- How to be an objectivist about colour.Frank Jackson - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):819-831.details
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Experiences as complex events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.details
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Do Experiences Represent?Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):87-103.details
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Colour for representationalists.Frank Jackson - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):169--85.details
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Sensing mind-independence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14931-14949.details
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Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.details
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Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps.Işık Sarıhan - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):1-13.details
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Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.details
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The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism vs. A Priori Physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):905-913.details
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Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self.Robert J. Howell - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):459-483.details
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Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.details
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Turning the zombie on its head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.details
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Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
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No such look: problems with the dual content theory.Walter Hopp - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):813-833.details
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Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.details
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On doing research on consciousness without being aware of it.Daniel Holender - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):612-614.details
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Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism.Emmett L. Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.details
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How to know one’s experiences transparently.Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-20.details
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How to know one’s experiences transparently.Frank Hofmann - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1305-1324.details
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Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):376-411.details
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“Consciousness” is the name of a nonentity.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):611-612.details
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Matter, levels, and consciousness.Jerry R. Hobbs - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):610-611.details
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Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):503-511.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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Précis of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):483-487.details
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Hallucination, sense-data and direct realism.David Hilbert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.details
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Appearance and reality.Christopher S. Hill - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):175-191.details
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Searle's vision of psychology.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):608-610.details
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That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.details
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The Metaphysics of Sensory ExperiencePapineau, David, The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 176, £33.49 (hardback). [REVIEW]Benj Hellie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Noise and perceptual indiscriminability.Benj Hellie - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):481-508.details
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Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.details
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Against Egalitarianism.Benj Hellie - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):304-320.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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Perceptual transparency and the temporal structure of experience.Matthew Heeney - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1829-1844.details
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The guise of the good and the problem of partiality.Allan Hazlett - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):851-872.details
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Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.details
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Objectifying the phenomenal in experimental psychology: Titchener and beyond.Gary Hatfield - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (3):73-94.details
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Perceiving as Having Subjectively Conditioned Appearances.Gary Hatfield - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):149-178.details
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What is cognitively accessed?Gilbert Harman - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):505-505.details
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Phenomenal fallacies and conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.details
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Intentionality: Some distinctions.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):607-608.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Explaining objective color in terms of subjective reactions.Gilbert Harman - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:1-17.details
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Bevissthet.Mette Kristine Hansen - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (4):253-268.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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Propositional Intentionalism and the Argument from Appearance.Zhiwei Gu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):697-715.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Content, illusion, partition.York H. Gunther - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.details
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Guilty consciousness.George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):255-256.details
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