- The realistic stance.John R. Searle - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):527.details
|
|
The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
|
|
Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Gerhard Schurz, Maria Sekatskaya & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
|
|
Moral Luck and Unfair Blame.Martin Sand & Michael Klenk - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-17.details
|
|
Moral Luck and Unfair Blame.Martin Sand & Michael Klenk - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (4):701-717.details
|
|
Will the argument for abstracta please stand up?Alexander Rosenberg - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):526.details
|
|
How to build a mind.H. L. Roitblat - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):525.details
|
|
Intentionality: How to tell Mae West from a crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.details
|
|
A definition of Chisholm's notion of immanent causation.Peter Inwagen - 1978 - Philosophia 7 (3-4):567-581.details
|
|
Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):119-133.details
|
|
The intentional stance and the knowledge level.Allen Newell - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.details
|
|
A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism.Thomas Müller & Hans J. Briegel - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):219-252.details
|
|
Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.details
|
|
An unconnected Heap of duties?David McNaughton - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):433-447.details
|
|
On fundamental responsibility.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
|
|
Causes and intentions.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):519-520.details
|
|
Dennett's instrumentalism.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):518.details
|
|
Free Will and the Burden of Proof.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:107-122.details
|
|
Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will.Bartlomiej Andrzej Lenart - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (2):385-407.details
|
|
What Does Indeterminism Offer to Agency?Andrew Law - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):371-385.details
|
|
The devil, the details, and Dr. Dennett.Patricia Kitcher & Philip Kitcher - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):517.details
|
|
Competence models are causal.David Kirsh - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
|
|
The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism.Levy Ken - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.details
|
|
Hume's Theory of Moral Responsibility: Some Unresolved Matters.Clarence Shole Johnson - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (1):3-.details
|
|
How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.details
|
|
Free Will for the Long Run.Benjamin I. Huff - 2021 - The Monist 104 (3):352-365.details
|
|
What is the 'Cause' in Causal Decision Theory?Christopher Hitchcock - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):129-146.details
|
|
Making a Difference.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):81-94.details
|
|
Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
|
|
Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism.Marcela Herdova - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):106-121.details
|
|
What is the intentional stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
|
|
The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
|
|
Real intentions?Donald R. Griffin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.details
|
|
Against the Mind Argument.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):273-294.details
|
|
Derived intentionality?Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.details
|
|
Spontaneous Freedom.Jonathan Gingerich - 2022 - Ethics 133 (1):38-71.details
|
|
Unprincipled Ethics.Gerald Dworkin - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):224-239.details
|
|
Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
|
|
Diverging lay intuitions about concepts related to free will in arbitrary and deliberate decisions.Jake Gavenas, Pamela Hieronymi & Uri Maoz - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 106 (C):103434.details
|
|
The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
|
|
The assimilation argument and the rollback argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416.details
|
|
How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
|
|
Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
|
|
Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
|
|
Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
|
|
Chance or Agency? A Response to “Divine Providence and Chance in the World”.Peter Forrest - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (3):111-125.details
|
|
Against libertarianism.Alicia Finch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.details
|
|
Is Middle Knowledge Possible? Almost.Evan Fales - 2011 - Sophia 50 (1):1-9.details
|
|
Divine freedom and the choice of a world.Evan Fales - 1994 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 35 (2):65 - 88.details
|
|
In Defence of the Mind Argument.Erik Carlson - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.details
|
|