Collection of papers presented at the First Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.

In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...) to a long-held reading, the control that the will has over doxastic states in Descartes’s theory is direct; the doxastic states are affected by the mere act of will. This reading is called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), or direct voluntarism (DV) for short, and it states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based only on our will to do so. Thus, these actions would be utterly and merely volitional. DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and direct negative voluntarism (-DV). Direct positive voluntarism deals with the act of forming judgments, maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either merely believe or not believe something voluntarily. Direct negative voluntarism deals with the suspension of judgment, maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by a simple act of will. However, I support an alternate account of Descartes’s voluntarism, which is called indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV), or indirect voluntarism (IV) for short. By this account, the will is capable of affecting a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on essential tasks for forming that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong reasons and evidence. IV is also possible to divide into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) and indirect negative voluntarism (-IV). Per indirect positive voluntarism the will needs to pay attention to reasons for accepting or denying some proposition. Likewise, by indirect negative voluntarism, in order to suspend judgment the will needs to direct this attention to the reasons for doubt. By attending to these reasons, the will also comes face-to-face with its own freedom. This feeling of freedom can be described as affectivity of the reasons for belief (assent) and doubt (suspension). (shrink)

Hutcheson fonde sa théorie morale sur un « sens moral ». Ce sens nous permet de faire des distinctions morales. Cette théorie donnera lieu à un débat sur la réalité des valeurs morales. Selon certains commentateurs, nos distinctions morales portent sur des faits moraux réels que l’on peut connaître empiriquement grâce à notre sens moral. Inversement, certains soutiendront que le sens moral ne produit pas de connaissance morale. Les jugements moraux issus de ce sens sont des réponses émotionnelles plus ou (...) moins fiables que l’on ressent face à des motivations qui nous semblent être vertueuses. Nous montrerons que, selon Hutcheson, nos jugements moraux sont bien des réponses émotionnelles, mais qu’ils ont néanmoins un critère d’objectivité. Notre sens moral, grâce à la Providence divine, a pour fonction de préserver le bien-être de l’humanité. Cette fonction du sens moral sert de critère pour évaluer le bon fonctionnement de ce sens moral. (shrink)

In the third volume of the History of England, David Hume considers the political ramifications of the Protestant reformation with a “Digression concerning the ecclesiastical state.” He advocates the establishment of a state church, believing it will dampen religious “enthusiasm” in the polity. Unlike later secularization theorists, Hume assumes an intractable basis for religion in the human passions. Tensions in Hume’s “cooptation” strategy are evident from Adam Smith’s famous attack upon it in section five of The Wealth of Nations, and (...) in Hume’s own treatment of seventeenth century independency in the fifth volume of the History. Smith argues that public competition among sects facilitates political moderation. In History V Hume stresses the positive role of enthusiasm in fostering civil liberty. This article traces Hume’s indecision to his “external” mode of moral and historical analysis, arguing that a secular policy on religion cannot proceed fruitfully without engaging the theological particulars of the religions at issue. (shrink)

In this paper I compare Hume's account of the causes of our belief in body in T 1.4.2 ‘Of scepticism with regard to the senses’ (SWRS)1 with his account of the causes of religious belief in the Nat...