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  1. Knowing Things in Themselves.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):332-358.
    A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Brentano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind, the author reveals the ontological (...)
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  • Carnap a jazyk: z Viedne do Santa Fé.Igor Hanzel - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (4):470-497.
    The paper reconstructs three main stages in the development of Carnap’s approach to language in the years 1931 – 1947. It starts with Carnap’s approach to metalogic in his Viennese Zirkelprotokolle and his Logische Syntax der Sprache from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski’s turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap’s (...)
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  • Carl Hempel: Whose Philosopher?Nikolay Milkov - 2013 - In N. Milkov & V. Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer, pp. 293-308. pp. 293--309.
    Recently, Michael Friedman has claimed that virtually all the seeds of Hempel’s philosophical development trace back to his early encounter with the Vienna Circle (Friedman 2003, 94). As opposed, however, to Friedman’s view of the principal early influences on Hempel, we shall see that those formative influences originated rather with the Berlin Group. Hempel, it is true, spent the fall term of 1929 as a student at the University of Vienna, and, thanks to a letter of recommendation from Hans Reichenbach, (...)
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  • Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.
    Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...)
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  • The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
    This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification (...)
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  • The Concept of Truth in Carnap'slogical Syntax of Language.Thomas Oberdan - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):239 - 260.
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  • What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?Patricia Marino - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):415-457.
    Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed - "true statements correspond to the way things are in the world," or implausible - "true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality." I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call "modest" correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various (...)
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  • Coherence, Anti-Realism and the Vienna Circle.James O. Young - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):467 - 482.
    Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted in believing. If so, truth cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are (...)
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  • The Vienna Circle's 'Anti-Foundationalism'.Thomas Oberdan - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):297-308.
    Uebel has recently claimed that, contrary to popular opinion, none of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists were proponents of epistemological foundationalism. According to the considerations of the current discussion, however, Uebel's conclusion is erroneous, especially with respect to the work of Moritz Schlick. The chief reason Uebel offers to support his conclusion is that current attempts to portray Schlick's epistemology as foundationalist fail to overcome its ‘ultimate incoherence’. In contrast, it is argued that current interpretations, based (...)
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  • “Logical Positivism”—“Logical Empiricism”: What's in a Name?Thomas Uebel - 2013 - Perspectives on Science 21 (1):58-99.
    Do the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” mark a philosophically real and significant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the first term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “logical positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “logical empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society (...)
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