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  1. What paradoxes depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):887-913.
    This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (J Philos Logic 34(2):155–192, 2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer and Schindler (Reference graphs and semantic paradox, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/19234872/reference_graphs_and_semantic_paradox). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo’s paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb’s dependence relation. They are called ‘locally finite paradoxes’, satisfying that any sentence in (...)
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  • Tarski's theorem and liar-like paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - 2014 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (1):24-38.
    Tarski's theorem essentially says that the Liar paradox is paradoxical in the minimal reflexive frame. We generalise this result to the Liar-like paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ for all ordinal $\alpha\geq 1$. The main result is that for any positive integer $n = 2^i(2j+1)$, the paradox $\lambda^n$ is paradoxical in a frame iff this frame contains at least a cycle the depth of which is not divisible by $2^{i+1}$; and for any ordinal $\alpha \geq \omega$, the paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ is paradoxical in a frame (...)
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  • Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach.Ming Hsiung - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):739-789.
    According to the revision theory of truth, the binary sequences generated by the paradoxical sentences in revision sequence are always unstable. In this paper, we work backwards, trying to reconstruct the paradoxical sentences from some of their binary sequences. We give a general procedure of constructing paradoxes with specific binary sequences through some typical examples. Particularly, we construct what Herzberger called “unstable statements with unpredictably complicated variations in truth value.” Besides, we also construct those paradoxes with infinitely many finite primary (...)
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  • From Paradoxicality to Paradox.Ming Hsiung - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    In various theories of truth, people have set forth many definitions to clarify in what sense a set of sentences is paradoxical. But what, exactly, is _a_ paradox per se? It has not yet been realized that there is a gap between ‘being paradoxical’ and ‘being a paradox’. This paper proposes that a paradox is a minimally paradoxical set meeting some closure property. Along this line of thought, we give five tentative definitions based upon the folk notion of paradoxicality implied (...)
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  • Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card via the Relativized T-scheme.Ming Hsiung - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (2):239-271.
    A relativized version of Tarski's T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain's card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in (...)
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  • Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods.Ming Hsiung - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (5):881-914.
    According to the revision theory of truth, the paradoxical sentences have certain revision periods in their valuations with respect to the stages of revision sequences. We find that the revision periods play a key role in characterizing the degrees of paradoxicality for Boolean paradoxes. We prove that a Boolean paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, iff this digraph contains a closed walk whose height is not any revision period of this paradox. And for any finitely many numbers greater than 1, (...)
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  • Sets and Plural Comprehension.Keith Hossack - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):517-539.
    The state of affairs of some things falling under a predicate is supposedly a single entity that collects these things as its constituents. But whether we think of a state of affairs as a fact, a proposition or a possibility, problems will arise if we adopt a plural logic. For plural logic says that any plurality include themselves, so whenever there are some things, the state of affairs of their plural self-inclusion should be a single thing that collects them all. (...)
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  • More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  • Unified Grounding.Casper Storm Hansen - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):993-1010.
    This paper offers a unification and systematization of the grounding approaches to truth, denotation, classes and abstraction. Its main innovation is a method for “kleenifying” bivalent semantics so as to ensure that the trivalent semantics used for various linguistic elements are perfectly analogous to the semantics used by Kripke, rather than relying on intuition to achieve similarity. The focus is on generalizing strong Kleene semantics, but one section is devoted to supervaluation, and the unification method also extends to weak Kleene (...)
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  • Supervaluation on trees for kripke’s theory of truth.Casper Storm Hansen - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):46-74.
    A method of supervaluation for Kripke’s theory of truth is presented. It differs from Kripke’s own method in that it employs trees; results in a compositional semantics; assigns the intuitively correct truth values to the sentences of a particularly tricky example of Gupta’s; and – it is argued – is acceptable as an explication of the correspondence theory of truth.
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  • Truth and reduction.Volker Halbach - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (1-2):97-126.
    The proof-theoretic results on axiomatic theories oftruth obtained by different authors in recent years are surveyed.In particular, the theories of truth are related to subsystems ofsecond-order analysis. On the basis of these results, thesuitability of axiomatic theories of truth for ontologicalreduction is evaluated.
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  • Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates.Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of (...)
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  • A System Of Complete And Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (3):311-327.
    To the axioms of Peano arithmetic formulated in a language with an additional unary predicate symbol T we add the rules of necessitation φ/Tφ and conecessitation T φ/φ and axioms stating that T commutes with the logical connectives and quantifiers. By a result of McGee this theory is w-inconsistent, but it can be approximated by models obtained by a kind of rule-of-revision semantics. Furthermore we prove that FS is equivalent to a system already studied by Friedman and Sheard and give (...)
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  • Semantics of propositional attitudes: A critical study of Cresswell's. [REVIEW]Anil Gupta & Leah Savion - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):395-410.
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  • Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  • A fixed point theorem for the weak Kleene valuation scheme.Anil Gupta & Robert L. Martin - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):131 - 135.
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  • Dynamic semantics and circular propositions.Willem Groeneveld - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):267 - 306.
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  • A contextual–hierarchical approach to truth and the liar paradox.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad (...)
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  • A Contingent Russell's Paradox.Francesco Orilia - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):105-111.
    It is shown that two formally consistent type-free second-order systems, due to Cocchiarella, and based on the notion of homogeneous stratification, are subject to a contingent version of Russell's paradox.
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  • Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus.Andreas Fjellstad - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (4):815-855.
    Inspired by recent work on proof theory for modal logic, this paper develops a cut-free labelled sequent calculus obtained by imitating Herzberger’s limit rule for revision sequences as a clause in a possible world semantics. With the help of two completeness theorems, one between the labelled sequent calculus and the corresponding possible world semantics, and one between the axiomatic theory of truth PosFS and a neighbourhood semantics, together with the proof of the equivalence between the two semantics, we show that (...)
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  • A theory of truth that prefers falsehood.Melvin Fitting - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (5):477-500.
    We introduce a subclass of Kripke's fixed points in which falsehood is the preferred truth value. In all of these the truthteller evaluates to false, while the liar evaluates to undefined (or overdefined). The mathematical structure of this family of fixed points is investigated and is shown to have many nice features. It is noted that a similar class of fixed points, preferring truth, can also be studied. The notion of intrinsic is shown to relativize to these two subclasses. The (...)
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  • Axiomatizing semantic theories of truth?Martin Fischer, Volker Halbach, Jönne Kriener & Johannes Stern - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):257-278.
    We discuss the interplay between the axiomatic and the semantic approach to truth. Often, semantic constructions have guided the development of axiomatic theories and certain axiomatic theories have been claimed to capture a semantic construction. We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory captures a semantic construction. After discussing some potential criteria, we focus on the criterion of ℕ-categoricity and discuss its usefulness and limits.
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  • Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency.H. Field - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):567-606.
    It might be thought that we could argue for the consistency of a mathematical theory T within T, by giving an inductive argument that all theorems of T are true and inferring consistency. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem any such argument must break down, but just how it breaks down depends on the kind of theory of truth that is built into T. The paper surveys the possibilities, and suggests that some theories of truth give far more intuitive diagnoses of (...)
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  • Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox. [REVIEW]Hartry Field - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):713–720.
    Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox is terrific. In some sense its solution to the paradoxes is familiar—the book advocates an extension of what’s called the Kripke-Feferman theory (although the definition of validity it employs disguises this fact). Nonetheless, the perspective it casts on that solution is completely novel, and Maudlin uses this perspective to try to make the prima facie unattractive features of this solution seem palatable, indeed inescapable. Moreover, the book deals with many important issues that most writers on (...)
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  • I'm OK if you're OK: On the notion of trusting communication. [REVIEW]Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (4):329 - 354.
    We consider the issue of what an agent or a processor needs to know in order to know that its messages are true. This may be viewed as a first step to a general theory of cooperative communication in distributed systems. An honest message is one that is known to be true when it is sent (or said). If every message that is sent is honest, then of course every message that is sent is true. Various weaker considerations than honesty (...)
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  • Tarski on “essentially richer” metalanguages.David DeVidi & Graham Solomon - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
    It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that (...)
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  • Logic: The Basics (2nd Edition).Jc Beall & Shay A. Logan - 2017 - Routledge.
    Logic: the Basics is an accessible introduction to the core philosophy topic of standard logic. Focussing on traditional Classical Logic the book deals with topics such as mathematical preliminaries, propositional logic, monadic quantified logic, polyadic quantified logic, and English and standard ‘symbolic transitions’. With exercises and sample answers throughout this thoroughly revised new edition not only comprehensively covers the core topics at introductory level but also gives the reader an idea of how they can take their knowledge further and the (...)
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  • Does truth behave like a classical concept when there is no vicious reference?Philip Kremer - unknown
    §1. Introduction. When truth-theoretic paradoxes are generated, two factors seem to be at play: the behaviour that truth intuitively has; and the facts about which singular terms refer to which sentences, and so on. For example, paradoxicality might be partially attributed to the contingent fact that the singular term, "the italicized sentence on page one", refers to the sentence, The italicized sentence on page one is not true. Factors of this second kind might be represented by a ground model: an (...)
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  • Paradoxos Semânticos.Ricardo Santos - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    The semantic paradoxes are a family of arguments – including the liar paradox, Curry’s paradox, Grelling’s paradox of heterologicality, Richard’s and Berry’s paradoxes of definability, and others – which have two things in common: first, they make an essential use of such semantic concepts as those of truth, satisfaction, reference, definition, etc.; second, they seem to be very good arguments until we see that their conclusions are contradictory or absurd. These arguments raise serious doubts concerning the coherence of the concepts (...)
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  • The revision theory of truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Some Open Questions about Degrees of Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - manuscript
    We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the same condition. In this paper, we outline some results and questions around the degrees of paradoxicality and summarize recent progress.
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  • Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction.Johan van Benthem & Eric Pacuit - unknown
    The combination of logic and game theory provides a fine-grained perspective on information and interaction dynamics, a Theory of Play. In this paper we lay down the main components of such a theory, drawing on recent advances in the logical dynamics of actions, preferences, and information. We then show how this fine-grained perspective has already shed new light on the long-term dynamics of information exchange, as well as on the much-discussed question of extensive game rationality.
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  • Truth, Hierarchy and Incoherence.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University Press.
    Approaches to truth and the Liar paradox seem invariably to face a dilemma: either appeal to some sort of hierarchy, or declare apparently perfectly coherent concepts incoherent. But since both options lead to severe expressive restrictions, neither seems satisfactory. The aim of this paper is a new approach, which avoids the dilemma and the resulting expressive restrictions. Previous approaches tend to appeal to some new sort of semantic value for the truth predicate to take. I argue that such approaches inevitably (...)
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  • Propriedades Naturais e Mundos Possíveis.Renato Mendes Rocha - 2015 - Coleção XVI Encontro ANPOF.
    O objetivo geral da pesquisa da qual esse artigo faz parte é investigar o sistema metafísico que emerge dos trabalhos de David Lewis. Esse sistema pode ser decomposto em pelo menos duas teorias. A primeira nomeada como realismo modal genuíno (RMG) e a segunda como mosaico neo-humeano. O RMG é, sem dúvida, mais popular e defende a hipótese metafísica da existência de uma pluralidade de mundos possíveis. A principal razão em favor dessa hipótese é a sua aplicabilidade na discussão de (...)
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  • An Observation about Truth.David Kashtan - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Jerusalem
    Tarski's analysis of the concept of truth gives rise to a hierarchy of languages. Does this fragment the concept all the way to philosophical unacceptability? I argue it doesn't, drawing on a modification of Kaplan's theory of indexicals.
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  • Self-reference and Chaos in Fuzzy Logic.Patrick Grim - 1993 - IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems 1:237-253.
    The purpose of this paper is to open for investigation a range of phenomena familiar from dynamical systems or chaos theory which appear in a simple fuzzy logic with the introduction of self-reference. Within that logic, self-referential sentences exhibit properties of fixed point attractors, fixed point repellers, and full chaos on the [0, 1] interval. Strange attractors and fractals appear in two dimensions in the graphing of pairs of mutually referential sentences and appear in three dimensions in the graphing of (...)
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  • Replacing Truth?Matti Eklund - 2014 - In Brett Sherman & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Metasemantics.
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  • Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knwledge: No Luck?Johannes Stern - manuscript
    The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene (...)
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  • New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory.Stephen Yablo - 2004 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press. pp. 312-330.
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  • The Liar and Theories of Truth.John Hawthorn - 1983 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
    I first discuss Chihara's claim that the presence of Liar-paradoxical sentences presents no problem for our understanding of natural languages, and argue that this cannot be held as easily as he suggests. I then consider the theories advanced by Martin, van Fraassen, Kripke and Burge which attempt to meet some of the problems involved. I argue that the claim in the first two theories that Liar sentences are ill-formed cannot be maintained, and that Burge's theory is methodologically unsound and seriously (...)
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  • Type-free truth.Thomas Schindler - 2015 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität München
    This book is a contribution to the flourishing field of formal and philosophical work on truth and the semantic paradoxes. Our aim is to present several theories of truth, to investigate some of their model-theoretic, recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and to evaluate their philosophical significance. In Part I we first outline some motivations for studying formal theories of truth, fix some terminology, provide some background on Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth, and then discuss the prospects of classical type-free truth. (...)
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  • Truth and Circular Definitions. [REVIEW]Francesco Orilia & Achille C. Varzi - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):124–129.
    This original and enticing book provides a fresh, unifying perspective on many old and new logico-philosophical conundrums. Its basic thesis is that many concepts central in ordinary and philosophical discourse are inherently circular and thus cannot be fully understood as long as one remains within the confines of a standard theory of definitions. As an alternative, the authors develop a revision theory of definitions, which allows definitions to be circular without this giving rise to contradiction (but, at worst, to “vacuous” (...)
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  • The truth is sometimes simple.Philip Kremer - manuscript
    Philip Kremer, Department of Philosophy, McMaster University Note: The following version of this paper does not contain the proofs of the stated theorems. A longer version, complete with proofs, is forthcoming. §1. Introduction. In "The truth is never simple" and its addendum, Burgess conducts a breathtakingly comprehensive survey of the complexity of the set of truths which arise when you add a truth predicate to arithmetic, and interpret that predicate according to the fixed point semantics or the revision-theoretic semantics for (...)
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