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  1. The usefulness of well-being temporalism.Gil Hersch - 2022 - Journal of Economic Methodology 30 (4):322-336.
    It is an open question whether well-being ought to primarily be understood as a temporal concept or whether it only makes sense to talk about a person’s well-being over their whole lifetime. In this article, I argue that how this principled philosophical disagreement is settled does not have substantive practical implications for well-being science and well-being policy. Trying to measure lifetime well-being directly is extremely challenging as well as unhelpful for guiding well-being public policy, while temporal well-being is both an (...)
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  • The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification.Lukas Beck - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):423-445.
    Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to procedural rationality, allows us to offer an account of the guiding idea behind preference purification that avoids inner rational (...)
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  • Theories of well-being and well-being policy: a view from methodology.Roberto Fumagalli - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (1):124-133.
    In the recent well-being literature, various theory-free accounts of well-being have been proposed to ground informative evaluations of policies’ welfare implications without relying on any specifi...
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  • No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):43-64.
    Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...)
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  • Ignoring Easterlin; Why Easterlin’s Correlation Findings Need Not Matter to Public Policy.Gil Hersch - 2018 - Journal of Happiness Studies 19 (8):2225-2241.
    Many believe that the lack of correlation between happiness and income, first discovered by Richard Easterlin in 1974, entails the conclusion that well-being policies should be made based on happiness measures, rather than income measures. I argue that distinguishing between how well-being is characterized and how that characterization is measured introduces ways of denying the conclusion that policies should be made based on happiness measures. It is possible to avoid the conclusion either by denying that well-being hedonism is true or (...)
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  • The Narrowed Domain of Disagreement for Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2018 - Public Affairs Quarterly 32 (1):1-19.
    in recent years, policy makers have shown increasing interest in implementing policies aimed at promoting individual well-being. But how should policy makers choose their well-being policies? a seemingly reasonable first step is to settle on an agreed-upon definition of well-being. yet there currently is significant disagreement on how well-being ought to be characterized, and agreement on the correct view of well-being does not appear to be forthcoming. Nevertheless, i argue in this paper that there are several reasons to think that (...)
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  • Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):209-234.
    The concept of well-being is increasingly gaining acceptance as an object of science, and many different types of well-being measures have been developed. A debate has emerged about which measures are able to capture well-being successfully. An important underlying problem is that there is no unified conceptual framework about the nature of well-being—a hotly debated topic of philosophical discussion. I argue that while there is little agreement about the nature of well-being in philosophy, there is an important agreement on some (...)
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  • Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    There are roughly two philosophical literatures on “happiness,” each corresponding to a different sense of the term. One uses ‘happiness’ as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing. The other body of work uses the word as a purely descriptive psychological term, akin to ‘depression’ or ‘tranquility’. An important project in the philosophy of happiness is simply getting clear on what various writers are talking about: what are the important meanings of the term and how do they connect? (...)
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  • Behavioral economics and the evidential defense of welfare economics.Garth Heutel - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (4):368-384.
    Hausman and McPherson provide an evidential defense of welfare economics, arguing that preferences are not constitutive of welfare but nevertheless provide the best evidence for what promotes welfare. Behavioral economics identifies several ways in which some people's preferences exhibit anomalies that are incoherent or inconsistent with rational choice theory. I argue that the existence of these behavioral anomalies calls into question the evidential defense of welfare economics. The evidential defense does not justify preference purification, or eliminating behavioral anomalies before conducting (...)
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  • Well-Being Coherentism.Gil Hersch - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4):1045-1065.
    Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually before measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize well-being and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.
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  • Epistemic and non-epistemic values in economic evaluations of public health.Alessandra Cenci & M. Azhar Hussain - 2019 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (1):66-88.
    We review methods for economic evaluation recently developed in health economics by focusing on the epistemic and non-epistemic values they embody. The emphasis is on insights into valuing health,...
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  • Daniel M. Hausman's Valuing health. Well-being, freedom, and suffering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 267 pp. [REVIEW]Andrea Klonschinski - 2016 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 9 (1):188.
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