The paper shows how Karl Popper's critique of 'historicism' is permeated by psychoanalytic discourse regardless of his critique that psychoanalysis is one of the exemplars of pseudoscience. Early on, when he was formulating his philosophy of science, Popper had an apparently stringent criterion, viz. falsifiablity, and painstaking analysis. The central argument of this paper is that despite his representation of psychoanalysis as the principal illustration of the category he dubs as 'pseudoscience', Popper's analysis has been infused with psychoanalysis when it (...) comes to his social and political philosophy. Besides, not only was his interpretation of the proponents of 'historicism' and the 'closed' society mediated by the very concepts of a field which he indicted as pseudoscientific but also he frequently slipped into vacuous and unverifiable accusations forgetting the jurisdiction he formerly accorded to empirical adequacy and logical consistency when examining and assessing theories. (shrink)

While recent scientific discoveries and theories can be taken to provide additional evidence for some of the central critical realist claims, overall critical realism seems to be in need of reassessment, revisions and further developments. First, I argue that here has been an inclination among critical realists to prefer the language and model of philosophy to falsifiable science, creating a predisposition towards somewhat sectarian practices. These tendencies also account for the relative lack of substantive research based on, or inspired by, (...) critical realism. Second, I make a case for radicalising the critique of anthropomorphism and applying it to critical realism itself. Third, and in some contrast to the second point, I argue for rethinking the subject-object relationship and the concept of the intransitive dimension of science. The critique of anthropocentrism has been taken too far. We are implicated in and are a part of the object of our study. It even seems that we humans are a part of the process of the cosmos becoming conscious of itself, also through science. (shrink)

Social work and other professions struggle with the roles of knowledge and values in the study of society and human lives, and in professional practice. Discussions of this topic range from those who see relatively clear distinctions between these concepts and those for whom the lines between the concepts are blurred. For those who separate theory and knowledge from values and ethics there is further discussion in the literature on which is the appropriate foundation for social work practice. The following (...) discussion examines two arguments: firstly, that these concepts, and the two camps they can be placed into, are distinct and should be kept separate; and secondly, the alternative perspective that the concepts overlap and that the separation into two camps is false. The analysis here outlines these perspectives and suggests reasons why shades of both are necessary to fully understand and participate in the reality of social work as a profession and an academic discipline. (shrink)

The relation between rationality in science and rationality in moral discourse is of interest to philosophers and sociologists of science, to educators and moral philosophers. Apparently conflicting conceptions of rationality can be detected at the core of two current socio-educational controversies: the creationievolution controversy and that concerning “moral education.” This paper takes as its starting point the recorded views of participants in these controversies; exhibits the contradictions and their effect on the public; relates these contradictions to developments in the philosophy (...) and history of science; and suggests, in a preliminary way, one approach for dealing with the problem. (shrink)

Continuing advances in human ability to manipulate matter at the atomic and molecular levels (i.e. nanoscale science and engineering) offer many previously unimagined possibilities for scientific discovery and technological development. Paralleling these advances in the various science and engineering subdisciplines is the increasing realization that a number of associated social, ethical, environmental, economic and legal dimensions also need to be explored. An important component of such exploration entails the identification and analysis of the ways in which current and prospective researchers (...) in these fields conceptualize these dimensions of their work. Within the context of a National Science Foundation funded Research Experiences for Undergraduates (REU) program in nanomaterials processing and characterization at the University of Central Florida (2002–2004), here I present for discussion (i) details of a “nanotechnology ethics” seminar series developed specifically for students participating in the program, and (ii) an analysis of students’ and participating research faculty’s perspectives concerning social and ethical issues associated with nanotechnology research. I conclude with a brief discussion of implications presented by these issues for general scientific literacy and public science education policy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The current paradigm of educational theory as‘emergent in practice’ might sooner have provoked, and here does provoke, an analysis of the distinctive profile of educational practice. This practice is shown to be (inter alia) ‘philosophical’ by virtue of its integral quest for a coherent view of life. A theory that is adequate to this practice will be a‘cluster’ of four interconnected ‘discourses’ (each already in use within mature practice itselfl, not only deliberative and evaluative discourses but also utopian and (...) scientific ones. The curriculum of teacher education, too, should extend to all of these discourses. (shrink)

The results of empirical research in psychology and psychiatry are increasingly being used to formulate as well as understand problems at the interface of law and psychiatry. There has been a proliferation of studies, such as the determinants of individual competence or threat to self or others, the results of which are influencing policy and legislative decisions as well as buttressing holdings in court cases. In this article, I explore the issues of interpretation of epidemiological studies, particularly the role of (...) ideological positions on the design and results of empirical findings, the importance of the way data are interpreted, and the role of ideologies in the way research findings are presented to provide support for policy positions. Two levels of analysis are involved in determining the validity of a study. The first addresses the questions of whether the study meets the statistical and epidemiological requirements for reliable results. These include considerations such as the appropriateness of the study design and methods for gathering and interpreting data. The second focuses on the underlying framework of the study. This involves factors such as the perspectives and values of those conducting the study, the explicit and implicit dominating ideologies where they operate, and the extent to which the study is constructed to reaffirm specific ideologies. This level of analysis is essential for disclosing the influences of ideologies on the results of studies and the way in which data are interpreted. In this article, I try to demonstrate through critiques of selected studies that the first stage of analysis is insufficient without an examination of underlying preconceived values to establish the meaningfulness of results. (shrink)

This study examined the challenges for supervisors and managers of managing sick leave within a New Zealand university. We used a qualitative research design, interviewing 20 university staff across the academic and service divisions who had managerial roles. We applied Habermas’ distinctions of technical instrumental, practical relational, and emancipatory critical transformative interests, and his twofold distinction of system and lifeworld to our analysis. The primary findings suggest that while the technical instrumental discourses were dominant within the university bureaucracy, managers drew (...) upon practical relational and emancipatory critical transformative discourses to justify the considerable discretion they exercised in managing sick leave. Far from being incidental, these humanistic elements are as much a part of the bureaucracy as the rational elements and are fundamental to the system’s equilibrium. (shrink)

Despite his hostility to religion in his early career, since the turn of the century Habermas has devoted his research to the relationship between faith and knowledge. His two-volume Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie is the culmination of this project. Spurred by the attacks of 9/11 and the growing conflict between religion and the forces of secularization, I argue that this philosophy of history is the centerpiece of an important turning point in Habermas’s intellectual development. Instead of interpreting religion merely (...) as part of the history of postmetaphysical thinking, Habermas now sees it as a crucial normative resource for both philosophy and social cohesion in the future aswell. Despite its backward-looking approach,my basic thesis is that this book is best understood as a forward-looking appeal for a tolerant, self-reflective democratic politics that brings religious and secular citizens together dialogically through the cooperative use of their rational freedom. (shrink)

Heinrich Popitz’s Phenomena of Power aims to uncover power as “a universal component in the genesis and operation of human societies”. In order to uncover this “universal” concept of power, Popitz employs Husserl’s method of the “imaginative variation” [Phantasievariation]. Yet, contrary to phenomenology’s traditionally descriptive posture, Phenomena of Power’s project is at once descriptive and normative—seeking not only to describe power, but to also describe the way in which power can be remade. In the present paper it is argued that (...) this normative component of Popitz’s project offers the burgeoning field of critical phenomenology an illustration of the way in which Husserl’s “imaginative variation” might be employed not only as a descriptive tool of pure essences, but also as an instrument in the refashioning of social reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I trace out Alasdair MacIntyre’s assessment of managerial capitalism as a uniquely positioned critique occupying an intersection between the sociology of knowledge, ideology critique, and social science metatheory. The first part of this paper outlines MacIntyre’s historical claim that social science principles diffused into an ‘industrial social science’ in the first half of the twentieth century. Tracing out this history allows us to identify four major categories of critique levelled against managerialism, spanning managerialism’s practices to its social (...) location as a discourse of scientific, objective knowledge. That four category typology provides a framework to understand MacIntyre’s specific critique of managerialism as concerned primarily with metatheoretical flaws. MacIntyre's argument provides a valuable sociological account of how flawed presuppositions lend to the creation of flawed descriptions of social reality. These descriptions come to serve as the ‘ideology of bureaucratic control’ when taken up as authoritative knowledge of organizational dynamics. (shrink)

Nursing as normative praxisThe purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces a variety of concepts of ‘praxis’, and argues in support of those which reflect the normative dimension of the critical social perspective. This begins with the Aristotelian concept, and moves through a variety of sources, including Hannah Arendt and Paulo Freire, but focuses primarily, and uniquely in the nursing literature, upon the work of the Yugoslavian ‘praxis Marxists’. Second, specific ways of conceiving nursing as praxis are outlined, (...) including political, aesthetic and ethical forms which have immediate import for nurses. The paper concludes with brief suggestions as to how these ways of conceiving praxis may be used by nurses to develop a more intimate and productive understanding of their own practices. (shrink)

The human being’s mastery of itself, on which the self is founded, practically always involves the annihilation of the subject in whose service that mastery is maintained, because the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and disintegrated by self-preservation is nothing other than the living entity.

This article explores Jürgen Habermas’s critical employment of Noam Chomsky’s insights and the philosophical assumptions that motivate or justify Habermas’s early enrichment of his universal pragmatics with material drawn from generative linguistics. The investigation of the influence Chomsky’s theory has exerted on Habermas aims to clarify what Habermas means by universalism, reason embedded in language and the universal core of communicative competence—away from various misinterpretations of Habermas’s rationalist commitments and from reductive, conventionalist readings of his notion of consensus. Much against (...) hasty and unexamined incriminations of Habermasian pragmatics, a turn to a neglected and scantly researched topic such as the philosophical affinity of some Chomskian and Habermasian themes (and to the philosophical justification of the points where Chomsky and Habermas part company) will retrieve the kind of depth and nuance that may lead us beyond facile and simplistic understandings of what discursively reaching consensus might mean from a Habermasian point of view. (shrink)

Over four decades, Habermas has put to paper many critical remarks on Husserl’s work as occasion has demanded. These scattered critical engagements nonetheless do add up to a coherent (if contestable) position regarding the project of transcendental phenomenology. This essay provides a comprehensive reconstruction of the arguments Habermas makes and offers a critical assessment of them. With an eye in particular to the theme of intersubjectivity (a theme of fundamental interest to both thinkers), it is argued that Habermas’s arguments do (...) indeed show up deficiencies in Husserlian phenomenology and yet that they do not succeed in proving that we must abandon the methods and tasks of phenomenological research. On the contrary, it is argued that phenomenological methods may well be needed in order to investigate certain philosophical questions that Habermas’s theory of communication has thus far only partially addressed. (shrink)

In Hegel's Practical Philosophy (2008), Robert Pippin argues that Hegel's mature concept of recognition is properly understood as an ontological category referring exclusively to what it means to be a free, rational individual, or agent. 1 I agree with Pippin that recognition for Hegel functions in this capacity. However, I shall argue that conceiving it this way also requires that we conceive it as a political category. Furthermore, while Hegel insists that recognition must be concrete?mediated by actors who hold one (...) another accountable according to institutional norms implicit in their actual social roles? I argue, appealing to Hegel himself, that social crisis impels actors to transcend their roles and adopt abstract points of view more in keeping with philosophical forms of reflection. Such alienation?so ardently embraced by postmodernists?need not undermine the possibility of recognition as an ontological category, as Pippin fears, but rather comports with the expressivist theory of action he imputes to Hegel, which describes the socially recognized intentions, rationales, and identities?not to mention, freedom?of actors as unfolding in interminable dialogue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.1 (2003) 1-21 [Access article in PDF] Did Habermas Cede Nature to the Positivists? Gordon R. Mitchell Jürgen Habermas's "colonization of the lifeworld" thesis (1987, 332-73) posits that many of society's pathologies are due to the tendency of institutions to convert social issues that ought to be sorted out by a debating citizenry into technical problems ripe for resolution by expert bureaucracies, thus pre-empting important public (...) discussion. Habermas has attempted to lay bare the pernicious effects of this colonization process in his analysis of public opinion polling, welfare policy, education, German reunification, immigration, and other social issues (see Habermas 1997, 1994, and 1970; Holub 1992). In each of these contexts, Habermas has publicly challenged the encroachment of scientistic modes of decision-making into spheres where joint communicative action by deliberating citizens would yield more appropriate and legitimate judgments. This critical impulse is also evident in Habermas's methodological reflections on the proper role of academic scholarship, where he has argued vigorously against attempts to graft "objectivating" methods of natural scientific inquiry onto research projects in the social sciences (1971, 304-17).From all of this, one might gather that Habermas's commitment to rolling back the influence of technical forms of reasoning is connected to some intrinsic quarrel he has with the natural sciences. Yet such a sweeping generalization is hard to sustain in light of the fact that Habermas does not oppose technical reasoning per se; he recognizes that the daunting complexity of social life in late capitalism requiresthat certain "steering" tasks be delegated to systems that utilize largely instrumental logics to co-ordinate action. Likewise, he acknowledges that the disciplines of the natural sciences necessarily play important supporting roles in such steering projects.One normative presupposition of Habermas's colonization thesis is that there exists some proper boundary demarcating where the sphere of technical reasoning ends and the realm of communicative rationality begins. [End Page 1] On one side of this boundary, Habermas has provided many details on what he sees as the essential qualities of a properly functioning "public sphere," where "new social movements" continuously reweave the threads of communicative fabric holding society together (1996, 359-87), and where "historico-hermeneutic" academic study reflects on public life, sluicing insight back into the capillaries of democratic deliberations (1987, 374-403).What lies on the other side of the boundary is murkier. The proper role of natural scientific investigation has received relatively scant attention in Habermas's critical theory of society, and this has led to some confusion regarding his account of the natural sciences, as well as debate over whether this account has political purchase. One would think that sympathetic commentators, such as Helen Longino (who bases much of her own coherence theory of scientific truth on Habermas), would have reassuring things to say on this point. Yet her lukewarm assessment that, "in trying to clear a space for an autonomous social and critical theory, [Habermas] has ceded nature to the positivists" (1990, 202), raises questions about the flexibility and scope of Habermas's theory of communicative action as a basis for critique of scientific practice.One way to test Habermas's account of the natural sciences on this count is to put his views in conversation with science studies commentators who share a similar commitment to the idea that dialogue and argumentation are constitutive elements of scientific practice. Such an approach recasts the "ceding to positivism" question into a moment of controversy over the role of dialogue, not only as an essential motor driving the scientific enterprise, but also as a vehicle for democratic decision-making on issues related to the purpose and direction of scientific inquiry in society.Part one of this essay locates discursive norms embedded pragmatically in the notion of scientific objectivity. By bringing a modified version of Habermas's theory of communicative action into conversation with other approaches to science studies that foreground intersubjective dialogue as the key motor driving the scientific enterprise, I develop a foundation for robust criticism of systematically distorted scientific communication. Specific strategies of... (shrink)

In this essay, I address the question of whether the indisputable progress being made by the neurosciences poses a genuine threat to the language game of responsible agency. I begin by situating free will as an ineliminable component of our practices of attributing responsibility and holding one another accountable, illustrating this via a discussion of legal discourse regarding the attribution of responsibility for criminal acts. I then turn to the practical limits on agents' scientific self-objectivation, limits that turn out to (...) be mirrored philosophically in the conceptual problems that plague reductionist strategies. Having shown that free will is rooted in unavoidable performative presuppositions belonging to agents' participant perspective, I then take up the difficult issue of how to reconcile an epistemic dualism of participant and observer perspectives with the assumption of ontological monism. I critically review a range of proposed physicalist solutions, including non-reductionist and (standard) compatibilist approaches. An underlying problem with scientistic, physicalist approaches is the methodological fiction of an exclusive ?view from nowhere? which relies on the problematic move of disengaging the objectivating perspective of the scientific observer from the investigators' participant perspective of those engaged in scientific practice. Since there is no way of getting around the requisite complementarity of both the observer's encounter with the objective world and the participant's involvement in shared lifeworld practices, the remaining option is to take an epistemological turn. But even the recognition that science is ultimately constituted from within the lifeworld still leaves us with the question as to how the human mind can understand itself as the product of natural evolution. I conclude with some tentative suggestions as to how this difficult question might be addressed. (shrink)

The small nation-state of Singapore has increasingly been referred to in the popular media as the Intelligent Island of the future. With significant state investment in the promotion and dissemination of information-communications technology and attendant social ramifications, this has become an area that can no longer be ignored or taken for granted. This article intends to map the conditions of possibility on which Singapore can be conceived of as an Intelligent Island, in situating the role of information technology and Intelligent (...) Island discourse within the discourses of postcoloniality, technocapitalism, late modernity, and globalization. In particular, this article attempts to show how, in Intelligent Island discourse, the processes of the construction of a Singaporean nation are intricately linked to the shift in political discourse from mobilizing a rhetoric of crisis to one of utopianism. (shrink)

Ausgehend von der Gegenüberstellung der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Naturwissenschaften und der Geisteswissenschaften wird argumentiert, daß Wissenschaftlichkeit nur auf der Basis einer Zusammenstellung wissenschaftstheoretischer, wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher und wissenschaftssoziologischer Kriterien definiert werden kann. Eine solche dreiteilige Definition wird skizziert, und es wird behauptet, daß dies gültig sowohl für die Naturwissenschaften als auch für die Geisteswissenschaften ist. Es folgt daraus, daß es im Prinzip keine Verschiedenheit zwischen der Wissenschaftlichkeit der einen Basiswissenschaft und der anderen gibt. Die Formulierung dreier normativer Kriterien für Wissenschaft als solche schließt (...) den Artikel ab. (shrink)

The nature of critical thinking remains controversial. Some recent accounts have lost sight of its roots in the history of philosophy. This article discusses critical thinking in its historical and social contexts, and in particular, for its educational and political significance. The writings of Plato and Aristotle are still vital in considering what makes certain kinds of thinking and certain kinds of knowledge distinctive. But neither Plato nor Aristotle theorised critical thinking in its specificity, that is, by differentiating it from (...) other kinds of thinking and by outlining its features. It was only with German Idealism, as part of the European Enlightenment, that philosophy achieved a level of self-reflection and engagement that broadened, deepened and made radical the logos of Socrates and Plato. In the encounter between Modern German and Ancient Greek philosophy we can see that there are different kinds of reason, the most politically and existentially significant of which runs through critical thinking, which we can only ever experience as critical dialogue. The logos of dialectical reason is uncompromising in its pursuit of truth and ‘the good life’, and as such, demands courage from those who pursue it. (shrink)

This paper is an exploration of the Cartesian paradigms of clarity and univocity and how these inform contemporary educational theory and practice. Phenomenology is discussed as a way of disrupting Descartes' visions of clarity and distinctness as paradigms of knowledge and as a return of inquiry to life as it is actually lived. Analogical discourse is examined as a way of giving a voice to this sort of inquiry. Heidegger's notions of inquiry as obedience and thanksgiving are discussed.

This paper rejects as unfounded a recent criticism of research on the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle and the claim that it sported a political philosophy of science. The demand for ‘specific, local periodized claims’ is turned against the critic. It is shown (i) that certain criticisms of Red Vienna’s leading party cannot be transferred to the members of the Circle involved in popular education, nor can criticism of Carnap’s Aufbau be transferred to Neurath’s unified science project; (ii) (...) that neither with regard to Carnap nor to Neurath does the criticism raise points that either engage with the thesis proposed or stand up to closer scrutiny; (iii) that the main thesis attacked is just what I had warned the claim that the Vienna Circle had a political philosophy of science should not be understood as. The question whether theirs is ‘political enough’ today can and should be discussed without distortion of the historical record. (shrink)

Epistemology mirrors reality but notperfectly, and in the process molds reality butnot exactly as intended or anticipated. Horizontal interconnections also exist betweenand among epistemology, ideology, theory andpraxiology. However, these relations areneither deductive nor deterministic in naturebut are merely resonant, and then unclear,ambiguous and confounded. In this paper, thepoint is made that we need a grand reflectionon both our paradigms of reality and ourpredicaments of life as lived, to deal with thediscontent of humanity at this moment of thehistory of our civilization, (...) and to engage inpraxis ``to act on our world and to reconstructit'' to make it moral, just and more humane. Toundertake such a grand reflection, we need apractical philosophy of knowledge – that is, apractical epistemology – to bridge across themultiple epistemological approaches nowcrowding our discussions. An epistemictriangle formed by systems thinking,constructivist thinking, and dialecticalthinking is offered to serve as the startingpoint of crystallization for building a commonground for epistemologies. It is shown how suchan epistemological diagram could be first usedto develop a minimum ideological consensus andthen to bring orderliness to the chaos ofcontemporary themes of our civilization andissues of education and culture within andacross nations. Finally, an agenda foreducational leadership for educational practiceis offered to fit the needs of the globalcommunity of nations as we enter thetwenty-first century. (shrink)

Börje Holmberg; A Paradigm for Research in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 19–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

The reconceptualisation of school placement (Teaching Council, 2013) poses a challenge to initial teacher education in Ireland. Some criticised the timing (Mulcahy and McSharry, 2013). Others considered it to be too great a professional leap (O’Grady, 2017). This study sought to explore if and how cooperating teachers could develop as mentors in the Irish context, through engagement in a ‘participatory action learning action research’ (PALAR) ‘mentoring community of practice’ (M-CoP). Qualitative data collection methods included: questionnaires with stimulus recall, pre-workshop questions, (...) workshop observation, workshop artefacts, reflective journals, learning journey plans, and extended focus group discussions. Data were analysed via constant comparison of codes and categories. CTs reported that their transformed practice as a mentor and a leader was achieved due to the multi-process, meta-pedagogical, meta-model design of the PALAR M-CoP. They indicated that the meta-model enhanced their fluency in the ‘language of critique’ enabling them to identify and become exercised about a range of complex barriers to growth. It also developed their fluency in the languages of ‘possibility’ and ‘leadership for change and empowerment’, which aided them to cope with, and overcome barriers to growth, resulting in the empowerment of themselves and other school placement partners. (shrink)

In the article I ask the question about the place of an emancipatory task within various forms of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, where conversations with the patient play an important role. This task arises on discovering that an important source of the patient’s problems are views inherited fom cultural traditions, ones which inhibit a proper assessment of various traumatic situations fom the past and the forms of dependence on others. Then psychotherapists and psychoanalysts are inevitably faced with the task of making (...) the patient aware of these limitations and forms of dependence, for only then is therapeutic progress possible. I provide three characteristic examples of similar cases fom Polish psychiatric tradition, in which we can speak of a similarly binding role of cultural tradition in the process of therapy. I point out that the difcult situation the therapist then fnds themselves in lies in the fact that, on the one hand, they have to depart fom the postulate of maintaining world-view neutrality in their approach to the patient while, on the other hand, they cannot directly impose their own position on the patient. The therapist has to fnd a third, middle way betwee. (shrink)

The historical emphasis of medical ethics, based on substantive frameworks and principles derived from them, is no longer seen as sufficiently sensitive to the moral pluralism characteristic of our current era. We argue that moral decision-making in clinical situations is more properly derived from a process of dialogic consensus. This process entails an inclusive, noncoercive, and self-reflective dialogue within the community affected. In order to justify this approach, we make two claims—the first epistemic, and the second normative. The epistemic claim (...) follows from Habermas’ “ways” of knowing. We argue that the dialogue emanating from this episteme focuses on the relevant facts about the patient, as well as on the values attached to these facts, thus allowing facts and their meanings to serve as the basis for reflective action appropriate to the circumstances. The normative claim follows from Habermas’ discourse theory of morality and communicative action. It determines that clinical decision-making should be approached from the perspective of the actual reality of people in their situation of illness, set in their socio-cultural background, and hence be grounded in the second-person perspective. Relocating ethical decision-making from a monological space into one characterized by dialogue is especially appropriate to the clinical encounter. (shrink)

The article situates Vico's hermeneutical science of history between a hermeneutics of suspicion and a redemptive hermeneutics. It discusses Vico's early writings and his ambivalent trajectory from Cartesian rationalism to counter-enlightenment historicist and critic of natural law reasoning. The complexity of Vico's thinking belies some of the popular treatments of his thought developed by Isaiah Berlin and others.

XIAO LD, KELTON M and PATERSON J. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 322–333 Critical action research applied in clinical placement development in aged care facilitiesThe aim of this study was to develop quality clinical placements in residential aged care facilities for undergraduate nursing students undertaking their nursing practicum topics. The proportion of people aged over 65 years is expected to increase steadily from 13% in 2006 to 26% of the total population in Australia in 2051. However, when demand is increasing for (...) a nursing workforce competent in the care of older people, studies have shown that nursing students generally lack interest in working with older people. The lack of exposure of nursing students to quality clinical placements is one of the key factors contributing to this situation. Critical action research built on a partnership between an Australian university and five aged care organisations was utilised. A theoretical framework informed by Habermas’ communicative action theory was utilised to guide the action research. Multiple research activities were used to support collaborative critical reflection and inform actions throughout the action research. Clinical placements in eight residential aged care facilities were developed to support 179 nursing students across three year‐levels to complete their practicum topics. Findings were presented in three categories described as structures developed to govern clinical placement, learning and teaching in residential aged care facilities. (shrink)

Indigenous agricultural knowledge (IAK) can be analyzed for its technical role in food production strategies, and for its role as cultural knowledge producing and reproducing mutual understanding and identity among the members of a farming group. IAK can also be approached from the perspective of critical theory, analyzing the relationship between knowledge and relations of power, with the goal of liberating indigenous farmers from forms of domination. The paper considers relationships between the different aspects of IAK, using examples of the (...) influence of non-local technologies and ideas on indigenous agricultural practices in the Ecuadorian Andes. The examples elucidate how technical change is a signifier of the changing relationship between indigenous farmers and wider society. The political implications of these changes are ambiguous, however, because the change is not necessarily one of social and cultural assimilation. As indigenous peasant organizations in Ecuador now reflect on these changes, they are connecting the questions of IAK, indigenous cultural identity and political strategy. Some organizations speak of recovering and revalorizing indigenous technologies as a tool for, and symbol of, resistance to domination by wider society. Others see selective modernization of indigenous agriculture as a necessary strategy to sustain the social and cultural cohesion of the group, even if this implies social changes. The different perspectives reflect both different conditions facing the organizations, and their varying approaches. That peasant organizations have these discussions suggests that they should constitute an important meeting point for farmers and crop researchers to discuss technology development strategies as equal partners. The organizations can provide an institutional forum in which participants reflect critically on the agrarian knowledge that they have, why they have it, and what it can contribute to future strategies of agrarian and social change. (shrink)

To what extent does the construction of any curriculum framework have to contain axiological assumptions? Educators have been made aware of tacit epistemological assumptions underlying existing curricular frameworks by the continual demands for their revision. Eisner suggested that curriculum policy should be centred around imagination; economic rationalists have suggested that it be made more functional and accountable than traditional university disciplines allow for. Is it possible, as Efland suggests, to combine competing traditional ideologies of education in a complex postmodern pastiche (...) which can nonetheless provide standards of assessment and evaluation without presuming a grand narrative? Brown suggests not. This paper examines the challenge of maintaining principled standards and recognising postmodern relativities, making particular reference to the notion of the sublime and the arts curriculum. (shrink)