(1993). Thomas solly (1816–1875):an unknown pioneer of the mathematization of logic in england, 1839. History and Philosophy of Logic: Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 133-169.

I show how Sir William Rowan Hamilton’s philosophical commitments led him to a causal interpretation of classical mechanics. I argue that Hamilton’s metaphysics of causation was injected into his dynamics by way of a causal interpretation of force. I then detail how forces are indispensable to both Hamilton’s formulation of classical mechanics and what we now call Hamiltonian mechanics (i.e., the modern formulation). On this point, my efforts primarily consist of showing that the contemporary orthodox interpretation of potential energy is (...) the interpretation found in Hamilton’s work. Hamilton called the potential energy function the “force-function” because he believed that it represents forces at work in the world. Various non-historical arguments for this orthodox interpretation of potential energy are provided, and matters are concluded by showing that in classical Hamiltonian mechanics, facts about the potential energies of systems are grounded in facts about forces. Thus, if one can tolerate the view that forces are causes of motion, then Hamilton provides one with a road map for transporting causation into one of the most mathematically sophisticated formulations of classical mechanics, viz., Hamiltonian mechanics. (shrink)

The idea of a canonical transformation emerged in 1837 in the course of Carl Jacobi's researches in analytical dynamics. To understand Jacobi's moment of discovery it is necessary to examine some background, especially the work of Joseph Lagrange and Siméon Poisson on the variation of arbitrary constants as well as some of the dynamical discoveries of William Rowan Hamilton. Significant figures following Jacobi in the middle of the century were Adolphe Desboves and William Donkin, while the delayed posthumous publication in (...) 1866 of Jacobi's full dynamical corpus was a critical event. François Tisserand's doctoral dissertation of 1868 was devoted primarily to lunar and planetary theory but placed Hamilton–Jacobi mathematical methods at the forefront of the investigation. Henri Poincaré's writings on celestial mechanics in the period 1890–1910 succeeded in making canonical transformations a fundamental part of the dynamical theory. Poincaré offered a mathematical vision of the subject that differed from Jacobi's and would become influential in subsequent research. Two prominent researchers around 1900 were Carl Charlier and Edmund Whittaker, and their books included chapters devoted explicitly to transformation theory. In the first three decades of the twentieth century Hamilton–Jacobi theory in general and canonical transformations in particular would be embraced by a range of researchers in astronomy, physics and mathematics. (shrink)

I will argue, pace a great many of my contemporaries, that there's something right about Boltzmann's attempt to ground the second law of thermodynamics in a suitably amended deterministic time-reversal invariant classical dynamics, and that in order to appreciate what's right about (what was at least at one time) Boltzmann's explanatory project, one has to fully apprehend the nature of microphysical causal structure, time-reversal invariance, and the relationship between Boltzmann entropy and the work of Rudolf Clausius.

79. This study of the interaction between mechanics and differential geometry does not pretend to be exhaustive. In particular, there is probably more to be said about the mathematical side of the history from Darboux to Ricci and Levi Civita and beyond. Statistical mechanics may also be of interest and there is definitely more to be said about Hertz (I plan to continue in this direction) and about Poincaré's geometric and topological reasonings for example about the three body problem [Poincaré (...) 1890] (cf. also [Poincaré 1993], [Andersson 1994] and [Barrow-Green 1994]). Moreover, it would be interesting to find out how the 19th century ideas discussed here influenced the developments in the 20th century. Einstein himself is a hotly debated case. Yet, despite these shortcommings, I hope that this paper has shown that the interactions between mechanics and differential geometry is not a 20th century invention. Klein's view (see my Introduction) that Riemannian geometry grew out of mechanics, more specifically the principle of least action, cannot be maintained. On the other hand, when Riemannian geometry became known around 1870 it was immediately used in mechanics by Lipschitz. He began a continued tradition in this field, which had several elements in common with the new view of mechanics conceived by the physicists and explicitly carried out by Hertz. Before 1870 we found only scattered interactions between differential geometry and mechanics and only direct ones for systems of two or three degrees of freedom. For more degrees of freedom the geometrical ideas were in some interesting cases taken over by analogy, but these analogies did not lead to formal introduction of geometries of more than three dimensions. (shrink)

Euclidean geometry, statics, and classical mechanics, being in some sense the simplest physical theories based on a full-fledged mathematical apparatus, are well suited to a historico-philosophical analysis of the way in which a physical theory differs from a purely mathematical theory. Through a series of examples including Newton’s Principia and later forms of mechanics, we will identify the interpretive substructure that connects the mathematical apparatus of the theory to the world of experience. This substructure includes models of experiments, models of (...) measurement, and modular connections with partial theories. It evolves during the life of a theory as physicists learn how to apply it in various contexts. It should nevertheless be regarded as an integral part of a genuine physical theory since the theory would otherwise degenerate into pure mathematics. (shrink)

For about the last thirty years Newton scholars have carried on a discussion on the meaning of Newton’s second law and its place in the stucture of his physics. E. J. Dijksterhuis, Brian D. Ellis, R. G. A. Dolby, I. Bernard Cohen, and R. S. Westfall in their treatments of these matters all quote a passage that Newton added to the third edition of the Principia. This passage, beginning “Corpore cadente” (“when a body is falling”), was inserted into the Scholium (...) following the Laws. The present article is an analysis of the literature that treats this passage and its relation to the second law. The conclusion is that they are right who see a deep duality in Newton’s mind regarding this law. (shrink)

Despite its basically syllogistic character, Richard Whately's Elements of logic presents the subject in a modern theoretical setting. Whately, for instance, regarded logic as an abstract science, and defined the syllogism as a purely formal device to be used as a means of determining the validity of all arguments. In this paper, I argue that such instances of abstractive ascent place Whately's theory in closer proximity to later 19th-century developments than to the work of his 17th-century predecessors. In addition to (...) discussing the theory itself, other sections deal with its historical setting, and various reactions to it. (shrink)

More than any other aspect of the Second Scientific Revolution, the remarkable revitalization or British mathematics and mathematical physics during the first half of the nineteenth century is perhaps the most deserving of the name. While the newly constituted sciences of biology and geology were undergoing their first revolution, as it were, the reform of British mathematics was truly and self-consciously the story of a second coming of age. ‘Discovered by Fermat, cocinnated and rendered analytical by Newton, and enriched by (...) Leibniz with a powerful and comprehensive notation’, wrote the young John Herschel and Charles Babbage of the calculus in 1813, ‘as if the soil of this country [was] unfavourable to its cultivation, it soon drooped and almost faded into neglect; and we now have to re-import the exotic, with nearly a century of foreign improvement, and to render it once more indigenous among us’. (shrink)

Although it is clear that Sir William Rowan Hamilton supported a Kantian account of algebra, I argue that there is an important sense in which Hamilton's philosophy of mathematics can be situated in the Newtonian tradition. Drawing from both Niccolo Guicciardini's (2009) and Stephen Gaukroger's (2010) readings of the Newton–Leibniz controversy over the calculus, I aim to show that the very epistemic ideals that underpin Newton's argument for the superiority of geometry over algebra also motivate Hamilton's philosophy of algebra. Namely, (...) Hamilton's defense of algebra, like Newton's defense of geometry, is driven by the claim that a mathematical science must have a proper object and thus a basis in truth. In particular, Hamilton aims to show that algebra is not a mere language, or tool, or a mere “art”; instead, he argues, algebra is a bona fide mathematical science, like geometry, because its methods also provide true and accurate insight into a genuine subject matter, namely, the pure form of temporal intuition. (shrink)

I have always been a philosopher at heart. I write history of science and history of its philosophy primarily as a philosopher wary of his abstractions and broad conceptualizations. But that has not always been the case. Lakatos famously portrayed history of science as the testing ground for theories of scientific rationality. But he did so along the crudest Hegelian lines that did injury both to Hegel and to the history and methodology of science. Since science is ultimately rational, he (...) argued, rival methodologies can prove their mettle by competing for whose tendentiously reconstructed account of the history of science renders more of it rational! My own approach to the relationship between history and philosophy of science started out perhaps a little more open-mindedly than Lakatos’s, but in a manner no less crude. Over the years the relationship between the history I wrote and the philosophy to which I was committed took on a firmer and more reciprocal shape. It did so in the course of a process that I now realize exemplified the philosophical position it eventually yielded. I would like to trace that development in the following pages and reflect as best I can on where it has lead and left me. (shrink)

Energy is a crucial concept within classical and quantum physics. An essential tool to quantify energy is the Hamiltonian. Here, we consider how to define a Hamiltonian in general probabilistic theories—a framework in which quantum theory is a special case. We list desiderata which the definition should meet. For 3-dimensional systems, we provide a fully-defined recipe which satisfies these desiderata. We discuss the higher dimensional case where some freedom of choice is left remaining. We apply the definition to example toy (...) theories, and discuss how the quantum notion of time evolution as a phase between energy eigenstates generalises to other theories. (shrink)

There existed essentially two theories of light during the early nineteenth century: the particulate theory and the wave theory. This we realise today is a gross over-simplification, since there were many varieties of each theory. But to the supporters of one theory the other theory had faults so fundamental that no distinction between varieties of the same theory was sufficient to placate opposition to that theory. This meant that opponents of either the wave or the particulate theory seldom, in their (...) attacks, distinguished between different varieties of either theory. (shrink)

The ArgumentA scientific work presupposes a body of texts that are a condition for its intelligibility. This paper shows that the study of intertextual reference — of the ways a text indicates its relation to other texts — provides a fruitful perspective in the study of science that deserves more attention than it has hitherto received. The paper examines intertextual reference in early nineteenth-century mathematics, first surveying a variety of mathematical texts in the period and then examining in detail W.R. (...) Hamilton's work on quaternions.Three questions are addressed: (1) What forms of intertextual reference are employed? (2) What is the range of intertextual reference? (3) What are the functions of intertextual reference? The answers to the first two questions provide an unexplored perspective on the institutional changes in science during the period. The transitional status of the period in the development of later professional science is reflected in the relative openness in the forms of intertextual reference employed and the range of texts to which reference was made. In virtue of these features the period is particularly fruitful in the study of the functions of intertextual reference. With some major qualifications, the paper defends a Mertonian view that intertextual reference needs to be understood in terms of the claim to intellectual property rights. (shrink)

Dans la première moitié du xixe siècle en Angleterre, autour de Charles babbage (1791–1871), John F. W. Herschel (1792–1871), George Peacock (1791–1858), Duncan F. Gregory (1813–1844), Augustus de Morgan (1806–1871), George Boole (1815–1864), et d'autres auteurs moins connus, un réseau d'algébristes renouvelle singulièrement la conception de l'algèbre, à tel point que leur travail est le plus souvent interprété comme émergence des travaux sur l'algèbre abstraite. Comme ces algébristes sont également des réformateurs impliqués dans la réorganisation de la science, il s'agira (...) de proposer de ces travaux une lecture plus contextuelle, afin d'éclairer leur inscription parmi les effects de la Révolution industrielle (1760–1830), et d'analyser leur rôle de médiation culturelle entre les racines d'un savoir universitaire fondé sur la fidélité aux Anciens, et de nouvelles formes d'élaboration des connaissances. Une médiation marquée par un premier rapprochement entre algèbre et logique. (shrink)