Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

In line with familiar portrayals of Kant's ethics, interpreters of his philosophy of education focus essentially on its intellectual dimension: the notions of moral catechism, ethical gymnastics and ethical ascetics, to name but a few. By doing so, they usually emphasise Kant's negative stance towards the role of feelings in moral education. Yet there seem to be noteworthy exceptions: Kant writes that the inclinations to be honoured and loved are to be preserved as far as possible. This statement is not (...) only at odds with Kant's general claim that education should not encourage feelings, but more importantly, it encourages a feeling that is in many ways paradigmatically un-Kantian. How are we to understand the fact that of all feelings, the love of honour should be preserved? To answer this question, I begin by clarifying the reasons behind Kant's negative stance towards feelings in moral education. I then turn to his account of the feeling of love of honour. After distinguishing between its good and its bad forms, I consider two ways of making sense of the positive role Kant assigns to it. The first, modest reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour is morally useful because it has two functions: an epistemic one, and a motivational one. The second, more ambitious reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour enables the child to experience her inner worth as bearer of value. (shrink)

This paper deals primarily with theDoctrine of Method(DM) of Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of theDM(1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is aDMnecessary at all (2.1)? How does theDMrelate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for latitude. (...) The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to theDM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties. (shrink)

Die Suche nach einem angemessenen Umgang mit Moral und ihrem rhetorisch-strategischen Einsatz in Diskursen führt unweigerlich zu der Frage, welche Perspektiven verschiedene Wissenschaftsdisziplinen aufmachen, wenn sie sich mit Moral und Moralisierung beschäftigen. Mit der Erörterung verschiedener Disziplinenzugänge ist auch das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen einem deskriptiven Erörterungsansatz und Aspekten der Bewertung inklusive der ihr zugrundeliegenden Werte angesprochen. Die Beiträge des Bandes geben auf diese Fragen keine abschließenden Antworten. Sie beginnen allerdings damit, ein multi- und interdisziplinäres Bild von Moralisierung zu zeichnen, das geschichts- (...) und politikwissenschaftliche, linguistische, philosophische und theologische Sichtweisen einbezieht und miteinander ins Gespräch bringt. Das komplementäre Bild ist einerseits gekennzeichnet durch die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Moralisierung als einer rhetorischen Strategie, der ein nicht unbeträchtliches diskursprägendes und sogar -schädigendes Potenzial innewohnt. Andererseits sperrt es sich gegen eine grundsätzliche Moralisierungsskepsis und weist stattdessen darauf hin, dass gesellschaftliche Debatten sich notwendigerweise zwischen Moralisierung und Entmoralisierung bewegen. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the relationship between liberal/secular and religious educations. I begin by tracing what I believe to be the source of tension between liberal/secular and religious educations to two highly influential liberal theories that have affected civic education in particular. I begin with an analysis of John Dewey's naturalistic approach to metaphysics and religion, arguing that Dewey's attitude to religious traditions, when used as a basis for civic education, is insufficient. Specifically, I argue that in Dewey's conception, religious doctrines, (...) principles, ideals, beliefs, and ultimately religious traditions as a whole, are important only instrumentally. Furthermore, I conclude that the only possible outcome once one accepts a prior commitment to Dewey's metaphysics is that reflection and deliberation on the 'religious' will denude it of its distinctively religious character. My major conclusion is that such a view of religion and the religious is egregiously deficient when evaluated in light of the liberal principle of respect for religion and religious diversity. I then move to a critical examination of the second highly influential liberal theory, political liberalism. The conclusion that I highlight in my critique of Rawlsian political liberalism is that a civic education based on the political ideals of political liberalism can pretty much ignore religious conceptions without detriment to the development of young citizens' deliberative capacities. I strongly challenge this conclusion, because I see engagement with religious conceptions as valuable – even necessary – for good citizenship, and for enabling citizens of diverse societies to do justice to/for each other. In the second half of the dissertation, I propose a theoretical framework for this supplemental dimension which is based on virtue epistemology. I focus specifically on the recent work of James Montmarquet, particularly his notion of subjective justification, which I incorporate as an ideal basis for engagement which focuses on reason-giving and validates the role that religious traditions can play in moral and civic deliberation. (shrink)