- Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God.Joshua R. Sijuwade - 2022 - Metaphysica (1):1-70.details
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The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Panpsychism.William E. Seager, Philip Goff & Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Donald Cary Williams.Keith Campbell, James Franklin & Douglas Ehring - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. pp. 0.details
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A Non‐Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism.Philip Goff - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43-54.details
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Tropes, Necessary Connections, and Non‐Transferability.Ross Cameron - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):99-113.details
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A dispositional theory of possibility.Andrea Borghini & Neil E. Williams - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):21–41.details
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What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan.Christian Sachse - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):201-205.details
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What about a reductionist approach? Comments on Terry Horgan.Christian Sachse - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205.details
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Mental causation and mental properties.Michael Esfeld - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):5-18.details
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Ostrich tropes.Daniel Giberman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-25.details
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Which Are the Genuine Properties?Bradley Rives - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):104-126.details
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The Russellian monist’s problems with mental causation.Robert Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):22-39.details
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Why Can't Geometers Cut Themselves on the Acutely Angled Objects of Their Proofs? Aristotle on Shape as an Impure Power.Brad Berman - 2017 - Méthexis 29 (1):89-106.details
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Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation.Lei Zhong - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):159-171.details
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Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.details
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Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers.David Yates - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4525-4550.details
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Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.David Yates - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1057-1072.details
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The Unreality of Realization.Chase Wrenn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):305-322.details
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The Factory Model of Disease.Neil E. Williams - 2007 - The Monist 90 (4):555-584.details
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Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View?Keith A. Wilson - 2022 - Erkenntnis (2).details
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Dispositions and the Argument from Science.Neil E. Williams - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71 - 90.details
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A reductive analysis of statements about universals.Ben White - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-21.details
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A Dispositional Theory of Health.Sander Werkhoven - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):927-952.details
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Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What, and in What Respect?Ralph Weber - 2014 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13 (2):151-171.details
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The Nature of Properties: Causal Essentialism and Quidditism.Jennifer Wang - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):168-176.details
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The Modal Limits of Dispositionalism.Jennifer Wang - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):454-469.details
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Where to Look for Emergent Properties.Agustín Vicente - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):156.details
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Explanatory dispositionalism: What anti-humeans should say.Barbara Vetter - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2051-2075.details
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Universals, laws, and governance.Matthew Tugby - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1147-1163.details
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Platonic Dispositionalism.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt071.details
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The problem of retention.Matthew Tugby - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Dispositional realism without dispositional essences.Matthew Tugby - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-27.details
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Graph-theoretic Models of Dispositional Structures.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):23-39.details
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Grounding theories of powers.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11187-11216.details
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Nomic Necessity for Platonists.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):324-331.details
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Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties.Matthew Tugby - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):123-145.details
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Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
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The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach).Brandon N. Towl - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61.details
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Spurious causal kinds: A problem for the causal-power conception of kinds.Brandon N. Towl - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):217-223.details
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Emergent substance.Patrick Toner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):281 - 297.details
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The Role Functionalist Theory of Absences.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):505-519.details
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Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities.Henry Taylor - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):425-433.details
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Powerful qualities and pure powers.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1423-1440.details
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Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
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Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.details
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In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.details
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A new solution to the regress of pure powers.Henry Taylor - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):709-718.details
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