Whether empirical givenness has the reliability that foundationalists expect is a point about which some philosophers are highly skeptical. Sellars took the doctrine of givenness as a “myth,” denying the existence of immediate perceptual experience. The arguments in contemporary Western epistemology are concentrated on whether sensory experience has conceptual contents, and whether there is any logical relationship between perceptions and beliefs. In fact, once the elements of words and conceptions in empirical perception are affirmed, the logical relationship between perceptual experience (...) and empirical belief is also affirmed. This relationship takes place through perceptual experience acting as evidence for beliefs. The real problem lies in how one should distinguish between the different relationships with perception of singular beliefs and of universal beliefs, and in how singular beliefs can provide justification for universal beliefs. (shrink)

Through a reading of Kant’s essay, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?”, I argue that Kant’s political philosophy fails to adequately engage with the political event in itself, and that Kant’s so-called political writings only provide a theory of the social sphere. First, I present the Kantian political subject as an antinomy between the metaphysically grounded spectator and the physically situated actor. Second, I show that Kant tries to solve the antinomy between the actor and (...) the spectator by attributing primacy to the judgement of the spectator. Third, I show that this move fails because it removes from political judgment what ultimately defines the political, i.e. plurality, spontaneity, and action. I conclude that rather than a theory of the sphere of political life, what Kant achieves is the thinking out of a theory of society (Gesellschaft). (shrink)

T. W. Adorno's philosophy of music aims to show that music is a source of important insights into the nature of modern society. This position leads, though, to a series of methodological difficulties, some of which can be alleviated by using resources from Heidegger's hermeneutics. The essay takes the key notion of `judgementless synthesis' from Adorno's unfinished book on Beethoven and connects it to Heidegger's account of pre-propositional under-standing and to Kant's notion of schematism. This connection is shown to have (...) consequences for how we conceive of both the meaning of music and meaning in more general terms, especially with regard to analytical philosophy. The essay argues that, despite its many important insights, Adorno's account of the meaning of music in modernity depends too much on his analogy between Hegel's claim to achieve the final philosophy and Beethoven's establishment of new forms of integration for musical material. (shrink)

The main idea or the concept of coherence can be expressed in the following way: The more the statements belonging to a given theory approximate a perfect supportive structure, the more coherent the theory. The degree of perfection of a supportive structure depends on the degree to which the following criteria of coherence are fulfilled: (1) the greatest possible number of supported statements belonging to the theory in question; (2) the greatest possible length of chains of reasons belonging to it; (...) (3) the greatest possible number of strongly supported statements belonging to the theory; (4) the greatest possible number of connections between various supportive chains belonging to the theory; (5) the greatest possible number of preference relations between various principles belonging to it; (6) the greatest possible number and complexity of reciprocal supportive relations between various statements belonging to the theory; (7) the greatest possible number of universal statements belonging to the theory; the greatest possible number of general concepts belonging to it; the highest possible degree of generality of concepts implemented within it; the greatest possible number of resemblances between concepts used within it; (8) the greatest possible number of conceptual cross‐connections between various theories; (9) the greatest possible number of cases covered by the theory; and (10) the greatest possible number of fields of life covered by the theory. (shrink)

Once affirmed that a formal and finalistic theory of action is one of the four pillars of neo‐institutionalism, the author introduces the concept of Freedom of action, which is based on two points: the empirical existence of a scope for action and an information process which determine the choice between alternative actions. He then analyzes different versions of determinism and the distinction between descriptive and practical sentences, and concludes that a theory of action based on the information process has to (...) deal with the structures of teleological thought. In this sense he stresses the practical relevance of the plurality of ends, often conflicting with each other. Finally, he explains how formal teleology is used in his theory of action and how this theory provides methodological achievements for jurisprudence.*. (shrink)

an exemplar of an approach that takes the human mind to be largely the product of social and cultural factors with negligible contributions from biology. The author argues that on the contrary, his sociological theory of the categories is compatible with the possibility of innate cognitive capacities, taking causal cognition as his example. Whether and to what extent there are such innate capacities is a question for research in the cognitive neurosciences. The extent to which these innate capacities can then (...) be explained by natural selection remains an open question for empirical investigation. Key Words: categories • causality • cognition • Durkheim • evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

This paper discusses two methodological notions, the concepts Gegenprobe (countercheck) and Gegenversuch (counter-trial), which were widely applied, discussed, relied upon, and defended in German-language writings about empirical inquiry. In the decades around 1800, they were common in physiology; medicine; agriculture; chemistry; various technologies, such as printing, metallurgy, and mining; accounting; and legal and political argumentation. The ubiquity of those concepts signals a broad concern with securing empirical findings and empirical knowledge. Gegenproben and Gegenversuche – the terms as well as the (...) practices – are evidence for the close connection among explicitly knowledge-seeking endeavors and crafts and technologies. Physiological experiments, chemical analyses, agricultural or vaccination trials were indebted to applied and practical procedures of making and assaying. What united these different fields was the fact that the problems that had to be solved were very complex yet at the same time of immediate relevance to everyday lives (like diseases or crops) or highly controversial (like vital forces or spontaneous generation). We know that late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century practices of inquiry were firmly embedded in applied, technical contexts; this essay shows that methodological notions were anchored in applied, technical contexts as well. (shrink)

This essay explores the various ways in which in the history of philosophy the imperative to return to nature has been understood. Against this background, it takes up the question as to how the concept of nature is to be determined in contemporary thought.

Social thinkers often use the concept of intersubjectivity to mark out a problem of theoretical sociology: If people are unable to look into each others' minds, why do they often understand each other nonetheless? This issue has been debated extensively by philosophers and sociologists in three largely disconnected discourses. The article investigates the three discourses for isolable ideas that can be fitted into a sociological answer to the problem of intersubjectivity. An interactional solution, fully coherent with key insights from the (...) discourses, is offered at the end of the article. Its main point is to identify coordinative interactional mechanisms that compel participants to "make themselves understandable" vis-à-vis their interaction partners. (shrink)

. The concepts of space and time are important in physics and geometry, but their definition is not the exclusive prerogative of those sciences. Space and time are important for ordinary human experience, as well as for philosophy and theology. Samuel Clarke, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant, and Albert Einstein are important figures in shaping our understandings of space, time, and eternity. The author subjects their arguments to critical examination. Space is neither an infinite and empty receptacle nor (...) a system of relations in the mind . Infinite space and time can be interpreted as expressing God's eternity and omnipresence in relating to the creation , but such an interpretation is enhanced by Kant's thinking, to clarify that even though time and space are differentiated in individual events, the whole is at the same time present. Even human experience recognizes this wholeness, and for God eternity is the simultaneous presence and possession of the wholeness. The temporal existence of finite entities is also related to a future participation in God's eternal life. Concepts of contingency are brought into the discussion as well. (shrink)

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes (as I named it) are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

In truth, however, value is here the active factor in a process, in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it at the same time changes in magnitude, differentiates itself by throwing off surplus-value from itself; the original value, in other words, expands spontaneously. For the movement... is its own movement... is automatic expansion... able to add value to itself... living off-springs...golden eggs...an independent substance....It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus value; as (...) the father differentiates himself from himself qua the son, yet both are one and of one age: for only by the surplus value of £10 does the £100 originally advanced become capital, and so soon as this takes place, so soon as the son, and by the son, the father, is begotten, so soon does their difference vanish, and they again become one, £110.3. Marx (1967, 1:171-73)The future must no longer be determined by the past....Anticipation is imperative...in order to be more than herself...“impossible” subject, untenable in a real social framework....But secretly, silently, deep down inside, she grows and multiplies...she goes and passes into infinity....Heterogeneous, yes...she does not cling to herself; she is dispersible, prodigious, stunning, desirous and capable of others, of the other woman that she will be, of the other woman she isn't, of him, of you...she is everywhere, she exchanges...in the exchange that multiplies....She does not “know” what she's giving, she doesn't measure it...she finds not her sum but her differences....In one another we will never be lacking. Cixous (1986, 309-20)If God is dead, everything is permitted, then the conclusion imposing itself within the text of our experience is that the response to God is dead, is nothing is any longer permitted. Lacan (1991, 139)It is therefore absolutely impossible to control capitalism from the metalevel, because capitalism itself is deconstructive.Karatani (1995, 71). (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's novels. In (...) connection with, a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Is het nog de moeite waard om het op te nemen voor de transcendentale kritiek van Dooyeweerd? Deze vraag suggereert dat de transcendentale kritiek wanneer zij aan zichzelf overgelaten zou worden, niet meer te redden is. Dat is misschien wat overdreven, maar één ding is duidelijk: de transcendentale kritiek is niet onomstreden, zelfs niet onder de meest trouwe volgelingen van Dooyeweerd. En daarin zit iets paradoxaals: het was hem er immers om te doen met zijn transcendentale kritiek ‘de denkgemeenschap in (...) het avondland’ te herstellen, maar het lukt hem niet eens om de denkgemeenschap onder gelijkgezinden op dit punt te bewaren. Intentie en werkelijkheid lopen hier dus ver uiteen. Daar zijn verschillende redenen voor. In de eerste plaats lijkt de transcendentale kritiek geplaagd te worden door een tweetal tegenstrijdige uitgangspunten. Kort gezegd komen deze uitgangspunten hierop neer: 1) de transcendentale kritiek poogt aan te tonen dat ieder theoretisch denken uitgaat van religieuze uitgangspunten; het theoretische denken is dus niet neutraal, zelfgenoegzaam of autonoom; 2) het onder punt 1 genoemde kan worden aangetoond door een stringente analyse van de aard van het theoretische denken zelf, zoals het door ieder die zich bezighoudt met wetenschap en wijsbegeerte beoefend wordt. De vraag is nu of het eerste punt niet impliceert, dat het tweede onmogelijk is. (shrink)

The author takes the interdisciplinary seminar on Evolutionary Epistemology at the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium as the occasion to discuss the question of the status, achievements and limits of Evolutionary Epistemology. She comes to the conclusion that neither its critique of the quid juris question in traditional epistemology nor its own philosophical pretensions can be justified. But it is a new science which is relevant and a challenge to traditional epistemology and philosophy of science in that it opens up a (...) horizon of new questions which they will have to take seriously. (shrink)

The author takes the interdisciplinary seminar on Evolutionary Epistemology at the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium as the occasion to discuss the question of the status, achievements and limits of Evolutionary Epistemology. She comes to the conclusion that neither its critique of thequid juris question in traditional epistemology nor its own philosophical pretensions can be justified. But it is a new science which is relevant and a challenge to traditional epistemology and philosophy of science in that it opens up a horizon (...) of new questions which they will have to take seriously. Sie sind den Kindern ähnlich, die, wenn sie in einen Spiegel geguckt, ihn sogleich umwenden, um zu sehen, was auf der anderen Seite ist. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Es gab Ewigkeiten, in denen (der menschliche Intellekt) nicht war;... nur sein Besitzer und Erzeuger nimmt ihn so pathetisch, als ob die Angeln der Welt sich in ihm drehten. Könnten wir uns aber mit der Mücke verständigen, so würden wir vernehmen, daß auch sie mit diesem Pathos durch die Luft schwimmt und in sich das fliegende Zentrum dieser Welt fühlt. Es ist nichts so verwerflich und gering in der Natur, was nicht durch einen kleinen Anhauch jener Kraft des Erkennens sofort wie ein Schlauch aufgeschwellt würde; und wie jeder Lastträger seinen Bewunderer haben will, so meint gar der stolzeste Mensch, der Philosoph, von allen Seiten die Augen des Weltalls teleskopisch auf sein Handeln und Denken gerichtet zu sehen. Friedrich Nietzsche. (shrink)

The essay focuses on the dispute over the Kantian legacy that took place in Davos, in 1929, between Cassirer and Heidegger. The relationship between imagination, freedom and politics is at its core. Two different readings of Kant stand in a discrepancy that generates dismay. An opposition, not a hermeneutical leveling, stands between the two. It is a philosophical opposition that is intimately linked to the positivity of what is posed - and not necessarily opposed — next to the opposite position; (...) philosophical opposition as a productive figure of the negative, because it incorporates the potential for movement and transformation that the negative has, avoiding the exclusion of one interpretation from the other. One must therefore read the confrontation or dispute between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos as a real opposition between opposing forces, both positive, because neither philosophy derives its meaning from the negation of the other, as Kant would have said. The opposites do not contradict each other, but rather face each other according to an ontological and symbolic plan which on the one hand makes them both necessary but on the other hand opposes them in a single space of knowledge. In the background stand the black shadows that stretch over Germany and Europe. Darkness that will soon throw the opposition into the darkness, imposing a night of the world in which one philosophy will save the symbolic through the exile, while the other philosophy will abandon itself to its destructive repetition leading to the annihilation of the being. (shrink)

Basing on the Michel Foucault’s description of the philosophical modernity given by him in his famous book Words and Things, I found that there is the compliance between the beginning of the Modern philosophy and the Kant’s discovery of the a priori synthesis. It is also well known that Husserl uses the term “synthesis” in his phenomenology. Thus, the Husserl’s phenomenology could belong to the same branch of philosophy as the Kant’s philosophy. To verify this hypothesis, I analyze the views (...) on synthesis a priori of both thinkers, Kant and Husserl, and then I compare them. One ought to say that Husserl widens the Kant’s view of the synthesis a priori through his notion of material a priori as well as through his differentiation of active and passive kinds of synthesis. As conclusion, I pose the question of the possibility of a priori synthesis after Kant and Husserl, taking into account the Moritz Schlick’s criticism of the synthetic propositions a priori. (shrink)

Although Flusser does not explain and develop his philosophical and methodological claims on the first three pages of his mini treatise „Für eine Phänomenologie des Fernsehens“, there is enough evidence for Flusser’s fundamentally phenomenological credo. The philosophers of Flusser’s implicit references can be unmistakably detected: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Immanuel Kant and Günther Anders. On the one hand, Flusser appears to be strongly rooted in the phenomenological tradition. On the other, in a text on Husserl’s philosophy written in (...) 1986/87, Flusser reveals that he had changed his mind in the meantime turning to a sociology of media that dispenses with the phenomenological stance that was the main aim of his thinking on media in the 1970ies. (shrink)

Auf Kants berühmte Frage "Wie ist Metaphysik möglich?" wird eine bejahende Antwort gegeben - eine, die Metaphysik als eine selbständige und unentbehrliche Disziplin darstellt, deren Aufgabe es ist, das Reich der wirklichen Möglichkeiten zu erforschen. Die Begriffe der "wirklichen" oder "metaphysischen" Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit werden verteidigt und von den Begriffen verschiedener anderer Arten von Modalität unterschieden, z.B. physischer, logischer und begrifflicher Möglichkeit oder Notwendigkeit. Es wird dargelegt, daß die Gegner der Metaphysik, von den Relativisten bis zu denen, welche die Metaphysik (...) den empirischen Wissenschaften, der Erkenntnislehre oder der Sprachphilosophie unterordnen möchten, inkohärente Auffassungen annehmen. (shrink)

On propose quelques réflexions sur le concept de temps, tout d'abord rappelant la diversité des expériences et des consciences du temps, et montrant comment le temps des sciences et de la physique est relié à cette expérience et à cette conscience qui en est prise, notamment en ce qui concerne le rapport entre l'instant et la durée. On s'efforce ensuite de tirer deux leçons des développements sur le concept de temps tel qu'il se présente en physique. La première est que (...) le concept de temps est construitpar la pensée, et ne nous est pas directement donné, soit par la nature, soit par notre «sens interne». Cela apparait, notamment, avec l'introduction du temps comme paramètre de la dynamique par Galilée, puis avec la définition du temps «absolu et mathématique » par Newton en vue de constituer le «temps instantané» de la loi fondamentale de la mécanique, et enfin avec la critique des limites de cette conception qui aboutit à la formulation de la relativité du temps et de son lien de constitution à l'espace (construction de l'espace-temps). La seconde leçon est que le temps se définit et se détermine par les phénomènes(et les objets) de la nature (qui se ramènent aux propriétés de la matière), alors qu'on a longtemps cru l'inverse. Cela apparait notamment avec la soumission du temps, dans la reconstruction du concept effectuée par Einstein, d'abord à des principes physiques(avec la relativité restreinte), ensuite avec sa détermination, conjointement à l'espace (dans l'espace-temps), par les champs de gravitation, qui sont des propriétés de la matière. Ce caractère est également confirmé par la deuxième loi de la thermodynamique et par les développements récents de la cosmologie. (shrink)