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  1. Problems for Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 2013 - In J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister & Khaldoun A. Sweis (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 169-180.
    A survey of logical problems for the concept of omniscience.
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  • Divine Omniscience and Knowledge de Se.Yujin Nagasawa - 2003 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):73-82.
    Patrick Grim argues that God cannot beomniscient because no one other than me canacquire knowledge de se of myself. Inparticular, according to Grim, God cannot knowwhat I know in knowing that I am making amess. I argue, however, that given twoplausible principles regarding divineattributes there is no reason to accept Grim'sconclusion that God cannot be omniscient. Inthis paper I focus on the relationship betweendivine omniscience and necessaryimpossibilities, in contrast to the generaltrend of research since Aquinas, which hasconcentrated on the relationship (...)
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  • New Puzzles About Divine Attributes.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):147-157.
    According to traditional Western theism, God is maximally great (or perfect). More explicitly, God is said to have the following divine attributes: omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I present three puzzles about this conception of a maximally great (or perfect) being. The first puzzle about omniscience shows that this divine attribute is incoherent. The second puzzle about omnibenevolence and omnipotence shows that these divine attributes are logically incompatible. The third puzzle about perfect rationality and omnipotence shows that these (...)
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  • Theism and Dialetheism.A. J. Cotnoir - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):592-609.
    The divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have faced objections to their very consistency. Such objections rely on reasoning parallel to semantic paradoxes such as the Liar or to set-theoretic paradoxes like Russell's paradox. With the advent of paraconsistent logics, dialetheism—the view that some contradictions are true—became a major player in the search for a solution to such paradoxes. This paper explores whether dialetheism, armed with the tools of paraconsistent logics, has the resources to respond to the objections levelled against (...)
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  • Omniscience, the Incarnation, and Knowledge de Se.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):59--71.
    A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christian theists (...)
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  • Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being.Joshua T. Spencer - 2006 - Philo 9 (1):62-72.
    In this paper I present two new arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being. My new arguments invoke considerations of cardinality and resemble several arguments originally presented by Patrick Grim. Like Grim, I give reasons to believe that there must be more objects in the universe than there are beliefs. However, my arguments will rely on certain mereological claims, namely that Classical Extensional Mereology is necessarily true of the part-whole relation. My first argument is an instance of a problem (...)
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  • The Intoxicating Effects of Conciliatory Omniscience.David McElhoes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2151-2167.
    The coherence of omniscience is sometimes challenged using self-referential sentences like, “No omniscient entity knows that which this very sentence expresses,” which suggest that there are truths which no omniscient entity knows. In this paper, I consider two strategies for addressing these challenges: The Common Strategy, which dismisses such self-referential sentences as meaningless, and The Conciliatory Strategy, which discounts them as quirky outliers with no impact on one’s status as being omniscient. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. The Common Strategy (...)
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  • The Coherence of Omniscience: A Defense. [REVIEW]John E. Abbruzzese - 1997 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41 (1):25-34.
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  • Allwissenheit Und ``Offenes Philosophieren''.Elke Brendel - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (1):7-16.
    As a result of his studies in metalogicEssler became convincedthat an absolute fixed totality of alltruths and a final metalanguage doesnot exist. Taking this result into account,it is shown that the usualabsolute concept of omniscience isuntenable. From this it can be concludedthat definitions of knowledge whichappeal to such a concept of omnisciencelead to serious problems.
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  • What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents' Access to Socially Strategic and Non-Strategic Information.Benjamin G. Purzycki, Daniel N. Finkel, John Shaver, Nathan Wales, Adam B. Cohen & Richard Sosis - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (5):846-869.
    Current evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion posit that supernatural agent concepts emerge from cognitive systems such as theory of mind and social cognition. Some argue that these concepts evolved to maintain social order by minimizing antisocial behavior. If these theories are correct, then people should process information about supernatural agents’ socially strategic knowledge more quickly than non-strategic knowledge. Furthermore, agents’ knowledge of immoral and uncooperative social behaviors should be especially accessible to people. To examine these hypotheses, we measured response-times (...)
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  • Grim Variations.Fabio Lampert & John Waldrop - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    Patrick Grim advances arguments meant to show that the doctrine of divine omniscience—the classical doctrine according to which God knows all truths—is false. In particular, we here have in mind to focus on two such arguments: the set theoretic argument and the semantic argument. These arguments due to Grim run parallel to, respectively, familiar paradoxes in set theory and naive truth theory. It is beyond the purview of this article to adjudicate whether or not these are successful arguments against the (...)
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  • Was Descartes's Cogito a Diagonal Deduction?Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):346-351.
    Peter Slezak and William Boos have independently advanced a novel interpretation of Descartes's "cogito". The interpretation portrays the "cogito" as a diagonal deduction and emphasizes its resemblance to Godel's theorem and the Liar. I object that this approach is flawed by the fact that it assigns 'Buridan sentences' a legitimate role in Descartes's philosophy. The paradoxical nature of these sentences would have the peculiar result of undermining Descartes's "cogito" while enabling him to "disprove" God's existence.
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  • Was Descartes a Liar? Diagonal Doubt Defended.Peter Slezak - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):379-388.
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  • God of the Gaps: A Neglected Reply to God’s Stone Problem.Jc Beall & A. J. Cotnoir - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):681-689.
    Traditional monotheism has long faced logical puzzles. We argue that such puzzles rest on the assumed logical truth of the Law of Excluded Middle, which we suggest there is little theological reason to accept. By way of illustration we focus on God's alleged stone problem, and present a simple but plausible ‘gappy’ framework for addressing this puzzle. We assume familiarity with the proposed logic but an appendix is offered as a brief review.
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  • The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency.Benjamin Grant Purzycki - 2013 - Cognition 129 (1):163-179.
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  • All Things Must Pass Away.Joshua Spencer - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:67.
    Are there any things that are such that any things whatsoever are among them. I argue that there are not. My thesis follows from these three premises: (1) There are two or more things; (2) for any things, there is a unique thing that corresponds to those things; (3) for any two or more things, there are fewer of them than there are pluralities of them.
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  • Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship.Wesley D. Cray - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):147-153.
    At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some more plausible than (...)
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  • God's Blindspot.Frederick Kroon - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (4):721-734.
    God, by definition, is all-powerful, all-good, all-wise, and all-knowing. Therein lies a problem for the theist, of course, for every one of these attributes has been the subject of fierce debate. In this paper I want to return to the debate by introducing a new problem for the idea that anyone could have the kind of perfect knowledge God is supposed to have. What distinguishes my problem from others is that the sort of knowledge it focuses on is self-knowledge, hence (...)
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  • Agency and Omniscience.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.
    It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and (...)
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