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  1. Feeling Better About Moral Dilemmas.Jason K. Swedene - 2005 - Journal of Moral Education 34 (1):43-55.
    There has been a trend in contemporary ethics to believe that a morally admirable agent would feel negative self?assessing emotions following even the best possible choice in a moral dilemma. A commonly held reason for holding this position is that agents who are well?brought up are trained to feel negative self?assessing emotions when they do something morally forbidden under ordinary circumstances, and that agents acting for the best in a dilemma will nonetheless recognize their deed as morally forbidden. I challenge (...)
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  • What is It to Do Good Medical Ethics? On the Concepts of 'Good' and 'Goodness' in Medical Ethics.Jan Helge Solbakk - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (1):12-16.
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  • Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
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  • Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):467-493.
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  • Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  • Shame and Attributability.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 6.
    Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...)
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  • Guilt and Child Soldiers.Krista K. Thomason - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):115-127.
    The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child (...)
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  • The Caveman's Conscience: Evolution and Moral Realism.Scott M. James - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):215-233.
    An increasingly popular moral argument has it that the story of human evolution shows that we can explain the human disposition to make moral judgments without relying on a realm of moral facts. Such facts can thus be dispensed with. But this argument is a threat to moral realism only if there is no realist position that can explain, in the context of human evolution, the relationship between our particular moral sense and a realm of moral facts. I sketch a (...)
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  • Transcendental Guilt: On an Emotional Condition of Moral Experience.Sami Pihlström - 2007 - Journal of Religious Ethics 35 (1):87-111.
    This article considers a central ethically relevant interpersonal emotion, guilt. It is argued that guilt, as an irreducible moral category, has a constitutive role to play in our ways of conceptualizing our relations to other people. Without experiencing guilt, or being able to do so, we would not be capable of employing the moral concepts and judgments we do employ. Elaborating on this argument, the paper deals with what may be described as the "metaphysics of guilt." More generally, it is (...)
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  • On "Positive" and "Negative" Emotions.Robert C. Solomon & Lori D. Stone - 2002 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32 (4):417–435.
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  • Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard's. In (...)
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  • On Irrational Guilt.Juha Räikkä - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):473 - 485.
    A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide (...)
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