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  1. Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception.Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
    Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...)
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  • Enactivism and the unity of perception and action.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Julian Kiverstein - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):63-73.
    This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...)
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  • Case study evidence for an irreducible form of knowing how to: An argument against a reductive epistemology.Garry Young - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.
    Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished (...)
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  • Knowing-how and knowing-that.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge from Resistance Training.Giovanni Rolla - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    The problem of self-knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in the context of traditional epistemology. In parallel to the traditional approach to epistemology, Radically Embodied Cognitive Science (RECS) has emerged in the last 30 years as a genuine contender in its field. According to RECS, the unity of analysis of cognitive processes is the dynamics between brain, body and environment. In this paper, I advance a RECS approach to self-knowledge, which immediately suggests that knowing oneself is a matter of knowing what (...)
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  • In Kontakt mit der Wirklichkeit: Die Perspektivität verkörperter Wahrnehmung.Magnus Schlette & Christian Tewes (eds.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.
    Dem Alltagsverständnis zufolge bringt uns die Wahrnehmung in einen Kontakt mit der Wirklichkeit. Die Stabilisierung der Wahrnehmungsgewissheit ist tief im subjektiven Bildungsprozess verankert, hat sich alltagspraktisch bewährt und in der Sprache sedimentiert. Andererseits hat sich durch Erfahrungen kultureller Diversität und sozialer Differenz auch die Auffassung verbreitet, dass die Welt nur gleichsam durch die Brille spezifischer Herkünfte und Zugehörigkeiten wahrgenommen wird. Die Spannung zwischen realistischen und konstruktivistischen Interpretationen des menschlichen Weltbezugs bildet die Ausgangssituation, mit der sich die Beiträge zu dem geplanten (...)
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  • Knowing our ways about in the world: Philosophical perspectives on practical knowledge.Bengt Molander, Thomas Netland & Mattias Solli (eds.) - 2023 - Scandinavian University Press.
    This anthology focuses on “practical” forms and expressions of knowledge, like thinking through artistic media or by crafting things out of materials. The ten chapters follow and review various tracks in conceptions of contemporary knowledge, exploring human knowledge and experience from the perspective of human activities or practices, professional, artistic, domestic, or whatever. A guiding idea is that human knowledge seldom, perhaps never, fits into the traditional dualism between thinking and doing. -/- The chapters are written by philosophers and musicians (...)
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  • Expressive Avatars: Vitality in Virtual Worlds.David Ekdahl & Lucy Osler - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (2):1-28.
    Critics have argued that human-controlled avatar interactions fail to facilitate the kinds of expressivity and social understanding afforded by our physical bodies. We identify three claims meant to justify the supposed expressive limits of avatar interactions compared to our physical interactions. First, “The Limited Expressivity Claim”: avatars have a more limited expressive range than our physical bodies. Second, “The Inputted Expressivity Claim”: any expressive avatarial behaviour must be deliberately inputted by the user. Third, “The Decoding Claim”: users must infer or (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intellectualizing know how.Benjamin Elzinga - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1741-1760.
    Following Gilbert Ryle’s arguments, many philosophers took it for granted that someone knows how to do something just in case they have the ability to do it. Within the last couple decades, new intellectualists have challenged this longstanding anti-intellectualist assumption. Their central contention is that mere abilities aren’t on the same rational, epistemic level as know how. My goal is to intellectualize know how without over-intellectualizing it. Intelligent behavior is characteristically flexible or responsive to novelty, and the distinctive feature of (...)
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  • Corpo funzionale e corpo senziente. La tesi forte del carattere incarnato della mente in fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):41-56.
    In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” (...)
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  • How Knowing-That and Knowing-How Interface in Action: The Intelligence of Motor Representations.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1103-1133.
    What mental states are required for an agent to know-how to perform an action? This question fuels one of the hottest debates in the current literature on philosophy of action. Answering this question means facing what we call here The Challenge of Format Dualism, which consists in establishing which is the format of the mental representations involved in practical knowledge and, in case they are given in more than one format, explaining how these different formats can interlock. This challenge has (...)
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  • An Anscombean Perspective on Habitual Action.Annemarie Kalis & Dawa Ometto - 2019 - Topoi 40 (3):637-648.
    Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicited by context cues, and insensitive to short-term changes in goals: therefore they are sometimes irrational. But even where habitual responses are rational, it can seem as if they are nevertheless not done for reasons. For, on a common understanding of habitual behaviour, agents’ intentions do not play any role in the coming about of such responses. This paper discusses under what conditions we can (...)
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  • Practical concepts and productive reasoning.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7659-7688.
    Can we think of a task in a distinctively practical way? Can there be practical concepts? In recent years, epistemologists, philosophers of mind, as well as philosophers of psychology have appealed to practical concepts in characterizing the content of know-how or in explaining certain features of skilled action. However, reasons for positing practical concepts are rarely discussed in a systematic fashion. This paper advances a novel argument for the psychological reality of practical concepts that relies on evidence for a distinctively (...)
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  • Re-conceptualizing the role of stimuli: an enactive, ecological explanation of spontaneous-response tasks.Alan Jurgens - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):915-934.
    This paper addresses a challenge proposed against non-mindreading explanations of infant spontaneous-response task data. The challenge is a foundational assumption of mindreading explanations best summed up by Carruthers : 141-172, 2013, Consciousness and Cognition, 36: 498-507, 2015) claim that only by appealing to a theory of mind is it possible to explain infant responses in spontaneous-response false-belief tasks when there are no one-to-one correspondences between observable behavior and mental states. Heyes, 131–143, 2014a, Developmental Science, 17, 647–659. b) responds to this (...)
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  • Enactivism and the ‘Explanatory Trap’. A Wittgensteinian Perspective.Anna Boncompagni - 2013 - Methode - Analytic Perspectives 2:27-49.
    This paper explores the enactive approach in cognitive science with an eye on the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The aim is not that of answering the question: was Wittgenstein an ante litteram enactivist? He was not, because he was not an ante litteram (cognitive) scientist of any kind. The aim, conversely, is that of answering the question: can enactivism be Wittgensteinian? In answering positively, it will be argued that a Wittgensteinian framework can help enactive cognitive scientists in dissolving certain old problems (...)
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  • Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge.Gabriele Ferretti - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10733-10763.
    Intellectualists suggest that practical knowledge, or ‘knowing- how’, can be reduced to propositional knowledge, or ‘knowing-that’. Anti-intellectualists, on the contrary, suggest, following the original insights by Ryle, that such a reduction is not possible. Rejection of intellectualism can be proposed either by offering purely philosophical analytical arguments, or by recruiting empirical evidence from cognitive science about the nature of the mental representations involved in these two forms of knowledge. In this paper, I couple these two strategies in order to analyze (...)
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  • Culture in Mind - An Enactivist Account: Not Cognitive Penetration But Cultural Permeation.Inês Hipólito, Daniel D. Hutto & Shaun Gallagher - 2020 - In Laurence J. Kirmayer, Carol M. Worthman, Shinobu Kitayama, Robert Lemelson & Constance Cummings (eds.), Culture, Mind, and Brain: Emerging Concepts, Models, and Applications. Cambridge University Press.
    Advancing a radically enactive account of cognition, we provide arguments in favour of the possibility that cultural factors permeate rather than penetrate cognition, such that cognition extensively and transactionally incorporates cultural factors rather than there being any question of cultural factors having to break into the restricted confines of cognition. The paper reviews the limitations of two classical cognitivist, modularist accounts of cognition and a revisionary, new order variant of cognitivism – a Predictive Processing account of Cognition, or PPC. It (...)
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  • Introduction to Special Issue on “Enactivism, Representationalism, and Predictive Processing”.Krzysztof Dołęga, Luke Roelofs & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):179-186.
    The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular (...)
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  • Movement in Music. An Enactive Account of the Dynamic Qualities of Music.Francesca Forlè - 2016 - Humana Mente (16):169-185.
    In this paper I shall attempt to give an enactive account of the dynamic qualities of music. Starting from Krueger’s account of musical experience, I will highlight how music’s qualities of movement are constituted in the horizon of an embodied consciousness – that is, an embodied subject who can virtually or actually bodily entrain with music and then follow the musical profile. I will argue that the common rythmòs-structure of both music and movement makes such an enactive constitution possible. In (...)
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  • Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency.Xabier E. Barandiaran - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):409-430.
    The concept of “autonomy”, once at the core of the original enactivist proposal in The Embodied Mind, is nowadays ignored or neglected by some of the most prominent contemporary enactivists approaches. Theories of autonomy, however, come to fill a theoretical gap that sensorimotor accounts of cognition cannot ignore: they provide a naturalized account of normativity and the resources to ground the identity of a cognitive subject in its specific mode of organization. There are, however, good reasons for the contemporary neglect (...)
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  • Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism.Jan Degenaar & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):393-407.
    The sensorimotor theory of perceptual consciousness offers a form of enactivism in that it stresses patterns of interaction instead of any alleged internal representations of the environment. But how does it relate to forms of enactivism stressing the continuity between life and mind? We shall distinguish sensorimotor enactivism, which stresses perceptual capacities themselves, from autopoietic enactivism, which claims an essential connection between experience and autopoietic processes or associated background capacities. We show how autopoiesis, autonomous agency, and affective dimensions of experience (...)
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  • The aesthetic stance - on the conditions and consequences of becoming a beholder.Maria Brincker - 2014 - In Alfonsina Scarinzi (ed.), Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 117-138.
    What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...)
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  • Sensorimotor enactivism and temporal experience.David Silverman - 2013 - Adaptive Behavior 21 (3):151-158.
    O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor approach rejects the old-fashioned view that perceptual experience in humans depends solely on the activation of internal representations. Reflecting a wealth of empirical work, for example active vision, the approach suggests that perceiving is, instead, a matter of bodily exploration of the outside environment. To this end, the approach says the perceiver must deploy knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies, the ways sense input changes with movement by the perceiver or object perceived. Clark has observed that the approach (...)
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  • Simondon,¿ enactivista? Individuación Y generación de sentido.Andreu Ballús Santacana - 2013 - Astrolabio 15.
    Pese a pertenecer a tradiciones distintas y haberse originado en momentos diferentes, la filosofía de la individuación de Gilbert Simondon y la corriente conocida en la filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas con el nombre de enactivismo comparten algunas características e intereses comunes. Ambas coinciden en su voluntad de integrar diferentes dominios del conocimiento, así como en algunos elementos de su aproximaciones a nociones como las de de emergencia y autonomía, y en su tratamiento general de las relaciones entre cognición, percepción (...)
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  • Thinking-is-moving: dance, agency, and a radically enactive mind. [REVIEW]Michele Merritt - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):95-110.
    Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë , has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...)
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  • Gestural sense-making: hand gestures as intersubjective linguistic enactments.Elena Cuffari - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):599-622.
    The ubiquitous human practice of spontaneously gesturing while speaking demonstrates the embodiment, embeddedness, and sociality of cognition. The present essay takes gestural practice to be a paradigmatic example of a more general claim: human cognition is social insofar as our embedded, intelligent, and interacting bodies select and construct meaning in a way that is intersubjectively constrained and defeasible. Spontaneous co-speech gesture is markedly interesting because it at once confirms embodied aspects of linguistic meaning-making that formalist and linguistic turn-type philosophical approaches (...)
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  • The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2018 - Synthese (11):4527-4553.
    The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...)
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  • Representation of Reality: Humans, Other Living Organism and Intelligent Machines.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Raffaela Giovagnoli (eds.) - 2017 - Heidelberg: Springer.
    In this book the editors invited prominent researchers with different perspectives and deep insights into the various facets of the relationship between reality and representation in the following three classes of agent: in humans, in other living beings, and in machines. -/- The book enriches our views on representation and deepens our understanding of its different aspects, a question that connects philosophy, computer science, logic, anthropology, psychology, sociology, neuroscience, linguistics, information and communication science, systems theory and engineering, computability, cybernetics, synthetic (...)
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  • Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction.Garry Young - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):593-607.
    This paper examines the relationship between knowing how to G and the ability to G, which is typically presented in one of the following ways: knowing how to G entails the ability to G; knowing how to G does not entail the ability to G. In an attempt to reconcile these two putatively opposing positions, I distinguish between type and token actions. It is my contention that S can know how to G in the absence of an ability to \, (...)
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  • Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-representational Phenomenology.Matt Bower - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
    While classical phenomenology, as represented by Edmund Husserl’s work, resists certain forms of representationalism about perception, I argue that in its theory of horizons, it posits representations in the sense of content-bearing vehicles. As part of a phenomenological theory, this means that on the Husserlian view such representations are part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I believe that, although the intuitions supporting this idea are correct, it is a mistake to maintain that there are such representations defining the (...)
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  • Understanding 'sensorimotor understanding'.Tom Roberts - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):101-111.
    Sensorimotor theories understand perception to be a process of active, exploratory engagement with the environment, mediated by the possession and exercise of a certain body of knowledge concerning sensorimotor dependencies. This paper aims to characterise that exercise, and to show that it places constraints upon the content of sensorimotor knowledge itself. Sensorimotor mastery is exercised when it is put to use in the service of intentional action-planning and selection, and this rules out certain standard readings of sensorimotor contingency knowledge. Rather (...)
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  • Embodied skillful performance: where the action is.Inês Hipólito, Manuel Baltieri, Karl Friston & Maxwell J. D. Ramstead - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4457-4481.
    When someone masters a skill, their performance looks to us like second nature: it looks as if their actions are smoothly performed without explicit, knowledge-driven, online monitoring of their performance. Contemporary computational models in motor control theory, however, are instructionist: that is, they cast skillful performance as a knowledge-driven process. Optimal motor control theory, as representative par excellence of such approaches, casts skillful performance as an instruction, instantiated in the brain, that needs to be executed—a motor command. This paper aims (...)
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  • The Normative Turn in Enactive Theory: An Examination of Its Roots and Implications.Nathaniel F. Barrett - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):431-443.
    This paper traces the development of enactive concepts of value and normativity from their roots in the canonical work of Varela et al. through more recent works of Ezequiel Di Paolo and others. It aims to show the central importance of these concepts for enactive theory while exposing a potentially troublesome ambiguity in their definition. Most definitions of enactive normativity are purely proscriptive, but it seems that enactive theories of cognitive agency and experience demand something more. On the other hand, (...)
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  • Locked-in syndrome: a challenge for embodied cognitive science.Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):517-542.
    Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome. LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to make explicit (...)
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  • Por que não somos só o nosso cérebro: em defesa do enativismo.Giovanni Rolla - 2023 - Trans/Form/Ação 46 (spe1):207-236.
    In the article “Why are we our brain: enactivism put into question” (this volume), Pereira and collaborators raise a battery of criticisms of enactivism, which is a family of approaches in the cognitive sciences that gives centrality to the body and to the autonomous action of organisms in explanations of their cognitive processes. The authors’ attacks target some central concepts of the enactivist proposal, such as practical knowledge, embodiment (or corporeity) and sensory-motor regularities. I argue that the criticisms by Pereira (...)
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  • REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification.Daniel D. Hutto - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):377-391.
    This paper shows how a radical approach to enactivism provides a way of clarifying and unifying different varieties of enactivism and enactivist-friendly approaches so as to provide a genuine alternative to classical cognitivism. Section 1 reminds readers of the broad church character of the enactivism framework. Section 2 explicates how radical enactivism is best understood not as a kind of enactivism per se but as a programme for radicalizing and consolidating the many different enactivist offerings. The main work of radical (...)
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  • Perception With Compensatory Devices: From Sensory Substitution to Sensorimotor Extension.Malika Auvray & Erik Myin - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (6):1036–1058.
    Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience (Grice, 1962), to which we have added the criteria (...)
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  • Interacting? Yes. But, of What Kind and on What Basis?Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):543-546.
    De Jaegher’s (2009) paper argues that Gallagher, who aims to replace traditional theory-of-mind accounts of social understanding with accounts based on direct perception (hereafter DP), has missed an important opportunity. Despite a desire to break faith with tradition, there is a danger that proponents of DP accounts will remain (at least tacitly) committed to an unchallenged, and perhaps unnoticed, sort of individualism inherent in traditional theories (i.e. those that regard our engagement with others as a ‘problem’ to be solved: a (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intellectualizing know how.Benjamin Elzinga - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-20.
    Following Gilbert Ryle’s arguments, many philosophers took it for granted that someone knows how to do something just in case they have the ability to do it. Within the last couple decades, new intellectualists have challenged this longstanding anti-intellectualist assumption. Their central contention is that mere abilities aren’t on the same rational, epistemic level as know how. My goal is to intellectualize know how without over-intellectualizing it. Intelligent behavior is characteristically flexible or responsive to novelty, and the distinctive feature of (...)
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  • Limited engagements and narrative extensions.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.
    E-approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non-representational variants these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I-approaches. While promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in folk-psychological terms. In this paper I outline the core features of the 'Narrative Practice Hypothesis' (NPH), showing how (...)
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  • Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell.Becky Millar - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (2):221-240.
    Sensorimotor enactivism takes perceptual experience to be constituted by a kind of attunement to sensorimotor contingencies – law‐like relations between sensory inputs and bodily activity. The chemical senses have traditionally been construed as especially simple and passive, and a number of philosophers have argued that flavour and smell are problem cases for the sensorimotor approach. In this article, I respond to these objections to the sensorimotor approach, and in doing so offer the beginnings of a sensorimotor account of the chemical (...)
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  • Sensorimotor strategies for recognizing geometrical shapes: a comparative study with different sensory substitution devices.Fernando Bermejo, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Mercedes X. HüG. & Claudia Arias - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism.Dave Ward - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):650-680.
    The transparency of perceptual experience has been invoked in support of many views about perception. I argue that it supports a form of enactivism—the view that capacities for perceptual experience and for intentional agency are essentially interdependent. I clarify the perceptual phenomenon at issue, and argue that enactivists should expect to find a parallel instance of transparency in our agentive experience, and that the two forms of transparency are constitutively interdependent. I then argue that i) we do indeed find such (...)
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  • Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition.Michiel van Elk, Marc Slors & Harold Bekkering - 2010 - Frontiers in Psychology 1.
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  • Begriffliche und nicht-begriffliche Wahrnehmungsgehalte. Eine verkörperungstheoretische Annäherung.Christian Tewes - 2024 - In Magnus Schlette & Christian Tewes (eds.), In Kontakt mit der Wirklichkeit: Die Perspektivität verkörperter Wahrnehmung. De Gruyter. pp. 81-106.
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  • TEST: A Tropic, Embodied, and Situated Theory of Cognition.Andriy Myachykov, Christoph Scheepers, Martin H. Fischer & Klaus Kessler - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (3):442-460.
    TEST is a novel taxonomy of knowledge representations based on three distinct hierarchically organized representational features: Tropism, Embodiment, and Situatedness. Tropic representational features reflect constraints of the physical world on the agent's ability to form, reactivate, and enrich embodied (i.e., resulting from the agent's bodily constraints) conceptual representations embedded in situated contexts. The proposed hierarchy entails that representations can, in principle, have tropic features without necessarily having situated and/or embodied features. On the other hand, representations that are situated and/or embodied (...)
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  • Exploring Enactive Realism.Tom Roberts - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):239-254.
    Abstract The paper considers the success of enactive realism about perception; the theory that perceivers gain direct access to the mind-independent physical world through their exercise of sensorimotor skills and understanding. I argue that while it is plausible that the possession of some forms of knowledge, conceptual or practical, may enable perceptual contact with the environment, the role of sensorimotor mastery is not as pervasive as the enactive realist proposes. Non-veridical perception, furthermore, cannot be captured adequately by enactivist resources under (...)
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  • Wittgenstein’s challenge to enactivism.Victor Loughlin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):391-404.
    Many authors have identified a link between later Wittgenstein and enactivism. But few have also recognised how Wittgenstein may in fact challenge enactivist approaches. In this paper, I consider one such challenge. For example, Wittgenstein is well known for his discussion of seeing-as, most famously through his use of Jastrow’s ambiguous duck-rabbit picture. Seen one way, the picture looks like a duck. Seen another way, the picture looks like a rabbit. Drawing on some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about seeing-as, I show (...)
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  • Enacting Media. An Embodied Account of Enculturation Between Neuromediality and New Cognitive Media Theory.Joerg Fingerhut - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media have on our mind. To grasp this impact, (...)
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  • New Developments in Enactive Social Cognition.Alan Walter Jurgens - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Wollongong
    The long standing and still highly influential mindreading framework claims that social cog- nition is best understood as an ability to predict and explain others’ behavior in terms of their mental states. This ability is explained by appealing to mental representations and inferential reasoning via rule-based knowledge. However, recent enactive work on social cognition questions most, if not all, of the main assumptions on which mindreading is founded. Enac- tivism’s emphasis on the structural coupling of the brain-body-world constitutes the foundation (...)
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