- The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.details
|
|
Confabulating Reasons.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):189-201.details
|
|
Action, Knowledge, and Will.Kim Frost - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):404-410.details
|
|
On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
|
|
On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3459-3480.details
|
|
Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
|
|
Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
|
|
Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
|
|
Critical study of John Hawthorne's knowledge and lotteries and Jason Stanley's knowledge and practical interests. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):178-192.details
|
|
Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-214.details
|
|
O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?Doraci Engel - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):540-565.details
|
|
The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.details
|
|
The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):141-162.details
|
|
Realism, Metasemantics, and Risk.Billy Dunaway - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3).details
|
|
Everything is Self-Evident.Steven Diggin - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (4):413-426.details
|
|
Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
|
|
Emotions, evidence, and safety.Christina H. Dietz - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2027-2050.details
|
|
Are all reasons causes?Christina H. Dietz - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1179-1190.details
|
|
Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (159):87-107.details
|
|
Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals: The First-Order Model.Laura Danón & Daniel E. Kalpokas - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
|
|
Acting in ignorance.Jonathan Dancy - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):345-357.details
|
|
The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason.J. J. Cunningham - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):235-257.details
|
|
The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
|
|
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):385-405.details
|
|
Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons.Joseph Cunningham - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):673-692.details
|
|
Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
|
|
Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?).Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):333-349.details
|
|
An epistemology for practical knowledge.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):159-177.details
|
|
Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
|
|
Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
|
|
Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
|
|
The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
|
|
Social knowing: The social sense of 'scientific knowledge'.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):23-56.details
|
|
The folk on knowing how.John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.details
|
|
Conclusive reasons, knowledge, and action.John A. Barker & Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.details
|
|
XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):277-308.details
|
|
The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of its History.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):161-184.details
|
|
Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.details
|
|
Reasons and the ambiguity of 'belief'.Maria Alvarez - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):53 – 65.details
|
|
How many kinds of reasons?Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.details
|
|
Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
|
|
Gilbert Ryle.Matt Dougherty - 2023 - In Duncan Pritchard (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques-Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
|
|
Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
|
|
Inference as a Mental Act.David Hunter - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Attitudes, Conditional and General.Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy.details
|
|
Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
|
|