Although Kant disapproved of war, he asserted it was sublime. His views of war are disconnected and in places surprisingly positive, but he avoids grappling with their implications. This article analyses these heterogeneous discussions through Kant’s notion of the sublime to argue that some of his statements imply war’s sublimity can provoke an educated public into forming an international federation: the power to keep all in awe in Kant’s interpretation of international foundation is not the Hobbesean sovereign or a coercive (...) international government, but reflection on war itself. Kant’s ideas about sublime warfare are internally contradictory. Although they are valuable as an encouragement to work toward peace, working toward peace in actual fact may have unintended results. (shrink)

The theme of childhood and education in Lyotard’s philosophy provides an interesting field of reflection combining education studies and continental philosophy. Childhood in Lyotard’s thought is mostly understood as infantia, a concept that appears towards the end of his work. The claim of this article is that childhood in Lyotard’s philosophy cannot be reduced to the late concept of infantia; looking at the recurring nature of this theme in his writings that is present from the beginning, as well as various (...) figures under which it appears, pushes Lyotard’s readers to reconsider his work from a pluralist and interdisciplinary perspective. (shrink)

A strategy for dealing systematically with such complex relationships as those between science and theology is presented after a brief overview of the historical record and illustrated in terms of the concept of divinity. The application of that strategy to the title relationships yields a multilogical/multilevel solution which presents certain analogies to or isomorphisms with the doctrine of the Trinity. These concern mainly the multilogical/multilevel character of both conceptualizations and the relational and contextual reasoning required to conceive them. Furthermore, certain (...) characteristics of the doctrine facilitate the dialogue between theologians and scientists on account of their similarity with such scientific concepts as diversity in unity, multiplicity of relationships, nonseparability, and nonclassical logic. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism is a value-loaded concept that seems to become popular in intervals. The latest cosmopolitan period started after the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union and concentrated mostly on aspects such as “a new world order”, and often with reference to Kant. It might be questioned if the cosmopolitan period still exists. Here it is suggested that a historical understanding of cosmopolitanism together with experience from later social and political experiences might give a new (...) perspective on the difficulties of creating a better world in a Kantian sense, including cosmopolitan education. Considering its history and taking concern of experience Kant’s cosmopolitanism still is relevant, not least in its broader sense. (shrink)

My purpose is to examine two of the foundations of medical ethics: the principle of autonomy and the concept of the human. I also investigate the extent to which health technology makes autonomy and humanness possible. I begin by underlining Illich's point that the same health technology designed to promote health and autonomy also is pathogenic. I proceed to analyse the Kantian concept of autonomy, a concept which is closely associated with health and which continues to determine current ethical thinking. (...) In so doing, I uncover an unexpected ontological function of health technology, a function described in Heidegger's work on technology. Based on this discovery, I suggest that calls for Kantian autonomy may often be self-defeating or even sometimes harmful. I conclude by calling for continued ethical vigilance, but also for a questioning of the hitherto virtually unquestionable concepts of ethics and humanness which may themselves play a role in our era's greatest problems. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] The collection of Vilnius University Library contains an incomplete, anonymous manuscript of a Polish translation of The Contest of the Faculties by Immanuel Kant. Numerous features of the manuscript confirm that it is a fragment of the lost translation by Józef Władysław Bychowiec, one of the most important popularisers of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy in Poland and Lithuania at the beginning of the 19th century. The manuscript is the earliest known work by (...) Bychowiec, probably completed during his philosophical studies in Königsberg. (shrink)

This article analyses the transformation of the notion of Bildung that is constructed in the German human sciences. From a perspective of field theory and discourse analysis, the article reveals how the notion evolves and stabilizes during a first stage (1810–60), how it comes under pressure because of the contextual changes in a second stage (1860–1960) and how the tension increases before it is resolved by a fundamental change of the traditional notion of Bildung in a third stage (1960–99).

Isaiah Berlin viewed value conflict as tragic, as it requires the sacrifice of some values for others. It is a mark of maturity, he thought, to accept this tragic truth. This view raises certain conceptual problems that can be attributed to Berlin’s subtle departures from the German authors (Kant, Schelling, and Hegel) who originated the doctrine of tragic maturity—figures who had, in turn, transformed the earlier idea that enlightenment is a natural and morally neutral process of maturation. Kant moralized the (...) notion of enlightened maturation by portraying it as contingent on our courage to bring it about, such that we are responsible if we remain immature. This theory of maturity rested on the idea, which would have been uncongenial to Berlin, that we are intelligible creatures inhabiting the noumenal realm, duty bound to exercise moral freedom, even though this duty surpasses our ability to carry it out, as we also inhabit the phenomenal realm, where our natural inclinations tend to make us resist laboring to fulfill our duties. However, according to Kant, the metaphysical limitations we face as individuals can be transcended to an extent, allowing us to make moral progress as a species—so long as we do not lazily persist in our immaturity. Schelling built upon Kant’s notion of freedom to bring out the tragic and heroic dimension of individual moral life, where the tragedy is our doomed but noble struggle to exert moral freedom in a world of natural necessity. Hegel turned these metaphysical notions in a more recognizably Berlinian direction by extending Schelling’s account of tragic conflict to conflicts of values. But he identified the ultimate tragic hero as an ethical totality that enacts eternal justice by reconciling such conflicts, while Berlin attempted to repudiate both the notion of a historical totality and the possibility of reconciliation on empirical grounds, even though these are metaphysical claims. Thus, Berlin asserted the absolute, trans-historical necessity of tragic value conflict, while the evidence for this assertion was merely his personal conviction that in his particular time and place, specific values were, as a matter of empirical fact, tragically irreconcilable. In this manner he illicitly portrayed Cold War value pluralists (such as himself) as courageously accepting the tragic inevitability of value conflict, while Marxists, the legatees of Hegel and thus German Idealism, immaturely shrank from this reality by embracing the fantasy of total reconciliation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT When melancholy is mentioned in connection with pietism, it is usually associated with self-ordained contrition and castigation which, according to the opponents of this religious movement, is prone to drive the believers into pathological dejection or even suicide. The example of the radical pietist Frankfurt physician Johann Christian Senckenberg, however, demonstrates the need for a more differentiated approach. As Senckenberg attained his medical knowledge primarily through physical and mental self-observation, he experienced the sadness of his own soul as absence (...) of divine grace and increased irritability resulting from his own wilfulness and lack of faith in God. Similarly, he interpreted his hypochondriac affliction as a divine punishment for his lustfulness and culinary debauchery. Concluding that both ailments could be remedied by dietetic moderation, steadfastness against temptations and withdrawal from the company of sinners, temporary seclusion and abstinence to him did not at all serve the crucifixion of the flesh, but rather functioned as part of a dietary cure, from which the sufferer could emerge cheerfully and strengthened. In this way, he could not only identify melancholy as a pathological yet treatable condition, but also solve the seeming contradiction between pious humility and independent self-preservation. (shrink)

This paper assesses the theory, first voiced by Schelling and Kant, according to which an infinite historical process will lead to cosmopolitan institutions.The assessment will mainly be done on the basis of theories about infinitely repeated games. The first part of the paper reconstructs “infinitesimal” historical cosmopolitanism as proposed by Schelling and Kant. The second part confronts this position with the results of the theory of infinitely repeated games among groups. The third part offers reflections on additional conditions and contingencies (...) of the theory and the forth part draws the conclusion: while we can reasonably assume global cooperation to increase and stabilize over time under sustainable conditions, we cannot predict the institutional design of that cooperation. (shrink)

Rawls says that public reason is the reason of the citizens of a democratic state and takes the Supreme Court in the USA as the exemplar of public reason. It differs from non public reason, which is used e.g., in universities and academic institutions. Rawls contrasts with Kant, which opposes the public reason of the scholar—or the philosopher—, who speaks before the world, to the private reason of state or church officials. The later, once they accept an authority, cannot think (...) by themselves (selbst denken). A closer examination shows that Rawls is not so far from Kant as it seems, because he takes the constitutional judges not as they are, but as they should be. However Rawls still apparently refuses Kant’s unity of reason. Further investigation of the relations between ethical reason, democratic reason and legal reason is needed. Democratic reason is tantamount both to public reason and to legal reason in a modern constitutional state. It is a requirement of ethics but still not identical with ethical reason, since it is possible to accept democratic reason and to argue against it from an ethical point of view. There is just one good way of reasoning, in spite of the constraints that the sources of law and the rules of procedure impose on legal reasoning, compared with ethics. Such constraints are based on the democratic principle, which is again based on ethical reason, which at last both grounds and limits the constraints that law imposes on reason. (shrink)

In recent years, the claim of the unrepresentability of the Shoah has stirred vivid debates, especially following the strong positions taken by the French filmmaker Claude Lanzmann and author of Shoah (1986). This claim of unrepresentability, it can be shown, draws part of its attraction from the fact that it oscillates undecidedly between a claim of logical impossibility (“the Shoah can’t be represented”) and a normative demand (“the Shoah shouldn’t be represented”). This essay analyzes the argumentative structure of the advocates (...) of the unrepresentability and shows why the often made connection to Kant is flawed. Although his Critique of the Power of Judgment affirms indeed that the prohibition of representation is the “perhaps most sublime passage in the Jewish Law”, turning the prohibition of representation into a supposedly Kantian claim does not hold grounds. The essay reconstructs the political framework of the debate, situates the Kantian passage in its precise philosophical context and then successively assesses the main arguments put forward by Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière and Georges Didi-Huberman in their critique of Lanzmann’s categorical imperative. While showing why the rhetoric of the “unrepresentable” bear troubling structural analogies to what they want to fight (i.e. the politics of erasure, which always also include the erasure of the traces of erasure), a certain notion of the “unrepresentable” is rescued nevertheless at the end of the essay. Representation, so it is argued by returning to a Kantian distinction, is not a matter of Kanon, but a matter of Organon, which then puts the debate about the Sublime (which took place between Lyotard and Rancière in the 90’s) into a new perspective. (shrink)

Collective memory is thought to be something “more” than a conglomeration of personal memories which compose it. Yet, each of us, each individual in every society, remembers from a personal point of view. And if there is memory beyond personal experience through which collective identities are configured, in what “place” might one legitimately situate it? In addressing this question, this article examines the political significance of the distinction between two levels of what are often lumped together under the term of (...) “collective memory”: memories that are retained through the direct experience of groups or associations of a limited size and those that are rarely the object of direct experience constituting the events marking the identities of mass societies. (shrink)

The chapter studies the speculative realist critique of the notion of finitude and its implications for the theme of the "end of the world" as a teleological and eschatological idea. It is first explained how Quentin Meillassoux proposes to overcome both Kantian and Heideggerian "correlationist" approaches with his speculative thesis of absolute contingency. It is then shown that Meillassoux's speculative materialism also dismantles the close link forged by Kant between the teleological ends of human existence and a teleological notion of (...) the "end of the world." Speculative materialism no longer sees the end of thought, or the end of the thinking human being, as an insurmountable limit of conceivability, but rather as one contingent and possible event among others. This allows us to conceive an "end of all things" in a positive sense with regard to which the old eschatological hope for the end of the present world of injustice and for the emergence of a new world of perfect, "divine" justice becomes meaningful and legitimate in an entirely new sense. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talking about the present situation of philosophy at university, namely his 'The Conflict of the Faculties' of 1798. Kant’s claims, though not applicable to the contemporary situation directly, can indeed be worked out in a way which can assign a distinct and clearly identifiable role for university-based philosophy. I need to emphasize, though, that I am not suggesting that this is the (...) only way Kant’s thoughts in this respect can be adapted to and utilized for such an account. Quite the contrary, Kant’s text offers a manifold of highly important options here. In my article I will seek to establish the following claims: a) Kant, in his later years, which therefore amounts to something like his “mature” position, subscribed to a conception of a public use of reason which mainly referred to the Faculties of Philosophy at universities. b) Kant’s dismissal of philosophy according to the school conception of it must not be taken as a dismissal of academic philosophy altogether. Philosophy practiced at university by professionals is vital for Kant to build philosophy as a fully worked out discipline and to answer questions revolving around the issue of the compatibility of the theoretical standpoint and Kant’s own moral theory. c) Neither a) nor b) can be immediately applied to the contemporary situation we find ourselves in. Combining elements of a) and b), however, a possible route for the actualization of Kant’s ideas may open up. At least one of the functions for which university-based philosophy is uniquely qualified is the assessment of the implications of progress in the natural sciences for the conception of a moral standpoint in general, and as such for a core element of our self-understanding as rational beings. (shrink)

The main objective of this work is to achieve an understanding of Husserl's phenomenology as philosophical foundation for theology. It sustains, in the first place, that theology and philosophy do more than converge. It deepens, in second place, in the connection between phenomenology and theology, as well as in the Husserlian conception of God as entelechy and ἐνέργεια. This study concludes with a reflection, in third place, on the possibility of elaborating a theology from the phenomenological inspiration. The thesis that (...) is defended is that phenomenology means for theology, literally, an authentic Herausforderung, that is to say, a provocation that from outside interpellates a discourse, the theological one, that many judged already exhausted and at risk of extinction. In the conclusions are detailed the main contributions that the phenomenology makes to theology. El principal objetivo de este trabajo es lograr una comprensión de la la fenomenología de Husserl como fundamento filosófico para la teología. Sostiene, en primer lugar, la idea de que la teología y la filosofía hacen algo más que converger. Profundiza, en segundo lugar, en la conexión entre fenomenología y teología, así como en la concepción husserliana de Dios como entelequia y ἐνέργεια. Este estudio concluye con una reflexión, en tercer lugar, sobre la posibilidad de elaborar una teología de inspiración fenomenológica. La tesis que se defiende es que la fenomenología supone para la teología, literalmente, una auténtica Herausforderung, es decir, una provocación que desde fuera interpela a un discurso, el teológico, que muchos juzgaban ya agotado y en riesgo de extinción. En las conclusiones se detallan las principales aportaciones que la fenomenología hace a la teología. (shrink)

The modern idea of progress assumes that time will bring a steady improvement in all things human. This idea was always a contested one. However, since the mid-20th century at the latest philosophical thought about progress has been almost exclusively critical. The present paper introduces the standard arguments of progress’s detractors, particularly the notion that progress should be understood dialectically as the transformation of good intentions into their opposite. It attempts to sketch a more timely conception of progress in opposition (...) to this line of thought. (shrink)