We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. (...) This point is illustrated by Carnap’s early semantics and model theory, which he developed within a type theoretical framework and which stand out both for their universalistic treatment and for certain idiosyncratic technicalities by which the construction is supported. One special property is that individuals are context relative in Carnap’s system. This leads to a model theory in which the model domains are more flexible than has been suggested in the literature. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that in the development of modern logic towards its actual shape at least two directions or traditions have to be distinguished. These traditions may be called, following the mo...

The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...) and Skolem. Itinerary V surveys the work in logic connected to the Hilbert school, and itinerary V deals specifically with consistency proofs and metamathematics, including the incompleteness theorems. Itinerary VII traces the development of intuitionistic and many-valued logics. Itinerary VIII surveys the development of semantical notions from the early work on axiomatics up to Tarski's work on truth. (shrink)

Accounts of the relation between theories and models in biology concentrate on mathematical models. In this paper I consider the dual role of models as representations of natural systems and as a material basis for theorizing. In order to explicate the dual role, I develop the concept of a remnant model, a material entity made from parts of the natural system(s) under study. I present a case study of an important but neglected naturalist, Joseph Grinnell, to illustrate the extent to (...) which mundane practices in a museum setting constitute theorizing. I speculate that historical and sociological analyses of institutions can play a specific role in the philosophical analysis of model-building strategies. (shrink)

The paper critically scrutinizes the widespread idea that Russell subscribes to a "Universalist Conception of Logic." Various glosses on this somewhat under-explained slogan are considered, and their fit with Russell's texts and logical practice examined. The results of this investigation are, for the most part, unfavorable to the Universalist interpretation.

(1) An introduction to the principles of conceptual modelling, combinatorial heuristics and epistemological history; (2) the examination of a number of perennial epistemological-methodological schemata: conceptual spaces and blending theory; ars inveniendi and ars demonstrandi; the two modes of analysis and synthesis and their relationship to ars inveniendi; taxonomies and typologies as two fundamental epistemic structures; extended cognition, cognitio symbolica and model-based reasoning; (3) Plato’s notions of conceptual spaces, conceptual blending and hypothetical-analogical models (paradeigmata); (4) Ramon Llull’s concept analysis and combinatoric (...) spaces; (5) Gottfried Leibniz’s development of compositional analysis and synthesis as a general modelling method and a paradigm for ars inveniendi; (6) Fritz Zwicky’s revival of the morphological method of analysis and construction, and its subsequent computerised applications. (shrink)

Turingin testi, interrogatiivimalli ja tekoäly.

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 864-886, December 2021.

A comprehensive survey of Martin-Löf's constructive type theory, considerable parts of which have only been presented by Martin-Löf in lecture form or as part of conference talks. Sommaruga surveys the prehistory of type theory and its highly complex development through eight different stages from 1970 to 1995. He also provides a systematic presentation of the latest version of the theory, as offered by Martin-Löf at Leiden University in Fall 1993. This presentation gives a fuller and updated account of the system. (...) Earlier, brief presentations took no account of the issues related to the type-theoretical approach to logic and the foundations of mathematics, while here they are accorded an entire part of the book. Readership: Comprehensive accounts of the history and philosophy of constructive type theory and a considerable amount of related material. Readers need a solid background in standard logic and a first, basic acquaintance with type theory. (shrink)

After the publication of Begriffsschrift, a conflict erupted between Frege and Schröder regarding their respective logical systems which emerged around the Leibnizian notions of lingua characterica and calculus ratiocinator. Both of them claimed their own logic to be a better realisation of Leibniz’s ideal language and considered the rival system a mere calculus ratiocinator. Inspired by this polemic, van Heijenoort (1967b) distinguished two conceptions of logic—logic as language and logic as calculus—and presented them as opposing views, but did not explain (...) Frege’s and Schröder’s conceptions of the fulfilment of Leibniz’s scientific ideal. -/- In this paper I explain the reasons for Frege’s and Schröder’s mutual accusations of having created a mere calculus ratiocinator. On the one hand, Schröder’s construction of the algebra of relatives fits with a project for the reduction of any mathematical concept to the notion of relative. From this stance I argue that he deemed the formal system of Begriffsschrift incapable of such a reduction. On the other hand, first I argue that Frege took Boolean logic to be an abstract logical theory inadequate for the rendering of specific content; then I claim that the language of Begriffsschrift did not constitute a complete lingua characterica by itself, more being seen by Frege as a tool that could be applied to scientific disciplines. Accordingly, I argue that Frege’s project of constructing a lingua characterica was not tied to his later logicist programme. (shrink)

This paper explores the main philosophical approaches of David Hilbert’s theory of proof. Specifically, it is focuses on his ideas regarding logic, the concept of proof, the axiomatic, the concept of truth, metamathematics, the a priori knowledge and the general nature of scientific knowledge. The aim is to show and characterize his epistemological approach on the foundation of knowledge, where logic appears as a guarantee of that foundation. Hilbert supposes that the propositional apriorism, proposed by him to support mathematics, sustains (...) — on its turn — a general method for the treatment of the problem in other areas such as natural sciences. This method is axiomatic. Broadly speaking, we intend to recover and update the Hilbert’s philosophical thinking about the role of logic for scientific knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of Frege’s views on semantics and metatheory by looking at his take on several themes in nineteenth century geometry that were significant for the development of modern model-theoretic semantics. I will focus on three issues in which a central semantic idea, the idea of reinterpreting non-logical terms, gradually came to play a substantial role: the introduction of elements at infinity in projective geometry; the study of transfer principles, especially (...) the principle of duality; and the use of counterexamples in independence arguments. Based on a discussion of these issues and how nineteenth century geometers reflected about them, I will then look into Frege’s take on these matters. I conclude with a discussion of Frege’s views and what they entail for the debate about his stance towards semantics and metatheory more generally. (shrink)

In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style ofPrincipia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of (...) axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory. (shrink)

SUMMARY Major theories of philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind are examined on the basis of the fundamental questions of ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and logic. The result is the choice between language of eliminative reductionism and dualism, neither of which answers properly the relation between mind and body. In the search for a non–dualistic and non–reductive language, Wittgenstein’s notion of language–games as the representative links between language and the world is considered together with Peirce’s semeiosis of cognition. The result (...) is a redefined notion of cognition as the goal–oriented ability to instantiate strategies from the rules of the language–games. Cognition is considered within the four-dimensional languagegames: rules/strategies, primitive/complete language-games, family-resemblances/forms of life, and non-temporal continuum as the language-games’ modality. Cognition is seen as a continuum process of non–individualized elements that unites perception, volition, emotion, will and thought against the commonly accepted understandings of cognition in exclusive terms of perception and thinking. The alternative to the mind/body problem is the continuity of cognition where rules and strategies, syntax and semantics, are considered inseparable within language–games. This continuity of cognition is explained in terms of virtual (univocal) identity, replacing the old philosophical paradigm of the mind/body problem. -/- SOMMARIO Le teorie maggiori della psicologia filosofica e filosofia della mente sono esaminate a partire dalle questioni fondamentali di ontologia, metafisica, epistemologia, semantica e logica. Il risultato è la scelta tra un linguaggio riduzionista eliminativo e un dualismo che però non confronta in modo adeguato la relazione tra mente e corpo. Nella ricerca per un linguaggio non-dualistico e non-riduttivo, viene considerata la nozione del gioco linguistico di Wittgenstein come un legame rappresentativo tra il linguaggio e il mondo insieme con la semiosi cognitiva di Peirce. Il risultato è la nozione ridefinita della cognizione come abilità goal-orientata di creare le strategie dalle regole dei giochi linguistici. La cognizione è considerata entro le quattro dimensioni dei giochi linguistici: regole/strategie, giochi linguistici primitivi/completi, somiglianze di famiglia/forme di vita, e la continuità atemporale come la modalità dei giochi linguistici. La cognizione diventa un processo continuo degli elementi non-individualizzati che tende ad unificare la percezione, volizione, emozione, la volontà e il pensiero contro un concetto generalmente accettato di vedere la cognizione nei termini esclusivamente di percezione e di pensiero. L’alternativa al problema della mente/corpo è la continuità della cognizione, dove le regole e le strategie, la sintassi e la semantica, sono considerate inseparabili nei giochi linguistici. Questa continuità della cognizione è spiegata nei termini dell’identità virtuale (univoca) sostituendo un paradigma filosofico previo del problema della mente/corpo. (shrink)

Contemporary hybrid logic is based on the idea of using formulas as terms, an idea invented and explored by Arthur Prior in the mid-1960s. But Prior’s own work on hybrid logic remains largely undiscussed. This is unfortunate, since hybridisation played a role that was both central to and problematic for his philosophical views on tense. In this paper I introduce hybrid logic from a contemporary perspective, and then examine the role it played in Prior’s work.

Jean Nicod (1893–1924) is a French philosopher and logician who worked with Russell during the First World War. His PhD, with a preface from Russell, was published under the titleLa géométrie dans le monde sensiblein 1924, the year of his untimely death. The book did not have the impact he deserved. In this paper, I discuss the methodological aspect of Nicod’s approach. My aim is twofold. I would first like to show that Nicod’s definition of various notions of equivalence between (...) theories anticipates, in many respects, the (syntactic and semantic) model-theoretic notion of interpretation of a theory into another. I would secondly like to present the philosophical agenda that led Nicod to elaborate his logical framework: the defense of rationalism against Bergson’s attacks. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed commentary on the classic monograph by Alfred Tarski, and offers a reinterpretation and retranslation of the work using the original Polish text and the English and German translations. In the original work, Tarski presents a method for constructing definitions of truth for classical, quantificational formal languages. Furthermore, using the defined notion of truth, he demonstrates that it is possible to provide intuitively adequate definitions of the semantic notions of definability and denotation and that the notion (...) in a structure can be defined in a way that is analogous to that used to define truth. Tarski’s piece is considered to be one of the major contributions to logic, semantics, and epistemology in the 20th century. However, the author points out that some mistakes were introduced into the text when it was translated into German in 1935. As the 1956 English version of the work was translated from the German text, those discrepancies were carried over in addition to new mistakes. The author has painstakingly compared the three texts, sentence-by-sentence, highlighting the inaccurate translations, offering explanations as to how they came about, and commenting on how they have influenced the content and suggesting a correct interpretation of certain passages. Furthermore, the author thoroughly examines Tarski’s article, offering interpretations and comments on the work. (shrink)

The article investigates one of the key contributions to modern structural mathematics, namely Hilbert’sFoundations of Geometry(1899) and its mathematical roots in nineteenth-century projective geometry. A central innovation of Hilbert’s book was to provide semantically minded independence proofs for various fragments of Euclidean geometry, thereby contributing to the development of the model-theoretic point of view in logical theory. Though it is generally acknowledged that the development of model theory is intimately bound up with innovations in 19th century geometry (in particular, the (...) development of non-Euclidean geometries), so far, little has been said about how exactly model-theoretic concepts grew out of methodological investigations within projective geometry. This article is supposed to fill this lacuna and investigates this geometrical prehistory of modern model theory, eventually leading up to Hilbert’sFoundations. (shrink)

One dimension of a comprehensive semantic and semiotic theory is its explanation of how a wide-variety of linguistic expressions designate singular objects. The bulk of scholarship on Peirce's theory of proper names has aligned his theory with the so called new theory of reference by drawing connections between proper names qua rhematic indexical legisigns and various aspects of Kripke's theory of names.2 Recent scholarship has navigated away from indexing Kripke-Peirce affinities and has begun the process of articulating a semiotic or (...) pragmatic theory of names that is distinctly Peircean. For example.. (shrink)

J. H. Lambert proved important results of what we now think of as non-Euclidean geometries, and gave examples of surfaces satisfying their theorems. I use his philosophical views to explain why he did not think the certainty of Euclidean geometry was threatened by the development of what we regard as alternatives to it. Lambert holds that theories other than Euclid's fall prey to skeptical doubt. So despite their satisfiability, for him these theories are not equal to Euclid's in justification. Contrary (...) to recent interpretations, then, Lambert does not conceive of mathematical justification as semantic. According to Lambert, Euclid overcomes doubt by means of postulates. Euclid's theory thus owes its justification not to the existence of the surfaces that satisfy it, but to the postulates according to which these "models" are constructed. To understand Lambert's view of postulates and the doubt they answer, I examine his criticism of Christian Wolff's views. I argue that Lambert's view reflects insight into traditional mathematical practice and has value as a foil for contemporary, model-theoretic, views of justification. (shrink)

Contacts of the two logicians are listed, and all Gödel's written mentions of Tarski's work are quoted. Why did Gödel almost never mention Tarski's definition of truth in his notes and papers? This puzzle of Gödel's silence, proposed by Feferman, is not merely biographical or psychological but has interesting connections to Gödel's philosophical views.No satisfactory answer is given by the three “standard” explanations: no need to repeat the work already done; Tarski's achievement was obvious to Gödel; Gödel's exceptional caution. In (...) fact, , Tarski had done the work, but Gödel almost never mentioned the achievement; , the obviousness is no explanation for the omission of Tarski's work in contexts in which an application of the definition of satisfaction was useful, and even necessary; , the point was not just caution: if Gödel had felt the need to mention the program of scientific semantics he could easily have done that in his manuscripts, or in conversations.Three ideas, detectable in Gödel's approach, can help us understand Gödel's silence: the idea of truth as the intuitive provability in the most general sense; defining it set-theoretically would contribute nothing. the idea of truth as an inexhaustible idea in the sense of Kant; “truth in general” is a category that must be applicable to all kinds of sentential expressions; also, while for Gödel language was secondary, Tarski's definition is focused on language. the idea of logic as the universal language, in Hintikka's sense, as opposed to the perception of logic as a reinterpretable calculus; hence the thesis that semantics is inexpressible. Gödel always remains a Platonist who asks a natural question: what does really happen in the realm of abstract objects? (shrink)

This paper discusses the distinctions indicated in its title. It is argued that the distinction between syntax and semantics is much more important for the present situation in logic than other distinctions. In particular, doing formal syntax and formal semantics requires the use of an informal melanguage based on ordinary mathematics.

G. H. von Wright proposed that a temporal interval exemplifies a real contradiction if at least one part of any division of this interval involves the presence of contradictorily related (though non-simultaneous) states. In connection with intervals, two negations must be discerned: 'does not hold at an interval' and 'fails throughout an interval'. Von Wright did not distinguish the two. As a consequence, he made a mistake in indicating how to use his logical symbolism to express the notion of real (...) contradiction. The present paper aims to reconstruct and philosophically motivate von Wright's argument for the possibility of real contradictions. (shrink)

The theory that ``consistency implies existence'' was put forward by Hilbert on various occasions around the start of the last century, and it was strongly and explicitly emphasized in his correspondence with Frege. Since (Gödel's) completeness theorem, abstractly speaking, forms the basis of this theory, it has become common practice to assume that Hilbert took for granted the semantic completeness of second order logic. In this paper I maintain that this widely held view is untrue to the facts, and that (...) the clue to explain what Hilbert meant by linking together consistency and existence is to be found in the role played by the completeness axiom within both geometrical and arithmetical axiom systems. (shrink)

: While the work of such expositors as Max H. Fisch, James J. Liszka, Lucia Santaella, Anne Friedman, and Mats Bergman has helped bring into sharp focus why Peirce took the third branch of semiotic (speculative rhetoric) to be "the highest and most living branch of logic," more needs to be done to show the extent to which the least developed branch of his theory of signs is, at once, its potentially most fruitful and important. The author of this paper (...) thus begins to trace out even more fully than these scholars have done the unfinished trajectory of Peirce's eventual realization of the importance of speculative rhetoric. In doing so, he is arguing for a shift from the formalist and taxonomic emphasis of so many commentators to a more thoroughly pragmaticist and "rhetorical" approach to interpreting Peirce's theory of signs. (shrink)

In this talk I present the main results from Anta (2021), namely, that the theoretical division between Boltzmannian and Gibbsian statistical mechanics should be understood as a separation in the epistemic capabilities of this physical discipline. In particular, while from the Boltzmannian framework one can generate powerful explanations of thermal processes by appealing to their microdynamics, from the Gibbsian framework one can predict observable values in a computationally effective way. Finally, I argue that this statistical mechanical schism contradicts the Hempelian (...) (1958) thesis that the predictive power of a scientific theory is directly proportional to its explanatory potential, and vice versa. (shrink)

In a series of articles dating from 1903 to 1906, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s methodology of proving the independence and consistency of various fragments of Euclidean geometry in his Foundations of Geometry. In the final part of the last article, Frege makes his own proposal as to how the independence of genuine axioms should be proved. Frege contends that independence proofs require the development of a ‘new science’ with its own basic truths. This paper aims to provide a reconstruction of this (...) New Science that meets modern standards and to examine possible problems surrounding Frege’s original proposal. The paper is organized as follows: the first two sections summarize the main points of the Frege–Hilbert controversy and discuss some issues surrounding the problem of independence proofs. Section 3 contains an informal presentation of Frege’s proposal. In section 4 a more detailed reconstruction of Frege’s New Science is set out while section 5 examines what is left out. The concluding section is devoted to a discussion of Frege’s strategy and its significance from a broader perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the nature of the metaphysical possibility of disunified time. A possibility that I argue presents unique problems for those who adhere to a strict A-theory of time, particularly those A-theorists who propose a presentist view. The first part of the paper discusses various arguments against the coherence of the concept of disunified time. I attempt to discount each of these objections and show that disunified time is indeed a possible and consistent topology of time. Then, (...) I attempt to show that disunified time is a problem for a semantics based on the A-series since A-truthmakers are hard to come by in a universe of temporally disconnected time-series. Finally, I provide a novel argument showing that presentists should be particularly fearful of such a universe. (shrink)

In a letter to Frege of 29 December 1899, Hilbert advances his formalist doctrine, according to which consistency of an arbitrary set of mathematical sentences is a sufficient condition for its truth and for the existence of the concepts described by it. This paper discusses Frege's analysis, as carried out in the context of the Frege-Hilbert correspondence, of the formalist approach in particular and the axiomatic method in general. We close with a speculation about Frege's influence on Hilbert's later work (...) in foundations, which we consider to have been greater than previously assumed. This conjecture is based on a hitherto neglected revision of Hilbert's talk "Über den Zahlbegriff". (shrink)

This paper attempts to confine the preconceptions that prevented Frege from appreciating Hilbert?s Grundlagen der Geometrie to two: (i) Frege?s reliance on what, following Wilfrid Hodges, I call a Frege?Peano language, and (ii) Frege?s view that the sense of an expression wholly determines its reference.I argue that these two preconceptions prevented Frege from achieving the conceptual structure of model theory, whereas Hilbert, at least in his practice, was quite close to the model?theoretic point of view.Moreover, the issues that divided Frege (...) and Hilbert did not revolve around whether one or the other allowed metalogical notions.Frege, e.g., succeeded in formulating the notion of logical consequence, at least to the extent that Bolzano did; the point is rather that even though Frege had certain semantic concepts, he did not articulate them model?theoretically, whereas, in some limited sense, Hilbert did. (shrink)

Jean Nicod (1893–1924) is a French philosopher and logician who worked with Russell during the First World War. His PhD, with a preface from Russell, was published under the title La géométrie dans le monde sensible in 1924, the year of his untimely death. The book did not have the impact he deserved. In this paper, I discuss the methodological aspect of Nicod’s approach. My aim is twofold. I would first like to show that Nicod’s definition of various notions of (...) equivalence between theories anticipates, in many respects, the (syntactic and semantic) model-theoretic notion of interpretation of a theory into another. I would secondly like to present the philosophical agenda that led Nicod to elaborate his logical framework: the defense of rationalism against Bergson’s attacks. (shrink)

When did the concept of model begin to be used in mathematics? This question appears at first somewhat surprising since “model” is such a standard term now in the discourse on mathematics and “modelling” such a standard activity that it seems to be well established since long. The paper shows that the term— in the intended epistemological meaning—emerged rather recently and tries to reveal in which mathematical contexts it became established. The paper discusses various layers of argumentations and reflections in (...) order to unravel and reach the pertinent kernel of the issue. The specific points of this paper are the difference in the epistemological concept to the usually discussed notions of model and the difference between conceptions implied in mathematical practices and their becoming conscious in proper reflections of mathematicians. (shrink)

This volume portrays the Polish or Lvov-Warsaw School, one of the most influential schools in analytic philosophy, which, as discussed in the thorough introduction, presented an alternative working picture of the unity of science.

Carnap's philosophy is examined from new viewpoints, including three important distinctions: (i) language as calculus vs language as universal medium; (ii) different senses of completeness: (iii) standard vs nonstandard interpretations of (higher-order) logic. (i) Carnap favored in 1930-34 the "formal mode of speech," a corollary to the universality assumption. He later gave it up partially but retained some of its ingredients, e.g., the one-domain assumption. (ii) Carnap's project of creating a universal self-referential language is encouraged by (ii) and by the (...) author's recent work. (iii) Carnap was aware of (iii) and occasionally used the standard interpretation, but was not entirely clear of the nature of the contrast. (shrink)

The symmetries between points and lines in planar projective geometry and between points and planes in solid projective geometry are striking features of these geometries that were extensively discussed during the nineteenth century under the labels “duality” or “reciprocity.” The aims of this article are, first, to provide a systematic analysis of duality from a modern point of view, and, second, based on this, to give a historical overview of how discussions about duality evolved during the nineteenth century. Specifically, we (...) want to see in which ways geometers’ preoccupation with duality was shaped by developments that lead to modern logic towards the end of the nineteenth century, and how these developments in turn might have been influenced by reflections on duality. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the two-dimensional character of Frege’s Begriffsschrift plays an epistemological role in his argument for the analyticity of arithmetic. First, I motivate the claim that its two-dimensional character needs a historical explanation. Then, to set the stage, I discuss Frege’s notion of a Begriffsschrift and Kant’s epistemology of mathematics as synthetic a priori and partly grounded in intuition, canvassing Frege’s sharp disagreement on these points. Finally, I argue that the two-dimensional character of Frege’s notations play (...) the epistemological role of facilitating our grasp of logical truths independently of intuition. The rest of this paper critically evaluates Frege’s view and discusses Macbeth’s account. (shrink)

Van Heijenoort’s main contribution to history and philosophy of modern logic was his distinction between two basic views of logic, first, the absolutist, or universalist, view of the founding fathers, Frege, Peano, and Russell, which dominated the first, classical period of history of modern logic, and, second, the relativist, or model-theoretic, view, inherited from Boole, Schröder, and Löwenheim, which has dominated the second, contemporary period of that history. In my paper, I present the man Jean van Heijenoort (Sect. 1); then (...) I describe his way of arguing for the second view (Sect. 2); and finally I come down in favor of the first view (Sect. 3). There, I specify the version of universalism for which I am prepared to argue (Sect. 3, introduction). Choosing ZFC to play the part of universal, logical (in a nowadays forgotten sense) system, I show, through an example, how the usual model theory can be naturally given its proper place, from the universalist point of view, in the logical framework of ZFC; I outline another, not rival but complementary, semantics for admissible extensions of ZFC in the very same logical framework; I propose a way to get universalism out of the predicaments in which universalists themselves believed it to be (Sect. 3.1). Thus, if universalists of the classical period did not, in fact, construct these semantics, it was not that their universalism forbade them, in principle, to do so. The historical defeat of universalism was not technical in character. Neither was it philosophical. Indeed, it was hardly more than the victory of technicism over the very possibility of a philosophical dispute (Sect. 3.2). (shrink)

In his famous paper Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen (Polish edition: Nakładem/Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, wydzial, III, 1933), Alfred Tarski constructs a materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term “true sentence” for certain kinds of formalised languages. In the case of other formalised languages, he shows that such a construction is impossible but that the term “true sentence” can nevertheless be consistently postulated. In the Postscript that Tarski added to a later version of this paper (Studia Philosophica, (...) 1, 1935), he does not explicitly include limits for the kinds of language for which such a construction is possible. This absence of such limits has been interpreted as an implied claim that such a definition of the term “true sentence” can be constructed for every language. This has far-reaching consequences, not least for the widely held belief that Tarski changed from an universalistic to an anti-universalistic standpoint. We will claim that the consequence of anti-universalism is unwarranted, given that it can be argued that the Postscript is not in conflict with the existence of limits outside of which a definition of “true sentence” cannot be constructed. Moreover, by a discussion of transfinite type theory, we will also be able to accommodate other of the changes made in Tarski’s Postscript within a type-theoretical framework. The awareness of transfinite type theory afforded by this discussion will lead, in turn, to an account of Tarski’s Postscript that shows a gradual change in his logical work, rather than any of the more radical transitions which the Postscript has been claimed to reflect. (shrink)

Van Heijenoort’s account of the historical development of modern logic was composed in 1974 and first published in 1992 with an introduction by his former student. What follows is a new edition with a revised and expanded introduction and additional notes.