The claim that we want to put forward is that Thomas Kuhn ’s growth of knowledge concept is drawn upon Heidegger’s epistemology. To bolster the tenet the corresponding works of both thinkers are considered. As a result, the one-to-one correspondence between the key propositions of Heideggerian epistemology and the basic tenets of Kuhn ’s growth of knowledge model is dawned. The tenets under consideration include the holistic nature of a paradigm, the incommensurability thesis, conventional status of a paradigm caused by (...) pragmatist way of its vocabulary justification and even the basic instance – connection between Aristotelean and Newtonian mechanics. It is conjectured that an indirect influence of Heidegger upon Kuhn should be taken into account to explain the isomorphism. For instance, through the works of Alexandre Koyré admired by Kuhn. As is well-known, Koyré had close professional links with another Russian émigré – Alexandre Kojev – who presented in his 1933-1939 Paris lectures Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” seen through the cognitive lens of Heideggerian phenomenology. Key words: Martin Heidegger, Thomas Kuhn, growth of knowledge, paradigm, incommensurability thesis, holism, pragmatism. (shrink)

This article re-orients Heidegger's analyses of things to cast light on two distinct ways of relating to things, one at the root of technological use and the other crucial to artistic creation. The first way, which we may call instrumental practice, denotes the activity of using something to accomplish some goal or objective. This practice underlies the analysis of use-things [Zeuge] that Heidegger presents in Being and Time. Heidegger's contribution there is twofold: to show how understanding things as zuhanden, there (...) for us, is prior to taking things as objects in "nature," and to clarify how the "phenomenon of the world" can show itself when a useful thing becomes dysfunctional. But Heidegger's focus on the thing as zuhanden leaves in the dark a second kind of practice that we engage in when we relate to things, the practice of attending to an activity for its own sake, as I illustrate by the using or making of four things: the hammer, the Daoist cook's cleaver, the Daoist-inspired empty jug or Krug, and the Japanese calligrapher's brush. Heidegger's dialogue on Gelassenheit anticipates but also cuts short this practice of attention: gelassenes Denken—the thinking that lets go of representations and expectations and simply lets things be—promises to open a way to experience our essential nature [Wesen], but the dialogue's focus on things as already there or already made distracts from the practice of attention that goes into the art of making things like jugs. By re-orienting Heidegger's thinking we are able to recast the question of technology: can the practice of attention performed for its own sake—caring for things simply to care for them, caring for the surrounding world simply to care for it—help salvage not only the environment but the very essence of being human? (shrink)

Philosophers have thought more about the nature of thinking than about anything else. After Plato and Aristotle, philosophers’ main concern was to promote good, that is, correct, thinking. Because correct thinking was achieved best in propositional statements, thinking became a matter of logic, and logic became a discipline dealing with the formulation of true predicative sentences.In the twentieth century, many philosophers expressed their dissatisfaction with this view. Some, such as Heidegger, have pointed to the ontological presuppositions of a logic that (...) makes truth a matter of correspondence between predicative sentences and the reality of states of affairs. Other philosophers, such as Deleuze, have .. (shrink)

The study “Psychoanalysis—its image and its public” intimates that common sense is increasingly informed by science. But common sense asserts its autonomy and, in turn, may affect the trajectory of science. This is a process that leads to many differentiations—in common sense, in scientific innovation and in political and regulatory structures. Bauer and Gaskell's toblerone model of triangles of mediation provided a distillation of their reading of “La Psychanalyse.” Here it was argued that representations are multi-modal phenomena necessitating the use (...) of multiple methodologies .In this paper we briefly summarise these arguments and elaborate ways in which social representation theory can be considered a progressive research programme. “Progressive” because as the theory has developed it has extended the range and depth of its conceptual basis; it provides a new synthesis for the social scientific understanding of the phenomena of common sense and of representation; it acts as an antidote to the reductionism of public opinion and, finally, it is a stimulus to depart from disciplinary silos. However, there remain unresolved issues: how to segment the relevant social milieus and how to close the feedback loop from common sense to science? (shrink)

In modern continental thought, natural science is widely portrayed as an exclusively instrumental mode of reason. The breadth of this consensus has partly preempted the question of how it came to persuade. The process of persuasion, as it played out in Germany, can be explored by reconstructing the intellectual exchanges among three twentieth-century theorists of science, Heidegger, Habermas, and Werner Heisenberg. Taking an iconic Heisenberg as a kind of limiting case of “the scientist,” Heidegger and Habermas each found themselves driven (...) to place new constraints on their previously more capacious assessments of science, especially its capacity to reflect on its method. Tracing how that happened, through archival and historical contextualization and close readings of their texts, lets us make visible Heidegger and Habermas’s intellectual affinities and argumentative parallels, which derived not only from their shared grounding in earlier reactions against positivism, but also from confrontation with contemporary events. The latter included, for Heidegger, the rise of a technically powerful science exemplified by nuclear physics, and for Habermas, post-World War II controversies over science, technology, and their socially critical possibilities. (shrink)

To examine Heidegger's pedagogy is to be invited into a particular era and cultural reality—starting in Weimar Germany and progressing into the rise and fall of the Third Reich. In his attempt to reform the German university in a strictly hierarchical, authoritarian and nationalistic mold, Heidegger addressed one group of students and professors and not another. The petit‐bourgeois student and the future philosophers he invited with his ‘logic of recruitment’ into the corps of instructors, would share his coded language with (...) its built‐in taboos and censorship. The result was a rhetoric of absolute self‐reference and a semiotic of pure propaganda, based on the evocation of the ancient Greeks in which the philosopher meant to project all that was properly Germanic. Heidegger's rhetoric is exclusionary; its politics and its philosophy are interpenetrating. His lecture courses grew increasingly poeticized, and thus mired in ambiguity, evasion, elision, avoidance, grandiloquence. Parallels are drawn in this essay between Heidegger and our time. Is Heidegger's insistence on autocratic controls within the German university comparable to the corporate positions taken today by some educators? How does the shifting relation between disciplines affect the role of the specialist? How might the sciences morales or humanities, along with the much maligned ‘humanism’, be redefined morally and holistically? (shrink)

Kirjoitus tarkastelee Martin Heideggerin myöhäisajattelussa esiin nousevaa olemisen ainutkertaisuuden (Einzigkeit, Einmaligkeit) teemaa ja sen edelleenkehittelyä Jean-Luc Nancyn ajattelussa. Teeman osoitetaan kytkeytyvän Heideggerin välienselvittelyyn filosofian esisokraattisen alun, erityisesti Parmenideen ajattelun kanssa. Parmenides ajattelee olemista kaikkia yksittäisiä ilmentymiään, "kuolevaisten" äärellisiä "näkemyksiä" (doksai) yhdistävänä absoluuttisen homogeenisena ja itseidenttisenä ilmeisyytenä (alētheia), todellisuuden puhtaana läsnäolona ajattelulle. Tätä vasten Heidegger ajattelee olemisen nimenomaan yksittäisten ilmentymiensä kontekstuaalisena ainutkertaisuutena, mielekkyystilanteiden ainutkertaistavana kontekstualisoitumisena. Nancy jatkaa ajatusta kuvailemalla olemista "ainutkertaiseksi-monikolliseksi" (singulier pluriel), mutta täydentää Heideggerin ajatteluun tunnetusti jäänyttä aukkoa soveltamalla ajatusta (...) yhteisön ajattelemiseen ainutkertaisuuksien yhdessäolemisena ja keskinäisyytenä. Näin avautuva "ainutkertaisuuden politiikan" teema onkin viime vuosikymmeninä noussut mannermaisen poliittisen ajattelun keskiöön. (shrink)

The text discusses philosophy of education from Gadamer's and Heidegger's point of view. Education undeceives people and humanity in accordance with their essence and nature in openness of progress. Education conceals the human being from and Ьу means of the truth in nature. lt is exhiblted the connection with the worldwiews of Platon, Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Dewey.

Artikkeli käy läpi Quentin Meillassoux’n Äärellisyyden jälkeen -teoksessa esittelemiä spekulatiivisen materialismin lähtökohtia: ajatuksen Kantin jälkeistä filosofiasta hallinneesta korrelationismista ja sen ”heikosta” ja ”vahvasta” muodosta sekä Meillassoux’n perusargumentin, jolla hän pyrkii osoittamaan vahvan korrelationismin pyrkimyksen absoluuttisista viitepiisteistä luopumiseen sisäisesti ristiriitaiseksi. Tarkastelun pääpaino on Meillassoux’n väitteessä, että ajattelun riisuminen kaikista absoluuttisista näkökohdista johtaa vahvan korrelationismin omaksumaan ”fideistisen”, uskon ja järjen erillisyyttä ja keskinäistä riippumattomuutta korostavan suhtautumisen uskonnolliseen uskoon. Tällainen fideismi voi Meillassoux’n mukaan suojella tai jopa palvella ”nykypäivän fanatismia”. Artikkeli esittää joukon kriittisiä (...) huomioita Meillassoux’n fideismin ja uskon, uskonnollisten absoluuttien sekä fanatismin käsitteistä. Hänen klassiseen valistusmoderniin nojaava fideismikritiikkinsä osoittautuu toistaiseksi puutteellisesti perustelluksi ja ongelmallisesti muotoilluksi. (shrink)

Resumen: Se ensaya la tesis de que no habiendo innovación sin tradición, la filosofía opera en un espacio en tensión entre estos dos polos. Se comienza trazando un recorrido por las distintas precomprensiones de la naturaleza y el conocimiento en la Antigüedad y en la Modernidad como esquemas del contraste entre tradición e innovación; a continuación, se acude a Ortega y Gasset y a Heidegger para precisar en qué consiste la innovación en filosofía y para explicitar su conexión con y (...) dependencia de la tradición; por último, se propone explorar la innovación educativa de la filosofía como, siguiendo a Odo Marquard, descarga compensatoria de la sobrecarga innovativa. Palabras clave: innovación, tradición, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, Marquard. English title: Philosophy as unloading of innovation overloadAbstract: This paper claims that insofar as there is no innovation without tradition, philosophy operates in a space of tension between those two poles. I begin by sketching different pre-understandings of nature and knowledge in Antiquity and Modernity as schemas of the contrast between tradition and innovation. I then resort to Ortega y Gasset and Heidegger to specify what innovation consists of in philosophy and to explain its connection with and dependence on tradition. I finally propose to understand, following Odo Marquard, educative innovation in philosophy as a compensatory unloading of innovation overload. Keywords: innovation, tradition, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, Marquard. (shrink)

Resumen Numerosas derivas de la fenomenología contemporánea, especialmente francesa, tematizaron fenómenos con excedencia que desafían la estructura husserliana de correlación intencional e impronta epistémica del polo subjetivo. La filosofía heideggeriana se pregunta sobre la facticidad y sus fundamentos, arribando al terreno en que el fenómeno se sustrae y resulta, por ello, inaparente, pero a la vez fundante de todo el ámbito del aparecer. En el presente trabajo estudiaremos en primer lugar el marco en que la filosofía de Heidegger tematiza la (...) excedencia en el Seminario de Zähringen, consideraremos la tensión con la posición husserliana y analizaremos el planteo de la noción de “fenomenología de lo inaparente” para trazar algunas proyecciones de esta idea que habilitan la inclusión de las temáticas ligadas con la excedencia dentro de la economía propiamente fenomenológica.Many lines of contemporary phenomenology, especially in its French sides, have studied phenomena that exceed the limits and defy the original Husserlian structure and its commitment with intentional correlation and the epistemic aspects of the subjective pole. The direction of Heideggerian philosophy and its treatment about facticity and its foundations was a defining issue. In this context it is studied the phenomenon that subtracts itself and is, therefore, inapparent, but at the same time it is the founder of the whole field of appearance. The present work mil study the framework in which Heidegger's philosophy thematizes excess in the Seminar of Zähringen. It mil be considered the tension with the Husserlian position and the propos al of the notion of'phenomenology of the inapparent". On this basis it mil be possible to draw some projections of this idea that enable the inclusion of the issues linkedmth exceedance within the phenomenological sphere. (shrink)

This monograph contributes to the scientific misconduct debate from an oblique perspective, by analysing seven novels devoted to this issue, namely: Arrowsmith by Sinclair Lewis (1925), The affair by C.P. Snow (1960), Cantor’s Dilemma by Carl Djerassi (1989), Perlmann’s Silence by Pascal Mercier (1995), Intuition by Allegra Goodman (2006), Solar by Ian McEwan (2010) and Derailment by Diederik Stapel (2012). Scientific misconduct, i.e. fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, but also other questionable research practices, have become a focus of concern for academic communities (...) worldwide, but also for managers, funders and publishers of research. The aforementioned novels offer intriguing windows into integrity challenges emerging in contemporary research practices. They are analysed from a continental philosophical perspective, providing a stage where various voices, positions and modes of discourse are mutually exposed to one another, so that they critically address and question one another. They force us to start from the admission that we do not really know what misconduct is. Subsequently, by providing case histories of misconduct, they address integrity challenges not only in terms of individual deviance but also in terms of systemic crisis, due to current transformations in the ways in which knowledge is produced. Rather than functioning as moral vignettes, the author argues that misconduct novels challenge us to reconsider some of the basic conceptual building blocks of integrity discourse. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that for Socrates political virtue is accomplished exclusively in the sphere of pure language or gesture. The argument consists of three parts. First, following on from the lectures entitled What is Called Thinking?, I examine Heidegger’s interpretation of the figure of Socrates in relation to the themes of language and gesture. Following on from this analysis, I remark that Heidegger overlooks important aspects of Socrates’ understanding of the relation between political virtue and speech. (...) Subsequently, based on the analysis of a central passage from Plato's Apology, I argue that virtue requires the public communicability of speech, and that it imposes itself over language and gestures as a principle of action that precedes and exceeds conceptual knowledge. Finally, I conclude by stating that political power is restricted to the medium of language, to what language itself does or says. (shrink)

The paper analyzes Quentin Meillassoux’s conception of the fideistic approach to religious faith intrinsic to the “strong correlationism” that he considers pervasive in contemporary thought. Backman presents the basic elements of Meillassoux’s speculative materialism and especially the thesis according to which strong correlationism involves a “fideistic” approach to religiosity. In doing so, Backman critically examines Meillassoux’s notions of post-metaphysical faith, religious absolutes, and contemporary fanaticism, especially against the background of Heidegger’s philosophy. According to Backman, Meillassoux’s logical and conceptual critique of (...) strong correlationism is innovative, and it may remain legitimate if its presuppositions are accepted. And yet, Backman argues that Meillassoux’s allegations of fideism seem to rely on the questionable application of Enlightenment conceptions to the contemporary situation. (shrink)

Ancient Chinese thought inquired primarily into how the achievement of things is possible rather than into what a thing as a thing is. It held that man should participate in the achieving or generation of things in order to realize his self-achievement. A thing is understood as an event. Because all things and man are united as one, it is possible for man to enter into things by tasting and feeling rather than by relying on the sense of sight. This (...) may provide a possible new means of rescuing things from the numericalization and phenomenalization that sweep over the world today. (shrink)

A revisionist movement in Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science seeking to modulate the positivistic stress on formalized systems and to consider science as ongoing research in finite historical context strikes resonances with hermeneutical phenomenology , whose ontology likewise shifts the locus of truth from verification to discovery. Fusion of the two traditions is utilized to illuminate hitherto relatively unexplored facets of the logic and psychology of scientific discovery, as well as its ontology, here developed from the intentional intertwining of man and (...) nature and finding its locus in the linguistic historicity of fundamental scientific concepts. (shrink)

Philosophers and artists consider the relevance of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy for understanding art and aesthetic experience. This collection of essays brings together diverse but interrelated perspectives on art and perception based on the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although Merleau-Ponty focused almost exclusively on painting in his writings on aesthetics, this collection also considers poetry, literary works, theater, and relationships between art and science. In addition to philosophers, the contributors include a painter, a photographer, a musicologist, and an architect. This widened (...) scope offers important philosophical benefits, testing and providing evidence for the empirical applicability of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetic writings. The central argument is that for Merleau-Ponty the account of perception is also an account of art and vice versa. In the philosopher’s writings, art and perception thus intertwine necessarily rather than contingently such that they can only be distinguished by abstraction. As a result, his account of perception and his account of art are organic, interdependent, and dynamic. The contributors examine various aspects of this intertwining across different artistic media, each ingeniously revealing an original perspective on this intertwining. (shrink)

En una de sus lecciones en Friburgo, hacia fines de 1951, Martin Heidegger pronunció una frase llamada a ser fuente de controversias y de exégesis inacabables: «La ciencia no piensa». La lección en la que aparece su frase provocadora se publicaría luego en su libro _¿Qué significa pensar?_, en 1954. En este trabajo analizamos las interpretaciones de esta frase, discutimos su dimensión política, y repensamos su significado en relación a su circularidad, i.e. a su carácter de dispositivo definitorio.

Within the variety of subjects considered by Heidegger after Being and time, the notion of ‘thinking’ stands out for its constant presence and for the central place it occupies in a large part of his later work. In fact, as a path towards overcoming metaphysics and as a means of rethinking the relationship between humans and being, distorted in the world of technique, Heidegger uses the exercise of thinking that is not only the heritage of philosophers, but is latent in (...) many of the habitual practices of individuals. This article aims to elaborate this notion in line with the concepts of forgetting and remembering, which are both human experiences and constitutive elements of being in its happening. The outlined thesis is thus that, in a world dominated by the entity, Heidegger ascribes to the ‘reminiscent thinking’ the task of restoring our relationship with being and thus widening the possibilities of meaning of our existence. (shrink)

La deconstrucción es la apertura al porvenir, hacia el otro como porvenir absoluto. Sin embargo, ese otro se encuentra ante nosotros y tras nosotros, es un pasado por venir, un pasado que nunca ha sido presente. De este modo, la obra de Derrida puede ser leída como la preocupación constante por esa memoria del porvenir, por la herencia y el duelo, por la apertura al acontecimiento. En este sentido, la memoria en Derrida no puede comprenderse como «reunión en el pensamiento», (...) como «Versammlung» y, por tanto, supone quizás una distancia radical en la obra de Derrida con respecto al pensamiento heideggeriano. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss and compare the possibility of thinking that which is most worth our thought in Deleuze’s What Is Philosophy? and Heidegger’s course lectures in What Is Called Thinking?. Both authors criticize the history of philosophy in similar ways in order to reconsider what should be taken as the nature and task of philosophical thinking. For Deleuze, true thinking is the creation of concepts, but what is most worth our thought in fact cannot be thought. For Heidegger, (...) Being calls on us think, and to think rightly is to be underway toward thinking itself, a grateful heeding of Being. In this paper I explore the very possibility to think that which is most worth our thought. I will argue that although for both authors proper thinking as such is possible, thinking what is most worth our thought seems remarkably both possible as impossible. (shrink)

This article examines Heidegger’s account of dwelling while placing it in the broad context of a wide array of his lectures and the constellation of his collected writings. The focus on this question is primarily ontological in character, in spite of the spatial significance of the phenomenon of dwelling, and the bearings it has on a variety of disciplines that interrogate its essence, be it in architectural humanities and design or in geography, which probe the various elements of its architectonic (...) and topological underpinnings. The investigation of Heidegger’s reflections on dwelling will be connected in this line of inquiry with his consideration of what he refers to as “the gathering of the fourfold,” namely as “earth, sky, mortals and divinities,” and the manner they are admitted and installed into “things,” all to be set against the background of his meditations on the origins of the work of art, and on the unfolding of the essence of modern technology as en-framing. (shrink)

Is it possible to think about “the Greeks” without exposing oneself to what they call their gods? Feeling called upon to respond to this question, precisely within the constellation of Europe’s most gloomy hour, Martin Heidegger employs the instruments that come to him through his own “turn,” but also from further back: the “Fourfold” and the “Holy” may thus be studied in their crucial confrontation with Parmenides. A corollary resides in the link with the famous problem of “Hellenization” in Christianity.

German philosopher Martin Heidegger stirred educators when in 1951 he claimed teaching is more difficult than learning because teachers must ‘learn to let learn’. However in the main he left the aphorism unexplained as part of a brief four-paragraph, less than two-page set of observations concerning the relationship of teaching to learning; and concluded at the end of those observations that to become a teacher is an ‘exalted matter’. This paper investigates both of Heidegger's claims, interpreting letting learn in the (...) context of Heidegger's larger philosophical project, and suggesting why in light of that project to become a teacher is an exalted concern. The methodology guiding the inquiry is largely hermeneutic, the purpose of the essay to interpret teaching from a Heideggerian perspective: its nature and general method. (shrink)

(2005). Frameworks & foundations. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 201-218.

In this essay the Author traces the search for “truth” in the game of understanding, one of the central themes of Gadamerian hermeneutics. Starting from the well-known Gadamerian reading, she attempts an unfaithful reading, a sort of inverted hermeneutics, through which she will be able to demonstrate the ontological dignity of the game, of play as truth experience.

Ancient Chinese thought inquired primarily into how the achievement of things is possible rather than into what a thing as a thing is. It held that man should participate in the achieving or generation of things in order to realize his self-achievement. A thing is understood as an event. Because all things and man are united as one, it is possible for man to enter into things by tasting and feeling rather than by relying on the sense of sight. This (...) may provide a possible new means of rescuing things from the numericalization and phenomenalization that sweep over the world today. /// 在中国传统思想世界中，对物首要的态度不是追问 "物之为物" 而是关注如 何 "成物"; 强调以自身参与到物的生成中去，成己以成物，遂使物成为 "事" 使 万物一体; 强调以 "味"、"感" 的方式进入物之中，发展出不同于 "看" 的通达事 物之方法论。进入事物之中而使事物退隐的可能性降低，为克服今日世界的数字化、 表象化提供了一种 "新" 的可能性。. (shrink)

Using abstract art as a paradigm, this paper attempts to think, in a provisional manner, the parameters of what the author calls `abstract hermeneutics'—a way of thinking capable of responding to the withdrawing, or abstracting , movement of Being. Such abstract thinking—which is an abstracting thinking of the abstract—aims to step beyond objectivity precisely in order to return to phenomenological concreteness. Through an engagement with Heidegger's understanding of the formal indicative role of the human being as sign ( Zeichen ), (...) the affinity between the abstracting gestures of abstract art, and the absenting characteristic of human existence, is explored. (shrink)

Angesichts auseinanderdriftender historischer Forschungs- und Publikationsformen ist es an der Zeit, die ursprünglich-radikalen Züge einer historischen Anthropologie nochmals hervorzukehren und ihre Eigenarten am Rande des Akademischen zu dramatisieren, ohne den von ihr zwischen den Disziplinen beanspruchten Raum unruhigen, riskanten Denkens vorschnell einer sekundären Disziplinierung zu unterwerfen. Daher stellt der Text einige noch immer aufregende Einsätze historischer Anthropologie um 1980 vor, die gegenwärtigen fachhistorischen Neigungen zum Didaktischen, Marktgerechten und Neoprofessionellen zuwiderlaufen. Sie stehen für ein gleichermaßen intellektuelles wie existenzielles Abenteuer, das eine (...) historische Anthropologie noch immer zu sein verspricht. (shrink)

This paper is motivated by Heidegger’s invitation to think the essence of technics through a dialogue between technics and art. This dialogue is approached with the help of several artworks belonging to what can be called the “technological turn” in art. First, I draw a schematic picture of notions of instrumentality, rationality, totality, and teleology inherited from classical philosophy of art and technology and challenged by contemporary art. I underline the Romantic claim that art overcomes these features thanks to its (...) freedom and ask, referring to the work of Gilbert Simondon, whether technology could also be liberated from its subordination to utilitarian ends. Second, I look at how certain contemporary works of art attempt to solve some of these problems. Artists who seize technical objects generally seek to make their functioning visible and problematic by distorting, interrupting, or otherwise modifying the technical dispositif—this is when a machine becomes a work of art. I show how this happens in certain works of Rebecca Horn, Jean Tinguely, Anaïs Tondeur, Eduardo Kac, and Tomas Saraceno. In conclusion, I show how art can liberate technology by liberating it from utility and instrumentality and by exposing it as such in its functioning. On the other hand, I argue that technology can liberate art, both through artistic techniques and nonartistic technological processes. (shrink)

In this article I examine whether late Heidegger’s philosophy can be called a mysticism. For serious reasons the answer should be negative. Heidegger’s early statements relating to the mystique are very unflattering. I try to grasp what the Heidegger’s exact attitude to the mystique is. Reflections on the mystique do not appear in late Heidegger’s philosophy. Heidegger treats the term “mysticism” as an objection to thinking, which consists in masking a lack of understanding of thinking. According to the immanent criteria, (...) the philosophy of Being cannot be called the mystique. But it is possible to transpose the concept of the mystique, which means to carry the word from the first in another beginning. The second part of my work is an attempt at such a transposition. As a result I obtain the word “mysticism” conceived from the side of Being, that is as a source for mysticism conceived in the traditional way. So I can say that the philosophy of Being is a mystique in this particular sense of this word. (shrink)

It is clear that we have to do something in our time concerning global warming yet before we can actually change the world, we must first understand our world. According to Heidegger, technology itself is not good or bad, but the problem is, that technological thinking (calculative thinking) has become the only form of thinking. Heidegger saw that the essence of technology nowadays is enframing – Ge-stell, which means that everything in nature is ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand). Enframing (as apparatus) is one (...) way of uncovering, which for Heidegger meant truth. Truth can appear in many ways and the danger is that this truth of representational-calculative thinking becomes the only truth. We claim that the calculative way of thinking must be changed and we posit that Gelassenheit (slow thinking, releasement, letting-go) is the remedy. It does not mean some kind of mysticism or irrationality. The notion of Gelassenheit includes the idea of to let learn. We as teachers and educators have to learn how to think outside of the technological ‘Ge-stell’ and start thinking and acting in radically new ways. Like Arne Naes and Michael Zimmerman we connect the overcoming of technological ‘Ge-stell’ with so called deep ecology. We have to ‘learn to think’ and act within the deep ecology. We call for an educational ecological imperative. Every teacher and educationalist has to think what they can do (not as private person but as professionals) in order to prevent the coming eco-catastrophe. (shrink)

In his essay on Herman Melville, Gilles Deleuze writes about an affirmation of the world as process and as archipelago. What does this mode of affirmation mean not only for the philosophy of Deleuze, but also for us all who live in this world today? This is the principal issue which I try to take up in my paper. Already in his text on David Hume, the young Deleuze was obliged to confront the problematics of the becoming-system of collection, which (...) would accompany him throughout his life. This essay discusses the ways in which Deleuze's central concepts including ‘transcendental empiricism', ‘difference/repetition', ‘schizophrenia’, ‘chaosmos', ‘thousand plateaus', ‘and’ and ‘line of flight’ are interconnected within his notion of archipelagic system. (shrink)

By drawing on the insights of a number of continental as well as Asian thinkers, this article reflects on the "significance" of comparative philosophy—both in the sense of discussing the "meaning" and in the sense of arguing for the "importance" of this endeavor. Encountering another culture allows one to deepen one's self-understanding by learning to "see oneself from the outside"; this deeper self-understanding in turn allows one to listen to what the other culture has to say. These two moments, or (...) movements, are interdependent and mutually supportive. Without the step back to self-understanding, we unknowingly reduce the other to the unrecognized categories of our own thinking; but without encountering another culture, our understanding of our own culture remains shallow. This article argues that an engagement with non-Western philosophy, particularly with a set of traditions as rich and radically different as those of Asian thought, can and should take place as a hermeneutic circling between self-understanding and openness to encounter: the dialogical step back and step forward are mutually supportive endeavors. For only by way of such dialogue do we attain the concrete freedom and possibility for transformation and change, that is, the ability to critically and creatively develop old customs or modes of thought and to critically and creatively adopt new ones. Moreover, only through such dialogue can we learn to not only let others be, but to share insights with them, and to build together a global community which neither reifies nor abolishes cultural differences. (shrink)

En el presente artículo proponemos un abordaje de los análisis en torno al tacto y la mano en trabajos fundamentales de Husserl y Heidegger, en un diálogo con el análisis respectivos de J. Derrida. Por la vía de una lectura que reconoce continuidades y despliegues, buscaremos demostrar que las elaboraciones prácticas del tocar desarrolladas por Derrida articulan una comprensión en cierta continuidad con aquellas elaboraciones tradicionales, en el marco de una lectura singular de los textos respectivos.

Heidegger’s late writings make constant allusion to a way of thinking that differs from metaphysics. While in metaphysical thinking we wander away from being, in the new thinking we are only in relation to being. For Heidegger, the only way to get out of the first and reach the second one is through a leap. This paper aims to clarify why there is only one way to access this new way of thinking and to defend that this is the radicalization (...) of the phenomenological maxim. To achieve this goal, the paper characterizes metaphysical thinking as erratic thinking; next, it characterizes the leap, understood as a sudden step to the unconcealment of being; and finally, it presents the consequences of these characterizations and the contrast between them. (shrink)

Trata-se da difícil questão do sentido em que, a partir de Heidegger, pode ser pensada uma superação da metafísica. O pano de fundo é a atualidade e a onipresença do seu acabamento técnico. A preocupação central é o problema do possível modo de ser - ou de sobreviver - de um pensamento que, imerso nessa onipresença, seja, ainda assim, capaz de interrogá-la. Questões como a do salto e da reviravolta revelam a espécie de contorcionismo envolvido nessa noção de superação, levando (...) a refletir, entre outras coisas, sobre a relação desse pensamento com a sua história. O desfecho é a identificação de um campo de preocupações no qual um pensamento posto diante da própria possibilidade de aniquilação coloca a si mesmo o problema hermenêutico de uma lúcida práxis pensante.We deal with a difficult question: the sense in which, after Heidegger, one can think of an overcoming of metaphysics. The background is the currency and omnipresence of its technical ending. Mainly focused is the problem of the possible way of being - or surviving - of a thought that, immersed in this omnipresence, is still able to inquire it. Questions such as that of the leap and the reversal show the kind of contortionism attached to this notion of overcoming. Among other issues, they call for a reflection on the relation of this thought with its history. The outcome is the identification of a field of matters which makes appear, for a thought facing the possibility of its own annihilation, the hermeneutic problem of a lucid thinking praxis. (shrink)