Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Ethical Education and Perspectives of Chinese Engineering Students: A Preliminary Investigation and Recommendations.Rockwell F. Clancy - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):1935-1965.
    To develop more effective ethics education for cross-cultural and international engineering, a study was conducted to determine what Chinese engineering students have learned and think about ethics. Recent research shows traditional approaches to ethics education are potentially ineffective, but also points towards ways of improving ethical behaviors. China is the world’s most populous country, graduating and employing the highest number of STEM majors, although little empirical research exists about the ethical knowledge and perspectives of Chinese engineering students. When compared to (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Rethinking Rationality.Emmanuel M. Pothos & Timothy J. Pleskac - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (3):451-466.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 451-466, July 2022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • ‘Utilitarian’ Judgments in Sacrificial Moral Dilemmas Do Not Reflect Impartial Concern for the Greater Good.Guy Kahane, Jim A. C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Miguel Farias & Julian Savulescu - 2015 - Cognition 134:193-209.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Sacrificial Utilitarian Judgments Do Reflect Concern for the Greater Good: Clarification Via Process Dissociation and the Judgments of Philosophers.Paul Conway, Jacob Goldstein-Greenwood, David Polacek & Joshua D. Greene - 2018 - Cognition 179:241-265.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • Some Challenges for Research on Emotion and Moral Judgment: The Moral Foreign-Language Effect as a Case Study.Steven McFarlane & Heather Cipolletti Perez - 2020 - Diametros 17 (64):56-71.
    In this article, we discuss a number of challenges with the empirical study of emotion and its relation to moral judgment. We examine a case study involving the moral foreign-language effect, according to which people show an increased utilitarian response tendency in moral dilemmas when using their non-native language. One important proposed explanation for this effect is that using one’s non-native language reduces emotional arousal, and that reduced emotion is responsible for this tendency. We offer reasons to think that there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Crítica a la naturalización del deontologismo en la teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral de Joshua Greene.Javier Gracia - 2018 - Isegoría 58:205-219.
    In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s naturalism raised by me (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Surveying Ethics: A Measurement Model of Preference for Precepts Implied in Moral Theories.Veljko Dubljević, Sam Cacace & Sarah L. Desmarais - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):197-214.
    Recent research in empirical moral psychology attempts to understand the salient normative differences that laypeople have when making moral decisions by using survey methodology that is based on the operationalized principles from moral theories. The PPIMT is the first measure designed to assess respondents’ preference for the precepts implied in the three dominant moral theories: virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. The current study used a latent modeling approach to determine the most theoretically and psychometrically-sound model for the PPIMT using a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.
    Recent empirical work appears to suggest that the moral intuitions of professional philosophers are just as vulnerable to distorting psychological factors as are those of ordinary people. This paper assesses these recent tests of the ‘expertise defense’ of philosophical intuition. I argue that the use of familiar cases and principles constitutes a methodological problem. Since these items are familiar to philosophers, but not ordinary people, the two subject groups do not confront identical cognitive tasks. Reflection on this point shows that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Morality, Risk-Taking and Psychopathic Tendencies: An Empirical Study.Sam Cacace, Joseph Simons-Rudolph & Veljko Dubljević - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Research in empirical moral psychology has consistently found negative correlations between morality and both risk-taking, as well as psychopathic tendencies. However, prior research did not sufficiently explore intervening or moderating factors. Additionally, prior measures of moral preference have a pronounced lack of ecological validity. This study seeks to address these two gaps in the literature. First, this study used Preference for Precepts Implied in Moral Theories, which offers a novel, more nuanced and ecologically valid measure of moral judgment. Second, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Measuring Impartial Beneficence: A Kantian Perspective on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale.Emilian Mihailov - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Brains, Trolleys, and Intuitions: Defending Deontology From the Greene/Singer Argument.C. D. Meyers - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):466-486.
    Joshua Greene and Peter Singer argue, on the basis of empirical evidence, that deontological moral judgments result from emotional reactions while dispassionate reasoning leads to consequentialist judgments. Given that there are good reasons to doubt these emotionally driven intuitions, they argue that we should reject Kantian ethics. I argue that the evidence does not support the claim that consequentialism is inherently more reason-based or less emotion-based than Kantian ethics. This is partly because the experiments employ a functional definition of ‘deontological’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What the Science of Morality Doesn’T Say About Morality.Gabriel Abend - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):157-200.
    In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Which Causes of Moral Beliefs Matter?Elizabeth O’Neill - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):1070-1080.
    I argue that information about the distal causes of moral beliefs, such as evolution, is only relevant for assessing the epistemic status of moral beliefs in cases where we cannot determine whether the proximal processes producing these beliefs are reliable just by examining the properties of these proximal processes. Any investigation into the epistemic status of moral beliefs given their causes should start with a look at proximal causes—not at evolution. I discuss two proximal psychological influences on moral beliefs—disgust and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Are Thoughtful People More Utilitarian? CRT as a Unique Predictor of Moral Minimalism in the Dilemmatic Context.Edward B. Royzman, Justin F. Landy & Robert F. Leeman - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (2):325-352.
    Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology.Guy Kahane - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545.
    According to Joshua Greene’s influential dual process model of moral judgment, different modes of processing are associated with distinct moral outputs: automatic processing with deontological judgment, and controlled processing with utilitarian judgment. This paper aims to clarify and assess Greene’s model. I argue that the proposed tie between process and content is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence, and that the supposed evidence for controlled processing in utilitarian judgment is actually likely to reflect generic deliberation which, ironically, is incompatible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Deontology Defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5197–5216.
    Empirical research into moral decision-making is often taken to have normative implications. For instance, in his recent book, Greene (2013) relies on empirical findings to establish utilitarianism as a superior normative ethical theory. Kantian ethics, and deontological ethics more generally, is a rival view that Greene attacks. At the heart of Greene’s argument against deontology is the claim that deontological moral judgments are the product of certain emotions and not of reason. Deontological ethics is a mere rationalization of these emotions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • In Defense of Best-Explanation Debunking Arguments in Moral Philosophy.Jonathon Hricko & Derek Leben - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):143-160.
    We aim to develop a form of debunking argument according to which an agent’s belief is undermined if the reasons she gives in support of her belief are best explained as rationalizations. This approach is a more sophisticated form of what Shaun Nichols has called best-explanation debunking, which he contrasts with process debunking, i.e., debunking by means of showing that a belief has been generated by an epistemically defective process. In order to develop our approach, we identify an example of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why Moral Psychology is Disturbing.Regina Rini - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1439-1458.
    Learning the psychological origins of our moral judgments can lead us to lose confidence in them. In this paper I explain why. I consider two explanations drawn from existing literature—regarding epistemic unreliability and automaticity—and argue that neither is fully adequate. I then propose a new explanation, according to which psychological research reveals the extent to which we are disturbingly disunified as moral agents.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Science of Morality and its Normative Implications.Tommaso Bruni, Matteo Mameli & Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (2):159-172.
    Neuromoral theorists are those who claim that a scientific understanding of moral judgment through the methods of psychology, neuroscience and related disciplines can have normative implications and can be used to improve the human ability to make moral judgments. We consider three neuromoral theories: one suggested by Gazzaniga, one put forward by Gigerenzer, and one developed by Greene. By contrasting these theories we reveal some of the fundamental issues that neuromoral theories in general have to address. One important issue concerns (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Making Psychology Normatively Significant.Regina A. Rini - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):257-274.
    The debate between proponents and opponents of a role for empirical psychology in ethical theory seems to be deadlocked. This paper aims to clarify the terms of that debate, and to defend a principled middle position. I argue against extreme views, which see empirical psychology either as irrelevant to, or as wholly displacing, reflective moral inquiry. Instead, I argue that moral theorists of all stripes are committed to a certain conception of moral thought—as aimed at abstracting away from individual inclinations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Risky Disciplining: On Interdisciplinarity Between Sociology and Cognitive Neuroscience in the Governing of Morality.Matthew Wade - 2020 - European Journal of Social Theory 23 (1):72-92.
    The neuroscience of morality presents novel approaches in exploring the cognitive and affective underpinnings of moral conduct, and is steadily accumulating influence within discursive frames of biocitizenship. Many claims are infused with varieties of neuro-actuarialism in governing morally risky subjects, with implications that other fields should observe closely. Sociologists and other social scientists, however, have typically been reluctant to interject their expertise. However, a resurgent sociology of morality offers the means by which closer engagement may be realized. In encouraging this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Psychology and the Aims of Normative Ethics.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - In Jens Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics.
    This chapter discusses the philosophical relevance of empirical research on moral cognition. It distinguishes three central aims of normative ethical theory: understanding the nature of moral agency, identifying morally right actions, and determining the justification of moral beliefs. For each of these aims, the chapter considers and rejects arguments against employing cognitive scientific research in normative inquiry. It concludes by suggesting that, whichever of the central aims one begins from, normative ethics is improved by engaging with the science of moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement.Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey - 2011 - Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7 (4):393-402.
    Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Cold or Calculating? Reduced Activity in the Subgenual Cingulate Cortex Reflects Decreased Emotional Aversion to Harming in Counterintuitive Utilitarian Judgment.Katja Wiech, Guy Kahane, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey - 2013 - Cognition 126 (3):364-372.
    Recent research on moral decision-making has suggested that many common moral judgments are based on immediate intuitions. However, some individuals arrive at highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions about when it is permissible to harm other individuals. Such utilitarian judgments have been attributed to effortful reasoning that has overcome our natural emotional aversion to harming others. Recent studies, however, suggest that such utilitarian judgments might also result from a decreased aversion to harming others, due to a deficit in empathic concern and social (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Beyond Sacrificial Harm: A Two-Dimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology.Guy Kahane, Jim A. C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Lucius Caviola, Nadira S. Faber, Molly J. Crockett & Julian Savulescu - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (2):131-164.
    Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutili- tarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people’s attitudes toward instrumental harm—that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Framing the Outcome of Moral Dilemmas: Effects of Emotional Information.Grazia Pia Palmiotti, Fiorella Del Popolo Cristaldi, Nicola Cellini, Lorella Lotto & Michela Sarlo - 2020 - Ethics and Behavior 30 (3):213-229.
    The present study was aimed at investigating whether and how the explicit representation of the decision outcome, framed in terms of lives saved or lost, could affect decision choices, emotional experience, and decision times in the course of a moral dilemma task. Decision outcomes were framed in a between-group design by means of smiling or injured faces depicting, respectively, the lives saved or lost with each choice. A control condition with no frame and no outcome was included. Results showed that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Conflicting Influences of Justice Motivations on Moral Judgments.Keith J. Yoder & Jean Decety - 2020 - Cognition and Emotion 34 (4):670-683.
    ABSTRACTHumans are motivated by justice concerns, yet vary in their reactions to observing or experiencing injustice. At a proximate level, approach and avoidance represent core fundamental motivat...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Switching Tracks? Towards a Multidimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology.Jim A. C. Everett & Guy Kahane - 2020 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
    Sacrificial moral dilemmas are widely used to investigate when, how, and why people make judgments that are consistent with utilitarianism. But to what extent can responses to sacrificial dilemmas shed light on utilitarian decision making? We consider two key questions: First, how meaningful is the relationship between responses to sacrificial dilemmas and what is distinctive of a utilitarian approach to morality? Second, to what extent do findings about sacrificial dilemmas generalise to other moral contexts where there is tension between utilitarianism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Neuroscientific Challenges to Deontological Theory: Implications to Moral Education.Jang-Ho Park - 2011 - Journal of Ethics: The Korean Association of Ethics 1 (82):73-125.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua D. Greene - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):695-726.
    In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life.Barbro Elisabeth Esmeralda Fröding - 2011 - Neuroethics 4 (3):223-234.
    This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • In Search of Greene's Argument.Norbert Paulo - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):38-58.
    The moral psychologist Joshua Greene has proposed a number of arguments for the normative significance of empirical research and for the unreliability of deontological intuitions. For these arguments, much hinges on the combination of various components of Greene's research – namely the dual-process theory of moral judgement, ‘personalness’ as a factor in moral decision-making, and his functional understanding of deontology and consequentialism. Incorporating these components, I reconstruct three distinct arguments and show that the Personalness Argument for the claim that empirical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Beyond Physical Harm: How Preference for Consequentialism and Primary Psychopathy Relate to Decisions on a Monetary Trolley Dilemma.Dries Bostyn, Sybren Sevenhant & Arne Roets - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (2):192-206.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Feedback From Moral Philosophy to Cognitive Science.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):569-588.
    A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition, then tests of moral thinking provide feedback to cognitive science. In certain circumstances, philosophers' introspective attention to their own moral deliberations can provide unique data for these tests. Recognizing the possibility for this sort of feedback helps to illuminate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Order Effects in Moral Judgment.Alex Wiegmann, Yasmina Okan & Jonas Nagel - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):813-836.
    Explaining moral intuitions is one of the hot topics of recent cognitive science. In the present article we focus on a factor that attracted surprisingly little attention so far, namely the temporal order in which moral scenarios are presented. We argue that previous research points to a systematic pattern of order effects that has been overlooked until now: only judgments of actions that are normally regarded as morally acceptable are susceptible to be affected by the order of presentation, and this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Is Deontology a Moral Confabulation?Emilian Mihailov - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):1-13.
    Joshua Greene has put forward the bold empirical hypothesis that deontology is a confabulation of moral emotions. Deontological philosophy does not steam from "true" moral reasoning, but from emotional reactions, backed up by post hoc rationalizations which play no role in generating the initial moral beliefs. In this paper, I will argue against the confabulation hypothesis. First, I will highlight several points in Greene’s discussion of confabulation, and identify two possible models. Then, I will argue that the evidence does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Morally Irrelevant Factors: What's Left of the Dual Process-Model of Moral Cognition?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):783-811.
    Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called ?deontological judgments.? In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Greene's dual process-theory of moral judgment nor the normative conclusions it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations