- Narrative Understanding.Alexander Prescott-Couch - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Gender identity: the subjective fit account.Rach Cosker-Rowland - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-36.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Gender Discourse: A Pragmatic Approach.Viktoria Knoll - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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The semantics of deadnames.Taylor Koles - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):715-739.details
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Responsibility and the emotions.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.details
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Etiological Debunking Beyond Belief.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 19:274-298.details
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A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions.Michael Deigan & Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):777-798.details
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Do Emotions Represent Values and How Can We Tell?A. Grzankowski - manuscriptdetails
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The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals.Rachel Achs & Oded Na’Aman - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2523-2546.details
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Why do evaluative judgments affect emotion attributions? The roles of judgments about fittingness and the true self.Michael Prinzing, Brian D. Earp & Joshua Knobe - 2023 - Cognition 239 (C):105579.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - 2023 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like.James Fritz - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2597-2616.details
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The rage we should have: Comments on Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage.Lidal Dror - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):362-372.details
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Unfitting Absent Emotion.James Fritz - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press. pp. 73-96.details
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The normativity of gender.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):244-270.details
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Consequentialism and our best selves.Miles Tucker - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):101-120.details
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Vicarious liability: a solution to a problem of AI responsibility?Matteo Pascucci & Daniela Glavaničová - 2022 - Ethics and Information Technology 24 (3):1-11.details
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Forever fitting feelings.Christopher Howard - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):80-98.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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(2 other versions)Well‐being, part 1: The concept of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
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The Ethics of Expectations.Rima Basu - 2023 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol 13. Oxford University Press. pp. 149-169.details
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Deserved Guilt and Blameworthiness over Time.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2022 - In Andreas Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Good Fit.Vida Yao - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):414-429.details
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The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.details
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Forgiveness and the Significance of Wrongs.Stefan Riedener - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (1).details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):195-215.details
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Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
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Perverse Reasons.Francesco Orsi - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (3):457-480.details
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(2 other versions)Hope as a Source of Grit.Catherine Rioux - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (33):264-287.details
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(2 other versions)Hope: Conceptual and Normative Issues.Catherine Rioux - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3).details
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A puzzle for evaluation theories of desire.Alex Grzankowski - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):90-98.details
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From self-defense to violent protest.Edmund Tweedy Flanigan - 2023 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (7):1094-1118.details
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(2 other versions)Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.details
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Two problems of fitting grief.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):240-247.details
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Emotions and Process Rationality.Oded Na’Aman - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):531-546.details
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Guilt, Desert, Fittingness, and the Good.Coleen Macnamara - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (4):449-468.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Shame and Attributability.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6. Oxford University Press.details
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Debt and Desert.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics.details
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Everything First.Errol Lord - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):248-272.details
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Veritism and ways of deriving epistemic value.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3617-3633.details
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Praise.Daniel Telech - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (10):1-19.details
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(1 other version)Gratitude Is Only Fittingly Targeted Towards Agents.Marcus William Hunt - 2021 - Sophia (2):1-19.details
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(2 other versions)Well‐being, part 2: Theories of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12812.details
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