We define a realizability interpretation of Aczel's Constructive Set Theory CZF into Explicit Mathematics. The final results are that CZF extended by Mahlo principles is realizable in corresponding extensions of T 0 , thus providing relative lower bounds for the proof-theoretic strength of the latter.

Systems of explicit mathematics provide an axiomatic framework for representing programs and proving properties of them. We introduce such a system with a new form of power types using a monotone power type generator. These power types allow us to model impredicative overloading. This is a very general form of type dependent computation which occurs in the study of object-oriented programming languages. We also present a set-theoretic interpretation for monotone power types. Thus establishing the consistency our system of explicit mathematics.

Justification logics are modal logics that include justifications for the agent's knowledge. So far, there are no decidability results available for justification logics with negative introspection. In this paper, we develop a novel model construction for such logics and show that justification logics with negative introspection are decidable for finite constant specifications.

In this paper, we study a concept of universe for a truth predicate over applicative theories. A proof-theoretic analysis is given by use of transfinitely iterated fixed point theories . The lower bound is obtained by a syntactical interpretation of these theories. Thus, universes over Frege structures represent a syntactically expressive framework of metapredicative theories in the context of applicative theories.

We give a broad discussion of reflection principles in explicit mathematics, thereby addressing various kinds of universe existence principles. The proof-theoretic strength of the relevant systems of explicit mathematics is couched in terms of suitable extensions of Kripke–Platek set theory.

We study the extension of Feferman’s operational set theory provided by adding operational versions of unbounded existential quantification and power set and determine its proof-theoretic strength in terms of a suitable theory of sets and classes.

We discuss several ontological properties of explicit mathematics and operational set theory: global choice, decidable classes, totality and extensionality of operations, function spaces, class and set formation via formulas that contain the definedness predicate and applications.

The goals of reduction andreductionism in the natural sciences are mainly explanatoryin character, while those inmathematics are primarily foundational.In contrast to global reductionistprograms which aim to reduce all ofmathematics to one supposedly ``universal'' system or foundational scheme, reductive proof theory pursues local reductions of one formal system to another which is more justified in some sense. In this direction, two specific rationales have been proposed as aims for reductive proof theory, the constructive consistency-proof rationale and the foundational reduction rationale. However, (...) recent advances in proof theory force one to consider the viability of these rationales. Despite the genuine problems of foundational significance raised by that work, the paper concludes with a defense of reductive proof theory at a minimum as one of the principal means to lay out what rests on what in mathematics. In an extensive appendix to the paper,various reduction relations betweensystems are explained and compared, and arguments against proof-theoretic reduction as a ``good'' reducibilityrelation are taken up and rebutted. (shrink)

The point of departure for this panel is a somewhat controversial paper that I published in the American Mathematical Monthly under the title “Does mathematics need new axioms?” [4]. The paper itself was based on a lecture that I gave in 1997 to a joint session of the American Mathematical Society and the Mathematical Association of America, and it was thus written for a general mathematical audience. Basically, it was intended as an assessment of Gödel’s program for new axioms that (...) he had advanced most prominently in his 1947 paper for the Monthly, entitled “What is Cantor’s continuum problem?” [7]. My paper aimed to be an assessment of that program in the light of research in mathematical logic in the intervening years, beginning in the 1960s, but especially in more recent years. (shrink)