A god is a cosmic designer-creator. Atheism says the number of gods is 0. But it is hard to defeat the minimal thesis that some possible universe is actualized by some possible god. Monotheists say the number of gods is 1. Yet no degree of perfection can be coherently assigned to any unique god. Lewis says the number of gods is at least the second beth number. Yet polytheists cannot defend an arbitrary plural number of gods. An alternative is that, (...) for every ordinal, there is a god whose perfection is proportional to it. The n -th god actualizes the best universe(s) in the n -th level of an axiological hierarchy of possible universes. Despite its unorthodoxy, ordinal polytheism has many metaphysically attractive features and merits more serious study. (shrink)

The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so that there (...) is an important divergence here which can easily be overlooked. (shrink)

IntroductionAll states routinely inflict punishment, often quite harsh punishment, for criminal offences committed by persons who are subject to their laws; but it is remarkably difficult to provide a satisfactory normative justification for this practice.This paper is a review essay of Tadros . References to the book will be by way of parentheses in the text. Non-consequentialist accounts, such as retributivism, can readily explain why some kinds of wrongs are punishable, but find it difficult to accommodate the intuition that deterrence (...) can justify punishment. Consequentialist theories can easily explain why harmful conduct is punishable, but struggle to account for the intuition that only the factually guilty should be punished or for the criminal jurist’s obsession with questions of fault and responsibility. Theories that combine elements of retributivism and consequentialism are therefore quite attractive. In The Ends of Harm, Victor Tadros offers such a hybrid account. Acco .. (shrink)

This introductory essay discusses how the trope of “religious violence” is operative in contemporary discussions concerning the so-called “return of religion” and the “post-secular constellation.” The author argues that the development of a genuine phenomenology of “religious violence” calls on us to critically reconsider the modern discourses that all too unambiguously tie religion and violence together. In a first part, the paper fleshes out the fault lines of a secularist modernity spinning out of control. In a second part, it demonstrates (...) how the “liberal imaginary” revolves around individualist conceptions of freedom and sovereignty that, on their part, become parasitic upon imaginations of disorder, otherness and violence. In a third part, the author demonstrates how these insights call for developing a transformed phenomenological framework in order to give a more sensible account of “religious violence.” Finally, in presenting the articles gathered in this “special issue” of Continental Philosophy Review, some pathways into such a sensibilized phenomenology of “religious violence” are outlined. (shrink)

Notre analyse pose le problème du rapport entre éducation et développement, et plus précisément, nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure l’éducation peut conduire au développement humain. Il s’agit là d’une question à propos de laquelle les pédagogies traditionnelle et nouvelle sont opposées. Notre objectif, dans ce travail, a consisté à montrer que l’éducation ne peut conduire au développement humain que si elle parvient à prendre en charge les deux dimensions fondamentales de l’homme que sont son individualité et sa personnalité. Pour (...) nous, une éducation capable d’assurer le développement humain serait tout autant celle qui considérerait l’homme dans sa totalité et l’engagerait sur un chemin ininterrompu d’apprentissage. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s new categorical imperative : it suggests that the new imperative is an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential part of moral philosophy, (...) and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge to be translated into right action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My interpretation of the new categorical imperative focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the old, Kantian one—self-evidence and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. (shrink)

Can any being worthy of worship make others worship it? I think not. By way of an analogy to love, I argue that it is perfectly coherent to think that one could be made to worship. However, forcing someone to worship violates their autonomy, not because worship must be freely given, but because forced worship would be inauthentic—much like love earned through potions. For this reason, I argue that one cannot be made to worship properly; forced worship would be unfitting. (...) My principal claim is that no being worthy of worship could exercise the power to make others worship it, since the act of making another worship would necessarily make one unworthy of worship. (shrink)

In this paper I first aim to identify, from a perspective mindful of both analytic and Continental traditions, the central normative issues at stake in the various debates concerning commodification in law. Although there now exists a wealth of thoughtful literature in this area, I often find myself disoriented within the webs of moral criteria used to analyze the increasingly ubiquitous practice of converting legal goods into monetary values. I therefore attempt to distinguish and organize these often conflated conceptual distinctions (...) across several registers of moral analysis. Second, I formulate what I consider the most illuminating questions regarding the criteria used to evaluate commodification in law. Critiques of commodification in law face what I call problems of ideology, intractability, and hyperbole, and identifying these issues helps to explain the momentum of the law and economics movement. (shrink)

Após consolidar o fundamento objetivo da lei moral na razão pura prática, Immanuel Kant investiga o fundamento subjetivo e introduz o sentimento. De produto da razão, a lei moral será examinada como efeito sobre o ânimo, numa dialética de desprazer e prazer, da qual surge o sentimento moral. O presente artigo visa problematizar este aspecto da ética do filósofo à luz da Crítica da faculdade do juízo e dos conceitos princípio do prazer e princípio da realidade de Sigmund Freud. Ao (...) colocar em questão a relação entre sentimento de prazer e moral nos dois pensadores, indaga se no filósofo não estaria em questão a descoberta da realidade interna da heteronomia. (shrink)

Partindo da proposta ontológica de Leibniz, a ideia de perfeição dá origem à discussão estética germânica. O grande questionamento é se o gosto está ligado a uma concepção de perfeição inerente à realidade ou se é o resultado da dinâmica dos sentidos, responsáveis pelas sensações. Reformulando a concepção estética moderna, Kant não concebe nenhuma validade de coisa-em-si para o gosto, ele não está nas coisas nelas mesmas, mas antes na maneira de operar da faculdade de julgar reflexiva. Reconhecendo esta nova (...) perspectiva, e encontrando nela lacunas no que diz respeito à aproximação entre razão e sensibilidade, Schiller propõe uma nova criação da estética como modelo de formação do homem. (shrink)

Entre as seções iniciais da Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes, Kant interpõe a dialética natural que justifica a transição da razão humana vulgar para a filosófica. Esse momento define o sentido da analítica da moralidade, tanto na Fundamentação quanto na Crítica da razão prática, sugere um projeto de reconstrução, cujo ponto de partida não constitui uma necessidade especulativa. Por isto, nesses escritos sobre a ética, além da busca do princípio a priori da lei moral, o filósofo planeja um retorno ao (...) homem empírico. Problematizar a relação entre dialética natural e analítica da moralidade é o propósito da presente reflexão, sob duas hipóteses. A problemática da dialética natural constitui fio condutor entre a primeira e a segunda obras de Kant sobre a ética. A partir dela uma arquitetônica da ética pode ser pensada, um projeto sustentado na existência da lei moral no conhecimento popular e para o qual deve retornar. (shrink)

O principal objectivo do artigo é pensar a educação como um valor intemporal. Apresentar-se-á um duplo sentido que esta intemporalidade pode assumir: A educação surge como um valor essencial, quer ao longo da história, quer ao longo da nossa vida. Tendo em consideração o primeiro sentido proposto, procurar-se-á realçar a sua intemporalidade, nomeadamente em terreno filosófico. Destacar-se-ão, neste sentido, as seguintes obras: A República, de Platão; O Mestre, de Santo Agostinho; Emílio, de Rousseau, e Pedagogia, de Kant. Relativamente ao segundo (...) sentido, quanto à intemporalidade da educação ao longo da vida, destacar-se-ão os quatro pilares fundamentais desta mesma educação, como apresentados no pertinente Relatório para a UNESCO da Comissão Internacional sobre Educação para o século XXI: aprender a conhecer; aprender a fazer; aprender a viver juntos; aprender a ser. Por fim, pretender-se-á evidenciar a grande finalidade comum aos dois sentidos propostos: o aprender a ser. (shrink)

I critically examine the plausibility of Kant’s conception of rationalising, a form of self-deception that plays a crucial role for Kant’s moral psychology and his conception of the functions of critical practical philosophy. The main problem I see with Kant’s conception is that there are no theory-independent criteria to determine whether an exercise of rational capacities constitutes rationalising. Kant believes that rationalising is wide-spread and he charges the popular philosophers and other ethical theorists with rationalising. Yet, his opponents could, in (...) turn, charge him with rationalising and some theorists, namely Act-Consequentialists, seem to be in an even stronger position to charge Kant with rationalising than vice versa. In response, I propose standards that do not assume a specific normative theory and that become apparent when we look at clear-cut abuses of rationality. These standards of minimally decent reasoning can help us diagnose rationalising. I develop these standards by looking at inadequate uses of rational capacities that should strike us as problematic regardless of the specific ethical theory we adopt. I emphasise that even an abuse of rational capacities can yield true results and that we can never tell from a single judgement that someone rationalises. Rather, we must look for patterns. (shrink)

The initial problem which motivated the writing of this thesis arose from reading of Emile by Rousseau. In this work, it was possible to detect the influence of different theoretical approaches, such as rationalism and empiricism, inspiring the development of the educational plan designed by Rousseau for his imaginary student (Emile). The very core question of the present thesis regards to whether there was a theory of knowledge pertaining to Rousseau’s philosophical thinking and, if so, how it was related to (...) his theories of education. In the set of his oeuvre, Rousseau’s affiliation to authors like Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Malebranche, as well as Condillac, Diderot, D’Holbach and Helvétius was discovered. As the reading of the great philosophical work of Rousseau progressed, an original knowledge theory was discovered, of the kind which accepts the coexistence of opposite thoughts. Pedagogy, in the context of (the work) Emile, arose out of the miscellany of such theories and also for the intense philosophical maturing process on the core of Rousseau’s thinking. This study intended, therefore, to understand the origin and development of Rousseau’s theory of knowledge, and also to figure out how the philosopher formulated his theories on Education, especially in Emile. The object of this research, materialized through the extensive bibliography of the Swiss philosopher, was intensively read and analyzed. The methodology used was that of comparative, descriptive and critical documentary research of the mentioned authors. This research is divided into three sections: the first one intends to investigate the philosophical influence from different authors on the foundations of Rousseau’s epistemology; the second section addresses Rousseau’s theories of Education; the third and final part investigates the link between theory of knowledge and Education within Rousseau’s philosophical thought. -/- . (shrink)

Although wonder is a response to what is extraordinary or regarded as such, this covers a variety of things. Hence, wonder covers a spectrum from mere surprise or puzzlement to stronger responses like dread or amazement; moreover, it is often linked to other powerful responses like fear or admiration, and it can lead people into many pursuits and areas of reflection. I look at the variety of the objects of wonder, and of the neighbouring responses and conceptual connections found here, (...) then I discuss the response of wonder itself, and its causes and effects. Finally, I ask why the sense of wonder can atrophy, and whether it can be suppressed deliberately. (shrink)

An existential interpretation of student angst in Chinese universities raises issues of autonomy and freedom. The governance arrangements in China create a conflict for Chinese students who in their coursework are urged to become critical-minded and open-minded. In this essay, Kant’s moral theory provides access to this phenomenon. His theory of duty–rationality–autonomy–freedom relates the liberty of thought to principled action. Kantian ideals still influence western business and university practice and they become relevant in China as that country modernises. The abilities (...) of graduates which officials say the country needs—insightfulness, creativity, innovation, progressiveness and commitment—are only achievable by professionals who are independent minded, rational and who commit to act on their own conclusions. Such people are Kant’s autonomous persons. Chinese students increasingly confront a conflicted educational environment. Universities require students to think, analyse and argue. An outcome of this deliberation is freedom, as construed by Kant as an ‘inner’construct. When students are unable to exercise Kantian freedom in matters which concern them they experience the angst of freedom. Students may carry a burden derived from bridles on information and authoritarian restrictions on dialogue. (shrink)

Morality is a critical factor in leadership that its absence could turn an otherwise powerful leadership model (i.e. transformational leadership) into a disastrous outcome. The importance of morality for leaders is self-evident in light of the far-reaching effects of leaders' actions or inaction on other people. Such proposition necessitates the discourse in the objectivity of universal moral principles as the legitimate basis of a sound understanding of moral leadership. Examining transformational leadership from a moral-laden perspective, this paper argues that morality (...) is a necessary component of leadership and that deontological moral reasoning provides a sufficient ground for morally attractive leadership theories. (shrink)

The argument from internal relatedness was one of the major nineteenth century neo-Hegelian arguments for monism. This argument has been misunderstood, and may even be sound. The argument, as I reconstruct it, proceeds in two stages: first, it is argued that all things are internally related in ways that render them interdependent; second, the substantial unity of the whole universe is inferred from the interdependence of all of its parts. The guiding idea behind the argument is that failure of free (...) recombination is the modal signature of an integrated monistic cosmos. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated with one another... (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, p. 43). (shrink)

Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, (...) to explain the difference. In the second part of this paper, I suggest that metaethical expressivists can provide a good explanation: by extending the analysis of ordinary (non-normative) demands and recommendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account that captures the key differences between morality and rationality. (shrink)

Although machine learning has been successful in recent years and is increasingly being deployed in the sciences, enterprises or administrations, it has rarely been discussed in philosophy beyond the philosophy of mathematics and machine learning. The present contribution addresses the resulting lack of conceptual tools for an epistemological discussion of machine learning by conceiving of deep learning networks as ‘judging machines’ and using the Kantian analysis of judgments for specifying the type of judgment they are capable of. At the center (...) of the argument is the fact that the functionality of deep learning networks is established by training and cannot be explained and justified by reference to a predefined rule-based procedure. Instead, the computational process of a deep learning network is barely explainable and needs further justification, as is shown in reference to the current research literature. Thus, it requires a new form of justification, that is to be specified with the help of Kant’s epistemology. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the (re-)conceptualisation of responsible innovation by proposing an evolutionary economic approach that focuses on the role of consumers in the innovation process. After a discussion of the philosophical foundations and ethical implications of this approach, which bears an explanatory potential that has not been adequately considered in previous discussions of responsible innovation, we present a first step towards capturing the important but often neglected role of consumers in innovation processes (including responsible innovation): We propose an agent-based (...) model that incorporates a multidimensional space of characteristics in which new products or services are represented by more than the mere aspect of price and quality. Instead, innovations are denoted by a large set of characteristics, including also negative or harmful ones. The model is used to illustrate that consumers’ heterogeneity and bounded rationality – even if considered in a simple manner – indeed play a crucial role in the creation and diffusion of responsible innovation which can and should be used for further work in this field and for possible extensions of the model. (shrink)

Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give (...) us a kind of evidence about the nature of the mind even if this evidence is not absolutely incorrigible. (shrink)

Com o advento da modernidade a filosofia passou a exigir que a religião prestasse contas à razão. A filosofia da religião de Kant é um exemplo desse tipo de iniciativa. Kant propôs julgar a religião no tribunal da razão. Mais de 200 anos depois, Habermas buscou renovar o projeto kantiano. Nosso trabalho visa esclarecer o modo como cada autor realiza o julgamento da religião no tribunal da razão. Além disso, discutiremos a relevância desse tipo de abordagem proposta por ambos os (...) filósofos. (shrink)

Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining (...) their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings. (shrink)

The present work, elaborated from a theoretical, bibliographical and documentary character, has for objective to develop some theoretical boardings regarding the concept of tolerance of a philosophical point of view, during a historical context that if initiates in the thought of John Locke, in the Modern Age, the scope of the religious wars, when such concept acquires a more rigorous and critical character, going until the contemporaneidade, period where the tolerance starts to acquire a paper of prominence for the understanding (...) of the systems politicians and the societies marked for one raised degree of complexity and pluralism. Authors as Stuart Mill, Bobbio, Adorno and Habermas, among others, present significant contributions from its reflections and questionings for the studies of this thematic one as well as for the confrontation of the patologias that afflict the contemporaneidade. More recently, the fact of the tolerance to have if transformed into consensus and normative landmark, through the elaboration and approval of the World-wide Declaration of the Principles of the Tolerance, in the year of 1995, for the ONU, reflects the importance and the central paper that the tolerance exerts today in the search of the peace and the construction of a world more just and human being. (shrink)

Je me propose d'examiner les paragraphes 18 et 19 de la deuxième partie des Prolégomènes. Bien que ces deux paragraphes ne constituent pas l'intégralité de la déduction transcendantale des Prolégomènes, ils ont une fonction essentielle dans la mesure où ils exposent l’argument entier in nuce. Ces deux sections établissent de façon claire que la doctrine de l'idéalisme critique, présentée dans la première partie des Prolégomènes comme un idéalisme qui ne supprime pas « l'existence de la chose qui apparaît », joue (...) un rôle indispensable dans la déduction transcendantale, qui est présentée dans la deuxième partie à partir de la distinction entre jugement de perception et jugement d'expérience. (shrink)

Neste texto, a proposta é mostrar a centralidade do conceito de autonomia, patente à atualidade da filosofia de Kant convergente com a pedagogia moral. Para tanto, revisitaremos algumas informações extraídas da obra do filósofo, enquanto contribuições que originam do contexto do Esclarecimento. A concepção implicada à necessidade da educação do homem distingue-se pelo interesse social e preponderância do bem comum, tendo-se o educando como principal sujeito do processo educacional, segundo o pensamento em que a humanidade é a destinatária e corresponsável (...) pelos efeitos da educação em cada indivíduo. (shrink)

In a thoughtful paper, Peter Martin Jaworski has written, “The debate over originals, authenticity, fakes, duplicates, and forgery got its start in the mid-60s and then continued until the ‘80s.”Peter Martin Jaworski. “In Defense of Fakes and Artistic Treason: Why Visually-Indistinguishable Duplicates Are as Good as the Originals.” Journal of Value Inquiry (2013), pp. 391–405. Quotation at p. 392. The debate, at least insofar as I participated in it, questioned whether original paintings and forgeries were sufficiently alike – sufficiently the (...) same kinds of things – that as a general rule the same qualities could be predicated of them. I and others argued they were not. To know the qualities of a painting, to make sense of the many often conflicting interpretations critics may offer of the same canvass, one must as a first step know what kind of painting it is. The relevant qualities of a painting, call them “artistic” or “aesthetic” or “stylistic” or whatever, are predicated of them i .. (shrink)

O artigo visa discutir formas de pensar o conceito de liberdade para além de sua submissão às figuras da autonomia. O objetivo é avaliar a necessidade e pertinência de pensarmos, em nosso contexto sócio-histórico, a liberdade como heteronomia sem servidão. Conceito este que nasce da crítica à elevação do paradigma do auto-pertencimento a condição de via única para a definição da liberdade.

The essay recapitulates the decisive steps in Heidegger’s development of the problem of human freedom. The interpretation is set in the context of a general matrix for how freedom is treated in the tradition, as both a theoretical ontological problem, and as practical appeal. According to some readers, Heidegger’s thinking is a philosophy of freedom throughout; according to others his “turning” implies abandoning the idea of human freedom as a metaphysical remnant. The essay seeks an intermediate path, by following his (...) explicit attempts to develop an ontology based on the concept of freedom in the earlier writings, showing how this is the central theme in his confrontation and also his final break with German idealism, with Kant and with Schelling in particular, and with the prospects for a system of freedom. However, this break does not terminate his preoccupation with the problem of freedom, which is then transformed into the idea of thinking as a practice of freedom, as a way of reaching into “the free”. (shrink)

This paper presents a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s (by Debreu, Tversky and others) are analyzed in a non-probabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that initial appearances (...) notwithstanding, these cases should not be classed as instances of irrationality in choice or reasoning. One way of explaining away their apparent oddity is to view certain aspects of these examples as making particular options salient. The decision problems in point can then be solved by ‘picking’ these options, although they could not have been ‘chosen’ in a principled way, due to ties or incomparabilities with alternative options. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity plays an important role in the public discussion about ethical questions concerning modern medicine and biology. At the same time, there is a widespread skepticism about the possibility to determine the content and the claims of human dignity. The article goes back to Kantian Moral Philosophy, in order to show that human dignity has in fact a determinable content not as a norm in itself, but as the principle and ground of human rights and any (...) deontological norms in biomedical ethics. When it comes to defining the scope of human dignity, i.e., the question which entities are protected by human dignity, Kant clearly can be found on the “pro life”-side of the controversy. This, however, is the result of some specific implications of Kant’s transcendental approach that may be put into question. (shrink)

I discuss the role played by ordinary or everyday experience in the origin of philosophy. I begin with a discussion of the disappearance of production from the tripartite Aristotelian division of the arts and sciences, and indicate how production reappears as the assimilation of both theory and practice. If knowing is making, then there is no distinction between philosophy and poetry. In particular, the everyday or pre-theoretical world loses its status as the original source and subject-matter of philosophy It becomes (...) an artifact, and in the age of science, an artifact of the "folk-world." The result is the deterioration of human nature, and science is deprived of its human significance. The first step back to clarity is to show that words like "reason" and "good," the core of moral competence, are identical at their root with phronesisor the rationality of common sense. (shrink)

No presente trabalho será demonstrada a estreita, embora discreta, relação da filosofia moral de Kant com a ética antiga, especialmente com o estoicismo de Cícero. O tema será explicitado mediante uma aproximação entre as obras da Crítica da razão prática e Sobre os fins (De finibus), respectivamente de cada um desses autores. Será destacada a crítica de Kant à identificação entre virtude e felicidade e sua reformulação sintética no conceito de “sumo bem”. Na conclusão se torna claro que a realização (...) moral da razão, reivindicada por Cícero, encontra na reformulação de Kant sua determinação mais precisa. The crises of practical reason and stoicismThe present paper shows the close albeit subtle relation of Kant’s moral philosophy to ancient ethics, especially Cicero’s Stoicism. The subject is made explicit by means of a rapprochement between the Critique of practical reason and De finibus, so as to be highlight Kant’s criticism of the classical identifying of virtue and happiness and his synthetical recasting of the concept of the supreme good. The essay concludes by making clear that the moral actualization of reason, reclaimed by Cicero, finds in Kant’s reformulation its most precise determination. (shrink)

Pretendemos reflexionar sobre la manera en la que los discursos audiovisuales están hilvanando las relaciones entre crisis medioambiental y quiebra de los marcos comunitarios sociales. Partiendo de una metodología híbrida basada tanto en la filosofía del arte (y de la ecología) de Heidegger como del análisis narratológico, proponemos pensar el campo mediante dos modelos: las representaciones mainstream que se basan en la repetición de estructuras narrativas clásicas donde la amenaza climática es un conflicto solucionable mediante una intervención heroica y aquellos (...) textos complejos en los que se exige el replanteamiento de una eco(teo)logía que ponga en su foco la necesidad de reactivar la comunidad. (shrink)

No artigo Prefácio à transgressão, revivemos dois cenários que encontram seu ponto de inflexão na Crítica da Razão Pura, especificamente, no gesto contestatório de determinação de limites realizado nesta Crítica. Em um dos cenários, que mais tarde seria detalhado em As palavras e as coisas, e já bastante visitado por seus leitores, Foucault problematiza os desdobramentos deste gesto, transgressão que inaugura a épistémè moderna: o Homem e sua finitude. No outro cenário, objeto deste artigo, Foucault analisa como este gesto poderia (...) ser delineado: como poderia ser possível uma transgressão desta finitude. Nosso principal objetivo é problematizar a linguagem desta transgressão e propor um caminho à finitude transgredida. (shrink)

“Materialism,” which is central for Marxism, is apparently less important for Marx, who, after the “Theses on Feuerbach,” only rarely mentions it. In Capital, Marx mentions “materialism” only two times: in a passage on Giambattista Vico, an important eighteenth Italian philosopher, and in the Afterword to the second German edition in the famous comment on Hegelian dialectic. This paper concerns the reference to Vico. This reference is important in two ways: in calling attention to a basic similarity between Marx’s position (...) and Vico’s constructivist approach to knowledge, and in suggesting Marx’s position is not science but rather a particular kind of philosophy. (shrink)

A nexus of imperfect duty, defined as positive commitments that have practical limits, describes business behavior toward building affable and virtuous relations, maintaining reasoned social discourse, and performing the due diligence necessary for making knowledgeable business decisions. A theory of the development and extent of the limits of these imperfect managerial duties is presented here, a theory that in part explains the activities and personnel included under the firm’s umbrella. As a result, the nexus of imperfect duty is shown to (...) complement the perfect-duty-based nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm. The existence of flexible trade-offs involving these duties, trade-offs limited by contractual arrangements whether explicit or implicit, is shown to be one of the advantages of imperfect duty for developing business relations. (shrink)

Resumo: O texto aqui apresentado analisa aspectos relevantes da complexa relação que Bergson estabelece com Kant. Defende-se a hipótese de que Bergson não pode ser considerado mero adversário do filósofo alemão, mas seu projeto filosófico tem como objetivo retomar a metafísica, levando em consideração os limites que a crítica kantiana lhe impôs. Nesse sentido, a Crítica da Razão Pura, à qual Bergson dedicou sua atenção, serve de guia e apoio para a colocação das questões propriamente metafísicas, as quais a filosofia (...) da duração busca responder. Procuramos mostrar também que, se Bergson criticou Kant em vários momentos da sua obra, foi apenas na medida em que a Crítica o impedia e impedia os outros de avançar. A relação entre as interdições kantianas para a razão especulativa e as ilusões da inteligência dissolvidas em A Evolução Criadora revela como Kant condensa ilusões que existiam antes dele e que, nesse sentido, Bergson não é nem pré-crítico, nem pós-kantiano. Em suma, defendemos que Bergson desloca as análises críticas e rompe com Kant do interior de sua filosofia, que ele divide em duas tendências - uma que ele rejeita, como antiga, outra da qual ele se apropria.: This paper examines important aspects of Bergson's complex relationship with Kant. Our hypothesis defends that Bergson can not be considered a mere opponent of Kant, but that instead his philosophical project aims to renew metaphysics, taking into account the limits that the Kantian critique has imposed. In this sense, the Critique of Pure Reason, to which Bergson devoted his attention, serves as a guide and support for reworking metaphysical questions that the philosophy of duration seeks to answer. We have also shown that if Bergson criticized Kant at various points in his work, it was only to the extent that the Critique was an impediment to moving forward. The relation between Kantian interdictions to speculative reason and the illusions of intelligence dissolved by the analysis of Creative Evolution shows how Kant condenses illusions that existed before him. In in this sense, Bergson is neither pre-critical nor post-Kantian. To sum up, we argue that Bergson displaces critical analysis and breaks with Kant from the inside of Kant's philosophy, which Bergson divides into two tendencies, one that he rejects as old, another that he accepts. (shrink)

One of the primary concerns of Immanuel Kant in his major works on philosophy of religion is the doctrine of radical evil. He was greatly perplexed by the conundrums of this doctrine. Although Kant claimed it to be a universal trait, he failed to give a formal proof supporting it. However, he asserted that the conducts of human beings are enough to demonstrate the nature of radical evil. The complexity of the doctrine is further fuelled by introducing the idea of (...) the need of divine intervention for one to overcome such moral-religious predicament. Critical responses from both Christian and secular scholars reflect interesting take on his ethico-religious discourse. One of the prominent criticisms to Kant’s doctrine of radical evil is its relapse to religious absurdity reflecting the Christian doctrine of the ‘fall of mankind’ as narrated in the first book of the Bible. Consequently, the seriousness of the criticism not only affects the moral maxims but also the portrayal of its strong religious affinity, rendering the doctrine even more allusive and perplexing. The article intends to throw some light on the pragmatic perspective of the doctrine with special focus on the universality of the radical evil nature of human. (shrink)