RESUMO Hans-Georg Gadamer retomou e elevou a atividade hermenêutica ao status de filosofia. Uma das suas idiossincrasias consiste em entrelaçar, no seu discurso, experiências de ordem ética, política, metafísica e estética. A hermenêutica filosófica pauta-se pela prática do diálogo sobre questões relativas ao pensar e à conduta humana. O presente artigo tem por meta realizar um exercício dialógico entre o projeto filosófico de Gadamer e o pensamento oriental - mais especificamente, o budismo zen da tradição da escola de Kyoto, representada (...) pelo pensamento de Nishida Kitarō. Nossa reflexão será articulada sobre quatro momentos distintos, mas que devem ser tomados dialeticamente: inicialmente, apresentaremos um quadro geral, indicando o estado da questão da hermenêutica gadameriana relativo ao pensamento oriental; a seguir, sustentaremos as semelhanças sobre o modo de proceder de ambas, sua metodologia dialética; posteriormente, aprofundaremos a noção fundamental de experiência e as proximidades que permeiam as perspectivas de ambas as tradições; enfim, como implicação das reflexões precedentes, sustentaremos a hipótese de um saber intuitivo enquanto experiência e ação intuitivas. Ao final, apontaremos algumas conclusões instauradas a partir desse exercício dialógico para a prática filosófica. ABSTRACT Hans-Georg Gadamer has taken over and raised hermeneutic activity to philosophy status. One of his idiosyncrasies is weaving, in his speech, ethical, political metaphysical and aesthetic experiences. Philosophical hermeneutics is guided by the practice of the dialogue on issues related to thinking and human behavior. This paper aims to perform a dialogic exercise between Gadamer's philosophical project and the Eastern thought-more specifically, the Zen Buddhism of Kyoto school tradition, represented by Nishida Kitarō's thought. Our reflection will be divided into four distinct moments that should be taken dialectally: first, we will present a general framework mentioning the status quaestionis of Gadamer's hermeneutics concerning Eastern thought; then, we will maintain the similarities on how the way to proceed in both, its dialectical methodology; subsequently, we will go deeper into the fundamental notion of experience and the proximities that permeate the perspective of both traditions; finally, as implication of foregoing reflections, we will maintain the hypothesis of an intuitive knowledge as intuitive experience and action. In order to conclude, we will consider some conclusions instituted from that dialogical exercise towards philosophical practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I compare the idea of ‘substitution’, central to the later work of Emmanuel Levinas, to the idea of jinen hōni, or ‘natural acts’, proposed by Shinran Shōnin. For Levinas, ‘substitution’ meant the acceptance of responsibility for the suffering of the Other that one hasn’t caused, giving oneself up to ‘persecution’ and ‘accusation’ of the Other in absolute passivity. For Shinran, a similar passivity is implied by the unability of the ‘I’ to act in order to liberate itself (...) from its conditioned existence, a result which can be achieved by giving up one’s own agency in favour of the Other. For both thinkers, ethical selfhood is thus attainable only by forsaking of one’s worldly ego, described in remarkably similar terms, even though their understanding of alterity itself is radically different. (shrink)

This article examines different ways agrarian thought has been interpreted and employed by ancient Chinese and early modern Japanese philosophers to criticize and attempt to limit the state’s power, and, in at least one case, to try to strengthen it. It analyzes the manner in which arguably the most fundamental human activities of farming, weaving, and governing have been conceptualized in a normative way, and the extent to which thinkers and statesmen in these East Asian historical contexts debated their correct (...) interrelation. The state’s critics were deeply concerned about the tragic occurrence of death by starvation during their ages, and by the conditions that allowed it to happen. They identified and advocated certain ethical values and political measures they believed would mitigate and help prevent this avoidable circumstance. Conversely, the state’s supporters appropriated agrarian thinking to demonstrate how the sovereign’s control of the realm and its subjects could be significantly enhanced by strategically apportioning the land in a particular way. Lastly, both groups of thinkers sought unity, ethically or geopolitically, but they conceived of this ideal in contrasting ways. (shrink)

The theism-atheism debate is foreign to many Mahāyāna Buddhist thinkers such as the Japanese Zen Master Dōgen. Nevertheless, his philosophy of ‘expression’ is able to shine a new light on the various incarnations of this debate throughout history. This paper will explore a/theism from Dōgen’s philosophical standpoint. Dōgen introduces the notion of ‘expression’ to describe the concomitant vertical and horizontal relationships of the religious project, namely the relationship between the individual and the divine as well as the relationship among a (...) multiplicity of individuals, each of which Dōgen conceives of as an expression of the divine and/or the oneness of the cosmos. Dōgen’s philosophy presupposes the ‘way of emptiness’ and Chengguan’s ‘four dharma worlds’. To Dōgen, the former indicates the conventional nature of predication and signification, while the latter denotes the existential interwovenness of numerous individuals and the divine oneness of the cosmos. Such a philosophy implies that all truth claims and philosophical positions are mere intellectual and discursive constructions that are formulated against a perceived other. Therefore, Dōgen observes laconically that ‘when one side is expressed, the other is obscured’ or, as Dōgen says elsewhere, ‘when expression is expressed, non-expression is not expressed.’ Dōgen’s philosophical framework provides some interesting insights about one or more discourses on atheism: Again, the basic assumption is that all philosophical paradigms, systems, and positions are devoid of an absolute truth value, framed in a specific cultural and historical context which they express, and formulated vis-à-vis a perceived other. In this paper, I will look at Friedrich Nietzsche’s atheism from the perspective of Dōgen’s philosophical standpoint. Concretely, I will present Nietzsche’s position on his own terms, translate his philosophy into Dōgen’s terminology, interpret his philosophy from the standpoint of Dōgen’s philosophical approach, and assess the utility of such an exercise. I believe that such a project enables us to read theism through the eyes of atheism, atheism through the eyes of theism, both through the eyes of Dōgen, and Dōgen through the eyes of the a/theism debate. In this last section, I will introduce the language of Nishida Kitarō who attempted a similar project in his The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview. The goal of this project is to determine what atheism denies, what atheism contributes, and why a multi-faceted and multi-cultural engagement of atheism is important today. (shrink)

Since the role of the Asian countries is increasing in the modern world, their philosophical traditions attract more and more attention. Due to this trend, a more complete panoramic view of the development of world philosophy as a whole is accessible, and it has become possible to understand that any constructions of the human mind that have arisen in a particular cultural field of experience cannot be regarded as exemplary and absolute. The researchers of Asian philosophies concentrate mostly on studying (...) the texts of individual thinkers. As a rule, they do not set themselves the task of examining these texts from the point of view of intercultural interactions and transformations of significant ideas and concepts in various cultural and historical contexts, defining the direction and mechanisms of cultural borrowing, as well as revealing new approaches and growth points. To achieve these goals, the research should focus at the problem of the self-determination and development of philosophy as a separate science in non-Western cultures, which are based on intellectual traditions with different origin than Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions. This article deals with the consideration of some topics that elucidate the features of the development of philosophical science in Japan, including the emergence of the concept of “philosophy” in this country, the definition of its subject, the formation of philosophical terminology, and various interpretations of what the term “Japanese philosophy” means. The author pays special attention to the characteristic of the main periods of progress of Japanese philosophical thought. In the conclusion, the author argues that the most important characteristic feature of the Japanese philosophy is its involvement in intercultural dialogue throughout its history. (shrink)

If a person's head moves, she may or may not have moved her head, and, if she did move it, she may have actively performed the movement of her head or merely, by doing something else, caused a passive movement. And, if she performed the movement, she might have done so intentionally or not. This short array of contrasts (and others like them) has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action. Beyond the matter of her moving, when (...) the person moves her head, she may be indicating agreement or shaking an insect off her ear. Should we think of the consequences, conventional or causal, of physical behavior as constituents of an action distinct from but ‘generated by’ the movement? Or should we think that there is a single action describable in a host of ways? Also, actions, in even the most minimal sense, seem to be essentially ‘active’. But, how can we explain what this property amounts to and defend our wavering intuitions about which events fall in the category of the ‘active’ and which do not? (shrink)

Human behavior and thought often exhibit a familiar pattern of within group similarity and between group difference. Many of these patterns are attributed to cultural differences. For much of the history of its investigation into behavior and thought, however, cognitive science has been disproportionately focused on uncovering and explaining the more universal features of human minds—or the universal features of minds in general. -/- This entry charts out the ways in which this has changed over recent decades. It sketches the (...) motivation behind the cultural turn in cognitive science, and situates some of its central findings with respect to the questions that animate it and the debates that it has inspired. Woven throughout the entry are examples of how the cognitive science of culture, and especially its elevated concern with different forms of diversity and variation, continues to influence and be influenced by philosophers. -/- One cluster of philosophical work falls within the traditional subject matter of philosophy of science, in this case of the cognitive and social sciences. Philosophers have analyzed and assessed the methods and evidence central to the scientific study of cognition and culture, and have offered conceptual scrutiny, clarification, and synthesis. Research in a second vein sees philosophers themselves contributing more directly to cognitive scientific projects, (co)constructing theories, helping build computational models, even gathering empirical data. A third kind of work is naturalistic philosophy or philosophy of nature, wherein philosophers seek to use results from the cognitive science of culture to inform or transform debates over long-standing philosophical questions, including questions about the nature of philosophy and philosophical methodology itself. (shrink)

This paper is an analysis of one theoretical facet of the problem of Buddhist participation in closed nationalist discourses: the essential relationship between the dislocation of subjectivity (or the emptying of ego) and the formation of communities (such as a nation-state or a Volk). Through this, I hope to explore the effects disciplines of subjectivity (including Buddhism) might have on socio-political formations (such as closed nationalism or imperialism). In order to do so, I will compare two key works in which (...) the existential structure of ethical community is examined: Watsuji Tetsurō's Ethics (Rinrigaku jōkan 倫理学 上巻 1937) and Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Community (La Communauté désœuvrée 1983). -/- In the first section, after briefly introducing the two thinkers, I will examine their views on the basic structure of the individual and community and how it leads to a sense of ethics. In the second section, I will delve into the essential differences between Watsuji and Nancy, beginning with their differing responses to Heidegger's notion of being-toward-death. I will then proceed to a critical re-reading of Watsuji's ethics possible from Nancy's thought. I will end by connecting the results of this comparative study to the problem of Buddhist involvement in immanent nationalism, in hopes of shedding light on one key theoretical aspect of this multi-faceted problem. (shrink)