What is a problem? What is problematic about any problem whatsoever, philosophical or otherwise? As the origin of assertion and apodeiction, the problematic suspends the categories of necessity and contingency, possibility and impossibility. And it is this suspension that is the essence of the problem, which is why it is so suspenseful. But then, how is the problem problematic? Only if what is suspended neither comes to presence, nor simply goes out into absence, that is, if the suspension continues, which (...) continues the problem. But what is problematic about suspension? As a consideration of language shows, the problem of suspension is the problem of implication. If being, for example, is merely implied, neither present nor absent, then it is the suspension of both, at least insofar as it is problematic. And this not only says something about language; rather, it has ontological implications as well — it speaks of being, and the being of anything whatsoever. For if being is implied, if that is the problem of being, it is because being is an implication. Then the being of things like problems is implied as well; or being is in things by implication. But what does it mean for being to be neither presence nor absence, but an implication? It means that being is implied in a way that is problematic — before it is necessary, or even possible. For being’s way of being is characterized by suspension — which has implications for thinking and speaking about being, and about things like problems, even about anything whatsoever. And this has implications for what being implies, namely, unity and time and aspect. (shrink)

Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of ?formal indication? is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer ?the ontological question of the being of the ?sum?? (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question ?what is it to be the entity I (...) am?? On the basis of these features, various further a priori, ontological structures (care and temporality) that constitute one as a first-person singular entity then become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence. (shrink)

Author: Sobota Daniel Title: HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY OF THE WAY (Heideggerowska filozofia drogi) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 37-72 Keywords: PHILOSOPHY OF THE WAY, HEIDEGGER, BEING Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The purpose of this paper is to present Heidegger’s philosophy of the way. The term of way is common in the history of philosophy. Heidegger does not use this term as a useful “metaphor”, but treats it as (...) a fundamental figure of his thoughts. The term of way can be understood twofold: 1. way as a place used for traveling, 2. way as being-on-the-way. Heidegger joints these two meanings to create his own way of thinking. From these two meanings there come to being fundamental oppositions: hiddenness and unhiddenness, falling and raising, openness and closeness, distance and closeness, vanity and fullness. Since the shape of Heidegger’s way is a circle, we get further categories: circle of understanding, reminder, coming back, turning. Characteristics of Heidegger’s way is described by such terms like dialectics, trichotomy and being-between. All the presented categories make the questioness of being itself. (shrink)

Se trata de pensar y abrir el horizonte del ser-con desde los análisis fenomenológicos vertidospor Heidegger en la I Sección de su libro Ser y Tiempo, respetando y aceptando sus propiaslimitaciones intrínsecas y a pesar del carácter aparentemente negativo que rodea a este existenciario,a fin de radicalizarlo, extenderlo y ubicarlo en su posibilidad más genuina. Por esta razón, a través deuna interpretación de corte fenomenológico, se ha querido potenciar los posibles rendimientos de unser-con en propiedad, enfatizando la necesidad de interpretar (...) el opus magnum heideggeriano desdeel horizonte de la mismidad del Dasein. La conclusión apunta sobre dos vías temáticas, a saber: a) atomar la mismidad del Dasein, por cuanto constituye una posibilidad ejecutiva de existir conforme alo que este ente es, en tanto condición necesaria y suficiente para pensar un ser-con en propiedad; b) aestablecer, casi a modo de esbozo, una relación entre ser-con, libertad y mismidad, la cual tiene su basetemática en una presumible igualdad de orden pre-ontológico. (shrink)

In this article, the Heidegger and Derrida controversy about the nature of questioning is revisited in order to rehabilitate questioning as an essential characteristic of contemporary philosophy. After exploring Heidegger's characterization of philosophy as questioning and Derrida's criticism of the primacy of questioning, we will evaluate Derrida's criticism and articulate three characteristics of Heidegger's concept of questioning. After our exploration of Heidegger's concept of questioning, we critically evaluate Heidegger's later rejection of questioning. With this, we not only contribute to the (...) discussion about why Heidegger rejected questioning in his later thought and whether this rejection is legitimized, but also to the rehabilitation of questioning in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Is it possible to investigate subjectivity reflectively? Can reflection give us access to the original experiential dimension, or is there on the contrary reason to suspect that the experiences are changed radically when reflected upon? This is a question that Natorp discusses in his Allgemeine Psychologie, and the conclusion he reaches is highly anti-phenomenological. The article presents Natorp's challenge and then goes on to account in detail for Heidegger 's subsequent response to it in his early Freiburg lectures, in particular (...) Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks and Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Heidegger 's early views on reflection, selfhood, and pre-reflective self-awareness are expounded, and the article concludes with a discussion of the relationship between reflective phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology. (shrink)

The following essay compares and contrasts Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time with an earlier lecture course that he delivered in the Winter Semester of 1919/2020 entitled Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Heidegger says explicitly that the pre-phenomenal basis for his analysis in Being and Time is “entities” in their equipmental totality. He calls these the “preliminary theme” for his analysis of Dasein. While the analytic of Dasein is the first step in posing the question of Being, the pre-phenomenal basis for the (...) analytic of Dasein is, he says, “entitities” or “equipment”. I argue that this can lead to certain misunderstandings, especially when he talks about nature and human relationships. In Basic Problems, Heidegger’s focus is not on “entities” or “equipment” but rather on experiences. In this earlier work, he is trying to develop a language that can capture the intensity of lived-experience, suggesting an experiential vibrancy to Dasein that is implicit but not thematized in Being and Time. I aim to show that while Heidegger turns away from the term “life” in Being and Time, his understanding of Dasein can still draw on the intensity and immediacy of experience so prominent in this early lecture course. (shrink)

After taking into consideration the most relevant criticisms questioning the capacity of the thinking “I” to grasp itself in a transparent and undistorting way, I will ask what remains of first-person authority with regard to one’s own identity. I argue that first-person authority is not to be abandoned, but rather reformulated in terms of public commitments that nobody else can take up in my place. After recovering the original meaning of Heidegger’s claim “one is what one does,” I turn to (...) Arendt’s performative disclosure of the “who” through political initiative and suggest reading the requirement of public exposure as a model allowing for a better understanding of self-identification. In order to discern more clearly the shape of this new paradigm of self-identification, I draw on Ricoeur’s notion of self-attestation, Crowell’s analysis of our “being-answerable” and Larmore’s account of avowals in which we give ourselves a publicly binding shape. In synthetizing and prolonging the considerations of the abovementioned authors about the performative disclosure of the self, I demonstrate that one’s identity—in the sense of ipseity—is both constituted and manifested by the commitments that the self endorses and for which it is held accountable in front of others. (shrink)

La fenomenología marioniana ha recibido diversas críticas respecto de su lectura de la _Gegebenheit_ husserliana y heideggeriana. Este artículo se propone dar cuenta de la importancia fenomenológica de la concepción marioniana de la donación.

Fenomenologia w dwudziestym wieku wiąże się z filozofią Edmunda Husserla. Punktem wyjścia jego myślenia jest założenie korelacji świata i świadomości. Podstawowe pojęcie intencjonalności świadomości ukazuje, że świadomość jest zawsze świadomością czegoś. Tak więc wszelkie bycie tego, co bytuje, istnieje o tyle, o ile ma odniesienie do doświadczającej, postrzegającej i myślącej świadomości. Swiat jest zatem korelatem świadomości. Fenomenologia nie jest początkiem drogi myślowej Martina Heideggera. Jego myślenie filozoficzne ma swoje korzenie w teologii i wczesnej fascynacji ontologią. Droga myślowa Heideggera wiedzie przez (...) fenomenologię i ontologię fundamentalną ku myśleniu bycia. Husserl położył podwaliny pod fenomenologię w swoim dziele Logische Untersuchungen. Heidegger był tym dziełem zawsze zafascynowany. Nie mógł tylko zaakceptować fenomenologii jako filozofii transcendentalnej. Natomiast w pierwotnej fenomenologicznej zasadzie „ku rzeczom samym” widział doskonałą możliwość filozofowania i myślenia metafizycznego. Przez dziesięć lat był Heidegger postacią wiodącą wśród młodych fenomenologów we Fryburgu Bryzgowijskim, uznawaną również przez samego Husserla. Później ich drogi myślowe się rozeszły. Heidegger zajmował się fenomenologią przez całe życie. Od ukazania się jego Sein und Zeit przejął, zajmowaną dotąd przez Husserla, wiodącą pozycję w ruchu fenomenologicznym. Heidegger zarzucał Husserlowi, że ten nie wyciągnął konsekwencji ontologicznych z fenomenologii. Zawsze ubolewał nad tym, że ostatecznie ich drogi się rozeszły. (shrink)

What is the difference between doing philosophy and doing the history of philosophy? Where should the line be drawn between ?using? previous philosophers to make one's point and discussing what past philosophers claimed? In trying to confront these questions, this essay starts with a reflection on the difference between doing philosophy and doing the history of philosophy as proposed by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and confronts it with a different one derived from the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. The ideas (...) developed by Heidegger will then lead to a definition of ?philosophy? and to some etymology-based reflections on what a ?philosopher? is that Plato proposes in his ?Symposium?. The essay continues by arguing that, when doing philosophy, it is necessary to return to philosophy's past in order to recoup philosophical momentum. The essay concludes with some reflection on the possible similarities between Plato's characterization of Eros as the first philosopher and the difference between doing philosophy and doing the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The essay provides an interpretation of the specific concept of ”ruinance” (Ruinanz), as this is introduced and developed by Heidegger in his 1921/22 lecture series on ”Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle” (GA 61). Instead of accepting this subsequently abandoned concept as a marginal excursus on Heidegger’s part, the interpretation uses it as a lever to explore the interconnectedness of intentionality, falling, destruction, history and finitude, and also the proclaimed necessity of so called ”formally indicative concepts”, of which ruinance itself is a (...) supreme example. (shrink)

Phenomenological descriptions are supposed to be revelatory and coincide with the self-showing of the things themselves. These features of phenomenological descriptions lead to the peculiar character of their expression, which has the effect of making them difficult to communicate. That is, the problem with communicating the findings of phenomenological researches is a consequence of the descriptive nature of the endeavor and the disclosive character of phenomenological descriptions. In the Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl recognized that the problem has three facets: how (...) does one state the findings of phenomenological researches, how can one effectively communicate these findings, and how can these communications be persuasive? In this essay I elaborate on these problems and then show that Heidegger’s method of formal indication was designed to solve these problems just as Husserl understood them. We can thus take formal indication as a model for dealing with these problems—and for informing phenomenological discourse—because it solves them with a single strategy. (shrink)

In his essay, ‘Heidegger's Categories in Sein und Zeit’, Robert Brandom argues that Heidegger, particularly in the notion of Zuhandenheit, anticipates his own normatively pragmatist conception of intentionality. He attempts to demonstrate this by marshalling short passages from right across the relevant sections of Sein und Zeit in such a way that they do seem to say what Brandom claims. But does one reach the same conclusion when one examines, more or less in sentence‐by‐sentence fashion, the large slab of text (...) in which Heidegger introduces the notion of Zuhandenheit? I believe not. First, however, let us look at how Brandom reads Heidegger, in particular, how he interprets the notion of Zuhandenheit, which, in contrast both to Macquarrie and Robinson and to Brandom, I shall translate as ready‐to‐handedness.1. (shrink)

La idea de que la fenomenología de Husserl representa una suerte de filosofía reflexiva, basada en una metodología que desarrolla la tradición cartesiana, se ha convertido en una creencia ampliamente difundida en la literatura filosófica. Este énfasis puesto por Husserl en la reflexión fue arduamente criticado por Heidegger. Desde entonces resulta frecuente encontrarse con la afirmación de que Husserl y Heidegger desarrollan dos conceptos de fenomenología diferentes, incluso antagónicos. No se trata de seguir alimentando esta discusión historiográfica. Aquí, por una (...) parte, se muestra el complejo proceso de desarrollo de la fenomenología hermenéutica de Heidegger en el transcurso de sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo (1919-1923) y Marburgo (1924-1928) y, por otra, se sopesan algunas de las observaciones críticas de Heidegger a Husserl a la luz de evidencias textuales de la fenomenología husserliana, ignoradas no sólo por Heidegger, sino también por un sorprendente número de reconocidos especialistas en el campo de la filosofía, de las ciencias cognitivas y de la filosofía de la mente. (shrink)

Embora saibamos que, nos passos iniciais do itinerário do pensamento de Heidegger, não haja um tratamento formal do conceito de natureza, existe, contudo, uma interpretação crítica do conceito naturalista do ser, pertencente à tradição metafísica, que o filósofo quer ultrapassar em direção a uma outra perspectiva de pensamento, guiada por uma fenomenologia hermenêutica e nascida do caráter humano de ser do homem, isto é, das condições ontológico-fácticas de sua existência. O presente artigo procura indicar o contraponto entre esses dois modos (...) de interpretação do ser, o natural e o humano, acompanhando os passos mais significativos dados pelo jovem Heidegger entre 1907, época de seu despertar para a filosofia, e meados dos anos 20, ocasião de suas pesquisas sobre o cristianismo primitivo e sobre escritos práticos sobre Aristóteles.Despite we know that there is not a formal treatment of nature′s concept in the initial steps of Heidegger′s thought, there is, although, a critical interpretation of the naturalist concept of Being, concerning to metaphysical tradition, which the philosopher wants go beyond to another perspective of thought. That perspective is guided by a hermeneutic phenomenology and born from human character of being of man, that is, from ontological and factical conditions of your existence. The present paper intends to indicate the counterpoint between these two ways of the interpretation of Being, the natural and the human, following the more expressive steps given by young Heidegger between 1907, age of his awakening to philosophy, and the early twenties, time of his researches about primal Christianity and Aristotle′s practical writings. (shrink)

Este artículo se centra en la interpretación del concepto de facticidad en los cursos impartidos por Heidegger entre 1921 y 1923. La facticidad será allí entendida en términos de cierto dinamismo, al tiempo que vacilantemente asimilada al “sentido del ser” del ente que somos. En relación a ello, trataremos de mostrar cómo en el problema al que esta noción apunta cabe ya reconocer la cuestión por el sentido del ser en general planteada en Ser y tiempo.

Author: Sobota Daniel Title: GENESIS, STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF SEINSFRAGE (Geneza, struktura i dynamika Seinsfrage) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.11, number: 2010/2, pages: 41-71 Keywords: HEIDEGGER, QUESTION OF BEING, ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE, ONTOLOGY, DASEIN Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The main purpose of this article is to present the genesis, structure and dynamics of the most important thought of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy (the question of Being). Since the very beginning of Heidegger’s (...) logical research he was interested in these forms of utterance, which previously had been acknowledged as of marginal significance in discovering the truth and the structure of science. The question of Being is phenomenological unity which has replaced traditional assigning of being and proposition. From this perspective all of the traditional logical and ontological problematic changes itself radically. By considering the question Heidegger revealed the ontological difference and the place of revelation which is a common people’s being (the everyday life). (shrink)

La serenidad parece abundar en la actitud resignada ante un mundo tecnificado cuya marcha irredenta solo podrá ser detenida ya solo por un dios que pueda aún salvarnos. En mi opinión, esta conocida lectura obvia la parte activa y comprometida de la serenidad cuya fertilidad emerge cuando se entiende vinculada al cuidado como esencia del Dasein. Este artículo defiende que esta interpretación es posible toda vez que se descubra la raíz cristiano-paulina de la Gelassenheit como la actitud adecuada para ser (...) en el mundo sin ser del mundo. (shrink)

In his famous essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Walter Benjamin compares the daily experience of buildings with the perception of films. His comparison relies on the peculiar concept of “tactile reception“, he opposes to the optically oriented traditional attitude towards art. The concept encompasses two essential traits: on the one hand, it designates the fact that films do not require a contemplative, focused attention, but a habitual, distracted approach, similar to that by which we (...) perceive buildings in our everyday life-world. On the other hand, Benjamin’s concept points to a particular “chock-effect” produced by cinematic experience, through its constant change of perspectives and points of view. By this, it challenges precisely the same form of ambient perception required in numerous situations of our daily life in the modern city. The two determinations sketch out a unitary concept that shows obvious similarities to the phenomenological idea of a “life-worldly circumspection” , a specific manner of sight guiding everyday practical life. (shrink)

En el siguiente escrito buscamos poner de manifiesto las necesidades expresivas, en razón de las cuales, el joven Heidegger emprende el camino en búsqueda de los indicadores formales. Nuestra línea argumentativa toma como punto de partida la crítica que Eugen Fink construye alrededor de los conceptos de la fenomenología husserliana, pero se enfoca exclusivamente en la transformación hermenéutica de sus contenidos. Con ello pretendemos aclarar la transición de qué al cómo que caracteriza la propuesta fenomenológico-hermenéutica de Martin Heidegger, desde el (...) punto de vista de su conceptualidad específica. (shrink)