In recent work, Amie Thomasson has sought to develop a new approach to the philosophy of the categories which is metaphysically neutral between traditional realist and conceptualist approaches, and which has its roots in the ‘correlationalist’ approach to categories put forward in Husserl’s writings in the 1900s–1910s and systematically charted over the past few decades by David Woodruff Smith in his studies of Husserl’s philosophy. Here the author aims to provide a recontextualization and critical assessment of correlationalism in a Husserlian (...) vein. To this end, the author presents, first, the reasons why, later in his life, Husserl himself found his earlier treatment of categories philosophically naive, and why he increasingly advocated for a more genetic-teleological account. The author then draws upon arguments made a century earlier by Schelling and Hegel, in criticism of Fichte, to point up what might remain philosophically unsatisfying about even the post-correlationalist genetic position of the later Husserl, in light of the pronounced trend in Husserl’s own development, on the questions of reason and spirit, toward absolute idealism. (shrink)

During the last decades of the 20th century, Western philosophy saw a renewed interest in religion, often referred to as ‘the return of religion’. At about the same time, a growing number of anthro...

What is social construction? This essay offers a survey of the various ways in which something could be socially constructed and then addresses briefly the questions whether social constructionism involves an untenable anti-realism and what, if anything, unifies all social construction claims.

The ontological turn in anthropological methodology, at least in its conceptualization-oriented formulation, aims to turn away from the concepts and objects found within one’s own social setting in order to turn to indigenous conceptualization processes and take a look at “the things themselves.” This article aims to unpack what such constant reconceptualization amounts to, arguing that when modified to meet certain objections, the ontological turn could provide important ingredients for an alternative version of interpretive social science—one that wishes to understand (...) social phenomena as human kinds in the vein of Ian Hacking, Sally Haslanger and Ron Mallon. (shrink)

Thomas Lynch has proposed that scholars of religion can profitably follow Sally Haslanger’s lead and treat “religion,” as she treats race, as a social construction. He argues that this proposal resembles my treatment of “religion” in Philosophy and the Study of Religions, but it goes further by treating “religion” as what Haslanger calls a strongly pragmatic social construction, that is, a category that is solely the product of the use of the concept and which does not capture any feature in (...) the world. In this response, I clarify that this argument can be made in a way that is stronger and closer to that of Haslanger if one adopts the position she calls “promiscuous realism.”. (shrink)

Metaphysics has undergone two major innovations in recent decades. First, naturalistic metaphysicians have argued that our best science provides an important source of evidence for metaphysical theories. Second, social metaphysicians have begun to explore the nature of social entities such as groups, institutions, and social categories. Surprisingly, these projects have largely kept their distance from one another. Katherine Hawley has recently argued that, unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are not sufficiently successful to provide evidence about the metaphysical nature (...) of social entities. By contrast, I defend an optimistic view of naturalistic social metaphysics. Drawing on a case study of research into contextual effects in social epidemiology, I show that social science can provide a valuable evidence for social metaphysicians. (shrink)

In addition to opening a fertile field for inquiry in analytical social epistemology, Miranda Fricker’s work has provided powerful conceptual tools that merge descriptive capacity and political potency. For this reason, over the last fifteen years, the conceptual repertoire introduced by the author has been well received in both academic and political arenas. At times, the concepts of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice acquire excessive dimensions in the literature, and this undermines, on the one hand, their analytical precision and, on (...) the other, their usefulness. In this paper I argue against Fricker’s structural parallelism thesis and defend an independent treatment of each of these concepts. On this basis, to counteract the hyperinflation of the concept of hermeneutic injustice, I proceed with an exercise of conceptual precision. To this end, I identify the conditions that make hermeneutic injustice both unjust and hermeneutic. Finally, I present theoretical and practical reasons to encourage the rigorous use of these concepts. (shrink)

Acts of sexual violence in transit environments are everyday occurrences for women across the globe, and the fear of being on the receiving end of sexual violence severely impacts women’s mobility patterns. Gill Valentine, in her examination of women’s fear of male violence and women’s perception and use of public space, has argued that the impact on women’s mobility amounts to a spatial expression of patriarchy. The aim of this paper is to expand upon Valentine’s notion of “the spatial expression (...) of patriarchy” by engaging feminist philosophy within the context of sexual violence against women on public transportation. More specifically, I will argue for two particular interpretations of the spatial expression of patriarchy, one structural and one relational. It follows from my view that solutions to overcoming and ending sexual violence against women on public transportation hinge on both a structural and a relational understanding of the spatial expression of patriarchy. (shrink)

Forms of racial cognition begin early: from about 3 months onwards, many human infants prefer to look at own-race faces over other-race faces. What is not yet fully clear is what the psychological mechanisms are that underlie racial thoughts at this early age, and why these mechanisms evolved. In this paper, we propose answers to these questions. Specifically, we use recent experimental data and evolutionary biological insights to argue that early racial cognition is simply the result of a “facial familiarity (...) mechanism”: a mental structure that leads infants to attend to faces that look similar to familiar faces, and which probably has evolved to track potential caregivers. We further argue that this account can be combined with the major existing treatments of the evolution of racial cognition, which apply to adult humans. The result is a heterogeneous picture of racial thought, according to which early and later racial cognition result from very different psychological mechanisms. (shrink)

Solidarity has been a key topic for feminist thinkers of different times, schools and places. More than other disciplines, feminist theorists have dwelled upon the role of theory in the achievement of political and social goals. Calls for global sisterhood have incited proliferating debates as to the basis for solidarity between women and feminists. Theoretical disputes arising from the spread of deconstructionist ideas since the 1990s have led to a practical perplexity as to how to set feminist political goals if (...) the category of woman is no longer straightforward. This article looks at how expectations for practical usefulness have resonated in feminist debates on solidarity and, drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of textuality and interpretation, reflects on the process of interaction between feminist theory and feminism as a social movement. It argues that in spite of the apparent lack of unanimity, or even outright hostility, that theoretical controversies might seem to indicate, the multiplicity of viewpoints and positions that various feminist theories collectively entail is a necessary vehicle for creating more solidarity between women in and outside academia in the contemporary world. Looking towards the future of feminist theory, the article invokes the metaphor of a sisterhood of letters to reflect on the value of shared intellectual endeavour in building solidarities between women of different social, racial, religious and cultural backgrounds. (shrink)

Résumé Dans cet article, nous discuterons de l’intégration du numérique à la sémiotique et proposerons qu’une modélisation conceptuelle puisse offrir un pont de dialogue entre ces deux domaines classiquement cloisonnés. Plus précisément, nous avancerons l’hypothèse que tout projet de recherche qui en appellera à l’informatique soit une démarche scientifique que s’il construit une théorie qui contient, en plus des modèles classiques que sont les modèles formel, computationnel et physique, un modèle conceptuel. Ce lieu, où les chercheur-es conceptualisent les multiples dimensions (...) de leur objet de recherche, sera alors défini en tant que socle d’une relation solide entre la sémiotique et l’informatique. Nous verrons que les différentes définitions du modèle conceptuel convergent vers la thèse soutenant que la connaissance scientifique met en œuvre une instance de conceptualisation qui doit identifier les diverses dimensions du problème en plus de devoir s’exprimer de manière à ce qu’elle soit communicable entre les membres des communautés épistémiques. Nous verrons, enfin, qu’un projet de recherché sémiotique exige la construction d’un tel modèle afin de décrire, généraliser et sélectionner des problèmes et que ce même modèle, conceptuel, sera aussi nécessaire si le ou la sémioticien-ne utilise l’informatique dans le cadre de sa recherche.fr. (shrink)

In (Re)Defining Racism, Alberto Urquidez argues that conflicting philosophical accounts over the definition of racism are at bottom linguistic confusions that would benefit from a Wittgensteinian-inspired approach. In this essay, I argue that such an approach would be helpful in disputes over the definition of metaphysically contested concepts, such as “race,” or semantically contested concepts, such as “racialization.” I disagree, however, that such insights would prove helpful or do very little for disputes concerning normatively contested concepts, such as “racism.”.

Chris Hom argued that slurs and pejoratives semantically express complex negative prescriptive properties, which are determined in virtue of standing in external causal relations to social ideologies and practices. He called this view Combinatorial Externalism. Additionally, he argued that Combinatorial Externalism entailed that slurs and pejoratives have null extensions. In this paper, I raise an objection that has not been raised in the literature so far. I argue that semantic theories like Hom’s are forced to choose between two alternatives: either (...) they endorse an externalist semantics that determines prescriptive properties, or they endorse the null extensionality thesis, but they can’t have both. (shrink)

Social constructionist explanations of human thought and behavior hold that our representations produce and regulate the categories, thoughts, and behaviors of those they represent. Performative versions of constructionist accounts explain these thoughts and behaviors as part of an intentional, strategic performance that is elicited and regulated by our representations of ourselves. This paper has four aims. First, I sketch a causal model of performative social constructionist claims. Second, I articulate a puzzling feature of performative claims that makes them seem especially (...) implausible: the puzzle of intention and ignorance. Like other constructionists, performative constructionists are especially interested in explaining thoughts and behaviors that are widely but mistakenly believed to be the unintentional consequences of membership in a natural kind. But why doesn’t the intentional performance of a category undermine this ignorance? My third aim is to resolve this puzzle. I suggest that a plausible understanding can be found in the failure to locate one’s mental states in a causal explanation of one’s thoughts and actions. Finally, I argue that this model implies that the sorts of theories we offer of particular behaviors can create or destroy agency and responsibility with regard to those behaviors. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis of (...) these premises, I argue that it is often neither possible nor desirable to evaluate scientific statements independently of non-epistemic values. Finally, I suggest that considerations of ontological choices do not only challenge the value-free ideal but also help to specify positive roles of non-epistemic values in an often neglected area of scientific practice. (shrink)

Over the last years, the debate over global justice has moved beyond the divide between statist and cosmopolitan, as well as ideal and non-ideal approaches. Rather, a turn to empirical realities has taken place, claiming that normative political philosophy and theory need to address empirical facts about global poverty and wealth. The talk argues that some aspects of the earlier “Critical Theory” and its notions of negativity, praxis, and communicative power allow for a non-empiristic link between normative theory and a (...) well-informed social science analysis that is based on experienced injustice. The analysis of border politics and housing politics will serve as an example for a critical theory of global injustice that addresses regressive as well as emancipative developments in society. (shrink)

Over the last years, the debate over global justice has moved beyond the divide between statist and cosmopolitan, as well as ideal and non-ideal approaches. Rather, a turn to empirical realities has taken place, claiming that normative political philosophy and theory need to address empirical facts about global poverty and wealth. The talk argues that some aspects of the earlier “Critical Theory” and its notions of negativity, praxis, and communicative power allow for a non-empiristic link between normative theory and a (...) well-informed social science analysis that is based on experienced injustice. The analysis of border politics and housing politics will serve as an example for a critical theory of global injustice that addresses regressive as well as emancipative developments in society. (shrink)

This paper employs tools and critiques from analytic feminist scholarship in order to show how particular values commonly on display in analytic theology have served both to marginalize certain voices from the realm of analytic theological debate and to reinforce a particular conception of the divine—one which, despite its historical roots, is not inevitable. I claim that a particular conception of what constitutes a “rational, objective, analytic thinker” often displays certain affinities with those infinite or maximal properties that analytic theologians (...) have taken to be most relevant or essential to their theological conceptions of the divine, and I explore what thinking differently about the former might mean for how we think about the latter and vice versa. (shrink)

The paper is about the connection between logic and discrimination, with special focus on Plumwood’s ideas in her groundbreaking article ‘The Politics of Reason. Towards a Feminist Logic’ (1993). Although Plumwood’s paper is not focused on the notion of discrimination, what she writes is useful for illuminating some basic mechanisms of thought that are at the basis of discriminatory practices. After an introductory section about the concepts of logic and discrimination and their possible interconnections, I present Plumwood’s ideas in 1993 (...) with a special focus on their relevance for understanding the nature of discrimination. More specifically, I use examples of discriminatory practices that make the connection between logical operations and oppression envisaged by Plumwood clear. I focus especially on two questions: Can logic produce discrimination? Can logic contribute to the fight against discrimination? If so, how? (shrink)

In recent analytic philosophy, there is a growing interest in the project of conceptual engineering. This paper examines two ways this project might be applied to scientific research, specifically anthropological research. It argues that both of them are harmful to this research. Specifically, it argues that a reliance on the axiological standards of analytic philosophy conflicts with the goal of empirical adequacy. Section one proffers two forms that the engineering project might take when applied to the science. Section two proffers (...) a case study drawn from anthropology. Specifically, it lays out Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande, paying particular attention to the inconsistency he discovered in Azande witchcraft. Sections three and four argue that attempting to remove this inconsistency via the two forms of engineering disable critical features of emic research and discard empirical findings. Finally, I close by noting how the conflict between axiological standards and empirical adequacy might generalize beyond anthropology. (shrink)

This paper takes as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty’s assertion: “everything will have to begin again, in politics as well as in philosophy”. In pursuing his later work, Merleau-Ponty signalled the need for a reconfiguration of his philosophical vision, so it was no longer caught in Cartesianism and the philosophy of consciousness. This required a turn towards ontology through which he consolidated two key ideas: firstly, a pervasive interdependence articulated in his reversibility thesis and the ontology of ‘flesh’; secondly, a (...) radical contingency at the heart of existence. This paper interrogates the political implications of these ideas, and specifically regarding humanism and human progress. Relatedly, I address the question – how might recognitions of ontological interdependence and radical contingency support a flourishing democracy? Merleau-Ponty’s early political work concerned the issues of his day – Nazism, Marxism and the status of humanism – and did not engage extensively with these emerging onto-political concerns. Nonetheless, there are indicative reflections in the writings and interviews; the political implications of his ontological interrogations become more thematic in the later works. There is no rupture between the earlier and later works regarding his philosophical vision, although he later distanced himself from Marxism with revelations of the gulags under Stalin and the Korean War. The overarching claim of this paper – we need to rethink politics from the ground up beginning with ontology; ontology is political and the political is intrinsically ontologically informed. Getting the ontology ‘right’ is a matter of discovery and not theory choice. (shrink)

Social constructionist analysis of kind terms such as ‘women’ are often criticized as counterintuitive. In response, Haslanger claims that such charges are moot once the distinctions between different types of philosophical analyses and their corresponding concepts are in place. I argue that even with the said distinctions, the Haslangerian definition of ‘women’ is problematic. Drawing on recent discussions on contextualism, metalinguistic negotiation, and the crucial role solidarity plays in politically significant terms, I claim that Haslanger’s replies would lead to consequences (...) contrary to the stated goal of her project. Moreover, I offer a new proposal that takes seriously the aim of ameliorating ‘women.’ My account draws on a dynamic understanding of solidarity based on feminist reconceptualization and makes recourse to Mikkola’s model of trait/norm covariance. Based on the vision that a proper ameliorative analysis in the positive moment should be forward-looking to enhance our coordination in a more just society, my construal elucidates what ‘women’ can and ought to be. (shrink)

The paper aims to apply the epistemologies of ignorance framework to racial issues outside the Anglo-American world, the region where it is has been developed and which has been its almost exclusive focus. Centering on the French context, which is often considered as a unique or particularly acute example of the tension between a republican intellectual tradition of colorblindness, and a lived reality of racial discrimination, the paper identifies two renewed and opposed anti-racist positions in France: a publicly dominant, republican (...) colorblind race-eliminativist position on the one hand, and a critical approach on the other hand. The latter puts the emphasis on the significance of racial concepts as decisive epistemic tools, used to identify specific racial inequalities that tend to remain invisible, even taboo, in the dominant French public discourse. This paper analyzes French republican colorblind race-eliminativism as a distinctive form of epistemology of ignorance that enacts epistemic injustice, and argues that critical anti-racism is a form of epistemology of resistance, aiming at epistemically empowering racialized agents. (shrink)

Does a white philosopher have anything of value to offer to the philosophy of race and racism? If this philosophical subfield must embrace subjective experience, why should we value the perspective of white philosophers whose racial identity is often occluded by racial normativity and who lack substantive experiences of being on the receiving end of racism? Further, if we should be committed to experience, in what sense can the philosophy of race and racism be “objective”? What should that word mean?Tackling (...) this question first, “objective” should at least mean general, that the ideas of the literature can be coherently integrated. An objective take on racism brings together a plurality of perspectives. What’s wrong with just a plurality of satellite ideas? It implies a fragmented approach to ameliorating racism, where different specialists have different recommendations. How can racism, generally, be lessened? If major views of racism are unifiable, then we have a general method to ameliorate racism. This project might appear tone-deaf: a white philosopher unifying things by reducing ideas to some central notion. But this unity isn’t about reducing things but rather integrating them in a way that respects difference. Yet, there’s a reason we should be interested in the white perspective. Whites can speak about racism from a participatory perspective. If whites are knowledgeable, and believe themselves to have no implicit bias, they may suppose they’re “beyond” racism or no longer at risk for perpetuating it. I explore this idea in a psychologically realistic way via my notion of overlooking, where ameliorating racism from the white perspective is an ongoing project. I end by considering how racism is applicable to other philosophical ideas beyond its typical or circumscribed purview. Here, I re-frame responsibility, arguing that we needn’t be forced to choose between responsibility models divided into individual versus social camps. We ought to instead think of responsibility in terms of power, which provides a realistic lens by which persons and groups are held to account. In being more generally convincing, it might actually get folks to take responsibility where they might not otherwise—theory in service of praxis. (shrink)

What is it for an analytic philosopher to do ideology critique? Just how useful are the proprietary tools of analytic philosophy when it comes to thinking about ideology, and in what sense ‘useful’, and to whom? And to what end might analytic philosophers pursue ideology critique? Here I attempt to say something about these questions by commenting on a recent contribution to analytic ideology critique, Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works.¿Qué significa para un filósofo analítico hacer crítica de la ideología? ¿En (...) qué medida son útiles las herramientas propias de la filosofía analítica cuando se trata de pensar sobre la ideología, y en qué sentido de ‘útiles’, y para quién? Y ¿con qué fin podrían emprender los filósofos analíticos la crítica de la ideología? Aquí pretendo decir algo acerca de estas cuestiones comentando una reciente contribución a la crítica analítica de la idelogía, la obra de Jason Stanley How Propaganda Works. (shrink)

This monograph discusses the question of what it is to be a reason – mainly in practical ethics – and proposes an original contribution to metaethics.It critically examines theories of metaethical realism, constructivism and error theory and identifies several misunderstandings or unclarities in contemporary debates. Based on this examination, the book suggests a distinction between a conceptual question, that can be answered by pure first-personal thinking, and a material question, that targets responses to reasons as a natural phenomenon in space (...) and time and that can be answered by help of the sciences. While this book defends a sharp distinction between these approaches, it also argues that the insights gained by the distinct approaches can be fruitfully integrated into a comprehensive picture.The comprehensive picture promoted in this book, based on both philosophical analysis and resources from psychology and cognitive science, is a picture of reasons as items in a collective archive of mind – reconfiguring the “domain of reasons” as a collectively established and socially cultivated fund of considerations with normative weight. The developed Collective Archive View combines Reasons Fundamentalism as an answer to the conceptual question, with a social ontological proposal, similar to Haslanger’s critical realism, as an answer to the material question.Thereby, it introduces central ideas from the field of social metaphysics into metaethics. At the same time, it offers a way of settling some controversies within metaethics, going on between proponents of Reasons Fundamentalism and Constitutivism, realism and constructivism, as well as proponents of mind-dependence and mind-independence of normative facts. Finally, the proposal enables us to envision and conceptualize genuine normative change within a metaethical theory. (shrink)

Feminist metaphysics is simultaneously feminist theorizing and metaphysics. Part of feminist metaphysics concerns social ontology and considers such questions as, What is the nature of social kinds, such as genders? Feminist metaphysicians also consider whether gendered perspectives influence metaphysical theorizing; for example, have approaches to the nature of the self or free will been conducted from a masculinist perspective, and would a feminist perspective yield different theories? Some feminist metaphysicians develop metaphysical theories with the aim of furthering certain social goals, (...) such as gender equality. Despite these and other intriguing research projects, feminist metaphysics faces challenges from two flanks: one might argue that "feminist metaphysics" is not metaphysics, or one might argue that it is not feminist. Recently, Elizabeth Barnes has made the case that, since contemporary accounts of the nature of metaphysics focus primarily on the fundamental, they have the problematic implication that feminist metaphysics is not, properly speaking, metaphysics. However, less emphasis has been paid, of late, to the idea that major strands of feminist thought also problematize feminist metaphysics. I will briefly assess the metaphysician's case against feminist metaphysics in Section 2 of this chapter. Then, in Section 3, I will examine in more detail possible feminist concerns over metaphysics. In Section 4, I sketch a different conception of metaphysics that avoids both mainstream and feminist challenges to feminist metaphysics. (shrink)

My aim in this dissertation is to analyze Black oppression and White domination. I attempt to show how social systems unjustly diminish Black Americans’ opportunities to form and pursue their conceptions of good lives and unjustly strengthen White Americans’ opportunities for the same. I believe that the accounts of Black oppression and White domination I offer are more adept at identifying the expansive and varied wrongs of Black oppression in America, analyzing the relationship between theorizing oppression and addressing oppression through (...) social and political change in America, and demonstrating the ways that Whites benefit from and are incentivized to maintain oppressive systems in America, than the accounts put forward by other theorists. In Chapter 1, I begin by discussing why I frame my project in terms of oppressive “wrongs” rather than “harms”. I worry the term ‘harm’ may be taken to imply that one has experienced subjective suffering or a measurable loss, whereas I am concerned with instantiations of oppressive systems even when they don’t cause the person subject to the oppressive system to experience a measurable loss or subjective suffering. In an effort to describe how I identify wrongs, I then argue that in virtue of the deep importance of freely pursuing one’s chosen life plan, any barriers one faces in pursuing his or her life plan must be justifiable. Barriers one experiences in virtue of his or her race are typically not justifiable. On this basis, I argue for my principle of racial injustice, which states that individuals are prima facie wronged by socially constructed barriers to their abilities to form and seek their conception of a good life if those barriers exist in virtue of their race. The “prima facie” nature of the wrongness is significant, I argue, because correcting the injustices of Black oppression will require that Whites face some barriers to pursuing our life plans that we do not currently face; it is not the case, then, that every race-based barrier is truly wrongful. I then discuss my understanding of race, arguing that race’s mutability across contexts and how one’s race is intimately tied to systems of subordination and domination support my view that race is socially constructed. I end with a brief history of White domination and Black subordination in the U.S. In Chapter 2, I outline general experiences of racism as espoused by Black writers and the statistical data that support these accounts. I then take a deep look at mass incarceration, including a history of the system, its disproportional impact on Black Americans, and the many resulting injustices inflicted largely on incarcerated Black Americans, their families, and their communities. I specifically highlight the recognition-wrongs inflicted on Black Americans through mass incarceration, where recognition-wrongs are acts that function primarily as a mode of dehumanizing individuals. Recognition-wrongs include verbal degradation through things like slurs, but also epistemic injustices, a concept developed by Miranda Fricker and others to identify injustices that wrong individuals in virtue of their status as knowers and communicators of knowledge. I then discuss kinship-wrongs, a concept I develop to identify wrongs that impact people’s ability to form and maintain relationships. I highlight and conceptualize these wrongs in an attempt to draw attention to their significance in racial subordination. In Chapter 3, I develop an account of oppression that is particularly responsive to race-based wrongs. I begin by showing why the influential accounts authored by Iris Marion Young and Ann Cudd are unsatisfactory for capturing Black oppression. I attempt to develop an account that is sensitive to the experiences of subordination detailed by Black Americans, equipped to address the material harms of oppression, and also able to make sense of the recognition- and kinship-wrongs raised in Chapter 2. I ultimately determine that a member of a c-group is subject to an oppressive wrong when, in virtue of his or her or their membership in that c-group, he or she or they suffer wrongs that are systematically perpetrated through social, political, or legal norms, conventions, or practices. A c-group is any collection of persons who share some set of constraints, incentives, penalties, and the like. I end the chapter by carefully describing my commitments to each clause of the definition of oppression, beginning by analyzing c-groups, describing systematically perpetrated wrongs, explaining what it means to be wronged in virtue of one’s c-group membership, and showing that my account of oppression is sensitive to both material and recognition-wrongs. In Chapter 4, I argue that we ought to understand oppression in the framework of a capabilities approach. I begin by explaining the concept of capabilities, which are real opportunities to function in particular ways. I then argue that securing capabilities is a better aim for justice than ensuring that people function in certain valuable ways because a focus on capabilities protects people’s opportunities to pursue the kinds of lives they want to live, respecting their interest in freely determining their life goals, while a focus on protecting valuable functionings inappropriately prescribes life goals to them. I show how capabilities can be utilized as part of a theory of justice, and argue that my utilization of capabilities, combined with the other moral commitments I defend throughout the dissertation, comprises a rectificatory theory of racial justice aimed at eliminating Black oppression. I argue that through the framework of capabilities, I can analyze both the material and recognition-wrongs of oppression, avoid the kinds of bad idealizations that often skew our understanding of oppressive systems and their impact, and make judgments about modern day society without developing an account of perfect justice. I next show that to avoid inflicting further recognition-wrongs, it is essential that oppressed peoples are the primary arbiters of which capabilities and oppressive systems should be prioritized in policy and advocacy. I conclude Chapter 4 with a brief sketch of how we can turn the priorities of the oppressed into public policy, moving from the prioritization process, to policy development, to implementing policies, and finally to monitoring and revising them. My final chapter, Chapter 5, shows how my account can also be used to analyze the norms of White domination that coincide with Black oppression. I begin by discussing “correlative capabilities,” which are those capabilities that are strengthened for Whites in virtue of the fact that Whites are not subject to oppression as Black Americans are. My discussion of correlative capabilities maps closely onto the advantages typically described as White privilege. I then turn to more insidious advantages Whites gain from Black oppression. I argue that oppressive norms advantage Whites by creating a social structure that empowers us with the capabilities to dominate racial narratives and ignore our racialized identities. The capability to dominate racial narratives consists in Whites’ abilities to pontificate on racialized events without justification for our views and still have our perspectives treated as mainstream, worthy of debate, and often as nearly definitive. I demonstrate this capability in action by examining Colin Kaepernick’s protest in the NFL, the coverage it received, and his resulting treatment. I then discuss Whites’ capability to ignore our racialized identities, showing how we establish Whiteness as a central, unconditioned perspective. Whites see ourselves as “simply people,” while seeing non-Whites as raced. This leads to Whites promoting color-blind conceptions of justice, which move us farther from true justice by ignoring social norms’ impact on policy development and implementation. I then show how Whites may go one step further and argue that we are victimized by “reverse racism” when efforts are made to eliminate oppressive systems. Finally, I end Chapter 5 with a discussion of how Whites are also disadvantaged by Black oppression, particularly in our capabilities to perform our jobs well, live morally, and establish and maintain relationships. I then conclude the dissertation by discussing how we might teach race-sensitive virtues in an effort to change White-favorable social norms. (shrink)

Transcendental materialism is a philosophical perspective that uses German Idealism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and natural science to offer a materialist account of subjectivity and culture. This essay compares this philosophical framework with recent work in the study of religion and philosophy of religion. While transcendental materialism has until now been unconcerned with religion, it offers parallels with this recent work. It differs, however, in its specific understanding of the material dimension of the dialectical relationship between abstraction/conceptuality and practice/embodiment.