Contrary to the expectations of several theorists belonging to the modernisation school, chieftaincy as a traditional institution survived various political changes throughout the 19th and 20th century in most African states. Nonetheless, their existence thereafter has varied in these states. Some states have lauded, recognised and employed chiefs for state development, while other states have blatantly ignored and designated the offices of chiefs as an obsolete governance institution that has outlived their usefulness. The variance in the disposition to chiefs is (...) identified as deeply rooted in a long-standing debate over the relationship between modernity and tradition. This study explores this debate, adopting the Ghanaian chieftaincy institution in its modern form as a case study. A synthesis of existing literature on the relevant concepts was developed and discussed in the development of the study. The study identified the major debate on tradition and modernity to be situated in a binary school, where one strand believes they can both exist together, and the other situates their argument in the need to abolish tradition completely from modern societies. For the Ghanaian setting, however, the chieftaincy institution is recognised and accorded its autonomy in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. This has created a bifurcated state where constitutional law and customary law are implemented at the same time. Over the years, the interaction between both systems of governance has been seen mostly in land administration, local governance, and development. Chiefs as such are identified as playing extensive roles in state development and investment promotion through land administration, serving as gatekeepers between the central government and their subjects, promoting solidarity and employing their influence and expertise as a means for introducing sustainable development initiatives in their localities. However, conflicts and land mismanagement have been areas of contention, affecting their influence and relevance in recent times. The study recommends capacity building and further integration with the modern democratic Ghanaian institutions to improve the contribution of chiefs to the development of Ghana and other contexts where they exist. (shrink)

This article offers a prolegomenon for an African feminist philosophy. The prompt for this as an interrogation of Oluwole’s claim that an African feminist philosophy cannot develop until identifiable African worldviews that guide the relationship between men and women have been established. She argues that until there is general agreement about the nature of African philosophy itself, African feminist philosophy will remain impoverished. I critique this claim, unpacking Oluwole’s argument, and examine the contested nature of both African and Western philosophy. (...) Drawing from the work of Mignolo and decolonial thinking, I then argue for the possibility of “epistemic disobedience” concerning the emergence of an African feminist philosophy. Engaging with precolonial African examples which disrupt modern normative gender assumptions and looking at the project of decoloniality, I issue a call for an African feminist philosophy unfettered by the falsely universal claims of modernity/coloniality. My call is for an African feminist philosophy from African loci of enunciation, rooted in the epistemes and experiences of African women. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The concept of vital force in African philosophy received its first full articulation in Placide Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy and has evolved over time from the ontological dimension of a universal actuation and energizing principle to an element of mind, notably in the work of Kwame Gyekye. In this essay, I present the concept of vital force and trace its evolution from the time of its first full articulation by Tempels up to its identification with spirit, or mind, in Gyekye’s (...) thought. I try to defend the thesis that the concept of vital force can ground the notion of mood that takes a pivotal position in the twenty-first century philosophy of consolationism. I adopt an analytical and constructive method in this paper. (shrink)

This article takes its inspiration from Jacques Derrida to consider how deconstructionism can be done inadvertently. This possibility is underscored when one considers how a very significant phrase in Ifá texts— “A díá fún...” has been construed away from its transliteration as “Ifá divination was performed for...” by each of Oluwole and Karenga. Oluwole justifies her “deconstruction” on the grounds that such transliteration does not capture the philosophic cogs gravid within Ifá verses. Karenga, through his Kawaida methodology, “improvises” to suit (...) the ethical inferences he seeks to deduce out of the corpus. On this showing, this research infers that each of these scholars have engaged in a reflective activity that passes, on Derrida’s reading, as deconstruction, unbeknownst to them. Would they admit that their intellectual drudgeries amount to postmodern philosophy? This is the primary research question that this disquisition interrogates. (shrink)

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 2, Page 154-172, June 2022.

The central argument of this article is that there is a remarkable conceptual parallel between Hegel’s famous notion of the “cunning of Reason” and the philosophically profound concept of Chi in Igbo metaphysics. By way of establishing this parallel, the article advances the following subsidiary but complementary points: Chi is also “cunning” in its dynamics; both principles (i.e. Chi and Reason/Spirit) are non-deterministic because they try to maintain a dialectic balance between destiny and individual responsibility; both possess divine attributes; and (...) community serves as an invaluable medium of operation for both. The scholarly significance of the article lies in its attempt not only to systematise the Igbo thought on Chi by eliminating the vestiges of discredited “ethno-philosophy”, but also to open up a constructive dialogue between Hegel and elements of African philosophy, using Igbo metaphysics as a placeholder. This is against the backdrop of certain discontents generated by Hegel’s famous uncomplimentary and racist remarks on Africa. Seen in this light, the article may well be an exercise in “rapprochement”. (shrink)

In this article I critically discuss some recent English language books in African philosophy. Specifically, I expound and evaluate key claims from books published by sub-Saharan thinkers since 2017 that address epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory and that do so in ways of interest to an audience of at least Anglo-American-Australasian analytic philosophers. My aim is not to establish a definitive conclusion about these claims, but rather to facilitate cross-cultural engagement by highlighting their relevance particularly to many western philosophers and (...) by presenting challenges to these claims that such philosophers would be likely to mount. (shrink)

This paper argues that one part of the picture of thinking about decolonising the philosophy curriculum should include problematising the notion of Western philosophy. I argue that there are many problems with the idea of Western philosophy, and with the idea that decolonising the curriculum should involve rejecting so-called Western philosophy. Doing this could include granting the West a false narrative about its origins, influences and interactions, perpetuating exclusions within contemporary and recent North American and European philosophy, perpetuating exclusions and (...) failed acknowledgements within the history of so-called Western philosophy, while at the same time rejecting a tradition which has included in itself so many topics and methodologies that what is left after excluding it would leave other traditions with limited resources, at the same time as wrongly granting the West proprietary rights over any ideas it has happened to investigate, rather than seeing these as belonging to all of humanity. I therefore conclude that a central part of curriculum change should be problematising Western philosophy, including our learning more about, and teaching, more complex views of its history and interactions with other traditions. (shrink)

In this article, I offer concrete suggestions about which topics, texts, positions, arguments and authors from the African philosophical tradition one could usefully put into conversation with ones from the Western, especially the Anglo-American. In particular, I focus on materials that would make for revealing and productive contrasts between the two traditions. My aim is not to argue that one should teach by creating critical dialogue between African and Western philosophers, but rather is to provide strategic advice, supposing that is (...) a sensible goal to adopt. (shrink)

Divided into eight sections, each with introductory essays, the selections offer rich and detailed insights into a diverse multinational philosophical landscape. Revealed in this pathbreaking work is the way in which traditional philosophical issues related to ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, for instance, take on specific forms in Africa's postcolonial struggles. Much of its moral, political, and social philosophy is concerned with the turbulent processes of embracing modern identities while protecting ancient cultures.

In the field of African philosophy, there exists the belief among the modernists or professional philosophers that gerontocracy is coterminous with authoritarian traditions in traditional Africa which, supposedly, are responsible for the lack of sustained curiosity to look at issues from different perspectives. Drawing from the Ifá literary corpus as a store-house for Yorùbá philosophy, I argue in this paper that gerontocracy in Africa does not construe the idea that the elderly in Africa are rigid in thoughts or have immutable (...) authority which discourages independence of thought. I conclude that the position of the modernists on the supposed manifestation of authoritarianism in Africa derives its continuing force from a conception of philosophy which gives special overtones to the ideas of individuals as opposed to a collectivistic system of thought and the assumption that the multitude cannot produce philosophy. (shrink)

The Caribbean is a site where multiple cultures, peoples, waysof thinking and acting have come together and where new formsof philosophy are emerging. The promise of Caribbean philoso-phy lays in its ability to give shape to an intellectual tradition which is both true to and beneficial to Caribbean peoples whilesimultaneously being provocative enough to engage wisdom-seekers of various geographies and identities. I argue that onlyby pursuing a “New Dialogic” which engages the philosophicaltraditions of Africans, African Americans, and Native Ameri-cans can (...) we hope to assert a unique philosophy of value toCaribbean peoples and cultures. The highest form of Caribbeanphilosophy thus must be plural and dialogical. Unfortunately,dialogues in philosophy have been typically characterized bya fixation with Europe, and a lack of consideration of otherphilosophical traditions or sources. The “New Dialogic” thatI propose here involves a more dynamic model of dialogue toopen or intensify different and multiple avenues of conceptualelaboration. I provide general guidelines or principles for this“New Dialogic” and demonstrate the extent to which Caribbeanphilosophers can both contribute to the expansion of this projectand be aided by it in their formulations of the field. (shrink)

Recent sociological theories of globalization represent a second encounter between sociology and global issues. Their underlying concept of "global society" was constructed from an idea of abstract linkage, given content by existing theories about metropolitan society emphasizing modernity, postmodernity, or system dynamics. Antinomies within the globalization theory, such as the global/local opposition and chaotic argument about power, arise from the metropole-centered logic itself, not from conflicts of evidence. The rhetoric and performativity of globalization theory construct a relation with metropolitan audiences, (...) and sociological theories constitute themselves in multiple ways as Northern theory. If we want a genuinely global analysis of globalization we must reconstruct sociological theory as a markedly more inclusive dialogue. (shrink)

The title of Emmanuel Eze’s final, posthumously published book uses the words “reason” and “rationality” in a manner that might suggest they are interchangeable. I would like to suggest that we not treat them as the same, but rather tease out a difference in emphasis and reference between the two. In African philosophy, the problem of reason is really two separate problems, the first of which I will call the “problem of reason” (that is, the question of whether there are (...) diverse forms of reason or only one universal form) and the second the “problem of rationality” (that is, the question of whether everyone has the capacity to deploy reason past what mimicry or programming makes possible). Both of these problems are addressed by Eze’s schema for forms of reason. He identifies several forms, but focuses on “ordinary reason”, which allows all the other forms to operate. Ordinary reason also makes rationality possible, that is, the culturally specific yet emergent way of navigating forms of reason. Reason is necessarily diverse, because its multiple forms are deployed differently by different rationalities. (shrink)

Today, there is a growing consensus among philosophers in Africa, Latin America and other regions of the world that the history of philosophy has to consider both written and oral sources in the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. Even though it is usually not denied that philosophy also expresses itself in oral practices, such as conversation or instruction, the question remains as to how oral philosophical traditions can become part of a history of philosophy. This is subject to a (...) number of methodological questions. On the basis of discourses in contemporary African philosophy as well as examples from other regions of the world, this article discusses selected methodological challenges that oral traditions pose for the historiography of philosophy, with a focus on the relation between philosophy and written texts and philosophy and practice. It is argued that a turn to philosophical practices can offer new insights into philosophy in oral societies. (shrink)

This article makes a case for wide reflective equilibrium in doing African epistemology. It argues that on the issue of formulating a viable theory of knowledge, such an approach is more promising than the extant dominant approaches, namely the method of ethno-epistemology and the method of particularistic studies. More specifically, wide reflective equilibrium articulates a proper balance between philosophy and culture and endows a theory of knowledge with multiple sources of normativity.

Epistemic decolonization, in its various conceptual formulations and presentations, could be taken to hold promise for either the completion of the anti-colonial struggle or the self-re-discovery of the formerly colonized and oppressed. In Africa this project has had a long history as both a counter to hegemonic histories of claimed Western epistemological superiority as well as theories of racism and racist practices against black people of African descent. What is not entirely clear are the precise achievements of decolonial thought and (...) practice. I interrogate the relevance, use and continuation of decoloniality as a genre of thought and practice on the African continent against the background of the perennial problems of material underdevelopment and stifled political spaces that render the supposed beneficiaries of decolonization hopeless subjects who continue to be disempowered and oppressed in their own home. This interrogation is to be carried alongside another inquiry aimed at evaluating the achievements of African philosophy as a form of epistemic decolonization. If African philosophy is a form of decolonization, as it should be, it should be able to clearly demonstrate its achievements and how they have had an effect on broader goals of decolonizing and empowering inhabitants of the African continent. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the concept of African communitarianism and reflect on its potential value for ecojustice education as a localised response to the wider ecological crises that i...

Nous soutenons que l’enseignement de la philosophie à travers le monde est encore hanté par une «politique» de marginalisation des traditions moins favorisées comme la philosophie africaine. Des travaux renommés montrent que le programme classique de philosophie utilisé dans les établissements d’enseignement à travers le monde est principalement occidental et, en tant que tel, très colonial. Nous soutenons que cela équivaut à une sorte d’«injustice épistémique» qui porte préjudice à la production de la connaissance. Nous affirmons en particulier que cette (...) «politique» doit être interrompue. Nous proposons comme alternative la tradition conversationnelle, à partir de laquelle une programme de philosophie compréhensif et inconciliable avec la politique d’exclusion pourrait être mis au point. (shrink)

Africa is the poorest continent in the world despite her huge human and material resources. She is at the periphery of global development. Some people attribute the African predicament to her experience of slavery and colonialism which distorted her identity and disoriented her values. But she is not the only continent that was colonised. Other colonised continents are already finding their bearing in global development. What is that unique factor about African identity that hinders her from having her own stake (...) in global development? This paper argues that Africa’s stable and rich natural environment which does not coerce her to struggle for survival makes Africa docile and complacent. This psychological disposition makes her to take her survival for granted and to liveonthe providence of her environment without conscientious effort to conquer and drive it to enhance her state of life. The search for African identity should not focus on just exhuming her past culture and lamenting her experiences, but on discovering the latent prowess of Africa that will help her to positively and effectively confront her existential challenges. Colonialism and neo-colonialism are parts of Africa’s existential challenges which she has to tackle to define her identity. For sustainable development, Africa has to wake upfromher slumber of eulogising her cultural heritage and blaming othersforher predicament, and brace up to critically, constructively and pragmatically evaluate her past, confront her current challenges and take responsibility for the effect of her actions and inactions. (shrink)

(C. Boundas, ed., Companion to 20th Century Philosophy, Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming 2007).

An instance of the use of a version of the analytic method known as the “ordinary-language approach” in African philosophy is characterised by a systematic examination (for the purpose of clarity) of philosophically significant concepts in an African language as used in ordinary discourse contexts among a local linguistic community. Central to this approach is the idea that the meaning of concepts depends on the ways ordinary people use them, and that this may form the basis of a philosophy. This (...) article examines Barry Hallen and Olubi Sodipo’s critical engagements with the epistemological concepts of ìmọ (knowledge) and ìgbàgbọ (belief) as an instance of this analytic methodological orientation in African philosophy. The article finds the resultant analysis of these Yoruba concepts theoretically faulty because it defeats both the rational structure of complex concept formation in Yoruba language and the logical presupposition embedded in every language. The article concludes that in order to correct this, African philosophy needs to evolve its own unique method of analysis, or otherwise reject altogether the analytic method and erect in its place its own peculiar method suitable for what it does, and consistent with the general nature of philosophy. (shrink)

© 2016 South African Journal of Philosophy. This article explores current issues in South African philosophy curriculum design. Four questions are considered, each followed by a supplementary note. Firstly, the place of philosophy from other traditions, particularly Western philosophies, in South African curricula is considered. The related note reflects on whether different philosophical traditions in curricula should be treated separately or integrated. Secondly, ambiguity in some important authors reception of plural traditions is identified and investigated to see what we can (...) derive from their example for our philosophical practice. The related note looks at "decolonisation of the curriculum". Thirdly, I affirm the importance of relevance as a criterion for curriculum development, interrogating the meaning of this criterion for philosophy. The related note focuses on interpreting student feedback. Fourthly, the continued presence of "white" lecturers in South African philosophy departments is discussed against the background of the tension between the Mandela and Biko paradigms in contemporary society. The related note considers ideological resonances of our response to this issue in other parts of the world. Finally, the articles ideas are presented as an attempt to map argumentative options, clarify some of their merits and implications, and acknowledge their limits. (shrink)

Recently there has been a strong movement towards reflections about the “geography of reason,” especially among philosophers who deal with postcolonial thinking. There is also a renewed interest among different schools of thought, both analytical and continental, in the ways our “life world,” or “embodiment,” or “situated cognition,” shape our minds and eventually the philosophy we do. As a result, we have seen some recent publications on the nature and import of the concept of “place” by authors such as Edward (...) Casey, Jeff Malpas, and Bruce Janz. In Philosophy in an African place, Bruce Janz introduces the concept of “philosophy-in-place” with the question as to what it is to do philosophy in a particular context of lived experience or, more specifically, what it is to do philosophy in an African place. This paper expands on Janz's “philosophy-in-place” by developing what will be called a “philosophy through place.” It starts with Janz's discussion of the problem of placing philosophy and a philosophy-in-place. Then it attempts to develop an argument for a “philosophy through place” and its implications for considering the place of philosophy in Africa and the challenge it poses to philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I have attempted to open a window on an African approach to Bioethics — that of the Nso' of the Bamenda Highlands of Kamerun — from the vantage position of someone who has familiarity with both African and Western cultures. Because of its scientific‐cum‐technological sophistication and its proselytising character, Western culture, as well as Western systems of thought and practice, have greatly affected and influenced other cultures, particularly African culture. But Western culture, systems of thought and practice, (...) have been highly impervious and immune to influences from other cultures, philosophies, systems of thought and practice, even where these might have been salutary and enriching to Western culture and systems. What I have here termed Nso' eco‐bio‐cummunitarianism clearly indicates a viable alternative world‐view within which some of the bioethical perplexities and controversies of today might be more satisfactorily resolved than within a Western framework. I have further attempted to show, by way of example, how within such a world‐view, abortion and suicide, for instance, would be disapproved of while euthanasia, in its etymological purity, is approved of. (shrink)

The Tshwane Conference on African Information Ethics of 5-7 February 2007 forces the question, What is an African information ethics? This question is addressed with reference to the complexities of a distinctly African information ethics, taking into account the distinction between ethics and morality, and the assumptions of the language of the Tshwane Declaration on Information Ethics in Africa. Gilles Deleuze‘s concept of assem-blage, analyzed from the perspectives of Bruno Latour‘s concept of ―reassembling the social‖ and recent anthropological approaches to (...) global assemblages are put to work to investigate possibilities of an African information ethics, with special attention to the concepts of universality and African identity. The task of assembling an African information ethics is then analyzed in terms of Latour‘s call for building "livable collectives". (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 8, August 2022.

Contemporary African philosophy ranges over a number of debates, positions, and theoretical traditions. It can, however, be read as its own critical tradition of hard-won methodological refinements and substantive philosophical debates common to a body of philosophical work concerned with African philosophical resources elided by coloniality and postcoloniality. In this paper I argue for an account of Analytic philosophy as a style of philosophy, and trace a congruous approach in history of African philosophy, suggesting that these should not be characterised (...) as antagonistic. I conclude by contrasting this style of philosophy with positions drawn from the work of Mogobe Ramose, arguing that the Analytic approach captures a set of questions worth pursuing in engagements with Ramose's work. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 3, Page 666-678, June 2022.

This article introduces the special section on the contribution of Jack Goody, which focuses on The Theft of History (2006). Goody attacks the notion of a radical division between Europe and Asia, which has become built into the commonsense academic wisdom and categorical apparatus of the social sciences and humanities. Eurocentrism is a constant target as he scrutinizes and finds wanting the claims of the West to have invented modern science, cultural renaissances, the free city, capitalism, democracy, love and secularism. (...) Goody’s approach favours a dynamic long-term basis for comparisons between societies and focuses on the exchange of information and goods across Eurasia to argue that the comparative advantage one society gains has been only temporary, swinging between different parts of Eurasia a number of times over the millennia. Goody suggests that China developed an active mercantile urban culture before Europe. Cities and towns with their mixture of luxury and learning, should not be seen as inevitably subordinate to centralized power structures in both eastern and western Eurasia. Goody criticizes the theoretical assumptions and the handling of evidence of Perry Anderson, Fernand Braudel, Norbert Elias, Moses Finlay, David Landes, Karl Marx, Joseph Needham, Immanuel Wallerstein and Max Weber. His concern is that the master categories of world history, such as antiquity, feudalism and capitalism, have been developed against a background of the particular European trajectory, then projected onto the world at large. Goody remains sceptical, not just about eurocentrism, but also the additional danger of being eurocentric about ethnocentricity, which he regards as a trap that postcolonialism and postmodernism frequently fall into. (shrink)

The title of my paper may lead the reader to expect an account of the content of Canadian philosophy, as seen from outside Canada. This is not my intention. In fact, I shall say very little indeed about the content of Canadian philosophy. What I shall offer, rather, is an apology for Canadian philosophy. The apology, needless to say, will not be apologetic; it will be an apologia, a clearing of the ground for a position. And the apology itself will (...) be cosmopolitan, having a world-wide perspective. (shrink)

Tsenay Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics has been crucial to the development of African philosophy. Initially employed as a pathway through the ethno- and professional philosophical debates, scholars have engaged how Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics grapples with one’s own place within a socio-historical world in service of liberation/self-determination. However, this scholarship mainly has focused on his adaptation of Gadamer’s ‘effective-historical consciousness’ for his own concept of heritage. This consequently leaves his concept of a ‘lived existence’ – which is equally crucial – under-examined. This paper probes (...) what a ‘lived existence’ entails and its essentiality when explicating how one even begins to authentically think, which is the groundwork to Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics. This deepens why his concept of heritage matters as a starting point for self-determination. Addressing this lacuna, this article asks, where does philosophy begin and where should it go, particularly when rationality has been historically denied? Serequeberhan’s point of departure to answer this question proposes Heidegger’s concept of thinking itself to arrive at a notion of existence; contrariwise to most African scholars who employ a Sartrean existentialism via Frantz Fanon. As such, this paper gives an in-depth exploration of Serequeberhan’s initial reading of Heidegger, and then unfolds how he appropriates Heidegger to craft his notion of ‘lived existence’. The upshot this is twofold: First, a broader understanding of Serequeberhan’s project, its non-existentialist view of existence; Second, it describes how he specifically tailors his ‘lived existence’ to undergird his hermeneutical approach to heritage as a prescriptive, activist project which dynamically addresses the postcolonial situation. (shrink)

Pearce's "African Philosophy and the Sociological Thesis" makes very interesting reading. Why it is interesting is not because it advances the frontiers of philosophical discourse in Africa or globally but because it shows that certain unwarranted dispositions die hard and that deliberate ignorance, if that is what is displayed, is hard to cure. In this article the author comments on the following contentions made by Pearce: (1) philosophy has no social relevance and/or responsibility; (2) philosophy is purely a linguistic activity (...) concerned with analysis of concepts and examination; (3) philosophy derives from religion; (4) because African philosophy cannot supplant world philosophy, it lacks locus and legitimacy; (5) African philosophy pursues intellectual apartheid through an ethnophilosophical agenda; and (6) African philosophy is vulnerable to the Sociological Thesis and is voided by it. The author's rebuttal consists of a critical and analytic examination of Pearce's views, counterfactual illustrations, and elicitation of enthymemic presuppositions. (shrink)

This article compares the ideas of Amílcar Cabral and Amartya Sen on capability, freedom, resistance and political change, thereby revealing the importance of radical realism in political thought and development studies. Sen’s path-breaking work has been transformative for multiple disciplines, not least development. Yet, reading Sen alongside the ideas of one of Africa’s most successful anti-colonial political leaders is revelatory: it provides the basis for the argument that radical realism is most valuable if it is action-guiding, comparative and about context-specific (...) change. This involves a distinction between realistic political theory and realism in political thought where only the latter demands utopian thinking. What follows from this regarding democracy, impartiality and justice? In answering this with reference to some social movements, the article then defends the political potential of conflict, partisan positions, resistance and political change directed towards overcoming domination. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe article assesses a postcolonial critique of Emmanuel Levinas’ thought. Levinas’ work has recently been accused of Eurocentrism, racism and xenophobia; those accusations are supported by recorded interviews, which at times voice bigoted and xenophobic remarks. What postcolonial critics suggest is that these remarks are made possible by Levinas’ philosophical commitments to phenomenology and Europe as an intellectual process. The article gives an assessment of the postcolonial critique and argues that the critique is necessitous but incomplete and extends a uniformity (...) thesis that carries with it a set of questionable assumptions regarding the connection of philosophy and historical narratives. (shrink)

This article engages Abraham Olivier’s recent distinction between “being” and “choosing to be” within his phenomenological approach to subjectivity in general and to African, communal subjectivity in particular. I recapitulate and problematize aspects of Olivier’s reverse phenomenological analysis, briefly contrasting it with more orthodox African approaches to the ontology of the self. I then hone in on the distinction between being who I am and choosing to be who I am not. I argue that I can indeed choose to be (...) who I am not, subject to the proviso that I cannot choose to be who I am. I close with some reflections on the moral significance of conscientiously choosing to be who I am not. (shrink)