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The Predictive Mind

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2013)

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  1. Predicting the Self: Lessons from Schizophrenia.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):381-400.
    Newly developed Bayesian perspectives on schizophrenia hold out the promise that a common underlying mechanism can account for many, if not all, of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. If this is the case, then understanding how schizophrenic minds go awry could shine light on how healthy minds maintain a sense of self. This article investigates this Bayesian promise by examining whether the approach can indeed account for the difficulties with self-awareness experienced in schizophrenia. While I conclude that it cannot, I (...)
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  • Cooperation and Social Rules Emerging From the Principle of Surprise Minimization.Mattis Hartwig & Achim Peters - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    The surprise minimization principle has been applied to explain various cognitive processes in humans. Originally describing perceptual and active inference, the framework has been applied to different types of decision making including long-term policies, utility maximization and exploration. This analysis extends the application of surprise minimization to a multi-agent setup and shows how it can explain the emergence of social rules and cooperation. We further show that in social decision-making and political policy design, surprise minimization is superior in many aspects (...)
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  • Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and Explanation.Stephan Hartmann & Matteo Colombo - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
    It is often claimed that the greatest value of the Bayesian framework in cognitive science consists in its unifying power. Several Bayesian cognitive scientists assume that unification is obviously linked to explanatory power. But this link is not obvious, as unification in science is a heterogeneous notion, which may have little to do with explanation. While a crucial feature of most adequate explanations in cognitive science is that they reveal aspects of the causal mechanism that produces the phenomenon to be (...)
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  • Reinforcement learning: A brief guide for philosophers of mind.Julia Haas - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12865.
    I argue for the role of reinforcement learning in the philosophy of mind. To start, I make several assumptions about the nature of reinforcement learning and its instantiation in minds like ours. I then review some of the contributions of reinforcement learning methods have made across the so-called 'decision sciences.' Finally, I show how principles from reinforcement learning can shape philosophical debates regarding the nature of perception and characterisations of desire.
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  • Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?Julia Haas - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):424-444.
    Hohwy et al.’s (2008) model of binocular rivalry (BR) is taken as a classic illustration of predictive coding’s explanatory power. I revisit the account and show that it cannot explain the role of reward in BR. I then consider a more recent version of Bayesian model averaging, which recasts the role of reward in (BR) in terms of optimism bias. If we accept this account, however, then we must reconsider our conception of perception. On this latter view, I argue, organisms (...)
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  • An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will.Julia Haas - 2018 - Synthese (12):1-21.
    This paper presents an empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will. Specifically, it presents a theory of action, grounded in contemporary cognitive neuroscientific accounts of decision making, that explains the phenomenon of weakness of will without resulting in a puzzle.
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  • The Perception-Cognition Border: A Case for Architectural Division.E. J. Green - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):323-393.
    A venerable view holds that a border between perception and cognition is built into our cognitive architecture and that this imposes limits on the way information can flow between them. While the deliverances of perception are freely available for use in reasoning and inference, there are strict constraints on information flow in the opposite direction. Despite its plausibility, this approach to the perception-cognition border has faced criticism in recent years. This article develops an updated version of the architectural approach, which (...)
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  • Analogue Models and Universal Machines. Paradigms of Epistemic Transparency in Artificial Intelligence.Hajo Greif - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (1):111-133.
    The problem of epistemic opacity in Artificial Intelligence is often characterised as a problem of intransparent algorithms that give rise to intransparent models. However, the degrees of transparency of an AI model should not be taken as an absolute measure of the properties of its algorithms but of the model’s degree of intelligibility to human users. Its epistemically relevant elements are to be specified on various levels above and beyond the computational one. In order to elucidate this claim, I first (...)
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  • Minds, Brains, and Capacities: Situated Cognition and Neo-Aristotelianism.Hans-Johann Https://Orcidorg909X Glock - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    This article compares situated cognition to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the mind. The article distinguishes two components in this paradigm: an Aristotelian essentialism which is alien to situated cognition and a Wittgensteinian “capacity approach” to the mind which is not just congenial to it but provides important conceptual and argumentative resources in defending social cognition against orthodox cognitive science. It focuses on a central tenet of that orthodoxy. According to what I call “encephalocentrism,” cognition is primarily or even exclusively a (...)
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  • Moral Learning, Rationality, and the Unreliability of Affect.Adam Gjesdal - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):460-473.
    ABSTRACTJames Woodward and John Allman [2007, 2008] and Peter Railton [2014, 2016] argue that our moral intuitions are products of sophisticated rational learning systems. I investigate the implications that this discovery has for intuition-based philosophical methodologies. Instead of vindicating the conservative use of intuitions in philosophy, I argue that what I call the rational learning strategy fails to show philosophers are justified in appealing to their moral intuitions in philosophical arguments without giving reasons why those intuitions are trustworthy. Despite the (...)
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  • Traits, beliefs and dispositions in a pluralistic folk psychology.Harmen Ghijsen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5395-5413.
    According to pluralistic folk psychology (PFP) we make use of a variety of methods to predict and explain each other, only one of which makes use of attributing propositional attitudes. I discuss three related problems for this view: first, the prediction problem, according to which (some of) PFP’s methods of prediction only work if they also assume a tacit attribution of propositional attitudes; second, the interaction problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how its different methods of prediction and explanation (...)
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  • Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1751-1769.
    Predictive processing accounts of perception assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be (...)
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  • Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?Harmen Ghijsen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):132-147.
    Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks-related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of (...)
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  • Why Are Acquired Search-Guiding Context Memories Resistant to Updating?Thomas Geyer, Werner Seitz, Artyom Zinchenko, Hermann J. Müller & Markus Conci - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    Looking for goal-relevant objects in our various environments is one of the most ubiquitous tasks the human visual system has to accomplish. Visual search is guided by a number of separable selective-attention mechanisms that can be categorized as bottom-up driven – guidance by salient physical properties of the current stimuli – or top-down controlled – guidance by observers' “online” knowledge of search-critical object properties. In addition, observers' expectations based on past experience also play also a significant role in goal-directed visual (...)
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  • Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account.Philip Gerrans - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding.Philip Gerrans - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):401-418.
    A flood of new multidisciplinary work on the causes of depersonalization disorder provides a new way to think about the feeling that experiences “belong” to the self. In this paper I argue that this feeling, baptized “mineness” or “subjective presence” : 565–573, 2013) emerges from a multilevel interaction between emotional, affective and cognitive processing. The “self” to which experience is attributed is a predictive model made by the mind to explain the modulation of affect as the organism progresses through the (...)
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  • A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence.Philip Gerrans - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1059-1080.
    The initial cause of Cotard delusion is pervasive dyshomeostasis (dysregulation of basic bodily function).This explanation draws on interoceptive active inference account of self‐representation. In this framework, the self is an hierarchical predictive model made by the brain to facilitate homeostatic regulation. The account I provide is an alternative to two factor accounts of the Cotard delusion that treat depersonalisation experience as the first factor in genesis of the Cotard delusion. I argue that depersonalisation experience and the Cotard delusion are produced (...)
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  • Emotion Perception as Conceptual Synchrony.Maria Gendron & Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (2):101-110.
    Psychological research on emotion perception anchors heavily on an object perception analogy. We present static “cues,” such as facial expressions, as objects for perceivers to categorize. Yet in the real world, emotions play out as dynamic multidimensional events. Current theoretical approaches and research methods are limited in their ability to capture this complexity. We draw on insights from a predictive coding account of neural activity and a grounded cognition account of concept representation to conceive of emotion perception as a stream (...)
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  • The Extended Mind: State of the Question.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):421-447.
    It has been twenty years since Clark and Chalmers published “The Extended Mind.” In the present article I review the development of the extended mind hypothesis across what some proponents have defined as three theoretical “waves.” From first‐wave extended mind theory, based on the parity principle, to second‐wave complementarity, to the third wave, characterized as an uneasy integration of predictive processing and enactivist dynamics, extended mind theorists have faced and solved a number of problems along the way. The fact that (...)
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  • Rethinking Again.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):234-245.
    Volume 2, Issue 2, June 2018, Page 234-245.
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  • Making enactivism even more embodied.Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower - 2013 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.
    The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, (...)
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  • Dynamical Relations in the Self-Pattern.Shaun Gallagher & Anya Daly - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Abstract: The notion of a self-pattern, as developed in the pattern theory of self, which holds that the self is best explained in terms of the kind of reality that pertains to a dynamical pattern, acknowledges the importance of neural dynamics, but also expands the account of self to extra-neural (embodied and enactive) dynamics. The pattern theory of self, however, has been criticized for failing to explicate the dynamical relations among elements of the self-pattern; as such, it seems to be (...)
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  • Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition.Shaun Gallagher & Micah Allen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2627-2648.
    We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding, predictive processing and predictive engagement. We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston’s proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.
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  • Autonomous technologies in human ecologies: enlanguaged cognition, practices and technology.Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Stephen J. Cowley - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (2):687-699.
    Advanced technologies such as drones, intelligent algorithms and androids have grave implications for human existence. With the purpose of exploring their basis for doing so, the paper proposes a framework for investigating the complex relationship between such devices and human practices and language-mediated cognition. Specifically, it centers on the importance of the typically neglected intermediate layer of culture which not only drives both technophobia and philia but also, more fundamentally, connects pre-reflective experience and socio-material practices by placing advanced technologies in (...)
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  • The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1021-1040.
    Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...)
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  • Un-debunking Ordinary Objects with the Help of Predictive Processing.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (4):1047-1068.
    Debunking arguments aim to undermine common sense beliefs by showing that they are not explanatorily or causally linked to the entities they are purportedly about. Rarely are facts about the aetiology of common sense beliefs invoked for the opposite aim, that is, to support the reality of entities that furnish our manifest image of the world. Here I undertake this sort of un-debunking project. My focus is on the metaphysics of ordinary physical objects. I use the view of perception as (...)
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  • Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors.Paweł Gładziejewski & Marcin Miłkowski - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (3):337-355.
    This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...)
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  • Predictive coding and representationalism.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2).
    According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...)
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  • Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: a foundherentist account.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11397-11421.
    In this paper, I use the predictive processing theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind-independent world. My main (...)
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  • Koherencja drogowskazem prawdy? Spójność jako źródło błędnych reprezentacji Komentarz do książki Krystyny Bieleckiej Błądzę, więc myślę. Co to jest błędna reprezentacja?Paweł Gładziejewski - 2020 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 11 (3).
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  • The Circularity of the Embodied Mind.Thomas Fuchs - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Immunoceptive inference: why are psychiatric disorders and immune responses intertwined?Karl Friston, Maxwell Ramstead, Thomas Parr & Anjali Bhat - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (3):1-24.
    There is a steadily growing literature on the role of the immune system in psychiatric disorders. So far, these advances have largely taken the form of correlations between specific aspects of inflammation (e.g. blood plasma levels of inflammatory markers, genetic mutations in immune pathways, viral or bacterial infection) with the development of neuropsychiatric conditions such as autism, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and depression. A fundamental question remains open: why are psychiatric disorders and immune responses intertwined? To address this would require a (...)
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  • The missing G.Erez Firt - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (4):995-1007.
    Artificial general intelligence is not a new notion, but it has certainly been gaining traction in recent years, and academic as well as industry resources are redirected to research in AGI. The main reason for this is that current AI techniques are limited as they are designed to operate in specific problem-domains, following meticulous preparation. These systems cannot operate in an unknown environment or under conditions of uncertainty, reuse knowledge gained in another problem domain, or autonomously learn and understand the (...)
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  • Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects.Chaz Firestone & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-72.
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  • Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 86:103031.
    Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts et al., 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this (...)
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  • Shannon + Friston = Content: Intentionality in predictive signaling systems.Carrie Figdor - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2793-2816.
    What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for (...)
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  • Predictive processing and anti-representationalism.Marco Facchin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11609-11642.
    Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse, no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully identified as a representational vehicle. To do so, I first examine some of the theoretical commitments these philosophers share, and show that these commitments provide a set of necessary conditions the satisfaction of which allows (...)
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  • Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing.Marco Facchin - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (2):305-327.
    I discuss Clark’s predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: Clark’s hybrid suggests that, when we use them, we pay attention to mind-extending external resources. This clashes with a commonly accepted necessary condition of cognitive extension; namely, that mind-extending resources must be phenomenally transparent when used. I then propose a solution to this problem claiming that the phenomenal transparency condition should be rejected. To do so, I put forth a parity argument to the effect that phenomenal transparency cannot be a (...)
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  • Is radically enactive imagination really contentless?Marco Facchin - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1089-1105.
    Radical enactivists claim that cognition is split in two distinct kinds, which can be differentiated by how they relate to mental content. In their view, basic cognitive activities involve no mental content whatsoever, whereas linguistically scaffolded, non-basic, cognitive activities constitutively involve the manipulation of mental contents. Here, I evaluate how this dichotomy applies to imagination, arguing that the sensory images involved in basic acts of imaginations qualify as vehicles of content, contrary to what radical enactivists claim. To argue so, I (...)
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  • Are Generative Models Structural Representations?Marco Facchin - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (2):277-303.
    Philosophers interested in the theoretical consequences of predictive processing often assume that predictive processing is an inferentialist and representationalist theory of cognition. More specifically, they assume that predictive processing revolves around approximated Bayesian inferences drawn by inverting a generative model. Generative models, in turn, are said to be structural representations: representational vehicles that represent their targets by being structurally similar to them. Here, I challenge this assumption, claiming that, at present, it lacks an adequate justification. I examine the only argument (...)
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  • Reconsidering the Mind-Wandering Reader: Predictive Processing, Probability Designs, and Enculturation.Regina E. Fabry & Karin Kukkonen - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Studies on mind-wandering frequently use reading as an experimental task. In these studies, reading is conceived as a cognitive process that potentially offers a contrast to mind-wandering, because it seems to be task-related, goal-directed and stimulus-dependent. More recent work attempts to avoid the dichotomy of successful cognitive processes and processes of mind-wandering found in earlier studies. We approach the issue from the perspective that texts provoke modes of cognitive involvement different from information processing and recall account that underlies many early (...)
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  • Into the dark room: a predictive processing account of major depressive disorder.Regina E. Fabry - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):685-704.
    Major depression is a prevalent mental disorder that leads to persistent negative mood and tremendous suffering in affected individuals. However, the biological realization of this disorder and associated symptom clusters remain poorly understood. Recently, phenomenological accounts of major depressive disorder and contributions to the emerging predictive processing account have provided valuable insights into the phenomenological and neuro-functional components that lead to manifestations of major depressive episodes. The purpose of this paper is to weave together these different strands of research to (...)
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  • Character and theory of mind: an integrative approach.Evan Westra - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1217-1241.
    Traditionally, theories of mindreading have focused on the representation of beliefs and desires. However, decades of social psychology and social neuroscience have shown that, in addition to reasoning about beliefs and desires, human beings also use representations of character traits to predict and interpret behavior. While a few recent accounts have attempted to accommodate these findings, they have not succeeded in explaining the relation between trait attribution and belief-desire reasoning. On my account, character-trait attribution is part of a hierarchical system (...)
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  • Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenality.Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):213-228.
    Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal experience. I propose a way of individuating perceptual experiences that does not depend on representationalism and raises a problem to the view defended by Hutto and Myin according to which, with respect to phenomenality, it is possible to adopt a view that partly construes experience in (...)
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  • Dependent Origination as Emergence of the Subject – A cognitive-psychological Approach.Gabriel Ellis - 2020 - Contemporary Buddhism 21 (1-2):263-283.
    ABSTRACT Dependent Origination is one of the fundamental concepts of early Buddhism. Traditionally, it is interpreted as a description of saṃsāra, the cycle of rebirth. This article offers a psychological interpretation of Dependent Origination as a model that describes how the forming unconscious of the foetus develops into the self-conscious mind of the adult human. This perspective opens new possibilities for the integration of Buddhist mind development, cognitive psychology and psychotherapy.
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  • Empty Higher Order States in Higher Order Theories of Consciousness.Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu - 2022 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 22 (64):91-100.
    According to higher order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious when there is a HO state about it. However, some HO states do not seem to be about other existing mental states. It is possible to resolve this problem since targetless HO states resemble HO states that misrepresent but the assumption that HO states always target other existing mental states is at odds with the theory since HO states are not only necessary but also sufficient for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  • A fresh look at research strategies in computational cognitive science: The case of enculturated mathematical problem solving.Regina E. Fabry & Markus Pantsar - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3221-3263.
    Marr’s seminal distinction between computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels of analysis has inspired research in cognitive science for more than 30 years. According to a widely-used paradigm, the modelling of cognitive processes should mainly operate on the computational level and be targeted at the idealised competence, rather than the actual performance of cognisers in a specific domain. In this paper, we explore how this paradigm can be adopted and revised to understand mathematical problem solving. The computational-level approach applies methods from (...)
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  • Betwixt and between: the enculturated predictive processing approach to cognition.Regina E. Fabry - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2483-2518.
    Many of our cognitive capacities are the result of enculturation. Enculturation is the temporally extended transformative acquisition of cognitive practices in the cognitive niche. Cognitive practices are embodied and normatively constrained ways to interact with epistemic resources in the cognitive niche in order to complete a cognitive task. The emerging predictive processing perspective offers new functional principles and conceptual tools to account for the cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily components that give rise to cognitive practices. According to this emerging perspective, many (...)
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  • Getting it: A predictive processing approach to irony comprehension.Regina E. Fabry - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6455-6489.
    On many occasions, irony is used to communicate emotions, to criticise or to tease other people. Irony comprehension consists in identifying an utterance as ironical and detecting its implied meaning. Existing research has investigated irony comprehension as a pragma-linguistic phenomenon, which has led to several theoretical accounts and interesting empirical results. However, given that irony comprehension is situated in a social context and has the purpose to communicate the mental states of the speaker/writer indirectly, it is reasonable to assume that (...)
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  • Limiting the explanatory scope of extended active inference: the implications of a causal pattern analysis of selective niche construction, developmental niche construction, and organism-niche coordination dynamics.Regina E. Fabry - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (1):1-26.
    Research in evolutionary biology and philosophy of biology and cognition strongly suggests that human organisms modify their environment through active processes of niche construction. Recently, proponents of the free-energy principle and variational active inference have argued that their approach can deepen our understanding of the reciprocal causal relationship between organisms and their niche on various scales. This paper examines the feasibility and scope of variational formalisations and conceptualisations of the organism-niche nexus with a particular focus on the extended active inference (...)
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