Nach einem weit verbreiteten Urteil gibt Kant der Ökonomie in seinem Werk keinen nennenswerten Raum. Die vorliegende Studie widerlegt dies, indem sie Kants Äußerungen zu ökonomischen Themen systematisiert: zur Selbstständigkeit, zum Kaufmann, zum Handel, zum Geld, zur „Staatswirthschaft" sowie zum technischen Fortschritt. Sie erschließt Kants Ökonomie aus der Ergänzung rechtlicher und ethischer Pflichten durch deren anthropologische Ausführungsbedingungen. Dabei geht sie aus von einem zeitgenössischen Verständnis der Ökonomie als Wissenschaft vom Wohlstand. Im deutschsprachigen Raum des 18. Jahrhunderts konkurrieren hier drei Paradigmen (...) miteinander: das aristotelische, das smithianische und das kameralistische. Sie identifizieren jeweils das Haus, den Markt oder den Staat als zentrale Handlungssphäre der Ökonomie. Die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Kants praktische Philosophie für Ergänzungen aus jeder dieser ökonomischen Handlungssphären offen ist, solange diese freiheitliche Prinzipien erfüllen; sie ist damit nicht, wie gelegentlich behauptet, auf eine einzige Wirtschaftsordnung festgelegt, etwa auf eine rein marktliberale. Relevant ist dies für die Kant-Forschung, für die Wirtschaftsphilosophie sowie für die Ideengeschichte. (shrink)

Kant entwickelt in der Kritik der Urteilskraft eine philosophische Ästhetik, eine Theorie der organischen Natur. Die beiden scheinbar heterogenen Gegenstandsbereiche sind durch das Prinzip der reflektierenden Urteilskraft, die Idee der Zweckmäßigkeit, verbunden, die der Mensch sowohl bei der Reflexion über die schönen Gegenstände der Natur und der Kunst als auch bei seiner Erforschung der organischen Natur zugrunde legt. Da sich alle Zwecke zuletzt auf den Endzweck des Menschen als moralisches Wesen beziehen, übersteigt die dritte „Kritik" schließlich die Bereiche von Kunst (...) und Natur und berührt Fragen der Moralphilosophie und der Moraltheologie. Zusätzlich entdeckt Kant im subjektiven Vermögen der Urteilskraft jenes Bindeglied unter den menschlichen Gemütskräften, das einen architektonischen Übergang zwischen den Naturbegriffen des Verstandes in der ersten und dem Freiheitsbegriff der Vernunft in der zweiten „Kritik" ermöglicht und die theoretische und die praktische Philosophie in einem einzigen philosophischen System vereinigt. Der vorliegende kooperative Kommentar bietet eine textnahe, fortlaufende Interpretation der „Kritik der Urteilskraft". Für die 3. Auflage anlässlich des 300. Jubiläums Immanuel Kants wurden alle Beiträge überarbeitet und auf den neuesten Forschungsstand gebracht. Mit Beiträgen von: K. Ameriks, J. Bojanowski, R. Brandt, G. Cunico, M. Foessel, E. Förster, C. Fricke, H. Ginsborg, P. Giordanetti, I. Goy, O. Höffe, A. Kablitz, G. Kohler, S. Mathisen, B. Recki, J. Rivera de Rosales, S. Roth und E. Watkins. (shrink)

In the globalizing world foreign language learning is becoming more and more important. This case leads to new developments in language learning research. The purpose of this study is to depict whether the second language learning would occur better in the childhood or later. In other words to investigate the question of in which period of bilingualism it will be better. In order to answer this question, important sources in the linguistic field, related to the topic, were highlighted. The important (...) researches and theories mentioned in the literature have been examined, evaluated, information about the first and second language learning has been given and the subject has been discussed from the scientific point of view. In this context, it has been understood that many reasons exist affecting the level of proficiency of preand post- 12 year's language learning (in mono-, bi-, tri-, quadra- or multi-, lingualism) such as age, brain function, individual differences, ambience differences; social, political, economic background and how to regard the language. The idea that bilingualism after the critical period (around the age of 12) could not be as that of the childhood has been gained weight, due to the system differences between two languages, especially the difficulties in intoning and pronouncing. (shrink)

Kant’s chapter “On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgement” is one of the most obscure passages of the Critique of Practical Reason and it has often been regarded as a mere appendix. However, it deals with a fundamental question, namely, how can the pure practical law be applied to particular cases. In this paper, I would like to make an original contribution towards a better understanding of this chapter by comparing it to the Schematism chapter on the (...) basis of their analogical relation and suggesting how the reference to a sensus communis could help in solving the aim of the Typic chapter. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order (...) to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird die Bedeutung von Kants Begriff des ethischen Gemeinwesens für die Frage des Kosmopolitanismus herausgearbeitet. Kosmopolitanismus ist für Kant zunächst eine Konsequenz der Rechtslehre: Der Rechtszustand kann nur als globaler peremtorisch wirklich sein. Diese Einsicht kollidiert jedoch mit der Voraussetzung souveräner bürgerlicher Staaten, so dass der politische oder juridische globale Rechtszustand die moralische Forderung des Kosmopolitanismus nicht erfüllt. Es lässt sich zeigen, dass diese Kollision in der antagonistischen Form der modernen Gesellschaft gründet, deren politische Instrumente die Staaten (...) sind. Im Unterschied zu den rechtsphilosophischen Schriften konstruiert Kant in der Religionsschrift ein weltbürgerliches ethisches Gemeinwesen, das von der Idee einer moralisch organisierten Gesellschaft ausgeht. Dieses Modell wird im Rahmen der Religionsphilosophie entwickelt. Darüber hinaus weisen Überlegungen Kants zur Pädagogik: Die Überwindung gesellschaftlich bedingter Partikularität und Konkurrenz kann als Bildungsaufgabe formuliert werden. (shrink)

In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...) explain how schemata function to subsume objects under concepts and to anticipate possible objects of experience before moving on to discuss the schema of substance. Next, I present a brief explanation of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, organizing my presentation around the idea of apperception. This paves the way for a demonstration of how the fundamental type is best understood as standing at the center of a cluster of concepts, including apperception, passive belief, natural bodies, and the one spatio-temporal horizon of experience. I argue that the fundamental type is central to Husserl’s attempt to ground logic in pre-predicative experience. Finally, I compare two specific types with schemata on the grounds cultivated in the previous sections. The first of these types, the fundamental type, functions to pre-predicatively anticipate objects of possible experience, just as schemata do. The second of these types, which is implied by but never discussed in Husserl’s work, serves to mediate between a formal system of rules and an intuitive grasp of the world, just as schemata do. (shrink)

In his response to the question about the conditions of the possibility of dependable cognition Kant first points to the faculties of the cognitive powers and subsequently lists the criteria and normative foundations of knowledge—a system of forms, concepts and principles. Kant primarily seeks the possibilities of experience-independent cognition, the logical criteria governing the possibility of cognition as such. The paper outlines the creation of the systemic union of the primal concepts and principles of pure reason, which is necessary for (...) the creation of knowledge. In other words, it follows the constitution phases of the cognition system: apperception, experience, self-consciousness and the principles of reason. The principles of reason ultimately give systemic unity to humancognitive powers—and, in effect, the human world of experience and cognition. It is this systemic unity which makes cognition science—or, in other words, pure reason—as it constitutes a specific system and is able to create science understood as the systemic unity of specific fields. (shrink)

In business ethics journals, Kant’s ethics is often portrayed as overly formalistic, devoid of substantial content, and without regard for the consequences of actions or questions of character. Hence, virtue ethicists ride happily to the rescue, offering to replace or complement Kant’s theory with their own. Before such efforts are undertaken, however, one should recognize that Kant himself wrote a “virtue theory” (Tugendlehre), wherein he discussed the questions of character as well as the teleological nature of human action. Numerous Kant (...) scholars argue that Kant already erected precisely the kind of integrative moral architecture that some of his modern interpreters (while aiming to supersede him) wish to construct. For business ethics, this divergence of scholarly opinion is of crucial importance. It shows first that the standard portrayals of Kant’s ethics in business ethics textbooks—as rigidly deontological, narrowly individualistic, and hence unsuitable for the specific demands of corporate agency—might have to be revised. Second, discussions in the business ethics literature on stakeholder-engagement and managerial decision-making likewise stand to gain from a more nuanced picture of Kant’s moral philosophy. Third, a reassessment of Kant’s ethics with regard to questions of personal character and moral sentiments might also lead to a more favorable view of the relevance of his ethics for managerial practice. Last, but not least, the many current attempts to reconcile Kant’s freedom-oriented philosophy with virtue theories stand to benefit considerably from a better understanding of how Kant himself conceived of one such synthesis between the formal and substantial aspects of morality. This, ultimately, could lead to an important overlapping consensus in the academic literature as to the role and relevance of virtuous conduct in business. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an original account of the distinction between the spheres of Sitten that goes beyond the traditional one based on the nature of incentives, since this underestimates some of their characteristics. First, the paper identifies in obligatio a common source between Ethics and Right. Then, it explores how in the Metaphysics of Morals the connection between law and incentive constitutes a more relevant criterion to distinguish ethical lawgiving from juridical lawgiving. Specifically, it demonstrates (...) that such connection: to be ethical should be linear, understood as a necessary self-determined process of connecting law to incentive; to be juridical should be mediated, namely it comprises an inclusive disjunction between two modalities of connecting law to incentive: a non-necessary linear and a divergent one. It concludes by exploring the implications of such perspective on the notions of internalisation and externalisation associated to each lawgiving. (shrink)

Contrary to much Kant interpretation, this article argues that Kant's moral philosophy, including his account of charity, is irrelevant to justifying the state's right to redistribute material resources to secure the rights of dependents (the poor, children, and the impaired). The article also rejects the popular view that Kant either does not or cannot justify anything remotely similar to the liberal welfare state. A closer look at Kant's account of dependency relations in “The Doctrine of Right” reveals an argumentative structure (...) sufficient for a public institutional protection of dependents and evidence that Kant identifies concerns of economic justice as lying at the heart of the state's legitimacy. (shrink)

An important question one can ask of ethical theories is whether and how they aim to raise claims to universality. This refers to the subject area that they intend to describe or govern and also to the question whether they claim to be binding for all (moral) agents. This paper discusses the question of universality of Luciano Floridi’s information ethics (IE). This is done by introducing the theory and discussing its conceptual foundations and applications. The emphasis will be placed on (...) the ontological grounding of IE. IE’s claims to universality will be contrasted with those raised by discourse ethics. This comparison of two pertinent ethical theories allows for a critical discussion of areas where IE currently has room for elaboration and development. (shrink)

En este trabajo me centro en la _Rechtslehre_ de la _Metaphysik der Sitten_ para exponer el modo en que Kant comprende el Derecho y su indisoluble vínculo con el concepto de libertad. Me detengo en la manera en que Kant analiza el Derecho Privado, especialmente en su análisis de la propiedad, y en el modo en que su fundamentación se enlaza con el establecimiento de un Estado basado sobre el Derecho que es a la vez expresión de una voluntad universal. (...) Hacia el final ofrezco algunas consideraciones en torno a la argumentación kantiana y a los problemas que ella plantea. (shrink)

This article seeks to analyze the theory of technology formulated by the philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979). It shows the ways in which the author repurposes fundamental concepts of classical aesthetics in order to formulate a theory of technology aimed at liberating both nature and humanity. To this end, we argue that Marcuse mobilizes the theories of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805). In the first part of the article, we tackle some important aspects of Kant’s and Schiller’s aesthetic theories. (...) We begin with an analysis of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), focusing on central concepts that would later be absorbed by Schiller and Marcuse. Next, we try to show the reception of the Third critique in Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795) and this author’s contribution to aesthetic studies within political thought. In the second part, we focus on Marcuse’s work, highlighting two key moments in his analysis on technology. We show that his theory undergoes transformation and development until it reaches its stable form in the 1960s and 1970s, during which the author proposes a new theory of technology based on human aesthetic possibilities whose goal is the liberation of nature. (shrink)

Investigates, by way of Derrida's engagements with Kant, how the foundations of modern constitutionalism can be differently conceived to address some of the challenges of the twenty-first century.

In order to carry out “a great and important piece of work, and that in a complete and lasting way”, Kant claims that one must join one’s “effort with that of the author”. The reading of a work, therefore, must try to embrace “the articulation or structure of the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness”. This structure and articulation, however, may not be so easily accessible; it may, rather, be latent under “bright (...) colours [that] paint over and make unrecognizable” the argument’s essence, often confusing the reader, who “cannot quickly enough attain a survey of the whole”. Now, it would be expected, then, that Kant, condemning such “ornaments”, would not employ those resources I n his writings. However, it is curious that not infrequently he makes use of such “bright colours”. The present paper aims at pointing out some passages of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy in which it is possible to identify such “colouring”. (shrink)

Kant’s critical theory on moral feeling can be divided into two stages: early and late. In the early stage, Kant was committed to accepting and transforming the traditional concept of moral feeling, while in the later stage he turned to developing his own unique theory on the topic. His beliefs about moral feeling changed between these two stages, both regarding the basic meaning of moral feeling and the function of moral feeling in moral philosophy. This paper argues that these shifts (...) help clarify the framework of Kant’s moral philosophy and introduce a new dimension to Kant’s definition of feelings and the relationship between sensibility and intellectuality. Namely, sensibility is not only determined by intellectuality but also has its unique initiative. Through acting on the body, intellectuality generates intellectual feelings, which in turn assist humans in realizing their intellectual purpose as a limited rational being. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo consiste em analisar, a partir dos parágrafos 34 a 38 da obra Kant e o problema da metafísica e segundo a exegese heideggeriana, o sentido e pertinência da inserção da problemática antropológica anteposta às três questões fundamentais expostas na Crítica da razão pura. Heidegger converte um rol exaustivo, delimitado pelas três perguntas, em um rol exemplificado, ao colocar a indagação da antropologia filosófica como pressuposto e consequência necessária das três interrogações kantianas. Heidegger recorre ao conceito de (...) finitude, para validar a importância e para fundamentar a primazia da questão antropológica sobre as demais: a interrogação “que é o homem” transforma-se na primeira que dispensa, a partir de si, as três restantes. Na finitude estão circunscritas as discussões sobre o tempo, a autoafecção pura, a imaginação e o tempo originário. É na finitude que estão os verdadeiros sinais ou ecos da antropologia filosófica kantiana. (shrink)

The past several decades have seen an increase in the concern for the treatment of human participants in research. Similarly, the ways journalists treat their subjects and sources have generated much concern. The ethics of these 2 endeavors share much in common, because both must use people in various ways to reach their goals. The well-developed guidelines in research designed to protect research participants' autonomy, to guard against needless deception, and to recognize the special needs of vulnerable research participants have (...) direct application to journalism. They can provide easy reference heuristics for journalists to use in making ethical decisions. (shrink)

En el presente artículo me propongo estudiar la diferencia sexual y el sexismo en el pensamiento de Immanuel Kant desde un punto de vista histórico-genético y también, la relación que existe entre la tesis de la diferencia sexual y su concepción de historia universal. Defiendo una tesis principal, aunque al final añado, a modo de epílogo y sólo de manera esquemática, una tesis secundaria. Según la tesis principal Kant cambió la concepción que tenía de la diferencia sexual y el sexismo (...) entre la década de 1760 y 1770, posición que se estabiliza en líneas generales hasta el final de su vida (o, más precisamente, hasta 1798, cuando publica su _Antropología en un sentido pragmático_). El resultado es que el sexismo de Kant se agudiza entre la década de 1760 y 1770 cuando se estabiliza y, por lo tanto, que en el período de madurez el filósofo es más sexista que en su juventud. La tesis secundaria -por ahora, más un mapa de orientación para una investigación futura que un resultado definitivo- es que conviven de manera coherente en el pensamiento de Kant, al menos a partir de 1775/6, una concepción universal de la historia y la tesis de la diferencia sexual. (shrink)

Purpose. This paper aims to show how the views of Kant persist in the modern debate on social justice and to outline the practical and political potential contained in his understanding of a just state system and international justice. To that end, I will present what Kant meant by a just state system and just relationships between states. Then, I will reference his understanding of social justice against three fundamental models of social justice thus far established in the philosophical tradition: (...) the legal, distributive, and contractual justice. Finally, I will explain how the Kantian understanding of social justice is reflected in select modern interpretations of a just state system and justice in international relationships, and how we can grasp the current practice and the expected development of sociopolitical life in the framework of social justice as understood by Kant. Originality. The article presents the theoretical-conceptual and practical-political relevance of the concept of social justice, developed by I. Kant. It was shown that Kant considered justice to be the basis of all correct social relations, both at the level of individual states and in the sphere of international relations. According to Kant, the only just state system is a republic. In his opinion, justice in the field of international relations requires that they be based on the principles of federal unification of individual states. The concept of social justice developed by Kant can be identified as a form of classically understood contractual justice. In addition, Kan’s notion of justice was correlated with the works of modern authors: John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Otfried Höffe, showing identical and different elements in them. Conclusions. The reflections above suffice to assert that the Kantian understanding of social justice primarily involves the following observations: 1. under a relevant contract, interested parties institute a public authority, i.e. a republican state or a federal institution endowed with judicial or executive powers ; 2. the institution of public authority remains fair in dealings with the governed; 3. the public authority has the right to intervene only in the circumstances of threat to the external freedom, equality and independence of the governed individuals; 4. the public authority is responsible only for guaranteeing just relations between individuals and the enforcement of their contracts. Furthermore, Kantian understanding of justice falls within the scope of the classical notion of contractual justice and remains present in the modern debates on justice, as exemplified by the thought of Rawls, Nozick and Höffe. Finally, the Kantian understanding of social justice remains topical and worthy of consideration during the design and the development of current and future solutions for a just public order, both at the national and international level. (shrink)

La intensa discusión que mantienen los constructivistas y realistas en torno a si Kant habría asumido una teoría de valor “proyeccionista” o “detectivista”, ha puesto al desnudo las insuficiencias del lenguaje y los términos empleados. Lo que podríamos llamar “lenguaje de Eutifrón”, no parece abrigar la suficiente sensibilidad como para capturar la singularidad de la ética kantiana. Ciertamente, Kant realiza afirmaciones proyeccionistas y detectivistas, y esto se debe a que su enfoque acerca de la normatividad posee componentes tanto constructivistas como (...) realistas. En virtud de ello, el presente trabajo defiende la tesis de que la ética kantiana asume una teoría “constitutivista” del valor, la cual, en pocas palabras, entiende que las fuentes de la normatividad y el valor son construcciones reflexivas del agente que implican, al mismo tiempo, y de forma performativa, la asunción realista de la libertad en cuanto que valor absoluto. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEine der deutschen Krankenhausketten versucht, ihr Geschäftsmodell u. a. auf Elemente der Kantschen Moralphilosophie zu stützen. In den Dienstverträgen der führenden Manager werden Verhaltensnormen spezifiziert, und es wird auf den kategorischen Imperativ Bezug genommen. Frage ist, ob dies mit der Kantschen Ethik vereinbar ist, und ob es sich dazu eignet, moralischen Anforderungen an Krankenhäuser besser gerecht zu werden. Eine Analyse der einschlägigen Texte zeigt, dass Kants kategorischer Imperativ mit der Goldenen Regel gleichgesetzt wird, wogegen Kant sich ausdrücklich gewehrt hat. Die (...) Goldene Regel wird außerdem entstellt. Dass der kategorische Imperativ nicht nur Achtungs-, sondern auch Fürsorgepflichten normiert, wird übersehen. Es bleibt offen, ob aus der Kantschen Ethik nicht doch Folgerungen für die Krankenhausorganisation zu ziehen sind, der hier kritisierte Versuch ist jedoch missglückt, weil – ganz abgesehen von den Anwendungsproblemen – schon die Kantschen Konzepte missverstanden wurden. Immerhin zeigt der Versuch, dass es im Management ein Bewusstsein für die Wichtigkeit moralischer Vorgaben im Krankenhaus gibt. (shrink)

El artículo reconstruye tres estratos de un concepto de lo social que puede encontrarse en la filosofía práctica de Immanuel Kant sin recurrir a sus textos de antropología e historia. Para ello se especifican las nociones de coexistencia humana y coacción recíproca universal que describe en su Metafísica de las costumbres, con el fin de indicar que con ellas no cabe referirse a una sociedad, sino a la forma de una. Posteriormente se reconstruyen algunas coordenadas de la “comunidad ética” presentes (...) en La religión..., para argumentar, por una parte, que aquí puede hablarse de una sociedad como tal, y por otra, que esta puede conformar un puente entre la forma de la sociedad jurídica y la formación ética de las personas, i.e., entre el uso externo de la libertad y su uso interno, al socializar máximas morales y abrigar estas una peculiar normatividad intrínseca. (shrink)

Of the questions concerning the many great minds of the European Enlightenment, the question of what constitutes right and proper government perhaps had the most enduring influence on the world stage. Both Thomas Jefferson and Immanuel Kant attempted to answer the question of what constitutes right government, in particular by basing the system upon the idea of human freedom as an inalienable right. This project is an attempt to compare the systems proposed by these two authors, as well as to (...) critique each on its ability to protect and foster individual freedom. It is my opinion that neither manages to do what it is constructed to do, as each fails to fully protect individual freedom, and each has as part of it a component which conflicts with individual freedom. (shrink)

This article deals with the question of the reception and “history of effects” of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. More precisely, in the present contribution I take into examination some original and influential “appropriations” of Kant’s third Critique in the context of 20 th -century and contemporary hermeneutics, providing both a reconstruction and a critical interpretation of the readings of Kant’s work provided by Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and nowadays Günter Figal. In the first section I basically offer (...) an overview of Kant’s conception of the power of judgment as an introduction to the topics investigated into detail in the following sections of this article. Then, I focus on the different interpretations of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment offered by the abovementioned hermeneutical philosophers, showing that, in a quite surprising and theoretically stimulating way, in the development of a phenomenological-hermeneutical aesthetics and/or philosophy of art from Heidegger to Gadamer up to Figal, we can observe a progressive shift from a sort of “disinterest” in Kant’s conception of aesthetics in favour of Hegel’s philosophy of art, to an explicit critique of the supposed subjectivization of aesthetics by Kant and its problematic consequences, up to a full-blown rehabilitation and retrieval of the significance of Kant’s treatment of beauty in the third Critique as still essential for any serious philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

This paper deals with the so-called “external history” of the origin of Critique of the power of judgment that is based primarily on the philosopher’s correspondence in the period between May 1787 and October 1789. Two letters from Kant to Reinhold (28.12.1787 and 12.05.1789) as well as modifications in the interpretation of the term “aesthetics” in the first Critique (KrVA 22, B 35-36) are crucial for the evolution of the project Critique of Taste in the book Critique of the Power (...) of Judgment. Special attention was paid to the debate between some modern scholars and editors about the importance of the reports on ‘Grundlegung’ / ‘Grundlage’ of Critique of Taste in the initial phase of work on the text. However, the available evidence does not allow us to reconstruct the “internal history” of the development of Kant’s thought during the period of writing the third Critique. Some modern scholars try to establish other objective criteria for this kind of reconstruction by identification in the text of Critique direct or hidden hints or citations to the literature of the 18th century. The author considers that the use of so-called “reflections” from the philosopher’s manuscript heritage, which can be seen as the formation and development of certain concepts of Kant’s theory, can be fruitful. The well-known problem of dating the reflections can be partially solved if terminus a quo will be not the published works, but Kant’s lectures on anthropology and logic taught at that time. (shrink)

This essay enquires into the implications for criminal law of Derrida’s analysis in the Death Penalty seminars. The seminars include a reading of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, specifically Kant’s reflections on the sovereign right to punish, which is read in conjunction with the reflections of Freud and Reik on the relation between the unconscious and crime, as well as Nietzsche’s reflections on morality, punishment and cruelty. What comes to the fore in Derrida’s analysis is a system of economic exchange operating (...) on an unconscious level, of which criminal law forms an intrinsic part. Derrida’s analysis of the ‘origin’ of crime in the seminars poses serious questions to the assumption of freedom underlying modern criminal law. The link, which he posits between punishment and political theology, likewise challenges the existing theories and forms of punishment. What the seminars call for, in the name of the Kantian Enlightenment, is a radical break with economic circularity as it operates in respect of crime and punishment. (shrink)