynamics of contemporary capitalism – within a framework of analysis derived from the tenets of Critical Theory of Frankfurt School origin. This activates a form of critique whose double focus on (1) shared conceptions of justice; and (2) structural sources of injustice, allows criteria of social justice (...) to emerge from the identification of a broad pattern of societal injustice surpassing the discrimination of particular groups. In this light, women’s victimization is but a symptom of structural dynamics negatively affecting also the alleged winners in the classical feminist agenda of critique. The analysis ultimately produces a model of social justice in a formula of socially embedded autonomy that unites work, care, and leisure. (shrink)

There has recently been a revived interest in temporal justice among political philosophers. For example, lone mothers have, on average, 30 h less free time per week than people in couples without children. Recent work has focussed on free time as a distinct distributive good, but this paper argues that it would be a mistake for a theory of temporal justice to focus only on shares of free time. First, I argue that the concept of free time does not succeed (...) in tracking discretionary control over time. All of time is a resource, and the particular moral relevance of free time must be established otherwise. Second, hours of time differ in use value, and we cannot fully track our concerns about the allocation of time, whether free or necessary, without taking this into account. We care about free time but also about ‘quality time’. To explain this observation, I develop an account of the value of time as a resource. The value of time periods differs with the prospects for which a time period can be used, that is, what we can do and be with it. What we are allocating when we are allocating time is not just hours; it is hours of time with a certain value. Finally, I argue that a concern for the value of time is compatible with a resourcist theory of temporal justice. (shrink)

How can work be a genuine good in life? I argue that this requires overcoming a problem akin to that studied by Marx scholars as the problem of work, freedom and necessity: how can work be something we genuinely want to do, given that its content is not up to us, but is determined by necessity? I argue that the answer involves valuing contributing to the good of others, typically as valuing active pro-sociality – that is, valuing actively doing something (...) good for others. This makes work better in one way, and may even make work something we are genuinely glad to have in our lives. Contemporary philosophical thinking about good work tends to focus on how work can be good for the person doing it, by providing, for example, self-realization or social relationships, while underappreciating the special importance of valuing social contribution. People will typically only really want work if they want a part of their lives to be about the good of others. This also means that work may be a part of the best life, something we should take into account when discussing work-related policies and the desirability of a ‘post-work’ future. (shrink)

To find out what is in one’s own best interest, it is helpful to ask one’s epistemic peers. However, identifying one’s epistemic peers is not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral competition of ‘Masses’ and ‘Elites’. To succeed, the Masses need to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom (...) they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the relevant peer group for information pooling by modelling this group formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injustice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their reduced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced by Miranda Fricker. (shrink)

The article deals with the question whether an unconditional basic income is part of an ideal liberal-egalitarian welfare regime. Analyzing UBI from an ideal-theoretical perspective requires a comparison of the justice performance of ideal welfare regimes instead of comparing isolated institutional designs. This holistic perspective allows for a more systematic consideration of issues like institutional complementarity. I compare three potential ideal welfare regimes from a liberal-egalitarian perspective of justice: An ideal social democratic regime, a mixed regime containing a moderate UBI (...) and a maximal UBI regime where UBI replaces most of the welfare state. These regimes are evaluated with respect to three aspects of justice performance: the scope and neutrality of opportunities provided, institutional complementarities with a dynamic, globalized economy and the policy feedback effects on the political stability of liberal-egalitarian political coalitions. I conclude that the overall performance of a mixed regime is superior to the other regimes. (shrink)

Must a society aim indefinitely for continued economic growth? Proponents of economic growth advance three central challenges to the idea that a society, having attained high levels of income and wealth, may justly cease to pursue further economic growth: if environmentally sustainable and the gains fairly distributed, first, continued economic growth could make everyone within a society and globally, and especially the worst off, progressively better off; second, the pursuit of economic growth spurs ongoing innovation, which enhances people’s opportunities and (...) protects a society against future risks; and third, continued economic growth fosters attitudes of openness, tolerance, and generosity, which are essential to the functioning of a liberal democratic society. This article grants these challenges’ normative foundations, to show that, even if one accepts their underlying premises as requirements of justice, a society may still justly cease to aim for economic growth, so long as it continues to aim for and realize gains on other dimensions. I argue that, while continued economic growth might instrumentally serve valuable ends, it is not necessary for their realization, as a society can achieve these ends through other means. (shrink)

Green republicanism can be described as a subset of republican political theory that aims at promoting human flourishing by ensuring a non-dominating and ecologically sustainable republic. An essential aspect of green republicanism is the promotion of post-productivism while preserving or expanding republican freedom as non-domination. Post-productivism implies the promotion of personal autonomy rather than the pursuit of permanent economic growth and the promotion of labour as an intrinsically positive human activity, which for green republicans will have three positive aspects: reduced (...) ecological impact, more time available for civic participation, and the extension of democratic decision-making and norms to the sphere of production. An important aspect in the definition of a post-productivist society is the way welfare schemes are designed. In this article, I will thus compare the existing welfare regimes with a participation income and with an unconditional basic income, and analyse how they promote green republican goals. I conclude that the current systems are one of the elements of the productivist society and that would not answer the green republican conditions. A green participation income could have a positive ecological impact and contribute to a shift to post-productivism but would face serious challenges from a republican perspective, namely in terms of the non-arbitrariness of its attribution. Finally, I conclude that depending on how it is defined, an unconditional basic income could contribute to post-productivism while being non-arbitrary thus obeying the green republican conditions. (shrink)

The Greens are the political group in which the support for the implementation of a basic income is stronger. Nevertheless, the reasons for that support are not always clear and quite often not related to environmental issues. For this reason, two different approaches to a green BI – environmental and ecological – are discussed in this article. The first could be part of a green growth strategy, whereas the second would require structural changes to the economic model, in support of (...) a post-productivist economy. Although showing some overlaps, these models are in conflict in some central aspects, such as the role of economic growth in promoting sustainability. For this reason, it might be incorrect to assume that an environmental BI is a step toward an ecological BI. We will focus on the green aspects as a consequence of implementing a BI and independently of its sources of funding – namely by looking into the amount a BI needs to be in order to support shifting activities from the market to the autonomous sphere – and on the green potential of its sources of financing. (shrink)

Despite devoting their time to another person’s needs, many carers paradoxically experience guilt during their caregiving tenure concerning whether they are providing enough care. When discussing the “enough” of anything, what is at stake is that thing’s quantification. Given that there are seemingly no quantifiable units of care by which to measure the role, concerns regarding whether enough care is being provided often focus on what constitutes enough time as a carer. In exploring this aspect of the carer’s experience, two (...) key parameters emerge; guilt, and, quantified time. The guilt that carers report regarding whether they devote “enough time” to their caring responsibilities can be examined through Henri Bergson’s philosophical conception of quantification. By integrating contemporary analyses of carers’ guilt from the social sciences, most significantly via the sociology of Rebecca Olson, the relationship between quantified time and guilt becomes apparent. A quantified conception of time frames the assumption that spending more time on caregiving will reduce the amount of guilt felt by a carer. However, whilst care is structured according to quantified, clocked and calendared time, there are not comparable, quantifiable parameters for guilt. This means that suppositions of an inverse relationship between how much time one spends giving care, and how much guilt they will feel in terms of their caregiving, are problematic. These insights become relevant to health care policies via a coherence with calls to make the role of unpaid, caregiving, labour time more visible, and by explaining how understanding quantified time can help policies guide how caregivers negotiate guilt. (shrink)

The World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development has recently confirmed the widely held belief that women across the world tend to perform different work from men who otherwise are situated similarly. Women also work longer hours than similarly situated men. In analyzing the justice of these gendered disparities in time-use, WDR 2012 uses a moral framework that is largely distributive. Although this framework illuminates some aspects of the injustice of the situation, I contend that it obscures other crucial (...) aspects, making the analysis inadequate overall. I argue that a more comprehensive and illuminating moral understanding can be reached by analyzing these time-use disparities in terms of global gendered exploitation. This alternative framework also better enables identifying those politically responsible for the injustice and points toward a vision of global gender justice that is morally more plausible. (shrink)

This thesis in philosophy consists of an introduction and five papers on three themes related to transport: valuations of time, the metric of transport justice, and future mobility solutions. The first paper analyses the properties of time as an economic resource taking into account literature on behaviour concerning time. The intent is to add to the understanding of the underlying assumption of transferability between time and money in the context of transportation. The second paper is on the metric of transport (...) justice. If we are concerned with distributive justice in the context of transportation, what type of good is being distributed? So far, most of the transport literature on transport justice takes accessibility to be the most appropriate metric. However, I argue that many operationalisations of accessibility are insufficient as metrics of justice. They are both too narrow and exclude relevant burdens of transportation. Additionally, accessibility can be achieved by other, non-travel-based means. I end by formulating tentative criteria for an alternative metric of transport justice. The third paper considers temporal justice in the context of transportation. Building on an argument against the claim of substitutability between time and money, I argue that temporal perspectives have been overlooked in the literature on transport justice. In part, this might be due to accessibility being the established metric of justice. Most common measures of accessibility do not capture temporal constraints and might consequently not capture temporal inequalities. Based on the case of gender differences in travel patterns and behaviour, I argue that an alternative account of the appropriate metric of transport justice is needed to capture temporal constraints and reflect gender inequalities sufficiently. The fourth paper argues that the diversity of possible mobility solutions based on self-driving vehicles has been somewhat overlooked in the current literature on the value of travel time. Thus, the complexity of valuing travel time for self-driving vehicles has not been fully addressed. The paper consists of a morphological analysis of the parameters that might impact the value of travel time for self-driving vehicles and a deeper analysis of five plausible self-driving vehicle mobility concepts. It is claimed that not all such concepts can be easily mapped into transport modes. It might be more appropriate to differentiate the value of travel based on travel characteristics. The fifth paper is a literature review of work on attitudes toward automation technology, specifically self-driving vehicles. In particular, I examine the narratives and values related to gender. Generally, women tend to be more sceptical of the prospect of automated vehicles. The review found that this tendency is often explained by women being more risk-averse and less tech-savvy. Moreover, the policy recommendations in the examined literature based focus on educational efforts. Such perspectives can downplay or neglect valid reasons why women are less enthusiastic. Moreover, needs related to women's specific travel patterns might not be considered in the design and planning process. In conclusion, more awareness in needed of the gender differences, needs and expectations to ensure that future transport solutions are designed with everyone in mind. (shrink)

The transportation system is essential for urban life – the spatial nature of our cities requires us to travel. Hence, we need to spend time in transit. However, time is a scarce resource. In transportation research, travel time savings are the key benefit of transportation improvements. Yet, “time savings” primarily function as a proxy for presumed societal benefits rather than reflect actual reductions in travel time. Moreover, time constraints are rarely considered in the transport justice literature. Based on the case (...) of gender differences in travel patterns and travel time, this paper argues that a lack of interest in time is partly due to accessibility being the established metric for transport justice. Nevertheless, temporal inequality should be a concern for urban justice. The answer to “justice of what” needs to include a temporal component. By connecting the literature on temporal justice with the literature on transport justice, this paper considers the foundations of a time-specific metric as well as its advantages and disadvantages. (shrink)

This licentiate thesis consists of an introduction and three papers discussing various aspects of time as a commodity and the practice of valuing travel time. The first paper is an analysis of the properties of time as an economic resource taking into account literature on behavior with regard to time. The intent is to provide better understanding of the underlying assumption of transferability between time and money in the context of transportation. The second paper builds on the analysis in the (...) first paper combined with the findings of a study of commuters travel experiences during disruptions in the train traffic on the Øresund strait between Sweden and Denmark. It contrasts the theoretical account of value of travel time with the experiences reported by commuters and argues that the view of travel time as strictly a disutility can be limiting from a planning perspective. Instead, it is argued that an alternative approach can be to make travel time ‘plannable’, meaning viewing travel time as time travellers can plan to spend in a certain way at a certain time. The third paper argues that the diversity of possible mobility solutions based on self-driving vehicles has been somewhat overlooked in the current literature on value of travel time. Thus, the complexity of valuing travel time for self-driving vehicles has not been fully addressed. The paper consists of a morphological analysis of the parameters that might impact value of travel time for self-driving vehicles and a deeper analysis of five plausible self-driving vehicle mobility concepts. It is claimed that not all such concepts can be easily mapped into transport modes and that it might be more appropriate to differentiate value of travel based on travel characteristics. (shrink)