Chung-ying’s project of onto-hermeneutics draws in order to shed light on the relations between ontology and epistemology in the hermeneutic act. In the process, not only will we be thinking with Cheng and some Western hermeneutic theorists, but we will also be thinking through history by examining the Confucian act of reading. To the extent that any hermeneutic exercise, in accordance with Cheng’s construal, cannot merely be a disembodied act of theoretical knowing but is also moral effort that entails personal (...) cultivation—or, in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s terms, Bildung—its espousal and its practice necessarily embody a larger conception of culture. In fact, precisely in terms of the intimate engagement with culture, Confucian insights, filtered through Cheng’s onto-hermeneutic lenses, may have much to offer contemporary hermeneutics. (shrink)

This paper articulates the relationship between knowledge and qing 情 in the Zhuangzi. I argue that Zhuangzi has a twofold view of qing, which is structurally similar to his view of knowledge. I sta...

In this article we focus on the famous dialogue between Zhuangzi 莊子 and Huizi 惠子 concerning the question whether or not ren 人 (in particular the shengren 聖人) have qing 情. Most scholars have understood qing in this exchange as referring to “feelings” or “emotions.” We take issue with such readings. First, we demonstrate that, while Huizi probably understands qing as something like feelings or emotions, Zhuangzi’s view is that having qing is connected with making shifei 是非 judgments whereas having (...) no qing means that shifei has no grip on those ren, especially the shengren. What follows is that the expression wuqing 無情 should not be identified as a “doctrine of nonemotion.” Instead, wuqing implies that Zhuangzi advises us to lead a life of tranquility, calmness, and stillness. We show that these peaceful attitudes are associated with the idea of wuwei 無為 in the Zhuangzi. (shrink)

The writers of the Huainanzi 淮南子 show that emotions are based on resonance. In this ancient Chinese text, emotional expressions are considered natural phenomena; however, at the same time, they are sometimes evaluated negatively. It states that sometimes, not only emotions stemming from desires but also emotional expressions in daily lives must be controlled. This is due to the following prescriptions stemming from the art of rulership: (1) a ruler must clearly and distinctly recognize a situation. Emotional expressions lose the (...) Quintessential Spirit (jingshen 精神), which mediates the recognition of the situation; and (2) the intention must not be revealed to the ruler’s vassals. The concept of heart (xin 心) in the Huainanzi, on the foundation called the “theory of cultivation” of Daoism, is influenced by the art of rulership from Legalism. (shrink)

“Heart-mind” has almost become the standard English translation of Mengzi’s concept of xin 心. However, it remains largely unsettled (1) on what basis xin can be regarded as possessing a mind aspect that allows it to function as a faculty that both feels and thinks, and (2) what role this mind aspect of xin plays in Mengzi’s ethics, which revolves around character formation. This paper aims to address these two questions through a detailed analysis of the original text and a (...) critical review of the relevant secondary literature. First, the paper argues that it is through the ability to si, which literally means “to think,” “to reflect,” and “to contemplate,” that xin can be understood as both an emotional and a rational faculty. Then, the paper demonstrates that si has the functions of being “attentive,” “associative,” “evaluative,” and “corrective,” which enable it to contribute to the process of self-cultivation by identifying, intensifying, and approving primitive moral feelings in an appropriate and self-regulating way. (shrink)

Volume 97, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 421-422.

Some common conceptions of Buddhist meditative practice emphasize the elimination of emotion and desire in the interest of attaining tranquility and spiritual perfection. But to place too strong an emphasis on this is to miss an important social element emphasized by major figures in the Mahāyāna and Chan/Zen Buddhist traditions who are critical of these quietistic elements and who stress instead an understanding of an enlightenment that emphasizes enriched sociality and flexible readiness to engage, and not avoid, life's fluctuations in (...) fortune and essential impermanence. It is argued here that these criticisms of quietism are bolstered by recent advances in the philosophy and psychology of the emotions that highlight the role of emotions in framing the context of decision making—that is, in sorting out the relevant from the irrelevant, identifying salience, and directing decisions when uncertainty prevents definitive judgment. This research makes clearer why self-liberation is fundamentally a matter of liberation from judgmental habit and inflexibility, and lends support to a view of enlightenment that emphasizes compassionate engagement with others. It also provides for a more plausible picture of the cognitive transformation involved in liberation and sheds light on the rationale for certain traditional Chan and Zen teaching tactics, such as those involving koan introspection. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe early Chinese idea of non-action refers not to spontaneity, as has been argued, but to a relation between agency and spontaneity. Non-action needs to be seen in connection with the idea...

This article examines the problem of mental partitioning and mental conflict in Han 漢 dynasty sources. It begins by outlining two Greek psychological models—the Platonic tripartite model and the Stoic monistic model—and explains the connection between the two psychological models and their differing descriptions of mental conflict. It then analyzes passages from a seldom discussed text, the _Extended Reflections_ (_Shenjian_ 申鑒), written by the Eastern Han thinker X un Yue 荀悅. A combined analysis of the _Extended Reflections_ with fragments from (...) other Han dynasty thinkers uncovers debates on mental partitioning and mental conflict that are in some ways analogous to those found in Greek philosophical literature. One view posits that the human psyche is composed of two parts capable of producing conflicting motivations. The other view sees all actions as stemming from a single psychological center. The conclusions of this article offer new perspectives on early Chinese moral psychology that have important implications for modern research on early Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

Among the various claims by early Chinese philosophers to hear someone’s de 德 or virtue through their music, the most astonishing statement may be found in the Yue Ji 樂記 : “Only Music cannot be faked”. While this classic Ru 儒 musical treatise on the development of human excellence in accordance with music is wide-ranging, the aim of this essay is narrow, in that it seeks to interpret this single sentence of the text by way of an explanation of the (...) reciprocal patterning between authentic emotions, character, and sound described by the Yue Ji. (shrink)

The question of possible moral conflict between commitment to family and to impartiality is particularly relevant to traditional Confucian thought, given the importance of familial bonds in that tradition. Classical Confucian ethics also appears to lack any developed theoretical commitment to impartiality as a regulative ideal and a standpoint for ethical judgment, or to universal equality. The Confucian prioritizing of family has prompted criticism of Confucian ethics, and doubts about its continuing relevance in China and beyond. This chapter assesses how (...) those sympathetic to the Confucian vision of the good life might respond. It first explores Confucian conceptions of love and the importance of familial love. Next, problems arising from this commitment to partiality are discussed, and how a modern Confucian ethics might respond. I explore what notions of impartiality—understood largely pragmatically, as a value that functions in everyday social life rather than as an explicit moral principle that guides deliberation or judgment—can be derived from an ethics that focuses on family commitments. (shrink)

Discusses the conditions of possibility for intercultural and comparative philosophy, and for crosscultural communication at large. This innovative book explores the preconditions necessary for intercultural and comparative philosophy. Philosophical practices that involve at least two different traditions with no common heritage and whose languages have very different grammatical structure, such as Indo-Germanic languages and classical Chinese, are a particular focus. Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel look at the necessary and not-so-necessary conditions of possibility of interpretation, comparison, and other forms (...) of interaction and how we can speak of similarities and differences in this context. The authors posit that it is necessary to dissolve the question of universalism versus relativism by replacing the ideal language paradigm with a paradigm of family resemblances and that it is not necessary to share a common language to engage in comparison. Numerous case studies are presented, including many comparisons of Western and Chinese concepts. (shrink)