Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Mindvaults. A Book Review.Pawel Gladziejewski - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):183-186.
    A book review of 'Mindvaults. Sociocultural Grounds for Pretending and Imaginining' by Radu J. Bogdan.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beyond ‘Interaction’: How to Understand Social Effects on Social Cognition.Julius Schönherr & Evan Westra - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):27-52.
    In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social-cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive, rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task: as it is currently deployed in the social cognition literature, this notion leads to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity.Thomas Szanto & Joel Krueger - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):153-162.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Factor Analysis of EMA-Scale on Adolescent Adjustment From a Developmental Perspective: A Short Form.Lucía Jiménez, Susana Menéndez & Victoria Hidalgo - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Getting Interaction Theory (IT) Together: Integrating Developmental, Phenomenological, Enactive, and Dynamical Approaches to Social Interaction.Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein.Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):445-461.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Perceptual Crossing: The Simplest Online Paradigm.Malika Auvray & Marieke Rohde - 2012 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Imitation by Social Interaction? Analysis of a Minimal Agent-Based Model of the Correspondence Problem.Tom Froese, Charles Lenay & Takashi Ikegami - 2012 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 31:41-56.
    A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives.Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.
    Human beings, even very young infants, and members of several other species, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to and engaging with others. These basic capacities have been the subject of intense research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind over the last several decades. Appropriately characterizing the exact level and nature of these abilities and what lies at their basis continues to prove a tricky business. The contributions to this special issue investigate whether and to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • We Read Minds to Shape Relationships.Vivian Bohl - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):674-694.
    Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Personal and the Subpersonal in the Theory of Mind Debate.Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):305-324.
    It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Interactive Turn in Social Cognition Research: A Critique.Søren Overgaard & John Michael - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):160-183.
    Proponents of the so-called “interactive turn in social cognition research” maintain that mainstream research on social cognition has been fundamentally flawed by its neglect of social interaction, and that a new paradigm is needed in order to redress this shortcoming. We argue that proponents of the interactive turn (“interactionists”) have failed to properly substantiate their criticisms of existing research on social cognition. Although it is sometimes unclear precisely what these criticisms of existing theories are supposed to target, we sketch two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Mechanistic Explanation for Enactive Sociality.Ekaterina Abramova & Marc Slors - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):401-424.
    In this article we analyze the methodological commitments of a radical embodied cognition approach to social interaction and social cognition, specifically with respect to the explanatory framework it adopts. According to many representatives of REC, such as enactivists and the proponents of dynamical and ecological psychology, sociality is to be explained by focusing on the social unit rather than the individuals that comprise it and establishing the regularities that hold on this level rather than modeling the sub-personal mechanisms that could (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What’s so Special About Interaction in Social Cognition?Julius Schönherr - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):181-198.
    Enactivists often defend the following two claims: Successful interactions are not driven and explained by the interactors’ ability to mindread. And the mechanisms enabling 2nd personal social cognition and those enabling 3rd personal social cognition are distinct. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are false. With regard to I argue that enactivists fail to provide a plausible alternative to traditional accounts of social cognition in interaction. I examine and reject Hanne De Jaegher’s view according to which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris D. Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Taking Stock of Phenomenology Futures.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):304-318.
    In this paper, I review recent contributions of phenomenology to a variety of disciplines, including the cognitive sciences and psychiatry, and explore (1) controversies about phenomenological methods and naturalization; (2) relations between phenomenology and the enactive and extended mind approaches; and (3) the promise of phenomenology for addressing a number of controversial philosophical issues.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations