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I will show that, in the Problem of Old Evidence, unless a rational agent has a property I will call theoretical omniscience (a stronger version of logical omniscience), a problem with noncommutativity of the learning theories follows. Therefore, scientists, when trying to behave as close to rationality as possible, should behave in a way close to the counterfactual strategy. The concept of theoretical omniscience will be applied to the problem of Jeffrey conditionalization, as an example, and we will see that (...) 

Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this article, we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be making a claim about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use to which Bayesian confirmation might be put, namely, determining the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide (...) 

Bayesianism and Inference to the best explanation are two different models of inference. Recently there has been some debate about the possibility of “bayesianizing” IBE. Firstly I explore several alternatives to include explanatory considerations in Bayes’s Theorem. Then I distinguish two different interpretations of prior probabilities: “IBEBayesianism” and “frequentistBayesianism”. After detailing the content of the latter, I propose a rule for assessing the priors. I also argue that FreqBay: endorses a role for explanatory value in the assessment of scientific hypotheses; (...) 

Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian conﬁrmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with conﬁrmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for (...) 

Una cuestión controvertida en la teoría bayesiana de la confirmación es el estatus de las probabilidades iniciales. Aunque la tendencia dominante entre los bayesianos es considerar que la única constricción legítima sobre los valores de dichas probabilidades es la consistencia formal con los teoremas de la teoría matemática de la probabilidad, otros autores partidarios de lo que se ha dado en llamar "bayesianismo objetivo" defienden la conveniencia de restricciones adicionales. Mi propuesta, en el marco del bayesianismo objetivo, recoge una sugerencia (...) 



Bayesianism and Inference to the best explanation are two different models of inference. Recently there has been some debate about the possibility of “bayesianizing” IBE. Firstly I explore several alternatives to include explanatory considerations in Bayes’s Theorem. Then I distinguish two different interpretations of prior probabilities: “IBEBayesianism” and “frequentistBayesianism”. After detailing the content of the latter, I propose a rule for assessing the priors. I also argue that FreqBay: endorses a role for explanatory value in the assessment of scientific hypotheses; (...) 

There is good reason to believe that, if it can be decided at all, the realism debate must be decided on a posteriori grounds. But at least prima facie the prospects for an a posteriori resolution of the debate seem bleak, given that realists and antirealists disagree over two of the most fundamental questions pertaining to any kind of empirical research, to wit, what the range of accessible evidence is and what the methodological status of explanatory considerations is. The present (...) 

Bayesian confirmation theory is a leading theory to decide the confirmation/refutation of a hypothesis based on probability calculus. While it may be much discussed in philosophy of science, is it actually practiced in terms of hypothesis testing by scientists? Since the assignment of some of the probabilities in the theory is open to debate and the risk of making the wrong decision is unknown, many scientists do not use the theory in hypothesis testing. Instead, they use alternative statistical tests that (...) 