This project explores the political economy, logic, strategies, agents, values, and ethical implications of this latest iteration of modern capitalism, and it seeks to delineate what surveillance capitalism is and what its consequences are for human dignity and worth. Using technologies of which they are ignorant, surveillance capitalists interfere with our ability to become ourselves individually and collectively. Without consent, they invade privacy, impede moral autonomy, harm democracy, and muddle care. Surveillance capitalists also violate a number of foundational ethical principles, (...) failing the standards of Kant, Mill, and Aristotle. I sketch out a broad alternative to surveillance capitalism, one where our media systems are built on decentered understandings of a care-based democracy. Reinvigorating both the press and collective self-government, the caring digital citizen has less need for surveillance, requiring good faith understanding and the moral autonomy to pursue excellence. (shrink)

Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is framed by a comprehensive theory of living nature. Central to this philosophical biology is the claim that animals lack self-consciousness but their awareness of their surroundings is nevertheless anchored in a self. Since Plessner does not explain how this unselfconscious self is manifest to the animal, the warrant for his claim remains unclear. Following Plessner’s construal of human existence as a radically transformed variant of animal life, I argue that he leaves animals’ selfhood unaccounted for (...) because he overlooks the animal precursor of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, which affords a pre-reflective self-awareness. I fill this lacuna by drawing on Kant’s and Plessner’s theories of human feelings, Hans Jonas’s conception of animal emotion,and recent arguments that make evaluative affects fundamental to animal consciousness. Revised along these lines, Plessner’s framework allows us to specify how animal affectivity is transformed in self-conscious human life. (shrink)

Patriotism is not commonly associated with freedom. Even less so when Hegel is evoked. By reading Hegel’s concept of patriotism through the lens of revolutionary France, I present a notion of patriotism that is tied to the realization of freedom. This paper demonstrates what happens when Hegel’s philosophy of law is re-read through the political philosophy of the French Revolution itself. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and its lectures are marked by tensions. The legacy it leaves traces it leaves behind can (...) be re-appropriated to explore the inconclusive hints left by the philosopher. The idea of patriotism is one of them, simply defined as an intersubjective link between the concrete individual and the state or as particular and general interests coinciding. This paper expands this analysis by introducing two elements: Hegel’s discussion on the character of the law and how it comes to be law; and the revolutionary phenomenon itself. The revolutionaries’ views on patriotism and its functions within a revolutionary moment can help us transform the mere traces left by Hegel into a wider vision that incorporates and promotes freedom. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to present the rule of law universalism as a relevant theoretical and socio-political issue that critical legal thought needs to contend with. In order to do so, this issue is described through a Marxist theoretical framework, which aids in identifying the consequences of this universalism. Furthermore, the Marxist theoretical framework is suggested as a countermeasure that allows for going beyond it. The rule of law universalism is analysed as a process connected to establishing (...) hegemony and status quo that affects both the way the law is thought of and practiced. The post-communist context serves in fleshing out some of these consequences. Although the transition is not the main subject of inquiry, it is a starting point to a set of philosophical questions directed towards the rule of law universalism, mainly regarding historical embeddedness and socio-political dependency of the rule of law. The transitional context illustrates the tension between the rule of law treated as a generalized blueprint and the reality it is introduced to. The method of approach to this tension argued for in this paper is Marxian theorization of concept as an interplay between concrete and abstract that underlies historical materialism. This movement within concept is juxtaposed to the universalism. The philosophical investigations are followed by findings from Marxist legal theory that pinpoint the importance of concrete interventions into the legal theory that abate its ever-growing abstractness. In particular, the import of knowledges and practices divorced from the capitalist system is brought into focus. The paper concludes with a brief assessment of the possibility of overturning the rule of law universalism and a discussion on the emancipatory potential of law. (shrink)

A well-known term in eighteenth-century literature and philosophy, the “beautiful soul” (die schöne Seele) has resurfaced in recent years. Deleuze refers to the beautiful soul’s “religiosity” and argues that aggressive “selection” is necessary as its antidote. However, in volatile contexts of social destabilization, such selection risks recoiling into reactionary violence. After first developing in more detail the beautiful soul’s background as a discursive figure, I argue that understanding Deleuze’s selection within a context of spiritual experience is necessary to mitigate this (...) worry. Exploration of this experience is pursued through juxtaposition of Deleuze’s thought with Nishida Kitarō’s investigation of the ontological structure of religious consciousness. The comparative resonances I develop suggest an ontological objectivity to the problems and structuring of the logos of religious consciousness and show how a more explicitly spiritual rendering of “selection,” developed through the Deleuze/Nishida encounter, intervenes into the broader beautiful soul problematic. (shrink)

Purpose. The article highlights the demand for critical thinking in everyday life at the present stage of development of globalized culture and emphasizes the role of philosophy as a source of rationality. Philosophizing, which is determined by the psychosociocultural matrix, sets the toposes, vocabulary and rhythms of meaning making, their preservation and transformation. The purpose of the article is to concretize the practices of socio-cultural communication, primarily through the social institute of education, where individuals interact with the psychosociocultural matrix of (...) philosophizing, which mediate the general and individual level in philosophical culture. Theoretical basis of the study are cultural anthropology and phenomenological methods. Originality of the study: based on the philosophy of intersubjectivity, we actualized the rational grounds for formation of adequate judgments in modern culture at the level of everyday life. This justifies the inevitability of the spread of various forms and types of philosophical education, philosophical thinking, ideas and values developed in philosophical communities beyond the narrow circle of professional philosophers. This implies the systemic involvement of philosophers as professionals of meaning-making in solving problems in various non-academic fields – politics, economics, law, etc. The formation of skills of philosophical critical thinking in the process of preparing young people for active civil life is no less important aspect of this. Conclusions lead to an understanding of the existential importance of philosophy and philosophizing and the need for organized forms of knowledge transfer such as the Faculty of Philosophy of the Classical University. There is a mutual interest and interaction of the general culture of society and philosophy as a special kind of culture. Because philosophy actively configures other forms of culture, contributes to the creation of sociocultural identities precisely because of its ability to conceptually reproduce the core of the psychosociocultural matrix that underlies the existence of all these different forms within one society. The sociocultural macro level of philosophical spiritual practices is formed by the psychosociocultural matrix of the philosophical tradition, which retains its longevity from the emergence of philosophy and goes through its history, demonstrating the features of the national reception of philosophy as a national-specific embodiment of sociocultural macro level of the psychosociocultural matrix. (shrink)

Yì 義 presents dual categories in classical Confucian conception. The first category is ethical-role duty originated from Zhou 周 ritual culture, which was a set of social norms defining ethical duties that fit each person’s role and status in the kinship group and society and regulating what was appropriate for a person’s behavior. The second category is moral conscience and rightness resulted from the internalization of social norms and ethical duties. From Confucius to Mencius, Xunzi 荀子, and others, while inheriting (...) and elaborating yì’s ethical implication of role duty from Zhou ritual culture, they also gradually internalized yì to become the subject’s moral conscience of doing right things. During this process, classical Confucianism gradually formed an ethico-moral conception of yì as both role duty and moral rightness that abridged the dual categories of social norms for interpersonal relations and moral values for personal autonomy. (shrink)

In this paper I present an interpretation of Deleuze's concept of the virtual. I argue that this concept is best understood in relation to the problematic of individuation or differentiation, which Deleuze inherits from Duns Scotus. After analysing Scotus' critique of Aristotelian or hylomorphic approaches to the problem of individuation, I turn to Deleuze's account of differentiation and his interpretation of the calculus in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition. The paper seeks thereby to explicate Deleuze's dialectics or theory of (...) Ideas, his approach to the principle of sufficient reason, and the concept of the virtual itself. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 72-91, Spring 2021.

In this paper I made an attempt to discuss how the concept of alienation has been discussed in G.W.F. Hegel’s (1770–1831) social philosophy. In Hegel’s philosophy, alienation is part of the process of self-creativity and self-discovery. According to Hegel, initially our consciousness is alienated from itself. It cannot understand its own true nature. In order to realize its own true nature consciousness’s needs to develop absolute knowledge. The development of consciousness’s absolute knowledge is possible through the overcoming of self-alienation of (...) consciousness. Here, concept of alienation plays an important role in bringing consciousness to the shape of itself called absolute knowing. According to Hegel, consciousness cannot easily know itself with certainty. Consciousness has to develop its self-understanding to fully understand itself. In his discussion of the concept of alienation Hegel compares the dialectic of self-consciousness and consciousness which is not self-realised with the famous dialectic of the lord and the bondsman. It means while discussing the relation of lord and bondsman Hegel compares lord with independent consciousness and bondsman with dependent consciousness. This dialectic of lord and bondsman is sometimes referred to as the dialectic of the master and the slave relationship. In the productive system when everybody regards themselves to be producer and as a member of productive activity, when everybody participates in the large collaborative activity, then there exists no alienation in the society. But when people forget this identity then alienation arises in the society. Hegel thinks that when our consciousness reaches at the stage of itself called Absolute knowledge then it clearly comes to know that it is a differentiated spiritual unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Then it comes to know its own true nature and it overcomes its self-alienation. In the same way in society people overcome their self-alienation when everyone can think themselves to be a part of the whole community. In the present study, I shall deal with how Hegel has applied the concept of alienation in his social philosophy and how does he try to show that through overcoming his alienation a man gets united with the other or the whole community. (shrink)

In this journal, Robert Smithson argues that considerations stemming from Kantian and post-Kantian idealism undermine naturalistic arguments that seek to debunk elements of the ‘manifest image’ in favour of the ‘scientific image’. The idealist tradition, on this view, holds that philosophy’s task is to uncover and clarify the principles and norms which underlie different forms of inquiry, and is thus well placed to dispel the apparent ‘placement’ problems that stem from the collision of our ordinary worldview with contemporary philosophical naturalism. (...) Smithson also argues that this idealist critique of naturalism is preferable to the Liberal Naturalist critique of naturalism. In this response, I argue that Smithson’s view contains a gap which the naturalist can exploit to evade idealist critique, but that a Hegelian idealism contains no such gap, making it the better idealist choice. Further, I argue that that Hegelian idealism is itself plausibly a version of liberal naturalism. (shrink)

This article argues that the problem of modernity concerns the circumstances of existence and human destiny in modern times. To understand the nature of this problem and find the corresponding solution, we need to reinterpret the thought of Karl Marx regarding the contradictions of human existence and its historical dimensions. Following Marx's line of thinking, this article reviews his critical sequence, creative transformation, and development of duality of thought on man and the world in Western history, focusing on the following (...) four issues: how Marx, on the basis of man's sensuous objective activities, observes the duality of man and the world as well as the relationship between man's internal and external activities; how Marx discloses the true connotation and real significance of man's historical existence, history, and historicity; how Marx reveals the inherent contradictions of modern capitalist society and the destiny of modern man based on historic thought concerning man's existence; and by praising Marx's views on material production and the eternal significance of ancient Greek culture, the article reveals another dimension of Marx's thought, a dimension that tends to be ignored. This article holds that in this era of globalization, it is extremely important and urgent to have an in-depth understanding of Marx's historical thoughts regarding human existence and of the feasibility of his theory. Moreover, it is imperative to further develop this understanding to create a clearer picture of our own path of development and our outlook on humanity. (shrink)

Human life is defined between diverse extremes: birth and death, nothing and infinity. Theater tries to stage something of this between-being and bring it out of its recess in everyday life. What can be called a metaxological philosophy can illuminate this between-condition. “ Metaxu ” is the Greek word for “between,” while “ logos ” can mean an accounting, or reasoning, or wording. A metaxological philosophy of the theatre would look on it as staging the between . Can we say (...) that the theatrical stage, as an intermedium of human communication, is a distinctive wording of the between? Can a metaxological philosophy throw light on what is staged on it, in and through it? In light of this philosophy of the metaxu, reflections are offered on essential themes such as: the space of the stage, the intermediation of inter-action, the shaping of plot, the openness of endings, the tragic and the comic, the sacred and the profane. (shrink)

In this paper I address a Euthyphro problem associated with personal love. Do we love someone because we have reasons for loving that person or do we have reasons for loving that person because we love her? I argue that a relational view of identity will help us move some distance towards resolving this dilemma. But the relational view itself needs to be further supplemented by examining the role that imagination plays both in personal identity and in our experience of (...) love. (shrink)

The paper develops the claim that in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard conceptualizes a demoralized understanding of sin. Rather than interpreting sin as moral guilt, he proposes a concept of sin that takes the form of alienation. The claim is unfolded in a three-step argumentation: First, we identify crucial hermeneutical issues and stress the role of the pseudonyms within Kierkegaard’s writings. Second, we offer a detailed analysis of the theory of self-consciousness developed by Anti-Climacus. Finally, using the romantic interpretation of (...) Kierkegaard as a foundation, we demonstrate how Anti-Climacus conceptualizes sin as alienation. (shrink)

This article reconstructs and evaluates a debate between Pippin and Žižek over the proper interpretation of Hitchcock’s Vertigo, in relation to Hegel’s concept of reconciliation. Both Pippin and Žižek agree that Vertigo exemplifies Hegelian reconciliation: Scottie exhibits Hegel’s reconciliatory “negation of negation” when he realizes that his lost love Madeleine had really been Judy all along, thereby losing his original loss. Yet Pippin and Žižek disagree on the precise significance of the concept of reconciliation both for the film and for (...) the contemporary world. Žižek argues for a revolutionary reading of reconciliation in Vertigo: we learn from reconciliation that we must make a revolutionary break from the present world, in order to bring about a wholly new world. Pippin argues for a reformist reading of reconciliation in Vertigo: we learn from reconciliation that we must find the “traces of reason” latent in the present world, in order to gradually reform it for the better. Ultimately, I argue that Žižek’s reading offers the more authentically Hegelian approach to interpreting Hitchcock’s Vertigo. But if nothing else, the Pippin-Žižek debate demonstrates the profound intellectual fecundity of the intersections between film and philosophy for understanding our current historical moment. (shrink)

My aim is to prove that Hermann Cohen was not only a philosopher of dialogue but has played an exceedingly important role in the history of that current of thought. His books Ethics of Pure Will (1904) and Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism (1919) offer a detailed analysis of the relationships between I and Thou, I and It, I and We. In the first book these relationships are considered from the ethical-legal point of view and in (...) the second from the viewpoint of religious anthropology. However, Cohen considers the problem of inter-personal relationships not in isolation, but as an important component of his entire philosophical system. Deduction of the concept of personality in Ethics of Pure Will is based on Cohen’s logic of the origin expounded in the first part of his system in The Logic of Pure Cognition. Cohen explains that the origin of the self-consciousness of I as a personality is not the external world, but another person, i.e. Thou. In turn, the partnership relationships between I and Thou create the community We which forms the basis of the law-governed state. The process of artistic creation in the framework of inter-personal relationship is explored in Aesthetics of Pure Feeling. Finally, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism formulates the conception of religion as the most complete realisation of inter-personal relationship. Thus, dialogism became an important dimension of Cohen’s entire philosophical system, a fact noted by Martin Buber. Franz Rosenzweig, in unfolding dialogical thinking, expressly appeals to all the elements of Cohen’s system. There are signs of his influence on Bakhtin’s doctrine. Thus, examining Cohen’s doctrine as part of the philosophy of dialogue gives insights into this entire trend as a coherent whole. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Imre Lakatos’s account on the relation between the history and the philosophy of science, if properly understood and also if properly modified, can be valuable for the philosophical comprehension of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. The paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part, I provide a charitable exegesis of the Lakatosian conception of the history of science in order to show that Lakatos’s history cannot be (...) a caricature. In the second part, I describe what I believe are the real problems of Lakatos’s account on a metaphysical and on a methodological level. In order to address these problems, I take advantage of the recent critique of the so-called “confrontation model”. Finally, in the third part, I suggest that a proper modification of Lakatos’s perspective can resolve the aforementioned problems without distorting Lakatos’s central aspiration, which is that the philosophical theories of scientific rationality can be assessed with the help of the history of science without losing their normative content. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the debate about how the overdemandingness objection applies to Kant's ethics. I first look at the versions of the overdemandingness objections Kant himself levels against other ethicists and ethical principles and I discuss in what sense he acknowledges overdemandingness as a problem. Then I argue that, according to Kant's own standards, introspection about the moral worthiness of one's actions can constitute forms of moral overdemandingness. Self-scrutiny and Kant's well-known claim that we can never be certain that (...) we acted for the right reason jeopardize agents’ deserved happiness. Furthermore, self-scrutiny can constitute an activity Kant himself criticizes under the labels of “micrology” and “fantastic virtue”. The demandingness of critical self-scrutiny has not yet received due attention in the overdemandingness debate since this debate is focused on duties we have towards others. (shrink)

This article assesses the role of Immanuel Kant’s ideas in the historical philosophy of Gustav Shpet (1879—1937). This theme has been largely ignored by Shpet scholars who have concentrated on comparing his logical-methodological theories with the ideas of representatives of phenomenology (E. Husserl, R. Ingarden and others) and hermeneutics (F. Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey, H. Lipps, H.-G. Gadamer and others). Accordingly, the authors consistently reconstruct “the sphere of conversation” within which Shpet’s concept of “historical philosophy” was formed and reveal the place (...) and role of Kant’s ideas in Shpet’s theories (with particular focus on the Plato-Kant antithesis). Among Shpet’s “interlocutors” with whom he discusses Kant and thus “ploughs” the field of historical philosophy are G. I. Chelpanov and E. Husserl, B. Bolzano and A. Trendelenburg, F. Heman and M. Frischeisen-Kohler. We have attached Shpet’s notes on Kant in the archive of his family. Shpet’s attitude to Kant was controversial (while of course largely critical) and yet he was aware that Kant was the foundation of European philosophy and that his efforts to resolve the epistemological problem merit a second, thorough examination and a retracing of the path followed by Kant. The authors show that Shpet’s notes on Kant have more than historical-philosophical relevance. They enable us to take a new look at many theoretical and cognitive problems and, even more importantly, make us rethink the fundamental tenets of philosophy and the methodology of scientific cognition. (shrink)

This paper looks at a constellation of three interrelated figures, the hypocrite, the imposter, and the chameleon, all of whom deceive others and at times themselves as they present themselves and are examined by others in different social settings. On closer examination, different facets of their public presentations come to light, some related to their motives, some to the expected goals of their conduct. The conduct of hypocrites overlaps with and resembles imposters insofar as they both suggest a possible nefarious (...) intentionality associated with undeserved outcomes or gains, as compared with chameleons, who seem at most to camouflage themselves in order to become undetected in their environments. The deceptive (and occasionally self-deceptive) character of the conduct of all three figures (whether understood interchangeably or not) remains of interest beyond the circles of social theorists and political pundits at least in the sense that it is condemnable as much as it is condemning, though to different degrees. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We can best understand Marx’s economic thought by seeing it as implicitly relying upon and reworking a Hegelian philosophy of history, which was deeply salvific and soteriological in its basic structure. Hegel’s philosophy of history reworked the Christian narrative of man’s fall, his redemption through Christ’s atonement, and his return to a state of reconciliation with God in the life of the Christian church. Thus, the loss of the organic form of community found in the Greek polis was a (...) fall that was atoned for in the religious alienation found in both Judaism and Christianity, where man is treated as separated from a transcendent God. The reconciliation between man and God is found, finally, in the reconciliation of the modern, rational state. Early on Marx adopted Hegel’s philosophy of history, but its basic structure remains even in his mature economic work. There he envisions the loss of the organic unity of primitive communism, and the alienation of individuals from the larger social totality of feudalism and capitalism. Under communism, however, individuals are reconciled with the larger social whole through the collective mastery of the products of labor. (shrink)

Marietta Kies and Lucia Ames Mead were two late nineteenth-century thinkers who anticipated the late twentieth-century feminist "ethic of care." Kies drew on Hegel's philosophy to develop a political theory of altruism. Ames Mead adopted Kant's theory of peace and established a pacifist theory based on international cooperation. Both Kies and Mead insisted that the prototypically "feminine" ideals they espoused are rational, not emotional, responses to modern political life, and are essential to good political practice. Kies was a member of (...) the early Hegelian movement and Christian Socialist movement. Ames Mead was a member of the Woman's Peace Party and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and an early proponent of the League of Nations. (shrink)

Nursing has a gendered and religious history where ideas of duty and servitude are present and shape its professional identity. The profession also promotes idealized notions of relationships with patients and of professional autonomy both of which are, in practice, highly constrained or even impossible. This paper draws on psychoanalytic concepts in order to reconsider nursing's professional identity. It does this by presenting an analysis of data from two focus group studies involving nurses in England and Australia held between 2010 (...) and 2012. The studies gave rise to data where extremely negative talk about nursing work seemed to produce, or to be expressed with, a high degree of energy, and a particular kind of enjoyment. In our analysis, we focus on the nurses' apparent enjoyment derived from their expression of a position of powerlessness in which they describe themselves as ‘slaves’ or ‘martyrs’ in the health care system. We interpret this as jouissance and suggest that the positions of slave or martyr provide a possible response to what we argue is the impossibility of the nurse's role. We argue that a remnant of a quasi‐religious ethic within the profession makes it acceptable for nurses to talk about self‐sacrifice and powerlessness as part of their working subjectivity. We further argue that this analysis offers a new consideration of the issue of power and professional identity in nursing that goes beyond seeing nurses as simply overpowered by, or engaged in, a gendered power struggle with other professional groups. We suggest that powerlessness and victimhood hold particular attractions and advantages for nurses and are positions that are more available to nurses than to other occupational groups. This research shows how psychoanalytic theory can help produce new insights into the problems and complexity of nursing and extend existing study of the professions. (shrink)

Формування рефлексії як схеми мислення та тригера практичної дії у стародавньому світі було важливим чинником виникнення феномена «вісьового часу» (К.Ясперс). У цей період виникли мораль як рефлексія та регулятор вольової діяльності, логіка як рефлексивне відслідковування істинності руху думки, демократія як рефлексивне взаємовизнання громадянами гідності один одного, монотеїстичні релігії (юдаїзм, брахманізм, веданта, християнство, деякі школи будизму), а також класична філософія. Рефлексія як компонент самосвідомості стала важливим механізмом самоорганізації ідентичності, починаючи з вісьового часу. Сократ виявив необхідність рефлексивного усвідомлення відмінності загального від одиничного (...) у процесі мислення та сприяв усвідомленню моралі як форми суспільної свідомості. Платон сформулював ідею мислення як бесіди душі із самою собою та рефлексивного осмисленного переходу від однієї ідеї до іншої у процесі мислення. Аристотель з’ясував, що відчуття, сприйняття, уява супроводжуються своєрідним сприйняттям-мисленням (усвідомленням, рефлексією), але останнє є вищим за природою, ніж перші, та, на противагу цьому, розум мислить божественне, що є однією природою з ним, і є мисленням мислення. (shrink)

: The importance of Hegel to the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, both to her early philosophical texts and to The Second Sex, is usually discussed in terms of the master-slave dialectic and a Kojève–influenced reading, which some see her as sharing with Sartre, others persuasively describe as divergent from and corrective to Sartre's. Altman shows that Hegel's influence on Beauvoir's work is also wider, both in terms of what she takes on board and what she works through and rejects, (...) and that her reading of Hegel is crucially inflected by two additional circumstances that Sartre did not entirely share: the experience of her first serious study of Hegel as a noncombatant in Paris during the German occupation and her earlier direct exposure to an eccentric, idealist reading of Hegel as developed by the group Philosophies in connection with surrealism and the artistic avant-garde. Altman also explores the afterlife of Hegel's influence on Beauvoir on second-wave feminism in the United States and Europe, and suggests continuing relevance to feminist theory today. (shrink)

: Reading Hegel's 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion alongside his Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that his vision for becoming a self-conscious subject—or seeing (oneself as) "spirit"—requires taking responsibility for the insight that every act of reason expresses an experience of sexual difference. It entails working to bring into being communities whose conceptions of gender and the absolute realize this idea.

Reading Hegel's 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion alongside his Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that his vision for becoming a self-conscious subject-or seeing (oneself as) "spirit"-requires taking responsibility for the insight that every act of reason expresses an experience of sexual difference. It entails working to bring into being communities whose conceptions of gender and the absolute realize this idea.

: One of the problems with a superficial reading of "Belief Itself" and "Women, the Sacred, Money" is that Irigaray is too easily understood as merely saying that woman is the hidden victim of sacrifice and that one is called to reveal this hidden victim. While this is an important aspect of Irigaray's work, a more radical interpretation is opened up when it is read alongside the work of Lacan and Žižek. Irigaray's work disturbs the traditional discourses on revelation, sacrifice, (...) and woman on one level while at the same time reinforcing their most extreme ramifications. (shrink)

One of the problems with a superficial reading of “Belief Itself” and “Women, the Sacred, Money” is that Irigaray is too easily understood as merely saying that woman is the hidden victim of sacrifice and that one is called to reveal this hidden victim. While this is an important aspect of Irigaray's work, a more radical interpretation is opened up when it is read alongside the work of Lacan and Žižek. Irigaray's work disturbs the traditional discourses on revelation, sacrifice, and (...) woman on one level while at the same time reinforcing their most extreme ramifications. (shrink)

This contribution seeks to understand the pervasive phenomenon of work compulsion among knowledge workers in our present network society. Knowledge workers not only have to work all the time from anywhere, but they also appear to want to. This study argues that this curious phenomenon may be attributed to the thumotic satisfaction that knowledge work generates. What is more, the neoliberal theory of human capital has found a way to harness thumotic satisfaction to the profit incentive, and has created arguably (...) the most productive working subject to date. The argument is divided into four parts: First, the paper analyses the government(- ality) of control operative in the network society by defining “neoliberalism”. It then focuses on Foucault’s examinations of German and American neoliberalism in the 20th century, treating them as instances of governmentality. The aim is to assess whether employing a governmentality lens is a valid approach for critically analysing present-day neoliberalism. If it proves justifiable, which I argue it does, the study explores the potential valuable insights gained from examining contemporary neoliberalism through this particular analytical framework. Second, the study turns to the “spiritedness” of knowledge workers under the conditions of stealth control that typify the neoliberal network society. Curiously, these highly engaged workers have reportedly experienced increased overall well-being. However, their overinvestment in work appears to be disproportionate to absolute necessity, increased earnings or improved overall quality of life. This paper contends that work compulsion generates and is in turn fuelled by thumotic satisfaction. Third, the study tries to ascertain the connection between neoliberal governmentality and thumos. Neoliberal governmentality appears to have found a way to appropriate thumotic satisfaction to produce and sustain the competitive entrepreneurial spirit. The fourth part of the study considers how the knowledge worker might resist the compulsion to work incessantly. (shrink)

This article has two aims: to bring Judith Butler and Wilfrid Sellars into conversation; and to argue that Butler's poststructuralist critique of feminist identity politics has metaphilosophical potential, given her pragmatic parallel with Sellars's critique of conceptual analyses of knowledge. With regard to, I argue that Butler's objections to the definitional practice constitutive of certain ways of construing feminism is comparable to Sellars's critique of the analytical project geared toward providing definitions of knowledge. Specifically, I propose that moving away from (...) a definition of woman to what one may call poststructuralist sites of woman parallels moving away from a definition of knowledge to a pragmatic account of knowledge as a recognizable standing in the normative space of reasons. With regard to, I argue that the important parallels between Butler's poststructuralist feminism and Sellars's antirepresentationalist normative pragmatism about knowledge enable one to think of her poststructuralist feminism as mapping out pragmatic cognitive strategies and visions for doing philosophy. This article starts a conversation between two philosophers whom the literature has yet to fully introduce to each other. (shrink)

In this article, I will respond to questions regarding the ontological status of relations by exploring Whitehead's pivotal notion of solidarity, especially focusing on the recently published Harvard lectures. Particularly, I shall investigate how solidarity become a metaphysical law in the development of Whitehead's thought, also exploiting other Whiteheadian works of the same period, such as Science and the Modern World and Religion in the Making. I will attempt to show that the comprehension of an immediate brute fact necessarily requires (...) its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world with some systematic relation to it. I will thus provide my interpretation on solidarity through a comparison with Hegel's notion of Wirklichkeit. (shrink)

In the preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel compares the philosopher’s work to the flight of the owl of Minerva: just as the latter begins only with the fall of dusk, so too is philosophy bound to ‘come on the scene’ too late to teach ‘what the world ought to be’. This well-known passage has been read in many quarters as a heavy, if not fatal blow to philosophy’s critical role. While some interpreters regard Hegel’s metaphor as an outright (...) rejection of critical theory, others see it as a restriction of philosophy’s normative dimension. In this article, I argue against both of these interpretations. In my view, Hegel’s methodological indications are not incompatible with a critical outlook on received reality. What is more, they do not preclude the possibility of a radical critique of received reality. To show why, I argue that the Philosophy of Right is primarily aimed at a normative reconstruction of existing social and political arrangements, which entails both a retrospective and a prospective dimension. Moreover, I claim that this duality is one of the most original features of Hegel’s practical thought, and the key to its enduring political relevance. (shrink)

The article presents a new typology of forms of misrecognition. Through a critique of Axel Honneth's Hegelian-Republican treatment of the issue of recognition, I elaborate an alternative typology of misrecognition forms inspired by Reinhart Koselleck's notion of asymmetric counterconcepts. After deriving three basic forms of misrecognition from historical examples of counterconceptual pairs, I examine some properties of their linguistic articulation as well as the horizons of expectations associated with their usage. The text concludes with an exposition of the comparative advantages (...) of this typology, particularly in regard to identifying the misrecognition of the ones who live outside the republic's national borders. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to explore the value of psychoanalysis in the early twenty-first century through reference to Freud, Lacan, and Stiegler’s work on computational madness. In the first section of the article I consider the original objectives of psychoanalysis through reference to what I call Freud’s ‘normalisation project’, before exploring the critique of this discourse concerned with the defence of oedipal law through a discussion of the post-modern ‘individualisation project’ set out by Deleuze and Guattari and others. (...) Tracking the development of ‘the individualisation project’ in history, I consider its connections with the cybernetic theories of Wiener and Shannon in the psycho-cyber-utopianism of the 1990s, before moving on to consider the other side of the psychoanalytic-cybernetic interaction through a discussion of Jacques Lacan’s rereading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle in the second section of the article. In reading Lacan’s seminar on Freudian drive in terms of the cybernetic repression of death, I set up the conclusion to the article which involves a discussion of Bernard Stiegler’s ‘survival project’ that relies on a recognition of the limit of death in order to produce human significance and oppose the madness of our contemporary computational reality. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 35-48, January 2022.

The subject of this article are Martin Heidegger’s and Eugen Fink’s interpretations of Hegel’s concept of experience of consciousness examined in the light of the history of the development of German Hegelian studies. Article aims at revisiting and comparison of those original interpre- tations formulated by the prominent followers of phenomenological philosophy. Furthermore, in the course of the article those interpretations also get compared to the general approach of con- temporary Hegelian studies to interpreting the concept of experience of consciousness. (...) The experience of consciousness is indeed one of the most problematic concepts of Hegel’s philosophy and the key concept of the “Phenomenology of Spirit”. Therefore, with regard to the role this concept has in the narrative of “Phenomenology...”, the interpretations of this concept, examined in the present article allow us to inspect, in a general outlook, Fink’s and Heidegger’s interpretational approaches towards all the “Phenomenology...”. Having examined each of the interpretations, a comparison of the two is conducted, that results in pointing out the key differences between those, which also relate to the interpretations of all the “Phenomenology...”. The article closes up with a brief inspection of the relation of Heidegger’s and Fink’s interpretational approaches to the contemporary scholar consensus on the experience of consciousness in the “Phenomenology of Spirit”. (shrink)

In the 1990’s, Robotics began to design a new robot aimed at industries (primarily automotive) that worked and interacted with humans outside the cage, thereby replacing traditional _robots_ for some specific duties. This _robot_ is therefore called _co-bot_ (_collaborative_ and _robot)._ Also in the 1990’s, Robotics designed the _social robot_ (for which we propose the neologism _so-bot),_ aimed at assisting humans and keeping them company. The sociality of the _sobots_ lies in their ability to follow the rules of human social (...) life, make decisions independently, and respect the roles assigned to them. Scientific literature usually keeps the terms _collaborative_ and _social robot_ distinct as if they indicated different and separate concepts. We question this separation and affirm that to collaborate (from the Latin _cum-laboro_) means to interact with someone while respecting their nature. Collaboration is that particular form of sociality that relates to work activity. From this it follows that the _cobot_ is essentially social and that _cobots_ and _sobots_ belong to the same category that we call _co-s-bots_ (_collaborative social robots_). In other words, _cobots_ and _sobots_ are two types of _cosbots,_ as the flea and the elephant are two types of animals. The difference between _cobot_ and _sobot_ is given by the development of AI. Both are _potentially_ social, that is, _potentially_ capable of interacting and making decisions independently; but while the _cobot_ is social in potency, the _sobot_ is social ‘in act’. With Aristotelian terminology we can therefore say that the _cobot_ is a _sobot_ in power, while the _sobot_ is a _cobot_ in act. We call this new concept ‘_cobot ontology_’. Such an ontology makes it possible to classify _cobots_ according to the degree of development of AI, just as living beings are classified according to the level of intelligence developed.To teach the _cosbot_ to interact with humans, engineers use some results of neuroscientific research such as mirror neurons and the _embodied Mind_. The use of these models should encourage machine self-learning. Self-learning means autonomy, and autonomy needs strong AI development. It is becoming increasingly clear that autonomy is the condition of the sociality of the _sobot_. The article thus concludes that the relationship between _cobot_ and _sobot_ is the identification of a more general _robot_-_automaton_ (_rabota_-_automatos_) relationship which, in the writer’s opinion, is the essential basis and driving force behind the entire history of Robotics. (shrink)

Practical political relations according to Luce Irigaray ground the possibilities for emerging to a new political epoch. She articulates that in order to move toward a more peaceful and emancipated politics, philosophers must focus more on subject-subject relations as opposed to subject-object relations. This in turn promotes the possibility of relating to a naturally and culturally different other. She also elaborates how an emancipated politics demands initially and primarily grounding subjectivity in the two, rather than in individuality or collectivity. This (...) is in contrast to classical liberalism which conceives of a social contract between individual agents who relate through mediations of property. Her philosophy conceives of refounding politics not only in the sphere of public government, but also in the traditionally private domestic sphere, which must become politically awakened. She articulates ways of refounding the family and the couple mediated first by relations between two, and liberating the family from its primary role as the material ground of society. Irigaray suggests that political relations at all levels must be rooted in difference rather than sameness, starting with recognizing sexual difference. Establishing such conditions involves creating civil protections and rights, especially for women, and establishing contexts nurturing to desire, including cultivating sensitivity and attending to sensible differences. Liberating contemporary politics from competitiveness and violence, and providing favorable conditions for peace, demands first attending to cultivating difference and fostering relations between two. (shrink)

Mark Wicclair’s defense of conscientious objection is grounded in an effort to respect the core moral beliefs of health care providers. While such a theoretical schema has merit, this paper argues that core moral beliefs should not serve as the basis of conscientious objection in health care because we, as a community, lack reliable access to a person’s core moral beliefs and because individuals are prone to be confused about the scope and extent of their core moral beliefs. Furthermore, a (...) person’s confusion over their core moral beliefs is likely to be exacerbated when they lack time to investigate those beliefs and are under heightened external pressure to do so—both conditions frequently encountered by health care providers. Finally, the paper considers whether grounding conscientious objection in core moral beliefs might have the unintended consequence of further entrenching the practical problems that the move is aiming to solve. (shrink)

“One of the most dangerous of ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think with our heads, or in our heads.” Wittgenstein… aber wir sprechen das Allgemeine aus;” Hegel“Hegel is the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing.” Derrida“Linguistic turn”, “pragmatic paradigm”, “Destruktion”, “deconstruction”, “condition postmoderne”, “pensiero debole” are not only philosophical labels. They are not only indices of intellectual positions which have inscribed themselves, as consequences as well as preconditions, in the end of (...) traditional metaphysics. “Nothing is true, everything is permitted”, Nietzsche'sGenealogy of Moralsannounces, describing the empty space which the metaphysical concepts have left; and in doing so opening up a seemingly boundless dimension for new developments of thoughts. The dilemma of these developments of modernity is that the vacuum they left, caused by their ruthless critique, cannot be refilled. So the outlook of modernity remains necessarily heterogeneous and unstable, meandering towards the colourful and fashionable-macabre extremes of postmodemity which gain from the tragic certainty of rien ne va plus the happy imperative of anything goes. But these are also ciphers of a particular philosophical-historical constellation, a work situation, in which the potencies of reason, being verhimmelt for a long time, now are going to be situated into their real contexts. Only, as Habermas puts it, “under the premises of an unexcited postmetaphysical thinking”, the once heroic concept of theory, which was meant to explain the world of human beings and their history as well as Nature out of onto-theleological principles of rationality, falls to pieces. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

ABSTRACTWhile Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase ‘second nature’ in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures ‘natural consciousness’, ‘natural notion’, and ‘inorganic nature’, in order to (...) elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the ‘official’ version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an ‘unofficial’ version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a ‘second nature’. (shrink)

The importance of Hegel to the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, both to her early philosophical texts and to The Second Sex, is usually discussed in terms of the master-slave dialectic and a Kojève-influenced reading, which some see her as sharing with Sartre, others persuasively describe as divergent from and corrective to Sartre's. Altman shows that Hegel's influence on Beauvoir's work is also wider, both in terms of what she takes on board and what she works through and rejects, and (...) that her reading of Hegel is crucially inflected by two additional circumstances that Sartre did not entirely share: the experience of her first serious study of Hegel as a noncombatant in Paris during the German occupation and her earlier direct exposure to an eccentric, idealist reading of Hegel as developed by the group Philosophies in connection with surrealism and the artistic avant-garde. Altman also explores the afterlife of Hegel's influence on Beauvoir on second-wave feminism in the United States and Europe, and suggests continuing relevance to feminist theory today. (shrink)