We prove that for every family I of closed subsets of a Polish space each Σ 1 1 set can be covered by countably many members of I or else contains a nonempty Π 0 2 set which cannot be covered by countably many members of I. We prove an analogous result for κ-Souslin sets and show that if A ♯ exists for any $A \subset \omega^\omega$ , then the above result is true for Σ 1 2 sets. A theorem (...) of Martin is included stating that this result is also true for weakly homogeneously Souslin sets. As an application of our results we derive from them a general form of Hurewicz's theorem due to Kechris, Louveau, and Woodin and a theorem of Feng on the open covering axiom. Also some well-known theorems on finding "big" closed sets inside of "big" Σ 1 1 and Σ 1 2 sets are consequences of our results. (shrink)

We show that given ù many supercompact cardinals, there is a generic extension in which the tree property holds at ℵ ω²+1 and the SCH fails at ℵ ω².

We show that given ω many supercompact cardinals, there is a generic extension in which there are no Aronszajn trees at ℵω+1. This is an improvement of the large cardinal assumptions. The previous hypothesis was a huge cardinal and ω many supercompact cardinals above it, in Magidor—Shelah [7].

Probably the two most famous examples of elementary embeddings between inner models of set theory are the embeddings of the universe into an inner model given by a measurable cardinal and the embeddings of the constructible universeLinto itself given by 0#. In both of these examples, the “target model” is a subclass of the “ground model”. It is not hard to find examples of embeddings in which the target model is not a subclass of the ground model: ifis a generic (...) ultrafilter arising from forcing with a precipitous ideal on a successor cardinalκ, then the ultraproduct of the ground model viacollapsesκ. Such considerations suggest a classification of how close the target model comes to “fitting inside” the ground model.Definition 1.1. LetMandNbe inner models of ZFC, and letj:M→Nbe an elementary embedding. Theco-critical pointofjis the least ordinalλ, if any exist, such that there isX⊆λ, X∈NbutX∉M. Such anXis called anew subsetofλ.It is easy to see that the co-critical point ofj:M→Nis a cardinal inN. (shrink)

We consider the infinite game where player ONE chooses terms of a strictly increasing sequence of first category subsets of a space and TWO chooses nowhere dense sets. If after ω innings TWO's nowhere dense sets cover ONE's first category sets, then TWO wins. We prove a theorem which implies for the real line: If TWO has a winning strategy which depends on the most recent n moves of ONE only, then TWO has a winning strategy depending on the most (...) recent 3 moves of ONE (Corollary 3). Our results give some new information concerning Problem 1 of [S1] and clarifies some of the results in [B-J-S] and in [S1]. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to outline some recent progress in descriptive inner model theory, a branch of set theory which studies descriptive set theoretic and inner model theoretic objects using tools from both areas. There are several interlaced problems that lie on the border of these two areas of set theory, but one that has been rather central for almost two decades is the conjecture known as the Mouse Set Conjecture. One particular motivation for resolving MSC is that (...) it provides grounds for solving the inner model problem which dates back to 1960s. There have been some new partial results on MSC and the methods used to prove the new instances suggest a general program for solving the full conjecture. It is then our goal to communicate the ideas of this program to the community at large. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against Penelope Maddy's set-theoretic realism by arguing (1) that it is perfectly consistent with mathematical Platonism to deny that there is a fact of the matter concerning statements which are independent of the axioms of set theory, and that (2) denying this accords further that many contemporary Platonists assert that there is a fact of the matter because they are closet foundationalists, and that their brand of foundationalism is in radical conflict with actual mathematical practice.

We give an affirmative answer to Brendle's and Hrušák's question of whether the club principle together with h > N₁ is consistent. We work with a class of axiom A forcings with countable conditions such that q ≥ n p is determined by finitely many elements in the conditions p and q and that all strengthenings of a condition are subsets, and replace many names by actual sets. There are two types of technique: one for tree-like forcings and one for (...) forcings with creatures that are translated into trees. Both lead to new models of the club principle. (shrink)

Let κ B be the least cardinal for which the Baire category theorem fails for the real line R. Thus κ B is the least κ such that the real line can be covered by κ many nowhere dense sets. It is shown that κ B cannot have countable cofinality. On the other hand it is consistent that the corresponding cardinal for 2 ω 1 be ℵ ω . Similar questions are considered for the ideal of measure zero sets, other (...) ω 1 saturated ideals, and the ideal of zero-dimensional subsets of R ω 1. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of set theory to say that there is no set of all well-orderings nor a set of all sets. We are implored to accept this due to the threat of paradox and the ensuing descent into unintelligibility. In the absence of promising alternatives, we tend to take up a conservative stance and tow the line: there is no universe. In this paper, I am going to challenge this claim by taking seriously the idea that we can (...) talk about the collection of all the sets and many more collections beyond that. A method of articulating this idea is offered through an indefinitely extending hierarchy of set theories. It is argued that this approach provides a natural extension to ordinary set theory and leaves ordinary mathematical practice untouched. (shrink)

The article looks briefly at Fefermans own foundations. Among many different senses of foundations, the one that mathematics needs in practice is a recognized body of truths adequate to organize definitions and proofs. Finding concise principles of this kind has been a huge achievement by mathematicians and logicians. We put ZFC and categorical foundations both into this context.

I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. -/- There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably (...) infinite, then the property of being a tautology is \Pi^1_1-complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is \Sigma_1-definable in set theory. -/- Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects. (shrink)

Let κ be a regular uncountable cardinal and λ be a cardinal greater than κ. We show that if 2 <κ ≤ M(κ, λ), then ◇ κ,λ holds, where M(κ, λ) equals $\lambda ^{\aleph }0$ if cf(λ) ≥ κ, and $(\lambda ^{+})^{\aleph _{0}}$ otherwise.

We introduce the notion of skinniness for subsets of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$ and its variants, namely skinnier and skinniest. We show that under some cardinal arithmetical assumptions, precipitousness or $2^\lambda$-saturation of $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}\mid X$, where $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}$ denotes the non-stationary ideal over $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$, implies the existence of a skinny stationary subset of $X$. We also show that if $\lambda$ is a singular cardinal, then there is no skinnier stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. Furthermore, if $\lambda$ is a strong limit singular cardinal, there (...) is no skinny stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. Combining these results, we show that if $\lambda$ is a strong limit singular cardinal, then $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}\mid X$ can satisfy neither precipitousness nor $2^\lambda$-saturation for every stationary $X \subseteq \mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. We also indicate that $\diamondsuit_\lambda(E^{\lambda}_{<\kappa})$, where $E^{\lambda}_{<\kappa} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \{\alpha < \lambda \mid \mathrm{cf}(\alpha) < \kappa\}$, is equivalent to the existence of a skinnier (or skinniest) stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$ under some cardinal arithmetical hypotheses. (shrink)

We prove that the statement "For every pair A, B, stationary subsets of ω 2 , composed of points of cofinality ω, there exists an ordinal α such that both A ∩ α and $B \bigcap \alpha$ are stationary subsets of α" is equiconsistent with the existence of weakly compact cardinal. (This completes results of Baumgartner and Harrington and Shelah.) We also prove, assuming the existence of infinitely many supercompact cardinals, the statement "Every stationary subset of ω ω + 1 (...) has a stationary initial segment.". (shrink)

My goal here is to explore the relationship between pure and applied mathematics and then, eventually, to draw a few morals for both. In particular, I hope to show that this relationship has not been static, that the historical rise of pure mathematics has coincided with a gradual shift in our understanding of how mathematics works in application to the world. In some circles today, it is held that historical developments of this sort simply represent changes in fashion, or in (...) social arrangements, governments, power structures, or some such thing, but I resist the full force of this way of thinking, clinging to the old school notion that we have gradually learned more about the world over time, that our opinions on these matters have improved, and that seeing how we reached the point we now occupy may help us avoid falling back into old philosophies that are now no longer viable. In that spirit, it seems to me that once we focus on the general question of how mathematics relates to science, one observation is immediate: the march of the centuries has produced an amusing reversal of philosophical fortunes. Let me begin there. In the beginning, that is, in Plato, mathematical knowledge was sharply distinguished from ordinary perceptual belief about the world. According to Plato’s metaphysics, mathematics is the study of eternal and unchanging abstract Forms,1 while science is uncertain and changeable opinion about the world of mere becoming. Indeed, in Plato’s lights, of the two, only mathematics deserves to be called ‘knowledge’ at all! Of course if sense perception cannot give us knowledge, if mathematics is not about perceivable things, then Plato owes us an account of how we ordinary humans achieve this wonderful insight into the properties of the abstract world of Forms. Plato’s answer is that we do not actually acquire mathematical knowledge at all; rather, we recollect it from a time before birth, when our souls, unencumbered by physical bodies, were free to commune with the Forms, and not just the mathematical ones, either – also Truth, Beauty, Justice, the Good, and so on.2 Whatever appeal this position may have held for the ancient Greeks, it will not begin to satisfy a contemporary, scientifically minded philosopher.. (shrink)

We show that one can solve Post's Problem by constructing generic sets in the usual set theoretic framework applied to tiny universes. This method leads to a new class of recursively enumerable sets: r.e. generic sets. All r.e. generic sets are low and simple and therefore of Turing degree strictly between 0 and 0'. Further they supply the first example of a class of low recursively enumerable sets which are automorphic in the lattice E of recursively enumerable sets with inclusion. (...) We introduce the notion of a promptly simple set. This describes the essential feature of r.e. generic sets with respect to automorphism constructions. (shrink)

This is an article whose intended scope is to deal with the question of infinity in formal mathematics, mainly in the context of the theory of large cardinals as it has developed over time since Cantor’s introduction of the theory of transfinite numbers in the late nineteenth century. A special focus has been given to this theory’s interrelation with the forcing theory, introduced by P. Cohen in his lectures of 1963 and further extended and deepened since then, which leads to (...) a development and further refinement of the theory of large cardinals ultimately touching, especially in view of the discussion in the last section, on the metatheoretical nature of infinity. The whole undertaking, which takes into account major stages of the research in large cardinals theory, tries to present a defensible argumentation against an ontology of infinity actually rooted in the notion of subjectivity within the world. This means that rather than talking of a general ontology of infinity in the ideal platonic or in the aristotelian sense of potentiality, even in the alternative sense of an ontology of the event in A. Badiou’s sense, one can argue from a subjective point of view about the impossibility of defining cardinalities greater than the first uncountable one \ that would correspond to a distinct existence in real world terms or would be supported by a mathematical intuition in terms of reciprocity with experience. The argumentation from the particular standpoint includes also certain comments on the delimitative character of Gödel’s constructive universe L and the influence of the constructive approach in narrowing the breadth of an ‘ontology’ of infinity. (shrink)

Putnam argues that, by ‘reinterpretation’, the Axiom of Constructibility can be saved from empirical refutation. This paper contends that this argument fails, a failure which leaves Putnam's sweeping appeal to the Lowenheim –Skolem Theorem inadequately motivated.

We study the logical structure of relations, and in particular the notion of occurrences of objects in a state. We start with formulating a number of principles for occurrences and defining corresponding mathematical models. These models are analyzed to get more insight in the formal properties of occurrences. In particular, we prove uniqueness results that tell us more about the possible logical structures relations might have.

We present a variation of the forcing S max as presented in Woodin [4]. Our forcing is a P max -style construction where each model condition selects one Souslin tree. In the extension there is a Souslin tree T G which is the direct limit of the selected Souslin trees in the models of the generic. In some sense, the generic extension is a maximal model of "there exists a minimal Souslin tree," with T G being this minimal tree. In (...) particular, in the extension this Souslin tree has the property that forcing with it gives a model of Souslin's Hypothesis. (shrink)

We investigate questions involving Aronszajn trees, square principles, and stationary reflection. We first consider two strengthenings of introduced by Brodsky and Rinot for the purpose of constructing κ‐Souslin trees. Answering a question of Rinot, we prove that the weaker of these strengthenings is compatible with stationary reflection at κ but the stronger is not. We then prove that, if μ is a singular cardinal, implies the existence of a special ‐tree with a cf(μ)‐ascent path, thus answering a question of Lücke.

It is shown that the power set of $\kappa$ ordered by the subset relation modulo various versions of the non-stationary ideal can be embedded into the partial order of Borel equivalence relations on $2^\kappa$ under Borel reducibility. Here $\kappa$ is an uncountable regular cardinal with $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$.

Informally, structural properties of mathematical objects are usually characterized in one of two ways: either as properties expressible purely in terms of the primitive relations of mathematical theories, or as the properties that hold of all structurally similar mathematical objects. We present two formal explications corresponding to these two informal characterizations of structural properties. Based on this, we discuss the relation between the two explications. As will be shown, the two characterizations do not determine the same class of mathematical properties. (...) From this observation we draw some philosophical conclusions about the possibility of a ‘correct’ analysis of structural properties. (shrink)

We present Woodin's proof that if there exists a measurable Woodin cardinal δ, then there is a forcing extension satisfying all $\Sigma _{2}^{2}$ sentences ϕ such that CH + ϕ holds in a forcing extension of V by a partial order in V δ . We also use some of the techniques from this proof to show that if there exists a stationary limit of stationary limits of Woodin cardinals, then in a homogeneous forcing extension there is an elementary embedding (...) j: V → M with critical point $\omega _{1}^{V}$ such that M is countably closed in the forcing extension. (shrink)

We construct a model [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] which lies between [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] for a Cohen real [Formula: see text] and does not have the form [Formula: see text] for any set [Formula: see text]. This is loosely based on the unwritten work done in a Bristol workshop about Woodin’s HOD Conjecture in 2011. The construction given here allows for a finer analysis of the needed assumptions on the ground models, thus taking (...) us one step closer to understanding models of [Formula: see text], and the HOD Conjecture and its relatives. This model also provides a positive answer to a question of Grigorieff about intermediate models of [Formula: see text], and we use it to show the failure of Kinna–Wagner Principles in [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

Set theory is an autonomous and sophisticated field of mathematics, enormously successful not only at its continuing development of its historical heritage but also at analyzing mathematical propositions cast in set-theoretic terms and gauging their consistency strength. But set theory is also distinguished by having begun intertwined with pronounced metaphysical attitudes, and these have even been regarded as crucial by some of its great developers. This has encouraged the exaggeration of crises in foundations and of metaphysical doctrines in general. However, (...) set theory has proceeded in the opposite direction, from a web of intensions to a theory of extensionpar excellence, and like other fields of mathematics its vitality and progress have depended on a steadily growing core of mathematical structures and methods, problems and results. There is also the stronger contention that from the beginning set theory actually developed through a progression ofmathematicalmoves, whatever and sometimes in spite of what has been claimed on its behalf.What follows is an account of the development of set theory from its beginnings through the creation of forcing based on these contentions, with an avowedly Whiggish emphasis on the heritage that has been retained and developed by current set theory. The whole transfinite landscape can be viewed as the result of Cantor's attempt to articulate and solve the Continuum Problem. (shrink)

In this paper we study the consistency strength of the theory $\mathbf\mathrm{ZFC} + (\exists\kappa \text{strong limit})(\forall\mu , and we prove the consistency of this theory relative to the consistency of the existence of a supercompact cardinal and an inaccessible above it.

We prove the existence of p-ideals that are nonmeagre subsets of P(ω) under various set-theoretic assumptions.

It is a theorem of Rowbottom [12] that ifκis measurable andIis a normal prime ideal onκ, then for eachλ<κ,In this paper a natural structural property of ideals, distributivity, is considered and shown to be related to this and other ideal theoretic partition relations.The set theoretical terminology is standard and background results on the theory of ideals may be found in [5] and [8]. Throughoutκwill denote an uncountable regular cardinal, andIa proper, nonprincipal,κ-complete ideal onκ.NSκis the ideal of nonstationary subsets ofκ, andIκ= (...) {X⊆κ∣∣X∣<κ}. IfA∈I+ −I), then anI-partitionofAis a maximal collectionW⊆,P ∩I+so thatX∩ Y ∈IwheneverX, Y∈W, X≠Y. TheI-partitionWis said to be disjoint if distinct members ofWare disjoint, and in this case, fordenotes the unique member ofWcontainingξ. A sequence 〈Wα∣α<η} ofI-partitions ofAis said to be decreasing if wheneverα<β<ηandX∈Wβthere is aY∈Wαsuch thatX⊆Y.. (shrink)

In set theory, a maximality principle is a principle that asserts some maximality property of the universe of sets or some part thereof. Set theorists have formulated a variety of maximality principles in order to settle statements left undecided by current standard set theory. In addition, philosophers of mathematics have explored maximality principles whilst attempting to prove categoricity theorems for set theory or providing criteria for selecting foundational theories. This article reviews recent work concerned with the formulation, investigation and justification (...) of maximality principles. (shrink)

We define the notion of Souslin forcing, and we prove that some properties are preserved under iteration. We define a weaker form of Martin's axiom, namely MA(Γ + ℵ 0 ), and using the results on Souslin forcing we show that MA(Γ + ℵ 0 ) is consistent with the existence of a Souslin tree and with the splitting number s = ℵ 1 . We prove that MA(Γ + ℵ 0 ) proves the additivity of measure. Also we introduce (...) the notion of proper Souslin forcing, and we prove that this property is preserved under countable support iterated forcing. We use these results to show that ZFC + there is an inaccessible cardinal is equiconsistent with ZFC + the Borel conjecture + Σ 1 2 -measurability. (shrink)

We study how equivalent nonisomorphic models an unsuperstable theory can have. We measure the equivalence by Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games. This paper continues the work started in $[HT]$.

Let U and B be two countable relational models of the same first order language. If the models are nonisomorphic, there is a unique countable ordinal α with the property that $\mathfrak{U} \equiv^\alpha_{\infty\omega} \mathfrak{B} \text{but not} \mathfrak{U} \equiv^{\alpha + 1}_{\infty\omega} \mathfrak{B},$ i.e. U and B are L ∞ω -equivalent up to quantifier-rank α but not up to α + 1. In this paper we consider models U and B of cardinality ω 1 and construct trees which have a similar relation (...) to U and B as α above. For this purpose we introduce a new ordering T ≪ T' of trees, which may have some independent interest of its own. It turns out that the above ordinal α has two qualities which coincide in countable models but will differ in uncountable models. Respectively, two kinds of trees emerge from α. We call them Scott trees and Karp trees, respectively. The definition and existence of these trees is based on an examination of the Ehrenfeucht game of length ω 1 between U and B. We construct two models of power ω 1 with 2 ω 1 mutually noncomparable Scott trees. (shrink)

The existence of a countable complete theory with exactly ℵ 1 many minimal models is independent of ZFC + ¬CH.

The Axiom of Projective Determinacy implies the existence of a universal $\utilde{\Pi}^{1}_{n}\setminus\utilde{\Delta}^{1}_{n}$ set for every $n \geq 1$. Assuming $\text{\upshape MA}(\aleph_{1})+\aleph_{1}=\aleph_{1}^{\mathbb{L}}$ there exists a universal $\utilde{\Pi}^{1}_{1}\setminus\utilde{\Delta}^{1}_{1}$ set. In ZFC there is a universal $\utilde{\Pi}^{0}_{\alpha}\setminus\utilde{\Delta}^{0}_{\alpha}$ set for every $\alpha$.

Subtle cardinals were first introduced in a paper by Jensen and Kunen [JK]. They show that ifκis subtle then ◇κholds. Subtle cardinals also play an important role in [B1], where Baumgartner proposed that certain large cardinal properties should be considered as properties of their associated normal ideals. He shows that in the case of ineffables, the ideals are particularly useful, as can be seen by the following theorem,κis ineffable if and only ifκis subtle andΠ½-indescribableandthe subtle andΠ½-indescribable ideals cohere, i.e. they (...) generate a proper, normal ideal.In this paper we examine properties of subtle cardinals and consider methods of forcing that destroy the property of subtlety while maintaining other properties. The following is a list of results.1) We relativize the following two facts about subtle cardinals:i) ifκisn-subtle then {α<κ:αis notn-subtle} isn-subtle, andii) ifκis -subtle then {α<κ:αisn-subtle} is in the -subtle filter to subsets ofκ:i′) ifAis ann-subtle subset ofκthen {α ϵ A:A∩αis notn-subtle} isn-subtle, andii′) ifAis an -subtle subset ofκthen {α ϵ A:A∩αisn-subtle} is -subtle.2) We show that although a stationary limit of subtles is subtle, a subtle limit of subtles is not necessarily 2-subtle.3) In §3 we use the technique of forcing to turn a subtle cardinal into aκ-Mahlo cardinal that is no longer subtle.4) In §4 we extend the results of §3 by showing how to turn an -subtle cardinal into ann-subtle cardinal that is no longer -subtle. (shrink)