When two actors have the same mental state but one happens to harm another person (unlucky actor) and the other one does not (lucky actor), the latter elicits a milder moral judgement. To understand how this outcome effect would affect post-harm interactions between victims and perpetrators, we examined how the social role from which transgressions are perceived moderates the outcome effect, and how outcome effects on moral judgements transfer to agentic and communal interpersonal goals. Three vignette experiments (N = 950) (...) revealed similar outcome effects on moral judgement across social roles. In contrast, outcome effects on agentic and communal goals varied by social role: victims exhibited the strongest outcome effects and perpetrators the weakest, with bystanders falling in between. Moral judgement did not mediate the effects of outcome severity on interpersonal goals. We discuss the possibility that outcome severity raises normative expectations regarding post-harm interactions that are unrelated to moral considerations. (shrink)

Two interlocutors, Philip Pettit and a student, are exchanging views on liberal political and economic philosophy during lunch at Prospect House, the faculty club of Princeton. The dialogue begins with clarifications of the notion of liberty, and, against objections of the student, Pettit introduces and defends his own conception of freedom as non-domination rather than as non-interference. It proceeds with an exchange of arguments regarding the different kinds of institutional settings that entrench liberty and all the other things valued by (...) humans. The interlocutors reach a preliminary consensus that in order to substantiate the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination in concrete institutional realities, two things are required: the establishment of a mixed constitution – so that no single, unconstrained body can exercise lawmaking and other government functions – as well as eternal vigilance on the part of the citizens. The second part of the dialogue deals with a major challenge to the republican political philosophy expressed by the student: the issue of non-domination in markets, which is diagnosed as an important lacuna in republican thought. (shrink)

Neste artigo abordaremos a questão da mentira, em Kant, vinculando a questões de ordem moral. Pois, sendo a ética e o direito ramos da moral, o problema da mentira encontra-se em saber se ela é uma questão ética ou jurídica, ou se é um problema moral, que engloba tanto a ética como o direito, que não legitimam tal ato. Iniciaremos esta unidade com a análise dos conceitos de moral, ética e direito buscando compreender o que constitui cada um desses campos (...) da cultura e qual a distinção entre ambos. Em seguida trataremos, em especial, da questão da mentira na filosofia prática de Kant, abordando o seu posicionamento ético sobre o ato de mentir, onde é levantada a questão em saber se uma falsa declaração pode ser legitimada ou não. Por fim, analisaremos o debate entre Kant e Benjamim Constant, sobre a problemática da mentira, onde será tratada a questão de um suposto direito de mentir e dos princípios gerais e intermediários, a saber, se é possível a aplicação de um princípio geral de forma absoluta isolada sem o auxílio de princípios intermediários. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the question of whether humans should reproduce. Some say human life is too punishing and cruel to impose upon an innocent. Others hold that such harms do not undermine the great and possibly unique value of human life. Tracing these outlooks historically in the debate has barely begun. What might philosophers have said, or what did they say, about human life itself and its value to merit reproduction? This article looks to (...) Kant, who wrote much on whether, by reproducing, humans do wrong or right morally. It assesses two main arguments: one examining whether perfect or imperfect duties condone reproduction, the other whether Kant’s teleological or, in the opposite sense, his eschatological outlooks can salvage reproduction. These two arguments are essential for building the entire argument. This article finds that, although Kant’s arguments against reproducing are strong, some of his writing seems to support reproduction as a good. Yet, must we must assume an author, even one who strove for systematicity, must be consistent over his entire oeuvre on every issue, especially if not handled directly in a single work? The article concludes that Kant does not sufficiently, systematically support anti-natalism as more moral than pro-natalism. It is best for the current debate to grapple with the very dilemma that daunted Kant. (shrink)

A stable classification of practical principles into mutually exclusive types is foundational to Kant’s moral theory. Yet, other than a few brief hints on the distinction between maxims and laws, he does not provide any elaborate discussion on the classification and the types of practical principles in his works. This has led Onora O’Neill and Lewis Beck to reinterpret Kant’s classification of practical principles in a way that would clarify the conceptual connection between maxims and laws. In this paper I (...) argue that the revised interpretations of O’Neill and Beck stem from a mistaken reading of the fundamental basis of the classification of practical principles. To show this, I first argue that Kant distinguishes between maxims and laws on the bases of validity and reality. I then argue that although a practical principle necessarily has the feature of validity, its reality in actually moving the agents to action sufficiently makes a principle a practical principle. If this is so, I argue that the classification of practical principles must be based on the extent to which they are effective in human agents. Such a classification yields us three exhaustive and mutually exclusive types namely, “maxims that are not potential laws”, “maxims that are potential laws” and “laws that are not maxims”. (shrink)

Reflexões, desde as filosofias africanas, sobre a educação, o ensino de filosofia e as relações raciais na educação brasileira.

In this work the doctrine of organicism will be addressed, as explained and seen mainly by Bertalanffy. We will study how this doctrine represents and embodies the ambiguity of Kantian teleology as a regulative principle, and how this same problem leads to consider a real problem as a knowledge problem. It will be concluded that organicism, conceived in this way, does not represent a true holism, but what we will call a syn-holism, a synthesis or assembly, and that to obtain (...) a true holism we must resort to the concept of true form. Finally, it will be established that since the fundamental characteristic of an organism is its development, a historical theory of the organism is required for which the concept of field can be useful and necessary. (shrink)

This article examines the plausibility of regarding altruism in terms of universal friendship. Section 1 frames the question around Aristotle’s ground-breaking philosophy of friendship. For Aristotle, most friendships exist for selfish reasons, motivated by a desire either for pleasure(playmates) or profit (workmates); relatively few friendships are genuine, being motivated by a desire for shared virtue (soulmates). In contrast to this negative answer to the main question, Section 2 examines a possible religious basis for affirming altruism, arising out of the so-called (...) “love command” – the biblical maxim that we ought to love others as we love ourselves. Many theologians have cited this maxim to justify altruism, with some (such as Aelred of Rievaulx) explicitly portraying it as a form of friendship. Section 3 examines Kant’s view of friendship, arguing that, although at first his position seems disappointingly limited, it actually captures the essence of the only possible form of friendship that could be regarded as a universal ideal without imposing unrealistic expectations onto friends. The article concludes in section 4 by offering a new, Kant-inspired interpretation of Jesus’ parable of the GoodSamaritan: Jesus’ appeal to the love command does enjoin friendship, but not as altruism; rather, love requires a selective form of friendship that is closer to Kant’s position. (shrink)

This first part of a two-part series exploring implications of the natural differences between the sexes for the cultural evolution of marriage assesses whether Kant should be condemned as a sexist due to his various offensive claims about women. Being antithetical to modern-day assumptions regarding the equality of the sexes, Kant’s views seem to contradict his own egalitarian ethics. A philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments requires one to assess those in other cultures by their own ethical standards. Sexism (...) is inappropriate if it exhibits or reinforces a tendency to dominate the opposite sex. Kant’s theory of marriage, by contrast, illustrates how sexism can be egalitarian: given the natural differences between the sexes, different roles and cultural norms help to ensure that females and males are equal. Judged by the standards of his own day and in the context of his philosophical system, Kant’s sexism is not ethically inappropriate. (shrink)

This second part of a two-part series exploring implications of the natural differences between the sexes for the cultural evolution of marriage considers how the institution of marriage might evolve, if Kant’s reasons for defending monogamy are extended and applied to a future culture. After summarizing the philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments that was introduced in Part I and then explaining Kant’s portrayal of marriage as an antidote to the objectifying tendencies of sex, I summarize Kant’s reasons for (...) rejecting polygamy and for viewing monogamy as the only ethically acceptable form of marriage. Finally, I argue that if we apply Kantian principles to the real situation of marriage in many modern cultures, and if we wish to maintain a legitimate place for marriage in the future evolution of human culture, then the future evolution of marriage laws must recognize polyfidelity (i.e., plural marriages for both men and women) as being just as legitimate as monogamy. (shrink)

This article focuses on the epistemological challenges of comprehending organic life. It explores the cognitive and experiential basis of the perspective that organisms are autonomous agents of their own teleological organization and development. According to Immanuel Kant and Hans Jonas, the conditions of the knowability of organic life lie within our mental faculties and inner experiences. This statement is often interpreted to mean that we cannot attain ontological knowledge about the life of an organism. Alternatively, attempts are made to “naturalize” (...) life, i.e. to explain the self-generating capacity of an organism from the interaction of its material components. In contrast, I posit that through the active mental representation of biological processes, such as the development of a plant, we can gain first-person insight into the life forces at play, suggesting a profound connection between our cognitive processes and the dynamic and teleological nature of life. Specifically, the parallels between life and our mental capacities lie in a blend of sensory perception, imaginative activity, conceptual thought, and the agential self, mirroring the physical structure and the autopoietic, teleological and agential organization of a living organism. It is shown that these parallels comprise four types of subject-object relationships. I propose and discuss that this correlation is not merely an analogy but reflects a deep ontological correspondence between life and mind and that this correspondence can provide empirical access to the study of life through first-person experience. I advocate for a re-evaluation of the materialistic view of nature to include qualities and experiences of life and mind, proposing that life’s properties can be “naturalized” by recognizing them as qualities we experience mentally. Overall, I call for a broader approach to understanding life that incorporates both empirical evidence and phenomenological, first-person experiences. (shrink)

Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give (...) us a kind of evidence about the nature of the mind even if this evidence is not absolutely incorrigible. (shrink)

ITA: L’elaborato ha come obiettivo una ricostruzione storica del dibattito tra Immanuel Kant e Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi nel contesto del cosiddetto _Pantheismusstreit_ degli anni Ottanta del Settecento. In particolare, si andranno ad evidenziare le fonti dei due autori, i quali propongono due interpretazioni uguali e contrarie rispetto alle possibilità della fede, nonché del rapporto che questa intercorre con la ragione. Nello specifico, si andrà esponendo la posizione kantiana oltre al mito del Kant «alles Zermalmender», rimarcando le radici profonde della sua (...) riflessione tanto nelle letture di autori quali Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius o Georg Friedrich Meier, quanto nella sua stessa produzione, come testimoniato già dalla _Principiorum primorum cognitionis methapysicae nova dilucidatio_ all’inizio del suo percorso intellettuale, culminando quindi nel breve saggio _Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?_ e nella seconda edizione della _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ del 1787. Inoltre, si fornirà anche una ricostruzione della posizione jacobiana, delle sue fonti, quali, ad esempio, Johann Georg Hamann o Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, e della sua originale riflessione all’interno del contesto tedesco dell’epoca evocando soprattutto due opere, ovvero _Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn_, vero e proprio _casus belli_ del _Pantheismusstreit_, e _David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus_. Dunque, obiettivi dello scritto sono tanto il dissolvere il mito di uno spietato Kant come «la lama che in Germania ha tagliato la testa al deismo», quanto quello dello Jacobi irrazionalista ed indegno del titolo di filosofo. ENG: The subject of this work is an historical reconstruction of the debate between Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi in the context of the so-called _Pantheismusstreit_ that happened in the '80s of the Eighteenth Century. Specifically, the sources of the two authors are going to be stressed to highlight the equal and opposite interpretations given about the possibilities of the faith, as well as its relationship with reason. In particular, the kantian position is going to be displayed over the myth of Kant as «alles Zermalmender», drawing attention to his thought’s roots as much as in his lectures of Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius or Georg Friedrich Meier, as in his own works, as the _Principiorum primorum cognitionis methapysicae nova dilucidatio_ already testimonies at the beginning of his career, climaxing in the short essay _Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?_ as well in the second edition of the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ in 1787. Also, it is going to be proposed a reconstruction of the jacobian standpoint, careful to remark his sources, like Johann Georg Hamann or Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and his original thought in the German context of the era, summoning two works of his, _Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn_, the very _casus belli_ of the _Pantheismusstreit_, and the _David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus_. Therefore, goals of this works are the dispel of the myth of a ruthless Kant as «the sword that cut deism’s head in Germany», as well as the one on Jacobi as an irrationalist unworthy of being granted the title of philosopher. ​. (shrink)

The expression “linguistic Kantianism” is widely used to refer to ideas about thought and cognition being determined by language — a conception characteristic of 20th century analytic philosophy. In this article, I conduct a comparative analysis of Kant’s philosophy and views falling under the umbrella expression “linguistic Kantianism.” First, I show that “linguistic Kantianism” usually presupposes a relativistic conception that is alien to Kant’s philosophy. Second, I analyse Kant’s treatment of linguistic determinism and the place of his ideas in the (...) 18th century intellectual milieu and provide an overview of relevant contemporary literature. Third, I show that authentic Kantianism and “linguistic Kantianism” belong to two different types of transcendentalism, to which I respectively refer as the “transcendentalism of the subject” and the “transcendentalism of the medium.” The transcendentalism of the subject assigns a central role to the faculties of the cognising subject. The transcendentalism of the medium assigns the role of an “active” element neither to the external world nor to the faculties of the cognising subject, but to something in between — language, in the case of “linguistic Kantianism.” I conclude that the expression “linguistic Kantianism” can be misleading when it comes to the origins of this theory. It would be more appropriate to refer to this theory by the expression “linguistic transcendentalism,” thus avoiding an incorrect reference to Kant. (shrink)

The study of the “first wave” of reactions to the Critique of Pure Reason in Germany from the second half of the 1780s until the beginning of the nineteenth century reveals the paradoxical status of the Kantian transcendental subject. While the existence of the transcendental subject, whatever the term means, is not open to question since it arises from the very essence of critical philosophy, the fundamental status of the subject is sometimes questioned in this period. Although the meaning of (...) the concept of transcendental subject seems obvious today (the subject of cognition, bearer of transcendental conditions of experience) it lends itself to various interpretations in the late eighteenth century. To achieve my goal I have undertaken a textological analysis of the works of the earliest opponents and followers of the Kantian critique and a reconstruction of the conceptual field in the midst of which the transcendental subject has been planted. Among others I draw on the works of J. S. Beck, J. A. Eberhard, J. G. Hamann, F. H. Jacobi, S. Maimon, K. L. Reinhold, G. E. Schulze and A. Weishaupt. The authors of the period are grouped depending on the common themes and questions that prompted them to turn to the concept of the transcendental subject, even though the results of their reflections did not always coincide. These authors think of the transcendental subject in its relationship to the transcendental object, or as “something = х”, and in terms of the relationship of representation to the object. It is characterised sometimes as something absolutely hollow, and sometimes as the fullness of true reality. The status ascribed to the transcendental subject is sometimes that of a thing-in-itself and sometimes that of a “mere” idea. Finally, Kant’s transcendental subject was sometimes seen as something to be overcome and sometimes as an infinite challenge to understanding. (shrink)

The story of Abraham – and the divine command to sacrifice his son Isaac – is, as many of us know, the source of inspiration for some reflections of Kierkegaard in his work Fear and Trembling. From this episode, Johannes de Silentio, the pseudony- mous author of the work, who makes an ode to faith as the highest of the passions, also wonders about a problem that, according to his interpretation, seems central, i.e. the teleological suspension of morality. The objective (...) of this paper is to investigate, especially from the reflections of Kierkegaard, a possible interpretation for the teleological suspension of morality and in what circumstances such a thing does occur and where we can insert it in the ethical debates of philosophy of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

O problema do desenvolvimento continua sendo abordado à maneira tradicional na semiperiferia da economia mundializada, como um problema de atração de investimentos que agreguem trabalho à economia. Políticas de fomento à inovação científica e à tecnológica são raras, e não atentam para o fato de que, nos países de desenvolvimento original, esse processo coincidiu com amplas agendas de transformação social e cultural associadas à ideia da modernidade. No entanto, a autonomia do campo político, central para a ideia da Modernidade, vem (...) sendo comprometida por interesses definidos no campo econômico, o que agrava as condições dos países semiperiféricos. Este artigo propõe uma reflexão sobre os limites do desenvolvimento na economia globalizada, através de uma síntese entre as abordagens filosófica, sociológica e econômica da questão. Palavras-chave: Modernidade. Globalização. Desenvolvimento. Vita activa. (shrink)

The paper examines the current debates regarding the grounding of human rights in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. It analyses the challenges which come today from certain policies of human rights which instrumentalize them under the pretext of a “global war on terror” and redefi ne them in terms of democracy promotion and regime change, as well as those challenges which come from ideologies which question the core principles of human rights and provoke the so called “crisis of legitimization.” The (...) paper argues for the necessity of restoring the genuine meaning of human rights and of the role of citizens in striving for their implementation. At the heart of the analysis is Kant’s concept of human rights as freedom. With Kant as its backdrop, the paper shows that the claim that religious worldviews provide the only intelligible foundation, as in Nicholas Wolterstorff, faces serious challenges in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. The paper then analyzes the non-religious philosophical concepts which seek to develop an account of human rights that does not depend upon controversial metaphysical or religious doctrines. It examines an account of human rights from the perspective of discourse ethics as developed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. It also analyses the concepts of human dignity and “emerging morality” by Arturo Roig and the “ethics of liberation” by Enrique Dussel. The analysis shows the ongoing relevance of Kant’s ideas and their recent development by the theorists of discourse ethics and of dialogical and democratic cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...) that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

Autonomous robots that are capable of learning are being developed to make it easier for human actors to achieve their goals. As such, robots are primarily a means to an end and replace human actions. An interdisciplinary technology assessment was carried out to determine the extent to which a replacement of this kind makes ethical sense in terms of technology, economics and legal aspects. Proceeding from an ethical perspective, derived from Kant’s formula of humanity, in this article we analyse the (...) use of robots in the care of the elderly or infirm and then examine robot learning in the context of this kind of cooperation. (shrink)

Como posso estar certo de que existe qualquer coisa de externa aos meus próprios pensamentos? Muitos filósofos procuraram ou apresentar uma prova da existência do mundo externo, ou rejeitar a inteligibilidade da própria ideia de uma “prova” nesse contexto. O objetivo desse artigo é mostrar que o denominado “problema do mundo externo” decorre de uma má compreensão acerca do que seja justificativa epistêmica. Apresento o que denomino “paradoxo de Berkeley” de modo a mostrar que o uso ordinário da linguagem não (...) deve funcionar como critério de correção para a aplicação de conceitos como conhecimento e existência. Concluo que tanto as tentativas tradicionais de se apresentar uma prova da existência do mundo externo quanto as tentativas de se mostrar que o problema não faz sentido são equivocadas. O que deve ser levado em conta no exame do problema do mundo externo é o contexto em que a proposta cética é feita. (shrink)

Escrito em 1963, três anos depois do seminário sobre A ética da psicanálise, o texto de Jaques Lacan, Kant com Sade, possibilita férteis discussões a respeito da prática analítica. Quais os limites desta prática? Qual é a razão que a sustenta? A prática analítica é um saber, uma ética ou uma terapêutica? Quais os pressupostos que orientam a sua ação? É evidente que não dispomos de condições necessárias e suficientes para respondermos a tais perguntas no limite de um artigo, tampouco (...) temos a pretensão de fazê-lo. Entretanto, as tomaremos como bússola em busca de pistas sobre a prática analítica lacaniana e o solo em que repousa até a década de 1960. A partir do texto Kant com Sade e do Seminário VII, A ética da psicanálise, ambos escritos por Lacan, buscaremos as semelhanças e diferenças irreconciliáveis entre a lei moral kantiana, a vontade de gozo sadeana e a ética psicanalítica, apontando que é a partir das consequências práticas, efetuadas pelo Marquês de Sade, da aplicação de uma razão pura, tal qual proposta por Kant, que Lacan buscará um novo horizonte para a prática analítica não mais baseada no desejo puro. Nesse sentido, tanto o filósofo alemão Immanuel Kant quanto o escritor francês Marquês de Sade, contemporâneos dos ares da modernidade, expõem um princípio universal pelo qual a ação é valorada. Princípio cuja execução evidencia sua dimensão ética, política e, com Lacan, clínica. Nessa pista, faremos uma discussão a propósito da perversão e da melancolia como limites à prática analítica. (shrink)

This paper describes developments in punishment theory since the middle of the twentieth century. After the mid–1960s, what Stanley I. Benn called “preventive theories of punishment”—whether strictly utilitarian or more loosely consequentialist like his—entered a long and steep decline, beginning with the virtual disappearance of reform theory in the 1970s. Crowding out preventive theories were various alternatives generally (but, as I shall argue, misleadingly) categorized as “retributive”. These alternatives include both old theories (such as the education theory) resurrected after many (...) decades in philosophy’s graveyard and some new ones (such as the fairness theory). Only in the last decade or so have new vares o “consequentialism” appeared to dilute a debate among philosophers that had become almost entirely about “retributivism”. I shall describe this trend in more detail. The description will be less an update of my 1990 survey than a rethinking of it. The conclusion I draw from this rethinking is that we need to drop the utilitarian–retributivist (and nonconsequentialist–nonconsequentialist) distinction in favor of one sorting punishment theories according to whether they rely in part on empirical considerations (externalist theories) or instead rely (almost) entirely on conceptual relations (internalist theories). (shrink)

Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative materialism rests on the historical claim that European philosophy since Kant is “correlationist” in its denial that thought can know being as it is in itself rather than merely for us. But though the claim is central to Meillassoux, it has not been much explored in the literature on his work. This paper argues that Nietzsche does not fit so easily into Meillassoux’s story. Though there are certain superficially correlationist elements in Nietzsche’s thought, part of his core (...) project is an ethically motivated rejection of the issues with respect to which realism and correlationism are alternatives. Thus, rather than denying that thought can access being in itself, Nietzsche aims to leave behind ways of thinking within which the question of thought’s access or lack of access matters. This means that Meillassoux loses some of the motivation for his positive position. (shrink)

Neste artigo, busca-se articular a noção de juventude romântica como ideal de formação no pensamento do estudante Benjamin. Nos primeiros ensaios dedicados a temas pedagógicos, o filósofo propôs um novo modelo de educação apoiado no romantismo, partindo de uma crítica às instituições de sua época que cindiram a totalidade e a unidade da vida do jovem. Em seus escritos enquanto era estudante, Benjamin recupera, com sua crítica, a necessidade de olhar a arte, a literatura, a educação, em suma, toda a (...) cultura humana, como um conjunto reunido de vivências históricas. O romantismo, no pensamento de Benjamin, será, portanto, basilar às discussões pedagógicas. A juventude, vista como comunidade, tem o dever de ser criadora, de se transformar em uma convenção de gênios do tempo presente, em seus espaços de atuação, ou seja, nas instituições de formação. De modo geral, só é possível perceber e adquirir o saber específico de uma profissão se as instituições acadêmicas perceberem que devem visar à formação universal, pelo modelo de criação do gênio, pois a juventude é entendida como aquela que garante a produção de valores novos, opostos aos da experiência - sinônimo de rigidez dos conhecimentos - que não estabelecem vínculo com a vida. Para encontrar essa verdade da vida, é necessário um ato de coragem e de sentido para se estar, assim, diante de espíritos livres. A juventude, dessa forma, traduz-se como um conceito ou categoria humana dependente de um despertar da consciência de si mesma. Diante disso, conseguirá promover mudanças dentro do âmbito institucional-escolar e acadêmico, mas, ao mesmo tempo, esse despertar da consciência histórica do jovem definirá um modo específico de se lidar com a cultura humana. Portanto, neste artigo, sob à luz dos aspectos românticos, procurou-se mostrar a juventude como categoria humana, com faixa etária determinada, cercada de preocupações acerca da realidade escolar e acadêmica e, também, do ponto de vista universal, isto é, filosófico-pedagógico, como uma categoria do pensamento que significa a vanguarda, tudo aquilo que não está determinado e fixado, criando novos preceitos e formas de vida. Palavras-chave: Juventude. Gênio. Romanticismo. Formação. Walter Benjamin. (shrink)

No presente artigo analisamos o entendimento e o uso da filosofia kantiana pelo físico filósofo alemão Werner Heisenberg, prêmio Nobel de Física de 1932, formulador do princípio de incerteza. Heisenberg parece adotar uma compreensão neokantiana da natureza da ciência, segundo a qual a ciência não trataria do real em si, mas apenas do modo como ele aparece, o que depende, inescapavelmente, da interação entre o sujeito e o objeto do conhecimento. No entanto, a despeito de tal posição, Heisenberg considera que (...) as definições kantianas de “espaço”, “tempo” e “causalidade” não são compatíveis com os desenvolvimentos da mecânica quântica. Nesta oportunidade nos deteremos com mais atenção na concepção de ciência e no problema da causalidade. (shrink)

O Movimento Escola sem Partido e a captura da docência: O professor como técnico do saber especializado Resumo: Este artigo tem por objetivo refletir sobre formas de captura das práticas pedagógicas do professor presentes no pensamento e no projeto de lei proposto pelo Movimento Escola sem Partido. Em nossa análise, a estratégia de vigilância do trabalho docente, a classificação do trabalho docente como doutrinação e a sobreposição da educação familiar sobre a escolar, emergem como formas de captura da docência, transformando (...) o professor num “técnico do saber especializado”, conforme conceituação de Jean-Paul Sartre.Palavras-chave: Educação. Escola sem partido. Fenomenologia. Sartre. The school without political party movement and the capture of teaching: the teacher as a specialist knowledge technician: This article aims to reflect on ways of capturing the pedagogical practices of the teacher present in the thought and the bill proposed by the School Without Political Party Movement. In our analysis, the strategy of surveillance of teaching work, the classification of teaching work as indoctrination and the overlap of family education over school, emerge as ways of capturing teaching, transforming the teacher into a "specialist knowledge technician", as conceptualization. by Jean-Paul Sartre.Keywords: Education. School Without Political Party. Phenomenology. Sartre. Le mouvement école sans parti et la capture de l’enseignement: L’ enseignant comme technicien spécialisé du savoir Résumé: Cet article vise à réfléchir sur les moyens de capter les pratiques pédagogiques de l’enseignant présent dans la pensée et das le projet de loi proposés par le Mouvement École sans Parti. Dans notre analyse, la stratégie de surveillance du travail d’enseignement, la classification du travail d’enseignement comme endoctrinement et le chevauchement de l’education familier sur l’éducation scolaire, apparaissent comme les raison de capturer de l’enseignement, transformant l’enseignant em um “technicien spécialisé du savoir”, comme conceptualisé par Jean-Paul Sartre.Mots clés: Éducation. École sans parti. Phénoménologie. Sartre. Data de registro: 17/06/2020Data de aceite: 26/11/2020. (shrink)

Carolyn Korsmeyer has offered some compelling arguments for the role of disgust in aesthetic appreciation. In the course of this project, she considers and holds up for justifiable criticism the account of emotional conversion proposed by David Hume in “Of Tragedy”. I will consider variant interpretations of Humean conversion and pinpoint a proposal that may afford an explanation of the ways in which aesthetic absorption can depend on and be intensified by the emotion of disgust.

Neste trabalho, pretendo oferecer uma interpretação da “Segunda proposição” da filosofia prática — Capítulo IV do Sistema do idealismo transcendental. A partir dessa delimitação textual, minha hipótese não vai além de uma sugestão segundo a qual a relação de interação recíproca e indireta entre as autoconsciências ocupa um “lugar” estratégico no argumento de Schelling, uma vez que, através dela, pelo menos em princípio, dois problemas seriam resolvidos: aquele acerca da contradição enraizada no limite originário dos atos transcendentais de autoconstituição da (...) inteligência como consciência individual e livre; e aquele acerca da articulação entre filosofia teórica e filosofia prática. (shrink)

This paper seeks to integrate analytic philosophy and phenomenology. It does so through an approach generated, specifically, in relation to imagination and its cognitive significance. As an Introduction, some reservations about existing phenomenological approaches to imagination—in the work of Sartre and Edward S. Casey—are considered. It is argued that their introspective psychological approach needs to be qualified through a more analytic orientation that determines essence, initially, on the basis of public discourse concerning the term ‘imagination.’ Part One then articulates this (...) orientation through an ‘analytic reduction’ that identifies imagination’s essence in public discourse as thought in its quasi-sensory mode. Part Two offers a sustained phenomenological investigation of this essence, and identifies four major intrinsic features. On the basis of this, Part Three shows how imagination is implicated, centrally, in the capacity to acquire language. In Conclusion the proceeding arguments are defended against possible objections, and a final key summarizing argument is formulated to show that imagination must be regarded, also, as necessary to perception and its capacity to articulate a world. The paper ends with a few thoughts on the further potential of post-analytic phenomenology. (shrink)

Reconstructing the evolution of Gramsci’s judgement about the Russian Revolution implies an overall rethinking of his own relation to Marx as well as to Kant. Already in the spring of 1917, Gramsci foresaw that the February Revolution could become a proletarian revolution and that this would realise in fact Kant’s moral: only a society completely freed from oppression and exploitation would allow people to be free and autonomous. After the fall of the Winter Palace, Gramsci wrote that the revolution happened (...) “against Marx’s Capital”, or better, against its literal interpretation as spread by the positivistic Marxism of the Second International. Between the end of the 1910s and the beginning of the 1920s, Gramsci thought it possible for Italy and the whole of Europe “to do as in Russia”; yet, from 1924, he started elaborating a different vision of the revolution in the Western World, which in the Prison Notebooks became a contraposition between a war of movement and a war of position. At the same time, he developed the concepts of caesarism/bonapartism and passive revolution which allowed the analysis of phenomena such as americanism and fascism from the perspective of a conservative modernisation, or revolution without a revolution. Still, and most of all, Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony, highlighting the importance of the moment of consensus in the fight for gaining and maintaining power. This drew Gramsci quite far from the marxism-leninism of his time, both from the political and theoretical point of view; for instance, he rejected the “ingenuous realism” of Lenin’s Materialism and Empiriocriticism in favour of a phenomenalism explicitly drawn by Kant. (shrink)

A Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes constitui um projeto específico de Kant, a saber, o projeto de determinar o princípio supremo da moralidade apenas. Kant não pretende com a Fundamentação oferecer um guia completo para a ação – e assim responder à questão “o que devo fazer?” – mas antes oferecer a fundamentação necessária para uma ética normativa. Neste sentido podemos dizer que a Fundamentação tenta responder a questões de segunda-ordem, geralmente do domínio da meta-ética, ou seja, o autor busca (...) identificar a fonte da legitimidade da própria moral. Neste artigo quero defender a leitura de que a Fundamentação parece estar suspensa entre um projeto ético-normativo e um projeto meta-ético. Projeto ético-normativo, na medida em que Kant identifica e afirma a existência de uma verdade moral que se apresenta geralmente de forma obscura ao ser humano, já que este é influenciado por desejos e intuições naturais. O método a priori de análise pretende trazer à superfície a verdade universal que todos os seres humanos têm o potencial de reconhecer como “suas”, i.e., uma verdade universal que se manifesta no reconhecimento da autonomia individual como exercício concreto da razão. O reconhecimento desta verdade permite-nos determinar como devemos agir, estabelecendo o critério que nos permite diferenciar uma ação moral de uma ação imoral. Por outro lado, a Fundamentação caracteriza simultaneamente, uma posição meta-ética, na medida em que a postulação desta verdade universal representa o culminar de um processo mais radical de questionamento das condições de possibilidade da própria moral. Assim, o objetivo deste artigo é articular os argumentos éticos e meta-éticos presentes na Fundamentação, mostrando que estes representam preocupações ou pontos de vista distintos mas que, em última análise, se pressupõem mutuamente. (shrink)

O objeto desta pesquisa é o ensino de filosofia no ensino médio e enfoca as formas de se curriculizar o saber escolar, especificamente o filosófico. A metodologia inspira-se na aplicação do conceito de endereçamento à análise da curriculização de saberes escolares. Chega a resultados que afiançam o entendimento de que o ensino de filosofia no Ensino Médio garantirá uma presença curricular harmonizada com a formação filosófica se ousar provocar a autoautoria de instrumentos educativos que, além de se valerem da história (...) da filosofia, lancem-se à produção de novos saberes conceituais.The object of this research is the teaching of philosophy in high school and focuses on ways to include in the curriculum know the school, specifically the philosophical. The methodology is based on applying the concept of addressing the review of curriculização of school knowledge. Reaches results that assure the understanding that the teaching of philosophy in high school curriculum will ensure a presence in line with the training philosophy is to dare provoke authors of educational tools that, in addition to involve the history of philosophy, is to launch production of new knowledge and conceptual. (shrink)

Many people, such as Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, Irving Fisher, and William Sharpe, assume that free markets full of rational people automatically lead to ethical actions and outcomes. After all, at its equilibrium point, a perfectly competitive free market maximizes utility, respects autonomy, and fulfills justice’s dictates. Unfortunately, in some technology markets, there are a significant number of people who have undergone epistemic closure. Epistemic closure entails that all reliable evidence that would challenge deeply held beliefs is dismissed as corrupted, (...) whereas all supporting evidence, no matter how unreliable, is accepted as incontrovertible. Those who have the condition act irrationally within that domain. As a result, business decisions become much more difficult than they would be in a rational market. In this article, epistemic closure’s ethical issues are developed. First, although they are acting irrationally within the closure’s domain, those with epistemic closure can still be held accountable for their actions. Second, to deal ethically with epistemic closure and its consequences, then it is vital to know what it is and its root causes, as well as to have a practical principle that can assist in making pragmatic decisions. Because some new technologies face epistemic closure, then focusing on a particular representative case of it will help to illustrate the issue’s ethical dimensions. (shrink)

Experimenters claim some nonhuman mammals have metacognition. If correct, the results indicate some animal minds are more complex than ordinarily presumed. However, some philosophers argue for a deflationary reading of metacognition experiments, suggesting that the results can be explained in first-order terms. We agree with the deflationary interpretation of the data but we argue that the metacognition research forces the need to recognize a heretofore underappreciated feature in the theory of animal minds, which we call Unity. The disparate mental states (...) of an animal must be unified if deflationary accounts of metacognition are to hold and untoward implications avoided. Furthermore, once Unity is acknowledged, the deflationary interpretation of the experiments reveals an elevated moral standing for the nonhumans in question. (shrink)

I Primi princìpi metafisici della scienza della natura di Kant sono stati approfonditamente letti dai filosofi dell’età kantiana, dai cosiddetti minori e dai grandi, spesso in dialogo tra loro, come Hegel e Schelling. Hegel, in particolare, cerca di mostrare come possano contribuire alla formazione del concetto di assoluto, di totalità e, nello stesso tempo, come possano salvaguardare l’individualità specifica degli enti. Nella Differenza dei sistemi filosofici di Fichte e Schelling, l’interpretazione dei Primi princìpi metafisici conduce a una nozione discorsiva di (...) assoluto, inteso come totalità immanente delle condizioni intellettuali dell’esperienza. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that deception of the enemy can be morally permissible in war. However, the question of the morally acceptable limits to deception in war has barely been explored in contemporary ethics. This paper defends the thesis that there are no moral limits on military deception per se, that is, no limits based on the ethics of truthfulness. Rather, all moral restriction against deception in war is based on another moral principle: military deception is morally unacceptable only when (...) it violates the principle of not harming those who do not intend to harm us. (shrink)

L’intérêt que Lacan porte aux probabilités, à la théorie des jeux et à la théorie de la décision, lui permet d’interpréter le calcul des partis et le fameux argument du pari. Partant d’une critique de l’esthétique transcendantale de Kant, que Lacan propose aux philosophes de remplacer par l’espace et le temps logiques de la théorie des jeux, le psychanalyste se tourne vers Pascal pour montrer qu’il est probablement l’ancêtre de la théorie des jeux et de la décision. Nombre d’interprétations de (...) Pascal qui auront cours dans les années 1970, devront, peut-être sans le savoir, à cette interprétation lacanienne, des éléments essentiels. (shrink)

Desde un futuro anterior el pensamiento de la deconstrucción _asedia_ a la filosofía del martillo nietzscheana, ya que nos permite re-escribirla a partir de la nueva perspectiva que inaugura. En este trabajo nos proponemos abordar principalmente los trabajos de Nietzsche _Sobre verdad y mentira en sentido extramoral_ y _Sobre la utilidad y el perjuicio de la historia para la vida_, para analizar el modo en que, en estos textos tempranos, la escritura derridiana reconfigura el entramado filosófico nietzscheano.

This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument (...) is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay explores the philosophical insights of Zhu Xi, Wang YangMing, Kant, and Husserl and therefore proposes a new epistemic constructivism. It demonstrates that a knowing mind is a co...