- The puzzle of plausible deniability.Andrew Peet - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-20.details
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Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief.James R. Shaw - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):844-850.details
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Smart and tensed beliefs.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):313-325.details
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The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.details
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From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.details
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Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
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Two Orders of Things: Wittgenstein on Reasons and Causes.Matthieu Queloz - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (3):369-97.details
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Gilbert Ryle.Matt Dougherty - 2023 - In Duncan Pritchard (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques-Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Can Testimony Generate Understanding?Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):477-490.details
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Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals: The First-Order Model.Laura Danón & Daniel E. Kalpokas - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
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Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
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Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons.Joseph Cunningham - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):673-692.details
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An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):176-195.details
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
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A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Sentimental Reasons.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 171–194.details
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Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (159):87-107.details
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Acting in ignorance.Jonathan Dancy - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):345-357.details
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The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
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The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason.J. J. Cunningham - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):235-257.details
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Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):385-405.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?).Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):333-349.details
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An epistemology for practical knowledge.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):159-177.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
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Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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Social knowing: The social sense of 'scientific knowledge'.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):23-56.details
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The folk on knowing how.John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.details
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Conclusive reasons, knowledge, and action.John A. Barker & Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.details
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XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):277-308.details
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The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of its History.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):161-184.details
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Reasons and the ambiguity of 'belief'.Maria Alvarez - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):53 – 65.details
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Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.details
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How many kinds of reasons?Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Inference as a Mental Act.David Hunter - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Non-human knowledge and non-human agency.Hans Johann Https://Orcidorg909X Glock - 2011 - In .details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Attitudes, Conditional and General.Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.details
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