The main research goal of the work is to study the notion of co-topos, its correctness, properties and relations with toposes. In particular, the dualization process proposed by proponents of co-toposes has been analyzed, which transforms certain Heyting algebras of toposes into co-Heyting ones, by which a kind of paraconsistent logic may appear in place of intuitionistic logic. It has been shown that if certain two definitions of topos are to be equivalent, then in one of them, in the context (...) of a subobject classifier, there should be a neutral label for the generic subobject, or if the label "true" appears instead, it carries no additional properties or assumptions. It has been shown that a natural isomorphism occurring in one of the definitions of topos need not be an isomorphism of the corresponding algebraic structures on the sets, so that a co-Heyting algebraic structure can be defined on the set of characteristic morphisms, which moreover will also be natural. The analyzes suggest that the notion of co-topos may be considered correct. However, it should be strongly emphasized that although the possibility of defining the notion of co-topos has been shown, its further full consequences should be very carefully examined, which can severely limit its logical applications. (shrink)

In 1981, Takeuti introduced quantum set theory by constructing a model of set theory based on quantum logic represented by the lattice of closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space in a manner analogous to Boolean-valued models of set theory, and showed that appropriate counterparts of the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice hold in the model. In this paper, we aim at unifying Takeuti’s model with Boolean-valued models by constructing models based on general complete orthomodular (...) lattices, and generalizing the transfer principle in Boolean-valued models, which asserts that every theorem in ZFC set theory holds in the models, to a general form holding in every orthomodular-valued model. One of the central problems in this program is the well-known arbitrariness in choosing a binary operation for implication. To clarify what properties are required to obtain the generalized transfer principle, we introduce a class of binary operations extending the implication on Boolean logic, called generalized implications, including even nonpolynomially definable operations. We study the properties of those operations in detail and show that all of them admit the generalized transfer principle. Moreover, we determine all the polynomially definable operations for which the generalized transfer principle holds. This result allows us to abandon the Sasaki arrow originally assumed for Takeuti’s model and leads to a much more flexible approach to quantum set theory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of category theory in the foundations of mathematics. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding this issue. A standard philosophical strategy in the face of a situation of this kind is to draw various distinctions and in this way show that the confusion rests on divergent conceptions of what the foundations of mathematics ought to be. This is the strategy adopted in the present paper. It is divided into 5 (...) sections. We first show that already in the set theoretical framework, there are different dimensions to the expression foundations of. We then explore these dimensions more thoroughly. After a very short discussion of the links between these dimensions, we move to some of the arguments presented for and against category theory in the foundational landscape. We end up on a more speculative note by examining the relationships between category theory and set theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to justify the claim that Topos theory and Logic (the latter interpreted in a wide enough sense to include Model theory and Set theory) may interact to the advantage of both fields. Once the necessity of utilizing toposes (other than the topos of Sets) becomes apparent, workers in Topos theory try to make this task as easy as possible by employing a variety of methods which, in the last instance, find their justification in metatheorems (...) from Logic. Some concrete instances of this assertion will be given in the form of simple proofs that certain theorems of Algebra hold in any (Grothendieck) topos, in order to illustrate the various techniques that are used. In the other direction, Topos theory can also be a useful tool in Logic. Examples of this are independence proofs in (classical as well as intuitionistic) Set theory, as well as transfer methods in the presence of a sheaf representation theorem, the latter applied, in particular, to model theoretic properties of certain theories. (shrink)

Let ZF denote Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (without the axiom of choice), and let $M$ be a countable transitive model of ZF. The method of forcing extends $M$ to another model $M\lbrack G\rbrack$ of ZF (a "generic extension"). If the axiom of choice holds in $M$ it also holds in $M\lbrack G\rbrack$, that is, the axiom of choice is preserved by generic extensions. We show that this is not true for many weak forms of the axiom of choice, and we derive (...) an application to Boolean toposes. (shrink)

The view that toposes originated as generalized set theory is a figment of set theoretically educated common sense. This false history obstructs understanding of category theory and especially of categorical foundations for mathematics. Problems in geometry, topology, and related algebra led to categories and toposes. Elementary toposes arose when Lawvere's interest in the foundations of physics and Tierney's in the foundations of topology led both to study Grothendieck's foundations for algebraic geometry. I end with remarks on a categorical view of (...) the history of set theory, including a false history plausible from that point of view that would make it helpful to introduce toposes as a generalization from set theory. (shrink)

A precise notion of ‘mathematical structure’ other than that given by model theory may prove fruitful in the philosophy of mathematics. It is shown how the language and methods of category theory provide such a notion, having developed out of a structural approach in modern mathematical practice. As an example, it is then shown how the categorical notion of a topos provides a characterization of ‘logical structure’, and an alternative to the Pregean approach to logic which is continuous with the (...) modern structural approach in mathematics. (shrink)

Category theory and topos theory have been seen as providing a structuralist framework for mathematics autonomous vis-a-vis set theory. It is argued here that these theories require a background logic of relations and substantive assumptions addressing mathematical existence of categories themselves. We propose a synthesis of Bell's many-topoi view and modal-structuralism. Surprisingly, a combination of mereology and plural quantification suffices to describe hypothetical large domains, recovering the Grothendieck method of universes. Both topos theory and set theory can be carried out (...) relative to such domains; puzzles about ‘large categories’ and ‘proper classes’ are handled in a uniform way, by relativization, sustaining insights of Zermelo. (shrink)

By a classifying topos for a first-order theory , we mean a topos such that, for any topos models of in correspond exactly to open geometric morphisms → . We show that not every first-order theory has a classifying topos in this sense, but we characterize those which do by an appropriate ‘smallness condition’, and we show that every Grothendieck topos arises as the classifying topos of such a theory. We also show that every first-order theory has a conservative extension (...) to one which possesses a classifying topos, and we obtain a Heyting-valued completeness theorem for infinitary first-order logic. (shrink)

Elementary axioms describe a category of categories. Theorems of category theory follow, including some on adjunctions and triples. A new result is that associativity of composition in categories follows from cartesian closedness of the category of categories. The axioms plus an axiom of infinity are consistent iff the axioms for a well-pointed topos with separation axiom and natural numbers are. The theory is not finitely axiomatizable. Each axiom is independent of the others. Further independence and definability results are proved. Relations (...) between categories and sets, the latter defined as discrete categories, are described, and applications to foundations are discussed. (shrink)

Volume 40, Issue 4, November 2019, Page 389-402.

Here we suggest a formal using of N.A. Vasil’ev’s logical ideas in categorical logic: the idea of “accidental” assertion is formalized with topoi and the idea of the notion of nonclassical negation, that is not based on incompatibility, is formalized in special cases of monoidal categories. For these cases, the variant of the law of “excluded n-th” suggested by Vasil’ev instead of the tertium non datur is obtained in some special cases of these categories. The paraconsistent law suggested by Vasil’ev (...) is also demonstrated with linear and tensor logics but in a form weaker than he supposed. As we have, in fact, many truth-values in linear logic and topos logic, the admissibility of the traditional notion of inference in the categorical interpretation of linear and intuitionistic proof theory is discussed. (shrink)

Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these (...) criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely autonomous from set theory. (shrink)

A version of intuitionistic type theory is presented here in which all logical symbols are defined in terms of equality. This language is used to construct the so-called free topos with natural number object. It is argued that the free topos may be regarded as the universe of mathematics from an intuitionist's point of view.

We describe a way of constructing models for the continuum which does not require an underlying structure of points. With a condition of spatial homogeneity the models have the mathematical structure of a sheaf.

In this paper (a sequel to [4]) I put forward a "local" interpretation of mathematical concepts based on notions derived from category theory. The fundamental idea is to abandon the unique absolute universe of sets central to the orthodox set-theoretic account of the foundations of mathematics, replacing it by a plurality of local mathematical frameworks - elementary toposes - defined in category-theoretic terms.

We define here a notion of internal copy and of weak internal copy of a category. We will then determine some families of categories having an internal copy or a weak internal copy. We will consider categories of definable classes of first-order theories and we will see that the notion of internal copy is related to the notion of numerical existence property.

The large-structure tools of cohomology including toposes and derived categories stay close to arithmetic in practice, yet published foundations for them go beyond ZFC in logical strength. We reduce the gap by founding all the theorems of Grothendieck’s SGA, plus derived categories, at the level of Finite-Order Arithmetic, far below ZFC. This is the weakest possible foundation for the large-structure tools because one elementary topos of sets with infinity is already this strong.

We investigate Hilbert’s varepsilon -calculus in the context of intuitionistic type theories, that is, within certain systems of intuitionistic higher-order logic. We determine the additional deductive strength conferred on an intuitionistic type theory by the adjunction of closed varepsilon -terms. We extend the usual topos semantics for type theories to the varepsilon -operator and prove a completeness theorem. The paper also contains a discussion of the concept of “partially defined‘ varepsilon -term. MSC: 03B15, 03B20, 03G30.

It is easy to show that in many natural axiomatic formulations of physical and even mathematical theories, there are many superfluous concepts usually assumed as primitive. This happens mainly when these theories are formulated in the language of standard set theories, such as Zermelo–Fraenkel’s. In 1925, John von Neumann created a set theory where sets are definable by means of functions. We provide a reformulation of von Neumann’s set theory and show that it can be used to formulate physical and (...) mathematical theories with a lower number of primitive concepts very naturally. Our basic proposal is to offer a new kind of set-theoretic language that offers advantages with respect to the standard approaches, since it doesn’t introduce dispensable primitive concepts. We show how the proposal works by considering significant physical theories, such as non-relativistic classical particle mechanics and classical field theories, as well as a well-known mathematical theory, namely, group theory. This is a first step of a research program we intend to pursue. (shrink)

Transitive extensional well founded relations provide an intuitionistic notion of ordinals which admits transfinite induction. However these ordinals are not directed and their successor operation is poorly behaved, leading to problems of functoriality. We show how to make the successor monotone by introducing plumpness, which strengthens transitivity. This clarifies the traditional development of successors and unions, making it intuitionistic; even the (classical) proof of trichotomy is made simpler. The definition is, however, recursive, and, as their name suggests, the plump ordinals (...) grow very rapidly. Directedness must be defined hereditarily. It is orthogonal to the other four conditions, and the lower powerdomain construction is shown to be the universal way of imposing it. We treat ordinals as order-types, and develop a corresponding set theory similar to Osius' transitive set objects. This presents Mostowski's theorem as a reflection of categories, and set-theoretic union is a corollary of the adjoint functor theorem. Mostowski's theorem and the rank for some of the notions of ordinal are formulated and proved without the axiom of replacement, but this seems to be unavoidable for the plump rank. The comparison between sets and toposes is developed as far as the identification of replacement with completeness, and there are some suggestions for further work in this area. Each notion of set or ordinal defines a free algebra for one of the theories discussed by Joyal and Moerdijk, namely joins of a family of arities together with an operation s satisfying conditions such as x ≤ sx, monotonicity or s(x ∨ y) ≤ sx ∨ sy. Finally we discuss the fixed point theorem for a monotone endofunction s of a poset with least element and directed joins. This may be proved under each of a variety of additional hypotheses. We explain why it is unlikely that any notion of ordinal obeying the induction scheme for arbitrary predicates will prove the pure result. (shrink)

We shall present two novel ways of deriving simply typed combinatory models. These are of interest in a constructive setting. First we look at extension models, which are certain subalgebras of full function space models. Then we shall show how the space of singletons of a combinatory model can itself be made into one. The two and the algebras in between will have many common features. We use these two constructions in proving: There is a model of constructive set theory (...) in which every closed extensional theory of simple typed combinatory logic is the theory of a full function space model. (shrink)

The simple connection of completeness and cocompleteness of lattices grows in categories into the Adjoint Functor Theorem. The connection of completeness and cocompleteness of Boolean algebras — even simpler — is similarly related to Paré's Theorem for toposes. We explain these relations, and then study the fibrational versions of both these theorems — for small complete categories. They can be interpreted as definability results in logic with proofs-as-constructions, and transferred to type theory.

The double slit experiment for a massive scalar particle is described using intuitionistic logic with quantum real numbers as the numerical values of the particle's position and momentum. The model assigns physical reality to single quantum particles. Its truth values are given open subsets of state space interpreted as the ontological conditions of a particle. Each condition determines quantum real number values for all the particle's attributes. Questions, unanswerable in the standard theories, concerning the behaviour of single particles in the (...) experiment are answered. (shrink)

F. Richman raised the question of whether the following principle of second order arithmetic is valid in intuitionistic higher order arithmetic HAH: $\forall X\lbrack\forall x(x \in X \vee \neg x \in X) \wedge \forall Y(\forall x(x \in Y \vee \neg x \in Y) \rightarrow \forall x(x \in X \rightarrow x \in Y) \vee \forall x \neg(x \in X \wedge x \in Y)) \rightarrow \exists n\forall x(x \in X \rightarrow x = n)\rbrack$ , and if not, whether assuming Church's Thesis CT (...) and Markov's Principle MP would help. Blass and Scedrov gave models of HAH in which this principle, which we call RP, is not valid, but their models do not satisfy either CT or MP. In this paper a realizability topos Lif is constructed in which CT and MP hold, but RP is false. (It is shown, however, that RP is derivable in HAH + CT + MP + ECT0, so RP holds in the effective topos.) Lif is a generalization of a realizability notion invented by V. Lifschitz. Furthermore, Lif is a subtopos of the effective topos. (shrink)

By a model of set theory we mean a Boolean-valued model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory allowing atoms (ZFA), which contains a copy of the ordinary universe of (two-valued,pure) sets as a transitive subclass; examples include Scott-Solovay Boolean-valued models and their symmetric submodels, as well as Fraenkel-Mostowski permutation models. Any such model M can be regarded as a topos. A logical subtopos E of M is said to represent M if it is complete and its cumulative hierarchy, as defined by Fourman (...) and Hayashi, coincides with the usual cumulative hierarchy of M. We show that, although M need not be a complete topos, it has a smallest complete representing subtopos, and we describe this subtopos in terms of definability in M. We characterize, again in terms of definability, those models M whose smallest representing topos is a Grothendieck topos. Finally, we discuss the extent to which a model can be reconstructed when its smallest representing topos is given. (shrink)