The hermeneutical tradition represented by Yorck, Heidegger, and Gadamer has distrusted Dilthey as suffering from the two sins of modernism: scientific “positivism” and individualistic and aesthetic “romanticism.” On the one hand, Dilthey’s epistemology is deemed scientistic in accepting the priority of the empirical, the ontic, and consequently scientific inquiry into the physical, biological, and human worlds; on the other hand, his personalist ethos and Goethean humanism, and his pluralistic life- and worldview philosophy are considered excessively aesthetic, culturally liberal, relativistic, and (...) subjective. This essay involves two tasks in response to this negative evaluation of Dilthey that has shaped our current understanding of his philosophical project; first, an interpretation of the issues at stake in Heidegger’s reception of and struggles with Dilthey. These issues touch upon language, historicity, and the nature of hermeneutics. Second, by pursuing this task in light of Guignon’s interpretation of Dilthey and Heidegger, I hope to question and challenge the “overcoming” of Dilthey’s epistemic and life-philosophical hermeneutics in the “ontological” or “philosophical” hermeneutics of Heidegger. (shrink)

This thesis articulates a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s explication of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs) in §15 of his masterwork Being and Time (1927/2006) and develops and applies the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature and articulate a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. Since §15 of BT explicates the being of gear, Part 1 expounds Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of beings (Seienden) and two issues raised in the ‘preliminary methodological (...) remark’ in §15 of BT regarding explicating being. §1.1 interprets the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a region (Region), district (Bezirk), or subject-area (Sachgebiet) – a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities. Although Heidegger posits two components of the being of a being, viz. material-content (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and mode-of-being (Seinsart) or way-of-being (Seinsweise, Weise des Seins, Weise zu sein) (1927/1975, 321), the unclarity of this distinction means that it does not figure prominently herein. §1.2 addresses Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations and his notion of ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten, Zugangsweisen). Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. §2.1 analyses Heidegger’s two necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and three core basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of these conditions and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Heidegger explicates the being of gear through content of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective intentional states. I term such states ‘mundane concern’, which is almost synonymous with Hubert Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’ (1991, 69). Heidegger’s explication highlights around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as the peculiar species of property figuring in mundanely concernful intentional content. §2.2 clarifies Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense: two of Heidegger’s most widely discussed concepts. I reject Kris McDaniel’s recent reading of Heidegger as affirming that nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously (McDaniel 2012). Part 3 develops and applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern. §3.1 explains the phenomena of situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. §3.2 undertakes the metaphysical accommodation of around-for references, which §3.1 posited as featuring prominently within mundanely concernful intentional content. This thesis thus contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship, but also to contemporary debates within the philosophy of action and cognitive science. (shrink)

The article examines a fundamental problem in classical Jaina philosophy, namely, the ontological status of dead matter in the hylozoistic and at the same time dualistic Jaina worldview. This question is of particular interest in view of the widespread contemporary Jaina practice of venerating bone relics and stūpas of prominent saints. The main argument proposed in this article is, that, from a classical doctrinal point of view, bone relics of renowned ascetics are valuable for Jainas, if at all, because of (...) their unique physical attributes, rather than the presumed presence of the deceased in the remains as posited in much of the extant literature on relic worship across cultures. The specific focus of the article are Jaina and non-Jaina explanations of the qualities of special matter in terms of karmic and natural processes of transformation. (shrink)

In various publications, Stanley Cavell and Stanley Rosen have emphasized the philosophical importance of what they both call the ordinary. They both contrast their recovery of the ordinary with traditional philosophy, including the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In this paper, I address Rosen’s claims in particular. I argue that Rosen turns the real situation on its head. Contra Rosen, it is not the case that the employment of Husserl’s epoché distorts the authentic voice of the ordinary—a voice that is (...) clearly audible only from within everyday life. For (pace both Cavell and Rosen) there is no single voice of the ordinary: There are many such voices, not all of which are to be relied upon. Therefore, if we want to achieve an adequate grasp of ordinary experience, and Rosen does want this, we precisely need the epoché to curtail the misleading messages of certain other voices of the ordinary. Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, this positive evaluation of the Husserlian epoché finds support in Heidegger’s writings from the twenties. I argue that Heidegger, too, believed that the epoché was an indispensable tool for the philosophical attempt to capture ordinary experience. (shrink)

The article explores the topic of Gelassenheit (releasement) in Heidegger, through the lense of the ambiguous role of Christian mysticism in general and Eckhart in particular in and for his thinking. In an analysis of how mysticism appears in his early lectures on religion, it explains why he is critical of this concept and of how it is commonly understood. It also gives reasons for why we too should be cautious in using it to describe his position in his later (...) writings where he explicitly reconnects to themes and concepts from Eckhart. The text provides a critical rehearsal of Eckhart's understanding of both “Abgeschiedenheit” (detachment) and "Gelassenheit" and how Heidegger relates to it both in his early lectures and in his later essays. Ultimately it outlines a phenomenological understanding of what is commonly referred to as a “mystical” comportment more along the lines of a heightened openness and awareness, in Heidegger’s words as a “releasement toward things and an openness to the secret”. Thus, instead of seeing Heidegger’s later writings as a sort of crypto-mysticism, the text seeks to show how his critical appropriation of Eckhart explicitly points beyond a standard dichotomy between the rational and the mystical, in an effort to develop a comportment of thinking than can respond to the demand of modern technological predicament. (shrink)

This article argues that Giorgio Agamben’s conceptions of kairos and messianic time are essentially to be understood in terms of experience. This becomes clear when we identify the methodological similarities between Agamben’s reading of Paulus in The Time That Remains and Heidegger’s lectures on Paulus from 1920-21: the doctrine of kairology is different from any eschatology, insofar as it involves an instantaneous modulation of our factical conditions, rather than a removal of them to come. In this way, I argue that (...) Agamben echoes Heidegger’s conception of formal indication and enactment-sense. But whereas Heidegger understood this modulation as an anticipatory resoluteness, in which Dasein identifies itself with its calling, Agamben emphasizes the very impossibility of such an identification. This is indeed a decisive difference between Agamben and Heidegger. I show, however, that Agamben phrases this difference in a language that recalls Heidegger’s thought, thus implicitly suggesting that the emancipatory potential of his philosophy is to be understood as the experiential enactment of an impotentiality that undermines any factical condition and any social identity. (shrink)

This essay returns to the origins of the phenomenology of religion, offering an introduction to and a discussion of seminal contributions to the field. Three figures are examined: Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach and the early Martin Heidegger, who are presented as the ‘German Fathers’ of the phenomenology of religion. Each conducted a radical foray into the religious life-world, sometimes in accord with the project of their Master Edmund Husserl, sometimes opposing or radically revising his project, but typically developing new methods (...) and proposing radical insights. They attempted to define the proper attitude a phenomenologist – who might possibly also be a religious person – should adopt in the face of phenomena and lived experiences clearly beyond the ordinary. This enterprise led to heated debates and a rich analysis described here. (shrink)

In this article, the Heidegger and Derrida controversy about the nature of questioning is revisited in order to rehabilitate questioning as an essential characteristic of contemporary philosophy. After exploring Heidegger's characterization of philosophy as questioning and Derrida's criticism of the primacy of questioning, we will evaluate Derrida's criticism and articulate three characteristics of Heidegger's concept of questioning. After our exploration of Heidegger's concept of questioning, we critically evaluate Heidegger's later rejection of questioning. With this, we not only contribute to the (...) discussion about why Heidegger rejected questioning in his later thought and whether this rejection is legitimized, but also to the rehabilitation of questioning in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

In his work, Being Given, Jean-Luc Marion calls for a phenomenological investigation of the givenness (donation) of the phenomenon. As a phenomenologist of religion, Marion aims to give a philosophical account of the possibility of revelation, something which by definition is unconditionally given. In Being Given, he contends that his phenomenological reduction to unconditional givenness (in the figure of the saturated phenomenon) can account for religious phenomena in a way that respects the subject matter, all the while remaining philosophically neutral. (...) In this paper I argue that Marion's aim to maintain strict philosophical neutrality interferes with his attempt to respect the subject matter of his own investigation, i.e., the givenness of revelation, since revelation is recognizably given, even as possibility, only in the non-neutral context of an interpretive tradition. I establish the latter claim with recourse to Heidegger's early hermeneutic sketches of ‘primordial Christian religiosity.’ In turn, I call for a phenomenological Destruktion of Marion's work in order to release its potential as a non-neutral investigation of a distinctively Catholic religiosity. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the key phenomena associated with the notion of kairos in Heidegger’s pre‐Being and Time writings and show that they all fall short of the methodological constraints and conceptual requirements placed on authentic presence in 1927. Though Heidegger’s early studies of Aristotle and the New‐Testament are broadly suggestive of the notion of temporality that is presented in his systematic treatise, none of those earlier texts carry the differentiations within which the Augenblick of Being and Time is (...) situated. We thus claim that the ekstasis of authentic presence is neither reducible to an eschatological nor to a phronological kairos and furthermore, that the successor to kairos in Being and Time is more likely to be Jemeinigkeit than Augenblick. Establishing these distinctions gives us greater insights into the fundamental orientation of Heidegger’s inquiry in Being and Time. (shrink)

The essay provides an interpretation of the specific concept of ”ruinance” (Ruinanz), as this is introduced and developed by Heidegger in his 1921/22 lecture series on ”Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle” (GA 61). Instead of accepting this subsequently abandoned concept as a marginal excursus on Heidegger’s part, the interpretation uses it as a lever to explore the interconnectedness of intentionality, falling, destruction, history and finitude, and also the proclaimed necessity of so called ”formally indicative concepts”, of which ruinance itself is a (...) supreme example. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo principal del artículo es terminar quién es el Dasein desde el aparecer del mundo en la obra de Martin Heidegger Ser y tiempo. Para ello, se plantea la posibilidad de aprehensión del horizonte del sí mismo del Dasein, en contra de los propios análisis heideggerianos sobre el uno, y, también, se muestra de qué manera la mismidad del Dasein se presupone ya en el modo de aparición del mundo-entorno a través del existenciario significatividad. La conclusión del artículo (...) intentará descubrir los posibles rendimientos fenomenológicos de la apertura del horizonte del sí-mismo del Dasein.The main goal of the paper is to determine who is the Dasein itself from the appearance of the world in the Book of Martin Heidegger Being and time. For this, it raises the possibility of understanding the horizon of the self of Dasein itself differently to Heidegger’s analysis about the they and also it shows how the Selfhood of Dasein is presupposed already in the appearance of the world-environment through the existential meaningfulness. The conclusion of this paper will try to discover the phenomenological yields of Dasein’s openness as horizon of its Selfhood. (shrink)

In this article I examine whether late Heidegger’s philosophy can be called a mysticism. For serious reasons the answer should be negative. Heidegger’s early statements relating to the mystique are very unflattering. I try to grasp what the Heidegger’s exact attitude to the mystique is. Reflections on the mystique do not appear in late Heidegger’s philosophy. Heidegger treats the term “mysticism” as an objection to thinking, which consists in masking a lack of understanding of thinking. According to the immanent criteria, (...) the philosophy of Being cannot be called the mystique. But it is possible to transpose the concept of the mystique, which means to carry the word from the first in another beginning. The second part of my work is an attempt at such a transposition. As a result I obtain the word “mysticism” conceived from the side of Being, that is as a source for mysticism conceived in the traditional way. So I can say that the philosophy of Being is a mystique in this particular sense of this word. (shrink)

Heidegger’s doubts concerning the concept of “empathy” are unequivocally proven not only by his general tendency to avoid it, but also by his sharp critique of this term, as presented in both Being and Time and the lectures from the Summer Semester 1925, History of the Concept of Time. However, the concept of empathy is used by Heidegger in a positive, albeit rather allusive fashion, in three consecutive lectures of his early Freiburg period: Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Phenomenology of Intuition (...) and Expression and The Phenomenology of Religious Life. The present paper analyzes these three passages of Heidegger’s early lectures in close detail, revealing their connection to the conceptions of empathy found in the works of both Dilthey and Scheler. Thus it aims to connect Heidegger’s rather idiosyncratic conception of intersubjectivity with some of the discussions on that topic in the phenomenological millieu of the early 1920s. (shrink)

RESUMEN: El presente artículo se centra en algunos de los aspectos centrales de la concepción heideggeriana de la indicación formal. Como es sabido, el filósofo toma como punto de partida en una de las más tempranas exposiciones de este metaconcepto, una explicación delimitativa frente a otras operaciones conceptuales. Se revisará críticamente la explicación que Heidegger hace de la generalización a diferencia de la formalización, destacando especialmente que no se trata aquí de una mera distinción entre generalización y formalización, sino de (...) una estructura de fundamentación. En segundo lugar se argumenta que la crítica de Heidegger no se dirige directamente contra la formalización, sino contra el contexto metódico al cual sirve. Por último, a modo de conclusión, se intenta mostrar que para Heidegger concebir la indicación formal como principio de la investigación fenomenológica, supone que ella es, por vía negativa, una radicalización de la tendencia a lo formal.ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to focus on central aspects of Heidegger's conception of the formal indication. An early Heideggerian exposition of this meta-concept take as starting point a differentiation from others conceptual operations. First, it will be critical discuss the exposition of the generalization. The main point is that the distinction of generalization and formalization is rather a foundational structure than a simple difference. This premise leads to the view that the Heidegger's critical attempt is not addressed to the formalization as such, but rather to the methodological context to which the formalization serves. Finally, based on this, it will be claimed that is a necessary condition for the determination of the formal indication as a methodological principle of the phenomenological investigation, that this meta-concept is a radical tendency toward the formal. (shrink)

Phenomenology of religion is among the oldest branches of the discipline founded by Husserl. It has always been difficult to define its outlines: from the very first essays of Scheler, Reinach and Heidegger to the so-called “theological turn” of French phenomenology, one has always feared the transformation of the phenomenology of religion in a religious philosophy that would give up the sacred principle of neutrality. This situation is perhaps behind us thanks to the recent endeavors to renew the field of (...) research. French and American specialists of Husserl’s thought Natalie Depraz and Anthony J. Steinbock try to push back the limits of and to explore new ways in genetic phenomenology by describing religious attitudes by mean of a philosophical-existential methodology especially designed for this task. This paper introduces what might open of a new era of the phenomenology of religion. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit presents one of the most striking reflexions on human facticity, i.e. the fact that Dasein fundamentally exists in a world letting Dasein and world be co-extensive. By quoting two central personages in theology, Pascal and Augustine, Heidegger refers to a concept of love that is constitutive for Dasein’s facticity to truth and to knowledge. By investigating the claim that love is as good as absent from Sein und Zeit, the article intends to show that the (...) scanty references to love nevertheless have a central role in Heidegger’s early work and, furthermore, why Heidegger returns to it in his later thinking. Interesting in this regard is the connection between the theological concept of love and Heidegger’s concept of ‘world’. The article places Heidegger’s Destruktion of the metaphysical tradition in the realms of his Dasein analysis focussing on facticity. Taking its methodological cues from Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida, the article shows how the concepts of possibility and impotentiality (Ohnmacht) become essential in Heidegger via his reference to love. Lastly, the article examines to what extent Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit paraphrases the old angelology letting the Dasein concept become its secularisation. (shrink)

Se trata de pensar y abrir el horizonte del ser-con desde los análisis fenomenológicos vertidospor Heidegger en la I Sección de su libro Ser y Tiempo, respetando y aceptando sus propiaslimitaciones intrínsecas y a pesar del carácter aparentemente negativo que rodea a este existenciario,a fin de radicalizarlo, extenderlo y ubicarlo en su posibilidad más genuina. Por esta razón, a través deuna interpretación de corte fenomenológico, se ha querido potenciar los posibles rendimientos de unser-con en propiedad, enfatizando la necesidad de interpretar (...) el opus magnum heideggeriano desdeel horizonte de la mismidad del Dasein. La conclusión apunta sobre dos vías temáticas, a saber: a) atomar la mismidad del Dasein, por cuanto constituye una posibilidad ejecutiva de existir conforme alo que este ente es, en tanto condición necesaria y suficiente para pensar un ser-con en propiedad; b) aestablecer, casi a modo de esbozo, una relación entre ser-con, libertad y mismidad, la cual tiene su basetemática en una presumible igualdad de orden pre-ontológico. (shrink)

Este trabajo se centra en el papel que juega la afectividad en la conocida como transformación hermenéutica de la fenomenología llevada a cabo por el joven Martin Heidegger. Tras establecer en la introducción la estrecha vinculación que existe entre la afectividad y la facticidad, tomo como hilo conductor la noción de movilidad de la vida fáctica. En un primer momento explico la peculiar significación que adquiere este término en la filosofía del joven Heidegger. En segundo lugar me detengo a analizar (...) la doble “movilidad fundamental” del amor y el odio como la matriz intencional del curare en la interpretación heideggeriana de las Confesiones de San Agustín durante las lecciones del semestre de verano de 1921. En un tercer momento considero la doble movilidad del pathos y de la disposición afectiva en las lecciones de 1924,_ Conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía aristotélica_. Y, _finalmente_, explicito la “lógica del corazón” que subyace a la hermenéutica de la facticidad desde la confluencia de la tradición neotestamentaria del _affectus _ y la tradición griega del _pathos_. (shrink)

Na preleção de verão de 1923, intitulada “Ontologia: hermenêutica da facticidade”, Martin Heidegger estabelece seu programa filosófico em termos de uma investigação fundamental, nomeada por ele como hermenêutica fenomenológica da facticidade. De acordo com esta, a interpretação da vida fática não se realiza sem que se tome o ser e o falar como fenômenos privilegiados, ou seja, sem que se recupere o vínculo essencial em que nós, seres humanos existentes, já nos descobrimos sendo no mundo como seres capazes de fala. (...) Tendo em vista que é a partir do constructo ser-no-mundo que o filósofo alemão consegue dar um passo atrás no esquema sujeito-objeto, não é por acaso então que ele busca encontrar, desde muito cedo, modos de dizer o ser que não mais o entifiquem, com o intuito de pensá-lo para além do registro da referência e, portanto, da objetivação. É com base nessa situação que se torna premente que sua análise tenha início a partir do horizonte do ente privilegiado, uma vez que é para este que o sentido do ser se torna um problema. Assim, este artigo parte da hipótese de que a hermenêutica da facticidade se constitui por conta da tentativa de Heidegger de ater-se ao problema do ser que compreende ser, tendo como premissa uma ampla problematização em torno da significação da palavra vida. Palavras-chave: Heidegger; hermenêutica; facticidade.: In the summer lecture of 1923, entitled Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Martin Heidegger established his philosophical program in terms of a fundamental research, named by him as phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. According to this, the interpretation of the factical life is not achieved without taking the being and the speaking as privileged phenomena, i.e., without recovering the essential bond in which we, existent human beings, have already discovered ourselves being in the world as being capable of speaking. Given the fact that it is from the construct being-in-the-world that the German philosopher is able to step back on subject-object scheme, it is not by accident that he tries to find, since the beginning, ways of expressing being that no longer turn it into an entity, with the intention of thinking it beyond the scheme and, therefore, any objectualization registry. It is based on this situation that it is pressing that his analysis starts from the horizon of a privileged entity, since it is for this the sense of being becomes a problem. In fact, this paper starts from the hypothesis that hermeneutics of facticity is constituted due to Heidegger’s attempt on holding to the problem of being that understands being, with the premise of a wide problematization regarding the significance of the word life. Keywords: Heidegger; hermeneutics; facticity. (shrink)

Obwohl in der Forschung es nicht selten ist, Heideggers Gedanken im Lichte des Verhältnisses zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu betrachten, benimmt Heidegger sich selbst gegen diese Dichotomie. Um die Kritik Heideggers an dieser Dichotomie und seine Konzeption der ursprünglichen Einheit zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu verstehen, muss auf Heideggers Lektüre der aristotelischen praktischen Philosophie zurückgeführt werden. Es wird zu zeigen versucht, dass Heideggers Ontologisierung der Praxis darauf abzielt, den vortheoretischen Praxisbegriff, der im Unterschied zur Einheit von Theorie und Poiesis ist, (...) herauszuarbeiten. Die Ontologisierung kommt durch die Methode der formalen Anzeige zustande, die in diesem Sinne im Mittelpunkt Heideggers Philosophie steht. (shrink)

El presente artículo reconstruye la lectura fenomenológica del autor contemporáneo francés Jean-Luc Marion de las Confesiones de San Agustín, en su libro Au lieu de soi. Marion se presenta como un filósofo que busca llevar la filosofía más allá de la ontología, en particular a través de una fenomenología de la donación. La donación se caracteriza por una triple desaparición: la del donatario, la del donador, y finalmente lo dado. El uso de la metáfora del espacio muestra la apariencia de (...) dos espacios vacíos, relacionado por un movimiento múltiple. El artículo concluye con algunoscuestionamientos acerca de la desaparición del yo y de Dios en la lectura de las Confesiones. (shrink)

El artículo expone y analiza la crítica de Heidegger al conceptismo de la metafísica clásica y a su teoría de la abstracción, que se fundarían según el pensador alemán en el desgaste del lenguaje y el uso impropio que de él se hace en la metafísica clásica, tergiversando y ocultando el auténtico sentido del pensamiento y del ser en lo genuinamente griego. Sobre esta base Heidegger postula la insuficiencia del concepto y de lo lógico a la vez que la necesidad (...) de un método hermenéutico. El artículo señala los puntos de coincidencia de esta perspectiva con la crítica zubiriana al idealismo y al conceptismo. Teniendo en cuenta todo ello, se trata de mostrar, no obstante, que son posibles conceptos descriptivos capaces de adecuarse a lo real, lo que supone en la realidad misma un momento sustancial de presencia de una cierta permanencia. Se hace una exposición y análisis de la magnífica crítica de Zubiri a la teoría clásica de la abstracción intentando conciliarla, empero, con la validez de los conceptos descriptivos y con momentos universales de la realidad. La tesis de fondo es que la filosofía primera no puede reducirse a hermenéutica. (shrink)

Phenomenological descriptions are supposed to be revelatory and coincide with the self-showing of the things themselves. These features of phenomenological descriptions lead to the peculiar character of their expression, which has the effect of making them difficult to communicate. That is, the problem with communicating the findings of phenomenological researches is a consequence of the descriptive nature of the endeavor and the disclosive character of phenomenological descriptions. In the Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl recognized that the problem has three facets: how (...) does one state the findings of phenomenological researches, how can one effectively communicate these findings, and how can these communications be persuasive? In this essay I elaborate on these problems and then show that Heidegger’s method of formal indication was designed to solve these problems just as Husserl understood them. We can thus take formal indication as a model for dealing with these problems—and for informing phenomenological discourse—because it solves them with a single strategy. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la interpretación heideggeriana en clave fenomenológica de Confesiones X. Mantiene que san Agustín es un fenomenólogo avant la lettre cuando propone como criterio del conocimiento de sí mismo “practicar la verdad en el corazón”. Se trata de algo más que un consejo; es un criterio de la verdad y para la verdad que reaparece una y otra vez a lo largo del libro X. Heidegger, sin embargo, menosprecia el pensamiento agustiniano por demasiado griego. Los dos ejes de (...) la lectura de Heidegger son: a) la resistencia agustiniana a reducir la experiencia vital a un sistema de conceptos; b) la exposición de la vida fáctica como inseguridad, inquietud, apertura existencial a Dios. (shrink)

En 1931, Rudolf Carnap publicó un artículo titulado "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" donde calificaba algunas expresiones de la conferencia de Martin Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?", como 'sinsentidos'. Distinguía así entre expresiones (enunciados) 'con' y 'sin' sentido. Denunció que las que violaran el criterio empirista de significado serían del segundo tipo: 'pseudo-expresiones'. Sin embargo, Carnap reconocía desconocer la fuente exacta de los sinsentidos al comentar que expresaban algo, pero 'como lo hace un artista'. En 1936, Heidegger (...) reaccionaba explorando el 'como lo hace un artista' de Carnap en una conferencia en Zürich, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", donde distinguía, basado en la 'diferencia ontológica' de Sein und Zeit (1927), entre expresiones (lenguaje) 'de comunicación' y 'del ser'. En 1955, Heidegger fundaría esa distinción en términos de áreas de investigación, 'filosofía' y 'poesía', en la conferencia de Normandia, "Was ist das-die Philosophie?". En ella, Heidegger, no obstante, concluía, al igual que Carnap, no saber cómo distinguirlas, dado que el lenguaje acoge a ambas. Esta disputa por la prioridad entre tipos de expresión continúa en nuestros días (Stove 1991; Smith 1992; Lacoue-Labarthe 2002; Gadenne 2008; y Nef 2009). En este escrito, quisiera contribuir a la controversia ensayando una reconciliación entre lo que llamaré 'la concepción formal del mundo', representada por el realismo lógico, el empirismo lógico y las fenomenologías realista y trascendental, y 'la concepción informal del mundo', representada por la filosofía del lenguaje ordinario, la hermenéutica, la deconstrucción, el contextualismo y la poesía. La conclusión será una eliminación de las prioridades mediante una defensa biológica de la libertad de expresión. Em 1931, Rudolf Carnap publicou um artigo intitulado "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" onde qualificava algumas expressões da conferência de Martin Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?", como 'sem sentido'. Distinguia assim entre expressões (enunciados) 'com' e 'sem' sentido. Denunciou que aquelas expressões que violassem o critério empirista de significado seriam do segundo tipo: 'pseudo-expressões'. Todavia, Carnap reconhecia desconhecer a fonte exata dos sem-sentidos ao comentar que expressavam algo, mas 'como o faz um artista'. Em 1936, Heidegger reagia explorando o 'como o faz um artista' de Carnap em uma conferência em Zürich, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", onde distinguia, baseado na 'diferença ontológica' de Sein und Zeit (1927), entre expressões (linguagem) 'de comunicação' e 'de ser'. Em 1955, Heidegger estabeleceria essa distinção em termos de áreas de investigação, 'filosofia' e 'poesia', na conferência de Normandia, "Was ist das-die Philosophie?". Nela, Heidegger concluia, contudo, do mesmo modo que Carnap, não saber como distingui-las, dado que a linguagem acolhe a ambas. Esta disputa pela prioridade entre tipos de expressão continua en nossos dias (Stove 1991; Smith 1992; Lacoue-Labarthe 2002; Gadenne 2008; y Nef 2009). Neste artigo, gostaria de contribuir à controvérsia procurando uma reconciliação entre o que chamarei 'a concepção formal do mundo', representada pelo realismo lógico, o empirismo lógico e as fenomenologias realista e trascendental, e 'a concepção informal do mundo', representada pela filosofia da linguagem ordinária, a hermenéutica, a desconstrução, o contextualismo e a poesia. A conclusão será uma eliminação das prioridades mediante uma defesa biológica da liberdade de expressão. (shrink)

En el siguiente artículo se aborda el problema de la concepción de sí misma de la filosofía en conexión con la noción de vida fáctica en las lecciones que Heidegger dictara entre los años 1919-1923 en Friburgo. La hipótesis hermenéutica aquí ensayada propone avanzar primero en el modo en que Heidegger plantea la pregunta por la filosofía y cuál es ahí el núcleo problemático, y sólo luego intentar ver cuáles son los elementos formales a los que el tratamiento de la (...) así llamada “vida fáctica” debe dar satisfacción para ser una respuesta a la pregunta. En este sentido la noción heideggeriana de vida fáctica sería una condición metódica básica en relación al proyecto de autocomprensión filosófica. (shrink)

Este artículo se centra en la interpretación del concepto de facticidad en los cursos impartidos por Heidegger entre 1921 y 1923. La facticidad será allí entendida en términos de cierto dinamismo, al tiempo que vacilantemente asimilada al “sentido del ser” del ente que somos. En relación a ello, trataremos de mostrar cómo en el problema al que esta noción apunta cabe ya reconocer la cuestión por el sentido del ser en general planteada en Ser y tiempo.

The article displays the reciprocal influence between Heidegger and Marcuse concerning the idea of practical philosophy. It first proceeds by evaluating the possibility of an ethical interpretation of Being and Time and following Marcuse’s reception of it, and then by delineating the basic elements of Heidegger’s interpretations of Marx, his answer to Hegelian Marxism, and his understanding of the concept of Praxis.

Embora saibamos que, nos passos iniciais do itinerário do pensamento de Heidegger, não haja um tratamento formal do conceito de natureza, existe, contudo, uma interpretação crítica do conceito naturalista do ser, pertencente à tradição metafísica, que o filósofo quer ultrapassar em direção a uma outra perspectiva de pensamento, guiada por uma fenomenologia hermenêutica e nascida do caráter humano de ser do homem, isto é, das condições ontológico-fácticas de sua existência. O presente artigo procura indicar o contraponto entre esses dois modos (...) de interpretação do ser, o natural e o humano, acompanhando os passos mais significativos dados pelo jovem Heidegger entre 1907, época de seu despertar para a filosofia, e meados dos anos 20, ocasião de suas pesquisas sobre o cristianismo primitivo e sobre escritos práticos sobre Aristóteles.Despite we know that there is not a formal treatment of nature′s concept in the initial steps of Heidegger′s thought, there is, although, a critical interpretation of the naturalist concept of Being, concerning to metaphysical tradition, which the philosopher wants go beyond to another perspective of thought. That perspective is guided by a hermeneutic phenomenology and born from human character of being of man, that is, from ontological and factical conditions of your existence. The present paper intends to indicate the counterpoint between these two ways of the interpretation of Being, the natural and the human, following the more expressive steps given by young Heidegger between 1907, age of his awakening to philosophy, and the early twenties, time of his researches about primal Christianity and Aristotle′s practical writings. (shrink)