We consider consciousness attributed to systems in space-time which can be purely physical without biological background and focus on the mathematical understanding of the phenomenon. It is shown that the set theory based on sets in the foundations of mathematics, when switched to set theory based on ZFC models, is a very promising mathematical tool in explaining the brain/mind complex and the emergence of consciousness in natural and artificial systems. We formalise consciousness-supporting systems in physical space-time, but this is localised (...) in open domains of spatial regions and the result of this process is a family of different ZFC models. Random forcing, as in set theory, corresponds precisely to the random influence on the system of external stimuli, and the principles of reflection of set theory explain the conscious internal reaction of the system. We also develop the conscious Turing machines which have their external ZFC environment and the dynamics is encoded in the random forcing changing models of ZFC in which Turing machines with oracles are formulated. The construction is applied to cooperating families of conscious agents which, due to the reflection principle, can be reduced to the implementation of certain concurrent games with different levels of self-reflection. (shrink)

In this commemorative article, the work of Richard Laver is surveyed in its full range and extent.

We introduce and consider the inner-model reflection principle, which asserts that whenever a statement \varphi(a) in the first-order language of set theory is true in the set-theoretic universe V, then it is also true in a proper inner model W \subset A. A stronger principle, the ground-model reflection principle, asserts that any such \varphi(a) true in V is also true in some non-trivial ground model of the universe with respect to set forcing. These principles each express a form of width (...) reflection in contrast to the usual height reflection of the Lévy–Montague reflection theorem. They are each equiconsistent with ZFC and indeed \Pi_2-conservative over ZFC, being forceable by class forcing while preserving any desired rank-initial segment of the universe. Furthermore, the inner-model reflection principle is a consequence of the existence of sufficient large cardinals, and lightface formulations of the reflection principles follow from the maximality principle MP and from the inner-model hypothesis IMH. We also consider some questions concerning the expressibility of the principles. (shrink)

Given a countable model of set theory, we study the structure of its generic multiverse, the collection of its forcing extensions and ground models, ordered by inclusion. Mostowski showed that any finite poset embeds into the generic multiverse while preserving the nonexistence of upper bounds. We obtain several improvements of his result, using what we call the blockchain construction to build generic objects with varying degrees of mutual genericity. The method accommodates certain infinite posets, and we can realize these embeddings (...) via a wide variety of forcing notions, while providing control over lower bounds as well. We also give a generalization to class forcing in the context of second-order set theory, and exhibit some further structure in the generic multiverse, such as the existence of exact pairs. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I investigate how conceptual engineering applies to mathematical concepts in particular. I begin with a discussion of Waismann’s notion of open texture, and compare it to Shapiro’s modern usage of the term. Next I set out the position taken by Lakatos which sees mathematical concepts as dynamic and open to improvement and development, arguing that Waismann’s open texture applies to mathematical concepts too. With the perspective of mathematics as open-textured, I make the case that this allows us (...) to deploy the tools of conceptual engineering in mathematics. I will examine Cappelen’s recent argument that there are no conceptual safe spaces and consider whether mathematics constitutes a counterexample. I argue that it does not, drawing on Haslanger’s distinction between manifest and operative concepts, and applying this in a novel way to set-theoretic foundations. I then set out some of the questions that need to be engaged with to establish mathematics as involving a kind of conceptual engineering. I finish with a case study of how the tools of conceptual engineering will give us a way to progress in the debate between advocates of the Universe view and the Multiverse view in set theory. (shrink)

The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous range of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe (...) view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. (shrink)

A pointwise definable model is one in which every object is \loos definable without parameters. In a model of set theory, this property strengthens $V=\HOD$, but is not first-order expressible. Nevertheless, if \ZFC\ is consistent, then there are continuum many pointwise definable models of \ZFC. If there is a transitive model of \ZFC, then there are continuum many pointwise definable transitive models of \ZFC. What is more, every countable model of \ZFC\ has a class forcing extension that is pointwise definable. (...) Indeed, for the main contribution of this article, every countable model of Gödel-Bernays set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which every set and class is first-order definable without parameters. (shrink)

We introduce a variant of Martin's axiom, called the grounded Martin's axiom, or math formula, which asserts that the universe is a c.c.c. forcing extension in which Martin's axiom holds for posets in the ground model. This principle already implies several of the combinatorial consequences of math formula. The new axiom is shown to be consistent with the failure of math formula and a singular continuum. We prove that math formula is preserved in a strong way when adding a Cohen (...) real and that adding a random real to a model of math formula preserves math formula. We also consider the analogous variant of the proper forcing axiom. (shrink)

It is shown that the boldface maximality principle for subcomplete forcing,, together with the assumption that the universe has only set many grounds, implies the existence of a well‐ordering of definable without parameters. The same conclusion follows from, assuming there is no inner model with an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals. Similarly, the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom, together with the assumption that does not exist, for some, implies the existence of a well‐ordering of which is Δ1‐definable without parameters, and ‐definable (...) using a subset of ω1 as a parameter. This well‐order is in. Enhanced versions of bounded forcing axioms are introduced that are strong enough to have the implications of mentioned above, and along the way, a bounded forcing axiom for countably closed forcing is proposed. (shrink)

We force a property of cardinals first proved relatively consistent by Sargsyan, that of being supercompact but not equation image-supercompact, starting from a model of set theory which does not satisfy equation image and that contains supercompact cardinals.

Let φ1 stand for the statement V = HOD and φ2 stand for the Ground Axiom. Suppose Ti for i = 1, …, 4 are the theories “ZFC + φ1 + φ2,” “ZFC + ¬φ1 + φ2,” “ZFC + φ1 + ¬φ2,” and “ZFC + ¬φ1 + ¬φ2” respectively. We show that if κ is indestructibly supercompact and λ > κ is inaccessible, then for i = 1, …, 4, Ai = df{δ κ is inaccessible. We show it is also (...) the case that if κ is indestructibly supercompact, then Vκ⊨T1, so by reflection, B1 = df{δ κ is inaccessible, we demonstrate that it is possible to construct a model in which κ is indestructibly supercompact and for every inaccessible cardinal δ < κ, Vδ⊨T1. It is thus not possible to prove in ZFC that Bi = df{δ < κ∣δ is an inaccessible limit of inaccessible cardinals and Vδ⊨Ti} for i = 2, …, 4 is unbounded in κ if κ is indestructibly supercompact. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim. (shrink)

We prove from suitable large cardinal hypotheses that the least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and even nearly θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta}$$\end{document}-supercompact, for any desired θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta}$$\end{document}. In addition, we prove several global results showing how the entire class of weakly compactcardinals, a proper class, can be made to coincide with the class of unfoldable cardinals, with the class of weakly measurable cardinals or (...) with the class of nearly θκ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta_\kappa}$$\end{document}-supercompact cardinals κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}, for nearly any desired function κ↦θκ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa\mapsto\theta_\kappa}$$\end{document}. These results answer several questions that had been open in the literature and extend to these large cardinals the identity-crises phenomenon, first identified by Magidor with the strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

We introduce and study some variants of a notion of canonical set theoretical truth. By this, we mean truth in a transitive proper class model M of ZFC that is uniquely characterized by some $$\in$$ ∈ -formula. We show that there are interesting statements that hold in all such models, but do not follow from ZFC, such as the ground model axiom and the nonexistence of measurable cardinals. We also study a related concept in which we only require M to (...) be fixed up to elementary equivalence. We show that this theory-canonicity also goes beyond provability in ZFC, but it does not rule out measurable cardinals and it does not fix the size of the continuum. (shrink)

We address Steel’s Programme to identify a ‘preferred’ universe of set theory and the best axioms extending $\mathsf {ZFC}$ by using his multiverse axioms $\mathsf {MV}$ and the ‘core hypothesis’. In the first part, we examine the evidential framework for $\mathsf {MV}$, in particular the use of large cardinals and of ‘worlds’ obtained through forcing to ‘represent’ alternative extensions of $\mathsf {ZFC}$. In the second part, we address the existence and the possible features of the core of $\mathsf {MV}_T$ (where (...) T is $\mathsf {ZFC}$ +Large Cardinals). In the last part, we discuss the hypothesis that the core is Ultimate-L, and examine whether and how, based on this fact, the Core Universist can justify V=Ultimate-L as the best (and ultimate) extension of $\mathsf {ZFC}$. To this end, we take into account several strategies, and assess their prospects in the light of $\mathsf {MV}$ ’s evidential framework. (shrink)

Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible. Similarly, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, rank-into-rank cardinals, extendible cardinals, 1-extendible cardinals, 0-extendible cardinals, weakly superstrong cardinals, uplifting cardinals, pseudo-uplifting cardinals, superstrongly unfoldable cardinals, Σn-reflecting cardinals, Σn-correct cardinals and Σn-extendible cardinals are never Laver indestructible. In fact, all these large cardinal properties are superdestructible: if κ exhibits any of them, with corresponding target θ, then in any forcing extension arising from nontrivial strategically <κ-closed forcing Q∈Vθ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} (...) \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{Q} \in V_\theta}$$\end{document}, the cardinal κ will exhibit none of the large cardinal properties with target θ or larger. (shrink)

We explore Woodin's Universality Theorem and consider to what extent large cardinal properties are transferred into HOD (and other inner models). We also separate the concepts of supercompactness, supercompactness in HOD and being HOD-supercompact. For example, we produce a model where a proper class of supercompact cardinals are not HOD-supercompact but are supercompact in HOD. Additionally we introduce a way to measure the degree of HOD-supercompactness of a supercompact cardinal, and we develop methods to control these degrees simultaneously for a (...) proper class of supercompact cardinals. Finally, we also produce a model in which the unique supercompact cardinal is also the only strongly compact cardinal, no cardinal is supercompact up to an inaccessible cardinal, level by level inequivalence holds and the unique supercompact cardinal is not HOD-supercompact. (shrink)

We construct a variety of inner models exhibiting features usually obtained by forcing over universes with large cardinals. For example, if there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a Laver indestructible supercompact cardinal. If there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a supercompact cardinal κ for which 2κ = κ+, another for which 2κ = κ++ and another in which the least strongly compact cardinal is supercompact. If there is a (...) strongly compact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a strongly compact cardinal, for which the measurable cardinals are bounded below it and another inner model W with a strongly compact cardinal κ, such that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${H^{V}_{\kappa^+} \subseteq {\rm HOD}^W}$$\end{document}. Similar facts hold for supercompact, measurable and strongly Ramsey cardinals. If a cardinal is supercompact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model of the Proper Forcing Axiom and another inner model with a supercompact cardinal in which GCH + V = HOD holds. Under the same hypothesis, there is an inner model with level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness, and indeed, another in which there is level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness. If a cardinal is strongly compact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model in which the least measurable cardinal is strongly compact. If there is a weakly iterable limit δ of <δ-supercompact cardinals, then there is an inner model with a proper class of Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinals. We describe three general proof methods, which can be used to prove many similar results. (shrink)

We develop a new method for coding sets while preserving GCH in the presence of large cardinals, particularly supercompact cardinals. We will use the number of normal measures carried by a measurable cardinal as an oracle, and therefore, in order to code a subset A of κ, we require that our model contain κ many measurable cardinals above κ. Additionally we will describe some of the applications of this result. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

This article addresses the question of fundamental entities in set theory. It takes up J. Hamkins’ claim that models of set theory are such fundamental entities and investigates it using the methodology of P. Maddy’s naturalism, Second Philosophy. In accordance with this methodology, I investigate the historical case study of the use of models in the introduction of forcing, compare this case to contemporary practice and give a systematic account of how set-theoretic practice can be said to introduce models as (...) new entities. In conclusion, I argue for a view that takes both sets and models to be fundamental entities in set theory. (shrink)

The mantle is the intersection of all ground models of V. We show that if there exists an extendible cardinal then the mantle is the smallest ground model of V.

This paper critically examines two arguments against the generic multiverse, both of which are due to W. Hugh Woodin. Versions of the first argument have appeared a number of times in print, while the second argument is relatively novel. We shall investigate these arguments through the lens of two different attitudes one may take toward the methodology and metaphysics of set theory; and we shall observe that the impact of these arguments depends significantly on which of these attitudes is upheld. (...) Our examination of the second argument involves the development of a new model for Steel’s multiverse theory, which is delivered in the Appendix. (shrink)

We present a class forcing notion, uniformly definable for ordinals η, which forces the ground model to be the ηth inner mantle of the extension, in which the sequence of inner mantles has length at least η. This answers a conjecture of Fuchs, Hamkins, and Reitz [1] in the positive. We also show that forces the ground model to be the ηth iterated of the extension, where the sequence of iterated s has length at least η. We conclude by showing (...) that the lengths of the sequences of inner mantles and of iterated s can be separated to be any two ordinals you please. (shrink)

A transitive model M of ZFC is called a ground if the universe V is a set forcing extension of M. We show that the grounds ofV are downward set-directed. Consequently, we establish some fundamental theorems on the forcing method and the set-theoretic geology. For instance, the mantle, the intersection of all grounds, must be a model of ZFC. V has only set many grounds if and only if the mantle is a ground. We also show that if the universe (...) has some very large cardinal, then the mantle must be a ground. (shrink)

This paper explores how a pluralist view can arise in a natural way out of the day-to-day practice of modern set theory. By contrast, the widely accepted orthodox view is that there is an ultimate universe of sets V, and it is in this universe that mathematics takes place. From this view, the purpose of set theory is “learning the truth about V.” It has become apparent, however, that the phenomenon of independence—those questions left unresolved by the axioms—holds a central (...) place in the investigation. This paper introduces the notion of independence, explores the primary tool for establishing independence results, and shows how a plurality of models arises through the investigation of this phenomenon. Building on a familiar example from Euclidean geometry, a template for independence proofs is established. Applying this template in the domain of set theory leads to a consideration of forcing, the tool par excellence for constructing universes of sets. Fifty years of forcing has resulted in a profusion of universes exhibiting a wide variety of characteristics—a multiverse of set theories. Direct study of this multiverse presents technical challenges due to its second-order nature. Nonetheless, there are certain nice “local neighborhoods” of the multiverse that are amenable to first-order analysis, and set-theoretic geology studies just such a neighborhood, the collection of grounds of a given universe V of set theory. I will explore some of the properties of this collection, touching on major concepts, open questions, and recent developments. (shrink)

Given an inner model and a regular cardinal κ, we consider two alternatives for adding a subset to κ by forcing: the Cohen poset Add(κ, 1), and the Cohen poset of the inner model. The forcing from W will be at least as strong as the forcing from V (in the sense that forcing with the former adds a generic for the latter) if and only if the two posets have the same cardinality. On the other hand, a sufficient condition (...) is established for the poset from V to fail to be as strong as that from W. The results are generalized to, and to iterations of Cohen forcing where the poset at each stage comes from an arbitrary intermediate inner model. (shrink)