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Standing to epistemically blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11355-11375.details
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What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.details
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Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori.Paul Boghossian - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):367-383.details
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Logic Informed.Justin Bledin - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):277-316.details
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Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.details
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The number of planets is not a number.J. Biro - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):622-631.details
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Argumentation, Education and Reasoning.Robert Binkley - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (2).details
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When weak explanations prevail.Carl Bereiter & Marlene Scardamalia - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):468-469.details
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Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):659-668.details
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A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):679-696.details
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The simple argument for subclassical logic.Jc Beall - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):30-54.details
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Should deflationists be dialetheists?J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):303–324.details
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Multiple-conclusion lp and default classicality.Jc Beall - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):326-336.details
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Lp+, k3+, fde+, and their 'classical collapse'.Jc Beall - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):742-754.details
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Complete Symposium on Jc Beall's Christ – A Contradiction: A Defense of Contradictory Christology.Jc Beall, Timothy Pawl, Thomas McCall, A. J. Cotnoir & Sara L. Uckelman - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):400-577.details
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A simple approach towards recapturing consistent theories in paraconsistent settings.Jc Beall - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):755-764.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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Everyday reasoning and logical inference.Jon Barwise - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):337-338.details
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Deduction as an example of thinking.Jonathan Baron - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):336-337.details
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Coherence and explanations.Thomas Bartelborth - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):209-224.details
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Handling rejection.Derek Baker & Jack Woods - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):159-190.details
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How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency.Derek Clayton Baker & Jack Woods - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):391-424.details
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Getting down to cases.Kent Bach - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-336.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):5-26.details
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Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):29–47.details
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Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.details
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Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism.Pavel Arazim - 2020 - Logica Universalis 14 (2):151-174.details
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The normativity of context.Daniel Andler - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (3):273-303.details
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Mental models and tableau logic.Avery D. Andrews - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-334.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection: An Interactive Perspective.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.details
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Holding One’s Own.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (4):571-584.details
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Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.details
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Are Conductive Arguments Possible?Jonathan Adler - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):245-257.details
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Explanation and acceptability.Peter Achinstein - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):467-468.details
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A Moorean paradox of desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Testimony and Assertion.David Owens - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105-129.details
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Epistemic Normativity is Independent of our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.details
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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.details
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