It is a common experience to be surprised by an artwork. In this paper, I examine how and why this obvious fact matters for philosophical aesthetics. Following recent works in psychology and philosophers such as Davidson or Scheffler, we will see that surprise qualifies as an emotion of a special kind, essentially “cognitive” or “epistemic” in its nature and functioning. After some preliminary considerations, I wish to hold two general claims: the first one will be that surprise is somehow related (...) to aesthetic appreciation, because it is often the ground to judge of a work’s value. The second point will be that a functional analysis of surprise provides support for cognitivist accounts of aesthetics. If this picture is right, surprise would generally play an important part in aesthetic experience and should also be seen as a paradigm to study the cognitive powers of art. (shrink)

This dissertation examines aspects of the interplay between computing and scientific practice. The appropriate foundational framework for such an endeavour is rather real computability than the classical computability theory. This is so because physical sciences, engineering, and applied mathematics mostly employ functions defined in continuous domains. But, contrary to the case of computation over natural numbers, there is no universally accepted framework for real computation; rather, there are two incompatible approaches --computable analysis and BSS model--, both claiming to formalise algorithmic (...) computation and to offer foundations for scientific computing. The dissertation consists of three parts. In the first part, we examine what notion of 'algorithmic computation' underlies each approach and how it is respectively formalised. It is argued that the very existence of the two rival frameworks indicates that 'algorithm' is not one unique concept in mathematics, but it is used in more than one way. We test this hypothesis for consistency with mathematical practice as well as with key foundational works that aim to define the term. As a result, new connections between certain subfields of mathematics and computer science are drawn, and a distinction between 'algorithms' and 'effective procedures' is proposed. In the second part, we focus on the second goal of the two rival approaches to real computation; namely, to provide foundations for scientific computing. We examine both frameworks in detail, what idealisations they employ, and how they relate to floating-point arithmetic systems used in real computers. We explore limitations and advantages of both frameworks, and answer questions about which one is preferable for computational modelling and which one for addressing general computability issues. In the third part, analog computing and its relation to analogue (physical) modelling in science are investigated. Based on some paradigmatic cases of the former, a certain view about the nature of computation is defended, and the indispensable role of representation in it is emphasized and accounted for. We also propose a novel account of the distinction between analog and digital computation and, based on it, we compare analog computational modelling to physical modelling. It is concluded that the two practices, despite their apparent similarities, are orthogonal. (shrink)

This paper is intended to sketch the definition of a methodological tool -- the notion of a format of representation -- for the study of scientific theorising. One of its main assumption is that a philosophical study of theorising needs to pay attention to other types of units of analysis than the traditional ones, namely, theories and models approached in a logical and structural way, since scientific reasoning is always led on concrete representational devices and depends upon their specific properties. (...) The notion of a format is intended to characterise the differences between various types of representational devices, in terms of the inferences they enable cognitive agents to draw. (shrink)

This thesis is intended to analyze a mental phenomenon widely neglected in current philosophical discussions: personal memories. The first part presents a general framework to better understand what personal memories are, how we access our personal past and what we access about our personal past. Chapter 1 introduces traditional theories of memory: direct realism and representationalism in their different versions, as well as some objections. I defend here a particular form of representationalism that is based on the distinction between content, (...) intentional object and ontological object. Chapter 2 explores the possible contents of our personal memories, which prove to be heterogeneous, whereas chapter 3 analyses their possible intentional objects, with a special focus on past events. The second part of the thesis explores an aspect of our personal memories that was omitted in the first part: the senses in which our personal past is apprehended as personal. Chapter 4 examines the way in which the “self” intervenes in the construction of our personal memories. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the analysis of what seems to be the most subjective aspect of our memories, that is, the emotions and feelings of our past experiences. In these last two chapters, I analyze the different interactions that can take place between memories and emotions and defend the idea that there can be emotional memories that are reducible neither to a propositional memory nor an occurrent and present emotion. The overall intention of this thesis is twofold. First, I aim to show to the philosophical community that there is still a lot to be said and discussed about memory as a mental phenomenon. And second, I intend to emphasize the importance of bringing into the philosophical discussions about the mind ideas coming from different philosophical traditions as well as ideas and empirical data coming from scientific research. (shrink)

This is the first volume of an impressive project on the relation of art, philosophy and social change. In an on-going argument and review ing several important aesthetic theories Paul Crow ther in this book argues for the idea that aesthetics should be a kind of critical assessment of art w orks' experiential consequences. Although I go along w ith his resistance against postmodernist reasoning, w hich functions as the starting point of his book, beyond that, our w ays often (...) part. My disagreement, how ever, does not annul the evident quality of the argument in this w ork. It is recommended reading material for all those aestheticians w ho are interested in the cognitive and non-cognitive functionality of art w orks and in the possibility of any influence of art on societal change. I w ill now discuss the most crucial steps in Crow ther's argument. Postmodernists claim to have undone the alleged rigidity of modern categories, like that of the autonomous subject, but according to Crow ther they reach this `achievement' by overemphasizing the fluidity of modes of know ledge and experience, and of their status as social constructs, but there may w ell exist flexible constants. Aesthetics can help w ith the analysis of these flexible constants, not by looking for the essences of art or aesthetic experience, but by supplementing our theoretical assessments w ith a critique of art. Crow ther proposes to view aesthetic experiences as w ell as w orks of art as functions of critical aw areness and of body-hold, an historicized version of Merleau-Ponty's much neglected notion of embodiment. Critical aesthetics actualizes the critical aw areness involved in our aesthetic experiences. Art, defined in terms of originality, roots in the body-hold of the artist, w ho moulds his medium to solve technical problems traditional art forms confront him w ith. Postmodernism involves only tw o theses, really. First, contemporary experience and sensibility are analyzed as imbued by the shocks generated by the rapid succession of mechanically reproduced events.. (shrink)

En este trabajo voy a sostener que algunas metáforas no pueden ser explicadas por la influyente teoría de Davidson sobre el asunto. En particular, afirmo que algunas oraciones metafóricas, muy extendidas en contextos artísticos, no son ni trivialmente verdaderas ni patentemente falsas punto esencial para que la teoría davidsoniana funcione. De esta manera, sostendré que este tipo de metáforas que traeré a colación obligan a los davidsonianos a rever o a modificar su teoría. Al mismo tiempo, sugeriré que las teorías (...) de Black y Goodman podrían estar mejor preparadas para solucionar el problema que plantean estas metáforas. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo desarrollar un estudio crítico de la concepción mecanicista de la explicación científica. En primer lugar, argumento que la caracterización mecanicista de los modelos fenoménicos (no explicativos) es inadecuada, pues no ofrece un análisis aceptable de los conceptos de modelo científico y similitud, que son fundamentales para la propuesta. En segundo lugar, sostengo que la caracterización de los modelos mecanicistas (explicativos) es igualmente inadecuada, pues los análisis disponibles de la relación explicativa de relevancia constitutiva implican una (...) tesis metafísica que es rechazada por los mismos mecanicistas. Concluyo que el mecanicismo no ofrece todavía una elucidación aceptable de la explicación científica. In this paper, I offer a critical assessment of the mechanicist approach to scientific explanation. Firstly, I argue that the mechanicist characterization of (non explanatory) phenomenological models is inadequate, since it does not develop an explication of the concepts of scientific model and similarity, which are indispensable to the approach. Secondly, I claim that the mechanicist conception of (explanatory) mechanicist models is inadequate as well, since all the available analices of the explanatory relation of constitutive relevance imply a metaphysical thesis that is rejected by the mechanicists themselves. I conclude that mechanicism needs to be emended if it aims to be considered as a genuinely illuminating approach to scientific explanation. (shrink)

6. Seeing With the Mind’s Eye 1: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery .................................................6-1 6.1 What is the puzzle about mental imagery?..............................................................................6-1 6.2 Content, form and substance of representations ......................................................................6-6 6.3 What is responsible for the pattern of results obtained in imagery studies?.................................6-8..

I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms (...) of teleofunction, explicated in terms of natural selection. -/- To explain (ii), we begin by recognizing that representational states do not have content, that is, they are neither true nor false except insofar as they both “point to” or “refer” to something, as well as “say” something regarding whatever it is they are about. To distinguish veridical from false representations, there must be a way for these separate aspects to come apart; hence, we explain (ii) by providing independent theories of what I call f-reference and f-predication (the ‘f’ simply connotes ‘fundamental’, to distinguish these things from their natural language counterparts). -/- Causal theories of representation typically founder on error, or on what Fodor has called the disjunction problem. Resemblance or isomorphism theories typically founder on what I’ve called the non-uniqueness problem, which is that isomorphisms and resemblance are practically unconstrained and so representational content cannot be uniquely determined. These traditional problems provide the motivation for my theory, the structural preservation theory, as follows. F-reference, like reference, is a specific, asymmetric relation, as is causation. F-predication, like predication, is a non-specific relation, as predicates typically apply to many things, just as many relational systems can be isomorphic to any given relational system. Putting these observations together, a promising strategy is to explain f-reference via causal history and f-predication via something like isomorphism between relational systems. -/- This dissertation should be conceptualized as having three parts. After motivating and characterizing the problem in chapter 1, the first part is the negative project, where I review and critique Dretske’s, Fodor’s, and Millikan’s theories in chapters 2-4. Second, I construct my theory about the nature of representation in chapter 5 and defend it from objections in chapter 6. In chapters 7-8, which constitute the third and final part, I address the question of how representation is implemented in biological systems. In chapter 7 I argue that single-cell intracortical recordings taken from awake Macaque monkeys performing a cognitive task provide empirical evidence for structural preservation theory, and in chapter 8 I use the empirical results to illustrate, clarify, and refine the theory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomorphisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, theobjection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by reserving the relation.

This paper explores early Australasian philosophy in some detail. Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’ such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition (...) and were influential in their communities, but produced relatively little. In Australia, materialism gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in 1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry Jones, who might therefore be said to have influenced both main strands of Australian philosophical thought. (shrink)

Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad (...) čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja.Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about (...) such epistemic functions of emotions: First, even though it is plausible that emotions are involved in epistemic processes, it may be doubted whether they really matter for the normative question of what counts as knowledge or justified belief. Second, some of the epistemic functions claimed for emotions in general may only be attributed to some specifically epistemic emotions, which have been present all along in traditional epistemology, albeit under different labels such as ‘intuitions’. (shrink)

There has been much philosophical debate about whether the meaning of pictures can be analysed using theoretical frameworks normally employed within philosophy of language. A specific question within this debate is the question of whether pictures can express propositions. Instead of addressing this question in of pictures in a broad sense, this essay focuses on a specific category of pictures referred to as pictorial signs. These signs constitute a pictorial form of communication that we use in our everyday lives. The (...) question of whether pictorial signs can express propositions should, because of this communicative use, be more approachable than the same question applied to pictures in general. While a standard approach to the question has been to investigate the extent to which pictures may share some syntactic or semantic features with natural language, the approach in this essay is instead to look at how pictorial signs are used. The suggested strategy is to approach the question of propositionality by attempting to translate a particular sign into some sentence in natural language on the basis of how the sign is used, rather than analysing its structure. (shrink)

In order to secure the limits of the critical use of reason, and to succeed in the critique of speculative metaphysics, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) had to present a full account of human cognitive experience. Perception in Kant’s Model of Experience is a detailed investigation of this aspect of Kant’s grand enterprise with a special focus: perception. The overarching goal is to understand this common phenomenon both in itself and as the key to understanding Kant’s views of experience. In the process, (...) the author argues against any such reading of Kant that puts too much emphasis on concepts and understanding in perception. This means that claims of the sort that intuitions cannot play their role without concepts, that sensibility cannot bring anything to cognition without being mediated through the functions of understanding, or that there is no such thing as concept-independent perception, are shown to be either plainly false or misleading at best. Together with the contemporary topics examined by the end of the book, the findings suggest how the role of conceptual thinking in human cognition has been exaggerated partly because of a misplaced interpretation of Kant, which not only makes perception far more intellectual in character than what was intended by Kant himself, but distorts Kant’s account of cognition by overlooking what there is at the heart of his critical philosophy: the revaluation of sensible cognition. (shrink)

In this paper, a particular case of deceptive use of images – namely, misattributions – will be taken in consideration. An explicitly wrong attribution (“This is a picture of the event X”, this not being the case) is obviously a lie or a mistaken description. But there are less straightforward and more insidious cases in which a false attribution is held to be acceptable, in particular when pictures are also used in their exemplary, general meaning, opposed to their indexical function (...) in referring to a specific event. In fact, the boundary between referential use and symbolic-exemplificative use is not always clear-cut, and it often becomes the subject of ideological dispute. The main point that this paper would like to do is that in some circumstances there is a deep-seated belief that images that are clearly misattributed could still be legitimately used to refer to the fact, even if this is not the case. This twisted epistemological stance, that I will summarize under the oxymoronic concept of “emblematic evidence”, is both the product of political and tribal polarization in the ideological debate, and the result of a shift in our understanding of what photographic images should do. (shrink)

In this talk I present the main results from Anta (2021), namely, that the theoretical division between Boltzmannian and Gibbsian statistical mechanics should be understood as a separation in the epistemic capabilities of this physical discipline. In particular, while from the Boltzmannian framework one can generate powerful explanations of thermal processes by appealing to their microdynamics, from the Gibbsian framework one can predict observable values in a computationally effective way. Finally, I argue that this statistical mechanical schism contradicts the Hempelian (...) (1958) thesis that the predictive power of a scientific theory is directly proportional to its explanatory potential, and vice versa. (shrink)

This research discusses Bernard Williams' critique of utilitarianism. I will address Williams' well-known “Integrity Objection” and clarify where his main issue with utilitarianism lies. Through this, I will demonstrate that the separation of the two viewpoints – the “inside viewpoint” and the “impartial viewpoint” - is the issue, as the utilitarian impartial viewpoint does not capture the value of ethical deliberations based on our inside viewpoint in which we presuppose our personal projects. Furthermore, I will argue that this interpretation enables (...) us to place the objection in the context of the critique of impartiality which is one of the central themes of Williams’ ethics. (shrink)

En La Transfiguración del lugar común Danto discute cuál es el estatuto de la copia y la falsificación en las obras de arte. Sostiene que una ruta posible para diluir ese problema es entender el contexto y el tipo de relación que se da entre una obra de arte y su autor, y considera que las copias son ontológicamente distintas del objeto copiado. En este artículo reviso algunas situaciones problemáticas en las que la resolución de Danto es iluminadora y otras (...) en donde lo es menos, o bien es debatible. Discutiré específicamente tres casos: la falsificación, la apropiación y el plagio. (shrink)

This article demonstrates that theory-laden perception is a pure fiction of some philosophers of science and does not in fact exist. It shows by examples from L. Fleck that non-neutral or person-bound observation is an important source of scientific knowledge and suggests that we can explain those changes in scientific knowledge that are caused by divergent perceptions of different observers by means of differences in the repertoires of visual concepts of the respective observers. Visual concept is introduced by means of (...) a performance model of perception. It is contrasted with definable or language-generated concept and compared to Wittgenstein's family resemblance of concepts. (shrink)

When investigating the nature of culinary works, it is easy to take for granted that they all share the same ontology. This paper argues that, on the contrary, the ontology of culinary works is really threefold. Some culinary works are edible concrete particulars, or dishes, as many of us may first assume. But others are types, or multiply realisable abstract entities. And, while some of these types are determined by one recipe, others are rather chased after by their indefinitely many (...) recipes. So, there are really three kinds of culinary works; only those belonging to one of the three are edible per se; and, each kind has a very different relationship to recipes. Indeed, it is very doubtful that culinary works consisting in edible concrete particulars are suitable to have one or more recipes: by exploring what are the requirements for being a recipe, the paper also examines under what necessary conditions there is a recipe for preparing a culinary work qua concrete particular. (shrink)

This dissertation examines aspects of the interplay between computing and scientific practice. The appropriate foundational framework for such an endeavour is rather real computability than the classical computability theory. This is so because physical sciences, engineering, and applied mathematics mostly employ functions defined in continuous domains. But, contrary to the case of computation over natural numbers, there is no universally accepted framework for real computation; rather, there are two incompatible approaches --computable analysis and BSS model--, both claiming to formalise algorithmic (...) computation and to offer foundations for scientific computing. -/- The dissertation consists of three parts. In the first part, we examine what notion of 'algorithmic computation' underlies each approach and how it is respectively formalised. It is argued that the very existence of the two rival frameworks indicates that 'algorithm' is not one unique concept in mathematics, but it is used in more than one way. We test this hypothesis for consistency with mathematical practice as well as with key foundational works that aim to define the term. As a result, new connections between certain subfields of mathematics and computer science are drawn, and a distinction between 'algorithms' and 'effective procedures' is proposed. -/- In the second part, we focus on the second goal of the two rival approaches to real computation; namely, to provide foundations for scientific computing. We examine both frameworks in detail, what idealisations they employ, and how they relate to floating-point arithmetic systems used in real computers. We explore limitations and advantages of both frameworks, and answer questions about which one is preferable for computational modelling and which one for addressing general computability issues. -/- In the third part, analog computing and its relation to analogue (physical) modelling in science are investigated. Based on some paradigmatic cases of the former, a certain view about the nature of computation is defended, and the indispensable role of representation in it is emphasized and accounted for. We also propose a novel account of the distinction between analog and digital computation and, based on it, we compare analog computational modelling to physical modelling. It is concluded that the two practices, despite their apparent similarities, are orthogonal. (shrink)

Aaron Ridley posed the question of whether results in the ontology of musical works would have implications for judgements about the interpretation, meaning or aesthetic value of musical works and performances. His arguments for the conclusion that the ontology of musical works have no aesthetic consequences are unsuccessful, but he is right in thinking (in opposition to Andrew Kania and others) that ontological judgements have no aesthetic consequences. The key to demonstrating this conclusion is the recognition that ontological judgments are (...) a priori and aesthetic judgments are empirical. A priori judgements have no empirical consequences. Neither fundamental ontology of music nor higher- order ontological reflections have any aesthetic consequences. (shrink)

Peirce is far too strange for the uses to which he is put in art history. This is a plea to art historians for a moratorium on Peirce citations.

The objective of this dissertation is to write the first pages of the biography of paleobiological data. I will focus on i) the genesis of this kind of data as it emerged in German stratigraphy and paleontology between the mid 19th and the early 20th centuries and ii) how the conceptualization of the paleontological data was reformulated and taken as the starting point for studying the patterns of the diversity of life in deep time between the 1940s and 70s. This (...) is the turning point that marks the ‘coming into being’ of specifically paleobiological data. I will reconstruct in detail how it was possible to transform an incomplete and misleading material object — the fossil record that can be admired in a museum —into a no longer misleading source of knowledge. I will namely describe the genesis of the paleobiological practice by retracing the encounter of two different approaches to the fossil record between the mid 19th and early 20th centuries in German academia and their later diffusion into English-speaking countries. (shrink)

This paper fills a gap in Flusser scholarship by conducting an initial comparison of Flusser with Rudolf Arnheim. After noting their similar approaches – open both to science and phenomenology – it looks closely at each theorist’s respective theory of photography. They differ in that Flusser believes that the photography as a technical apparatus is not objective. However, with some contextualization each can be seen to say complementary things. Reflecting on each theorist’s cautiously optimistic or pessimistic approach to evolving media, (...) the paper concludes with thoughts on how they give helpful ideas on how to flesh out aspects of the other’s thought. (shrink)

This study investigates the composer-performer relationship in terms of the site of responsibility for the aesthetic features of the musical performance. It considers the extent to which the performer's view of that relationship affects the performance itself. This is accomplished by examining four focal points: the composer-performer relationship; composers' intentions; Nelson Goodman's account of notation, expression and style; and the work--including the writings--of Canadian pianist Glenn Gould. ;The composer is seen by some as predominantly responsible for the performance, with the (...) performer's role as that of fulfilling the composer's intentions. A contrasting perspective, cognizant of the significance of interpretive decisions, situates the performer as co-creator. ;Pivotal in this debate are the discrepancies surrounding the role of composers' intentions. Critical discussion of the Early Music Movement, considered here as a paradigm of historical authenticity, distinguishes between its proponents, for whom composers' intentions are authoritative, and its opponents, who perceive that historical authenticity, even if attainable, would be insufficient to ensure a work's aesthetic merit. ;This divergence derives from the fact that the musical performance is underdetermined by Western musical notation. Nelson Goodman addresses this by assigning to the musical score the function of identification: Any performance which complies with the score constitutes an instance of the work. Moreover, Goodman's account of expression and style recognizes the score's non-notational elements as instrumental to the aesthetic qualities of the performance. ;Goodman's theoretical account is then applied to the work of Glenn Gould. First, Gould's consideration of the performer as co-creator is identified as instrumental in determining the aesthetic features of his performances. The interpretive autonomy afforded by his perspective, it is argued, led to the development of a performance and compositional style characterized by a predilection for a manifestly contrapuntal rather than hierarchical structure. Gould's performances and compositions are shown to express views of an ethical as well as aesthetic nature, contributing to what Goodman terms "worldmaking," affirming the symbolic function of music. ;In conclusion, the performer's view of the performer-composer relationship is fundamental and determinant in defining the aesthetic features of the musical performance. (shrink)

In robustness analysis, hypotheses are supported to the extent that a result proves robust, and a result is robust to the extent that we detect it in diverse ways. But what precise sense of diversity is at work here? In this paper, I show that the formal explications of evidential diversity most often appealed to in work on robustness – which all draw in one way or another on probabilistic independence – fail to shed light on the notion of diversity (...) relevant to robustness analysis. I close by briefly outlining a promising alternative approach inspired by Horwich’s (1982) eliminative account of evidential diversity. (shrink)

The thesis explores the adequacy of five well-known conceptions of art to the case of gardens. It concludes that, of those conceptions, the cluster theory is best suited to the case of gardens.

The aim of this paper is to draw the attention of those conducting research on imagery to the different kinds of visual information deployed by expert drawers compared to non-expert drawers. To demonstrate this difference I draw upon the cognitive science literature on vision and imagery to distinguish between three different ways that visual phenomena can be represented in memory: structural descriptions, denotative descriptions, and configural descriptions. Research suggests that perception and imagery deploy the same mental processes and that the (...) drawing of one's imagery would require the simultaneous deployment of these very processes. I reason that drawing a picture of one's imagery is not possible. I hypothesize that when required to draw a picture from memory, both expert and non-expert drawers access their denotative description of the object rather than their imagery. I then suggest how my hypothesis could be tested and if accurate, how this finding would impact upon the design and interpretation of experiments on imagery when drawing is involved. I also suggest why the constraints that perception places upon the simultaneous deployment of imagery appear not to cause the same constraints in autistic savant drawers and visual agnosia patients. (shrink)

This thesis considers the role of aesthetic meaning-making in elementary school science learning. Children’s aesthetic experiences are traced through their use of aesthetic judgements, spontaneous metaphors and art activities. The thesis is based on four empirical studies: the first two examining children’s language use, i.e. the role of aesthetic judgements and the significance of spontaneous metaphors while learning science and the latter two dealing with how art activities mediate what elementary school children learn in science and what a variety of (...) art activities with different purposes afford elementary school children to learn in science. The theoretical stance emanates from pragmatist theories and includes Dewey’s definition of an aesthetic experience, Wittgenstein’s later work on language-games, and socio-cultural perspectives. The analytic approach used is a practical epistemology analysis developed by Wickman and Östman. The empirical data consists of audio- and video recordings of elementary school children’s (aged 6–10 years) discussions in pairs or small groups during science lessons and photographs of children’s pictures, sculptures and poems from a total of 14 different elementary school classes. The main findings of the empirical studies show how aesthetic meaning-making is continuous with elementary school children’s scientific learning. The thesis shows how elementary school children’s aesthetic experiences are related to whole activities and are crucial for the direction that learning takes. Aesthetic experience is important in terms of how and what elementary school children learn aesthetically and normatively in science class, which has consequences for cognitive learning, the possibility of participating in science class and learning the genre of science. Moreover, it can be seen how children’s prior experiences are recurrently reconstructed and transformed through imaginative processes. (shrink)

The first lecture will present pictorial semiotics within the framework of general semiotic theory. It will construe semiotics as a particular point of view taken on everything which is human or, more generally, endowed with life, rather than simply the continuation of the mixed or separate doctrines due to Saussure and Peirce. The historical part will describe briefly the development of pictorial semiotics and the peculiarities of its different schools and traditions, following upon the somewhat premature founding gesture attributed to (...) Barthes. (shrink)

This dissertation provides a theory of the nature of aesthetic experiences on the basis of a theory of aesthetic values. It results in the formulation of the following necessary conditions for an experience to be aesthetic: it must consist of a representation of an object and an accompanying feeling; the representation must instantiate an intrinsic value; and the feeling must be the recognition of that value and bestow it on the object. Since representations are of intrinsic value for different reasons, (...) there are different kinds of aesthetic experiences . By means of certain conceptual links, it is possible to extend this account to other aesthetic entities thus enabling the formulation of a general theory of the aesthetic in non-aesthetic terms. In particular, aesthetic values are identical with subjective dispositions to elicit aesthetic experiences under normal conditions. Accordingly, I endorse anti-realism about aesthetic values: their existence, nature and exemplification are mind-dependent, while their ascriptions to objects have genuine truth-values. I back up this account by arguing against the alternative positions that either take aesthetic values to be objective or deny the truth-aptness of their attributions. Furthermore, I put forward a relativist variant of anti-realism according to which ascriptions of different aesthetic values to a particular object are all correct, given that the aesthetic experiences involved are made under normal conditions and concern the same aesthetically nonevaluative features of that object. For there is no specifically aesthetic norm by means of which one of the faultless aesthetic experiences can be picked out as the only appropriate one. That aesthetic values nevertheless show a normative dimension is ensured by their conformity to a general account of values as capacities to satisfy, or dissatisfy, rational desires. (shrink)

The search for understanding is a major aim of science. Traditionally, understanding has been undervalued in the philosophy of science because of its psychological underpinnings; nowadays, however, it is widely recognized that epistemology cannot be divorced from psychology as sharp as traditional epistemology required. This eliminates the main obstacle to give scientific understanding due attention in philosophy of science. My aim in this paper is to describe an account of scientific understanding as an emergent feature of our mastering of different (...) (causal) explanatory frameworks that takes place through the mastering of scientific practices. Different practices lead to different kinds of representations. Such representations are often heterogeneous. The integration of such representations constitute understanding. (shrink)

This paper comments on an article by V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein (JCS,1999) in which they purport to be identifying the neurological principles of beauty. I draw attention to the way the problem of beauty is construed in the philosophical literature by Mary Mothersill (1984) and Immanuel Kant (Critique of Judgment). I argue that Ramachandran and Hirsteins' principles do not address the problem of beauty because they do not differentiate between the experience of beauty and other closely related phenomena. I (...) then show how one might address the problem of beauty within the framework that they have adopted. (shrink)

Este artículo trata el problema de los objetos creados que pueden ser repetidos, como las obras musicales y las literarias. En la sección 2 presentamos una serie de desiderata intuitivos que toda teoría debe satisfacer. En las secciones 3 y 4 presentamos un silogismo disyuntivo extendido. Los objetos en cuestión pueden ser o bien universales concretos, particulares concretos, universales abstractos o particulares abstractos. Mostramos cómo es que las teorías que consideran que son cualquiera de las tres últimas opciones fracasan. Por (...) lo tanto, debemos entender a dichos objetos como universales concretos. En la sección 5 ofrecemos una teoría breve pero detallada de la naturaleza metafísica de los universales concretos para después mostrar cómo esta propuesta permite dar cuenta de los desiderata intuitivos a la vez que se evitan las objeciones presentadas en contra de teorías alternativas. (shrink)

This paper proposes an extensionalist analysis of computer simulations (CSs). It puts the emphasis not on languages nor on models, but on symbols, on their extensions, and on their various ways of referring. It shows that chains of reference of symbols in CSs are multiple and of different kinds. As they are distinct and diverse, these chains enable different kinds of remoteness of reference and different kinds of validation for CSs. Although some methodological papers have already underlined the role of (...) these various relationships of reference in CSs and of cross-validations, this diversity is still overlooked in the epistemological literature on CSs. As a consequence, a particular outcome of this analytical view is an ability to classify existing epistemological theses on CSs according to what their authors choose to select and put at the forefront: either the extensions of symbols, or the symbol-types, or the symbol-tokens, or the internal denotational hierarchies of the CS or the reference of these hierarchies to external denotational hierarchies. Through the adoption of this extensionalist view, it also becomes possible to explain more precisely the reasons why some complete reduction of CSs to classical epistemic paradigms such as “experiment” or “theoretical argument” remains doubtful. On this last point, in particular, this paper is in agreement with what many epistemologists already have acknowledged. (shrink)

I argue for three main claims about Leibniz. (1) He views representation as a kind of structural correspondence between the representing thing and its target. (2) The primary sense in which he considers a perception or representation distinct, as opposed to confused, concerns the degree to which its structure is explicit or consciously accessible. (3) This is also the sense in which he takes concepts or ideas to be distinct.

The aim of this thesis is to increase our ontological understanding of musical works in two ways. We’ll increase our understanding of their categorial nature and we’ll increase our understanding of what the identity of each musical work consists in. In chapter 1, I introduce the basic question of the thesis: what are musical works? This question is broken down into four separate questions which guide the structure and argument of the thesis. One question asks if musical works exist, the (...) other asks about the ontological category to which musical works belong. In the first half of the thesis, I argue that musical works exist and that the best explanation of their features is given by assigning them to the category of universals. I argue for this conclusion by elaborating and defending a view according to which musical works are properties. I then show that this conception is superior to the strongest rivals. One rival takes musical works to be historical individuals (Rohrbaugh 2003). The other takes them to be actions of composition (Davies 2004). In chapter 6, I turn to two questions about identity. One question asks about the identity criteria for musical works, the other question asks for an explanation of musical work identity. In the remainder of chapter 6, I argue by reference to contextualist intuitions that a superficially appealing view, sonicism is problematic. The critique of sonicism is used to draw out certain contextualist assumptions that our ontology of music ought to explain. In chapter 7, I examine a family of Levinsonian contextualist proposals. I argue that the original formulations (Levinson 1980) give incorrect results, and that attempts to modify them (Davies, S: 2001) slip into obscurity, or undermine the aims of the project (Levinson 1992). I end chapter 7 by presenting the performance theory in a more flattering light. I argue that as a theory of musical work identity, the performance theory is the best on the market because it overcomes the problems associated with the Levinsonian views and deepens our understanding of contextualist intuitions. In chapter 8, I present an account of the ontology of music which integrates the property theory of category with the performance theory of identity by construing musical works as impure relational properties. I then defend the integrated account against various objections. In this defence, I elaborate a view of compositional actions as belonging to the ontological category of processes. (shrink)

Scientific models are important, if not the sole, units of science. This thesis addresses the following question: in virtue of what do scientific models represent their target systems? In Part i I motivate the question, and lay out some important desiderata that any successful answer must meet. This provides a novel conceptual framework in which to think about the question of scientific representation. I then argue against Callender and Cohen’s attempt to diffuse the question. In Part ii I investigate the (...) ideas that scientific models are ‘similar’, or structurally morphic, to their target systems. I argue that these approaches are misguided, and that at best these relationships concern the accuracy of a pre-existing representational relationship. I also pay particular attention to the sense in which target systems can be appropriately taken to exhibit a ‘structure’, and van Fraassen’s recent argument concerning the pragmatic equivalence between representing phenomena and data. My next target is the idea that models should not be seen as objects in their own right, but rather what look like descriptions of them are actually direct descriptions of target systems, albeit not ones that should be understood literally. I argue that these approaches fail to do justice to the practice of scientific modelling. Finally I turn to the idea that how models represent is grounded, in some sense, in their inferential capacity. I compare this approach to anti-representationalism in the philosophy of language and argue that analogous issues arise in the context of scientific representation. Part iii contains my positive proposal. I provide an account of scientific representation based on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as. The result is a highly conventional account which is the appropriate level of generality to capture all of its instances, whilst remaining informative about the notion. I illustrate it with reference to the Phillips-Newlyn machine, models of proteins, and the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey systems. These examples demonstrate how the account must be understood, and how it sheds light on our understanding of how models are used. I finally demonstrate how the account meets the desiderata laid out at the beginning of the thesis, and outline its implications for further questions from the philosophy of science; not limited to issues surrounding the applicability of mathematics, idealisation, and what it takes for a model to be ‘true’. (shrink)