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  1. Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success.Cheng-Hung Tsai - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-17.
    What is practical wisdom? What does a practically wise person know? It is widely held that a person is practically wise if and only if the person knows how to live well, and that a person knows how to live well only if the person knows what is good or important for well‐being. The question is: What is it that contributes to or constitutes well‐being known by a wise person? A theory of wisdom without a substantive answer to this question (...)
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  • Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter examines some key developments in discussions of the social dimensions of knowing-how, focusing on work on the social function of the concept of knowing-how, testimony, demonstrating one's knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice. I show how a conception of knowing-how as a form of 'downstream knowledge' can help to unify various phenomena discussed within this literature, and I also consider how these ideas might connect with issues concerning wisdom, moral knowledge, and moral testimony.
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  • What the Debasing Demon Teaches Us About Wisdom.Kevin McCain - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):521-530.
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  • Theoretical Wisdom.Paul O’Grady - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (3):415-431.
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  • Can We Measure Practical Wisdom?Jason Swartwood - 2020 - Journal of Moral Education 49 (1):71-97.
    ABSTRACTWisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom. Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers (...)
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  • Artificial Wisdom: A Philosophical Framework.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2020 - AI and Society:937-944.
    Human excellences such as intelligence, morality, and consciousness are investigated by philosophers as well as artificial intelligence researchers. One excellence that has not been widely discussed by AI researchers is practical wisdom, the highest human excellence, or the highest, seventh, stage in Dreyfus’s model of skill acquisition. In this paper, I explain why artificial wisdom matters and how artificial wisdom is possible (in principle and in practice) by responding to two philosophical challenges to building artificial wisdom systems. The result is (...)
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  • Über Sokratische Weisheit als intellektuelle Bescheidenheit.Guido Löhrer - 2018 - Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica 32:141--163.
    In Platons Apologie des Sokrates zeichnet sich eine auf menschliche Art weise Person durch ihre Fähigkeit aus, den epistemischen Status und den Wert ihrer Meinungen über Sachverhalte korrekt zu beurteilen. Sie weiß, ob es sich bei ihnen um Wissen oder bloß um Meinung handelt, aber auch, ob sie etwas nicht weiß. Es ist zudem eine breit geteilte Auffassung, dass intellektuelle Bescheidenheit, obwohl nicht dasselbe wie Weisheit, ein bedeutender Aspekt der Weisheit ist. Doch wenn die hier vorgestellten Überlegungen triftig sind und (...)
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  • A Process Model of Wisdom From Adversity.Michel Ferrari, Igor Grossmann, Stephen Grimm & Julia Staffel - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (3):471-473.
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  • Understanding as an Intellectual Virtue.Stephen Grimm - 2019 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Companion to Virtue Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge.
    In this paper I elucidate various ways in which understanding can be seen as an excellence of the mind or intellectual virtue. Along the way, I take up the neglected issue of what it might mean to be an “understanding person”—by which I mean not a person who understands a number of things about the natural world, but a person who steers clear of things like judgmentalism in her evaluation of other people, and thus is better able to take up (...)
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  • Why Study History? On Its Epistemic Benefits and Its Relation to the Sciences.Stephen R. Grimm - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (3):399-420.
    I try to return the focus of the philosophy of history to the nature of understanding, with a particular emphasis on Louis Mink’s project of exploring how historical understanding compares to the understanding we find in the natural sciences. On the whole, I come to a conclusion that Mink almost certainly would not have liked: that the understanding offered by history has a very similar epistemic profile to the understanding offered by the sciences, a similarity that stems from the fact (...)
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  • Grimm Wisdom.Paul O’Grady - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (1):67-77.
    Wisdom has not been widely discussed in analytical epistemology. An interesting recent analysis comes from Stephen Grimm who argues that wisdom requires knowledge and that the traditional dichotomy between theoretical and practical wisdom doesn’t hold. I note a tension between these aspects of his work. He wishes to maintain that traditional exemplars of wisdom may still be termed ‘wise’ by his theory. But his knowledge condition seems to require that only a subset of those who hold conflicting views are really (...)
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  • Is There a Christian Virtue Epistemology?Kent Dunnington - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):637-652.
    Given that curiosity, the desire for knowledge, is thought by many virtue theorists to play a controlling role over the other intellectual virtues, Christian concerns about proper and improper formations of curiosity should interest virtue theorists. Combine the fact that curiosity gets a different treatment in Christian thought with the claim that curiosity has a controlling function over the other intellectual virtues, and it follows there is a meaningful distinction between Christian and non-Christian virtue epistemologies. Differences include distinct understandings of (...)
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  • Wisdom - the Answer to All the Questions Really Worth Asking.Andreas Fischer - unknown
    Wisdom is an ancient concept with close conceptual relations to human goals, means and problem solving. However, in the recent scientific discourse there has been some confusion about the meaning of "wisdom". In this paper the most prominent definitions are contrasted with each other and a new reading is proposed: Based on an extensive literature review it is proposed that "wisdom" is explanatory knowledge of the fundamental truths in the domain of living well – an orienting knowledge about what is (...)
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  • Wisdom: Understanding and the Good Life.Shane Ryan - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):235-251.
    I argue that a necessary condition for being wise is: understanding how to live well. The condition, by requiring understanding rather than a wide variety of justified beliefs or knowledge, as Ryan and Whitcomb respectively require, yields the desirable result that being wise is compatible with having some false beliefs but not just any false beliefs about how to live well—regardless of whether those beliefs are justified or not. In arguing for understanding how to live well as a necessary condition (...)
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