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Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible informationchanging actions available to individual agents, and their knowledge preand post conditions. For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public, truthful announcements. However, little research so far has considered describing and analysing rational choice between such actions, i.e., predicting what rational selfinterested agents actually will or should do. Since the outcome of information exchange ultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the agents in the system, and assuming that agents (...) 

We present a variant of ATL with incomplete information which includes the distributed knowledge operators corresponding to synchronous action and perfect recall. The cooperation modalities assume the use the distributed knowledge of coalitions and accordingly refer to perfect recall incomplete information strategies. We propose a modelchecking algorithm for the logic. It is based on techniques for games with imperfect information and partially observable objectives, and involves deciding emptiness for automata on infinite trees. We also propose an axiomatic system and prove (...) 

The aim of this paper, is to provide a logical framework for reasoning about actions, agency, and powers of agents and coalitions in gamelike multiagent systems. First we define our basic Dynamic Logic of Agency ( ). Differently from other logics of individual and coalitional capability such as Alternatingtime Temporal Logic (ATL) and Coalition Logic, in cooperation modalities for expressing powers of agents and coalitions are not primitive, but are defined from more basic dynamic logic operators of action and (historic) (...) 

We introduce and study a PDLstyle logic for reasoning about protocols, or plans, under imperfect information. Our paper touches on a number of issues surrounding the relationship between an agent’s abilities, available choices, and information in an interactive situation. The main question we address is under what circumstances can the agent commit to a protocol or plan, and what can she achieve by doing so? 



We study the logic of strategic ability of coalitions of agents with bounded memory by introducing Alternatingtime Temporal Logic with Bounded Memory (ATLBM), a variant of Alternatingtime Temporal Logic (ATL). ATLBM accounts for two main consequences of the assumption that agents have bounded memory. First, an agent can only remember a strategy that specifies actions in a bounded number of different circumstances. While the ATLformula means that coalition C has a joint strategy which will make φ true forever, the ATLBMformula (...) 

We provide a Kripke semantics for a STIT logic with the "next" operator. As the atemporal group STIT is undecidable and unaxiomatizable, we are interested in strict fragments of atemporal group STIT. First we prove that the satisfiability problem of a formula of the fragment made up of individual coalitions plus the grand coalition is also NEXPTIMEcomplete. We then generalize this result to a fragment where coalitions are in a given lattice. We also prove that if we restrict the language (...) 