O presente trabalho investiga a crítica de Rorty à teoria do conhecimento como essência especular. Considerando a ideia presente na tradição filosófica de que o conhecimento verdadeiro é aquele que representa fidedignamente a realidade, Rorty se insurge contra esta posição, argumentado que, o pensamento representacionista se ergueu a partir da crença de que é possível construir descrições do mundo que espelhem sua própria natureza, ou seja, descrições que representem de maneira fidedigna realidade, que é objeto do conhecimento e do mundo, (...) tal como ela é em si mesma, no qual a filosofia criou uma teoria do conhecimento como essência especular. Desse modo, o trabalho direciona-se para a seguinte questão: de que forma, a teoria do conhecimento como essência especular ocasionou peseudosproblemas para a filosofia antirrepresentacionista de Richard Rorty? Sendo assim, este trabalho tentará encontrar uma resposta ou um direcionamento para a resolução desse problema. (shrink)

The paper presents, firstly, a brief review of the long history\nof information ethics beginning with the Greek concept of parrhesia\nor freedom of speech as analyzed by Michel Foucault. The recent concept\nof information ethics is related particularly to problems which arose\nin the last century with the development of computer technology and\nthe internet. A broader concept of information ethics as dealing\nwith the digital reconstruction of all possible phenomena leads to\nquestions relating to digital ontology. Following Heidegger{\textquoteright}s\nconception of the relation between ontology and metaphysics, (...) the\nauthor argues that ontology has to do with Being itself and not just\nwith the Being of beings which is the matter of metaphysics. The\nprimary aim of an ontological foundation of information ethics is\nto question the metaphysical ambitions of digital ontology understood\nas today{\textquoteright}s pervading understanding of Being. The\nauthor analyzes some challenges of digital technology, particularly\nwith regard to the moral status of digital agents. The author argues\nthat information ethics does not only deal with ethical questions\nrelating to the infosphere. This view is contrasted with arguments\npresented by Luciano Floridi on the foundation of information ethics\nas well as on the moral status of digital agents. It is argued that\na reductionist view of the human body as digital data overlooks the\nlimits of digital ontology and gives up one basis for ethical orientation.\nFinally issues related to the digital divide as well as to intercultural\naspects of information ethics are explored {\textendash} and long\nand short-term agendas for appropriate responses are presented. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an original account of the distinction between the spheres of Sitten that goes beyond the traditional one based on the nature of incentives, since this underestimates some of their characteristics. First, the paper identifies in obligatio a common source between Ethics and Right. Then, it explores how in the Metaphysics of Morals the connection between law and incentive constitutes a more relevant criterion to distinguish ethical lawgiving from juridical lawgiving. Specifically, it demonstrates (...) that such connection: to be ethical should be linear, understood as a necessary self-determined process of connecting law to incentive; to be juridical should be mediated, namely it comprises an inclusive disjunction between two modalities of connecting law to incentive: a non-necessary linear and a divergent one. It concludes by exploring the implications of such perspective on the notions of internalisation and externalisation associated to each lawgiving. (shrink)

Arendt a écrit deux volumes dédiés à la pensée et la volonté qui sont réunis dans le texte La vie de l’esprit, mais en raison de sa mort inopportune, son travail consacré au jugement, et plus spécialement au jugement politique, n’a jamais été achevé. Cependant, nous disposons d’une quantité significative d’écrits sur ce thème, provenant de ses conférences sur la troisième Critique de Kant. Le jugement et la pensée sont essentiels pour empêcher ce qu’Arendt appelle «la banalité du mal». En (...) s’inspirant de saint Augustin et du travail d’Arendt sur Augustin, cet article entend démontrer qu’une autre forme de mal sérieux trouve sa racine dans ce qu’Augustin appelle la libido habendi et la libido dominandi, le désir ou la pulsion de dominer et posséder. Nous essaierons de montrer que la solution d’Arendt au problème de la banalité du mal peut aussi s’appliquer au désir et au plaisir très humains de causer ou d’infliger du mal. (shrink)

Drawing on Lennart Nordenfelt’s distinction between the four distinct senses of dignity, I elucidate the meaning of dignity in the context of research involving human subjects. I acknowledge that different interpretations of the personal senses of dignity may be acceptable in human subject research, but that inherent dignity (Menschenwürde) is not open to interpretation in the same way. In order to map out the grounds for interpreting dignity, I examine the unique application of the principle of respect for dignity in (...) Canada’s research ethics guidelines. These guidelines are unique because they consider dignity to be a foundational concept and the protection of the dignity of research subjects is regarded as a measure that prevents “the impoverishment of humanity as a whole”. While the conception of humanity invoked here is incomplete, Canada’s research ethics guidelines nevertheless represent a more European approach to biomedical policy. Finally, in order to correct a pervasive blind spot in contemporary policy on research involving human subjects, I sketch a functional model for attributing inherent dignity that avoids the untenable connotations of speciesism. (shrink)

The ancient dualism of a sensible and an intelligible world important in Neoplatonic and medieval philosophy, down to Descartes and Kant, would seem to be supplanted today by a scientific view of mind-in-nature. Here, we revive the old dualism in a modified form, and describe mind as a symbolic language, founded in linguistic recursive computation according to the Church-Turing thesis, constituting a world L that serves the human organism as a map of the Universe U. This methodological distinction of L (...) vs. U helps to understand how and why structures of phenomena come to be opposed to their nature in human thought, a central topic in Heideggerian philosophy. U is uncountable according to Georg Cantor’s set theory but Language L, based on the recursive function system, is countable, and anchored in a Gray Area within U of observable phenomena, typically symbols, prelinguistic structures, genetic-historical records of their origins. Symbols, the phenomena most familiar to mathematicians, are capable of being addressed in L-processing. The Gray Area is the human Environment E, where we can live comfortably, that we manipulate to create our niche within hostile U, with L offering overall competence of the species to survive. The human being is seen in the light of his or her linguistic recursively computational mind. Nature U, by contrast, is the unfathomable abyss of being, infinite labyrinth of darkness, impenetrable and hostile to man. The U-man, biological organism, is a stranger in L-man, the mind-controlled rational person, as expounded by Saint Paul. Noumena can now be seen to reside in L, and are not fully supported by phenomena. Kant’s noumenal cause is the mental L-image of only partly phenomenal causation. Mathematics occurs naturally in pre-linguistic phenomena, including natural laws, which give rise to pure mathematical structures in the world of L. Mathematical foundation within philosophy is reversed to where natural mathematics in the Gray Area of pre-linguistic phenomena can be seen to be a prerequisite for intellectual discourse. Lesser, nonverbal versions of L based on images are shared with animals. (shrink)

The present paper suggests to consider Kierkegaard’s use of Abraham’s story in Fear and Trembling in regulative terms, that is, to consider it as a model – not for our moral behaviour but rather for our religious behaviour. To do so, I first rely on recent literature to argue that Kierkegaard should be regarded as a distinctively post-Kantian philosopher: namely, a philosopher who goes beyond Kant in a way that is nevertheless true to the spirit of Kant’s original critical philosophy. (...) Then, I present a post-Kantian reading of Fear and Trembling, focusing on the problematic implications that result from comparing this text with Hegel’s theory of recognition. Finally, I submit that sacrifice in Fear and Trembling is a regulative notion in a Kantian sense. This interpretation addresses some of the most problematic aspects of the text. I conclude that the regulativity of sacrifice may be regarded as an important and perhaps an essential component of Kierkegaard’s overall philosophical strategy. (shrink)

J. E. Grunig's seminal work on excellence theory and subsequent works by other scholars advance the two-way symmetrical model as a best-practice approach to public relations. In part, two-way symmetry is preferred because of an assertion that it is the most ethical form of practice. However, only within a means-based deontological framework do two-way symmetry and the principle of dialogue emerge as universally ethical. Taking an ends-based utilitarian standpoint makes the potential ethical flaws of two-way symmetry apparent. Issues of moral (...) luck, hegemony, and the limitations of dialogue also pose problems for the moral primacy claims surrounding two-way symmetry. The analysis that follows points toward a need for a more relative and contingent approach to PR ethics, and by extension to PR practice itself. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é a análise das críticas de Hannah Arendt à concepção dos direitos humanos, introduzida pelo pensamento dos filósofos contratualistas e efetivada, politicamente, pelas revoluções americanas e francesas no final do século XVIII. Contudo, este objetivo não seria plenamente alcançado sem a avaliação da proposta de Arendt para a superação de suas próprias críticas: a reconstrução dos direitos humanos através do reconhecimento que cada indivíduo tem direito a ter direitos, independente das fronteiras do Estado-nação. Arendt vai buscar (...) na moral universalista e cosmopolita kantiana o conceito de humanidade e dá a ele as dimensões ontológicas e políticas necessárias para se construir um espaço público internacional, onde o direito a ter direito seja decorrente do mero pertencimento à humanidade, não se dissolvendo nos limites de cada Estado-nação. The purpose of this article is the analysis of the criticisms of Hannah Arendt's conception of human rights, introduced by the thought of the contractual philosophers and made effective, politically, by American and French revolutions in the late eighteenth century. However, this aim would not be fully achieved without the review of Arendt's proposal to overcome her own criticisms: the reconstruction of human rights by recognizing that every individual has the right to have rights, regardless of borders of the Nation-State. Arendt tries to discover in the universal and cosmopolitan moral of Kant the concept of humanity and gives him the ontological and political dimensions needed to build an international public space where the right to have rights is due to the mere belonging to the humanity, not dissolving itself in the limits of each Nation-State. (shrink)

Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: I promise to love, honour, and cherish .... But this poses a problem. Divorce is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections, a ‘hard-line’ response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the ‘hardship’ response—the hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisors in far too (...) many cases. I resolve the triad by considering the content of the vows. Vows concerning love are not promises at all. We cannot promise to do acts the performance of which is outside our control, and love involves states of mind outside our control. Vows concerning spousal roles are complicated by diverse social understandings of marriage and the centrality of emotion to the roles. (shrink)

Recent Darwin scholarship has provided grounds for recognising the Origin as a literary as well as a scientific achievement. While Darwin was an acute observer, a gifted experimentalist and indefatigable theorist, this essay argues that it was also crucial to his impact that the Origin transcended the putative divide between the scientific and the literary. Analysis of Darwin's development as a writer between his journal-keeping on HMS Beagle and his construction of the Origin argues the latter draws on the pattern (...) of the Romantic or Kantian sublime. The Origin repeatedly uses strategies which challenge the natural-theological appeal to the imagination in conceiving nature. Darwin's sublime coaches the Origin's readers into a position from which to envision nature that reduces and contains its otherwise overwhelming complexity. As such, it was Darwin's literary achievement that enabled him to fashion a new 'habit of looking at things in a given way' that is the centrepiece of the scientific revolution bearing his name. (shrink)

This paper explains the nature and origin of what I am calling Transgressive Realism, a middle path between realism and anti-realism which tries to combine their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses. Kierkegaard created the position by merging Hegel’s insistence that we must have some kind of contact with anything we can call real (thus rejecting noumena), with Kant’s belief that reality fundamentally exceeds our understanding; human reason should not be the criterion of the real. The result is the idea that (...) our most vivid encounters with reality come in experiences that shatter our categories, the way God’s commandment to kill Isaac irreconcilably clashes with the best understanding of ethics we are capable of. I explain the genesis of this idea, and then show it at work in Heidegger and Levinas’ thought. Understanding this position illuminates important aspects of the history of continental philosophy and offers a new perspective on realism. (shrink)

Le principe d’induction est lié à la définition des nombres entiers d’une façon à la fois essentielle et sujette à controverse. Fonde-t-il ces nombres, ou bien trouve-t-il en eux son fondement ? Son statut lui-même peut être conçu de diverses manières. Est-il donné par l’expérience, par l’intuition, par la logique, par convention ? Ces questions furent l’objet d’une âpre discussion, autour des années 1905-1906, dans le cadre plus large d’un débat sur les fondements des mathématiques qui opposa Poincaré aux logicistes (...) et aux « axiomatistes » . Nous proposons dans cet article de faire le point sur les termes et les enjeux de cette discussion. Nous montrerons en outre qu’elle fut l’occasion d’une redéfinition de l’analytique et, par suite, des frontières de la logique.The principle of induction is linked essentially to the definition of “integers”, but at the same time has been the subject of controversy : Is the principle founded on integers or, on the contrary, are integers founded on it ? The principle itself can be understood in different ways : as a result of experiment, intuition, logic or convention. These topics were hotly debated in the years 1905-06, in the context of a larger debate on the foundations of mathematics, in which Poincaré opposed the logicists and the “axiomatists” . This article reconsiders what is at stake by looking at the debate in detail and also shows that the debate provided an opportunity for redefining analyticity, and in doing so, redefining the domain of logic. (shrink)

By starting from the idea of processes of numerical assignment, an explication, á la Kant, of the concept of property is proposed. In this way two results are achieved: on the one hand, the Kantian doctrine of explication is revaluated; on the other hand, the notion of property is tackled from an empiricist point of view based on the representational theory of measurement.

Este texto pretende apresentar, de forma sucinta, um conjunto de estratégias de ?folósofos modernos para a retomada e crítica do ceticismo antigo, procurando destacar algumas semelhanças e diferenças.

No presente artigo investigaremos o sentido político da história na Filosofia da História de Kant e Hegel. Ambos atribuem, cada um à sua maneira, à concretização de um determinado projeto político – cujo cerne é a estruturação do Estado Constitucional – a realização da finalidade suprema da história humana. Analisaremos, para este fim, as obras Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita, escrita por Kant em 1784, cinco anos antes da Revolução Francesa e A Razão na (...) História – uma introdução geral à Filosofia da História, obra organizada a partir dos cursos proferidos por Hegel em sua maturidade. Nas considerações finais, procuraremos problematizar as noções de “sentido” e “finalidade” da História. (shrink)

L’azione morale è soltanto la conclusione e il compimento di un più complesso e stratificato processo deliberativo. Uno dei passaggi cruciali riguarda il ruolo svolto dal «movente». Se da un lato occorre infatti giungere ad una chiara presa di posizione circa l’azione da ritenere realmente morale, dall’altro risulta necessario trovare lo sprone capace di spingerci ad agire in tal senso. L’indagine sul movente riguarda esattamente lo studio del ruolo e della natura di questo sprone. A tematizzare con grande lucidità l’imprescindibile (...) azione del movente morale fu Kant. Egli non soltanto lo distinse dall’individuazione delle ragioni di fondo atte a rendere giusta un’azione, ma cercò anche di inquadrarlo e caratterizzarlo nei propri scritti di filosofia pratica, presentandolo come l’impulso necessario per la conversione di una decisione morale in azione morale. Invero, il contributo offerto dal filosofo prussiano non è privo di difficoltà ed ambiguità. Nelle righe dei suoi testi sembrano emergere più soluzioni per la definizione e la comprensione del movente. È proprio questa difficoltà a stimolare una ricerca più ampia, in cui il confronto fra l’indagine trascendentale e le ipotesi teoriche sul movente si chiarifichino vicendevolmente, testimoniando la lungimiranza filosofica dell’indagine kantiana e la profonda salienza del tema del movente. (shrink)

Focusing on media actions surrounding the initial shootout between the Branch Davidian religious group and agents of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms outside Waco, Texas, in 1993, this article examines legal and ethical duties of the media. Using the legal concept of negligence and the work of several philosophers, the article concludes first that the media did not violate their legal duties but did violate the ethical duty to minimize harm and second that although law and ethical (...) intertwine and often share vocabulary, they are different. (shrink)

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I (...) suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

-/- In this article I deal with the question “How could we renew and enrich computer technology with Kant's help?”. By this I would like to invite computer scientists and engineers to initiate or intensify their cooperation with Kant experts. -/- What I am looking for is a better “method of definition” for software systems, particularly for the development of object-oriented and knowledge-based systems. -/- After a description of the “software crisis”, I deal first with the question why this crisis (...) could not yet be overcome. A way out of this software crisis can be expected from systems which are adapted to the human faculty of thinking. I show which foundation is in my opinion necessary and sketch the principles according to which a “human-centred” method of definition for sych systems could be developed on that foundation with Kant's help. (shrink)

Cancer research is experiencing ‘paradigm instability’, since there are two rival theories of carcinogenesis which confront themselves, namely the somatic mutation theory and the tissue organization field theory. Despite this theoretical uncertainty, a huge quantity of data is available thanks to the improvement of genome sequencing techniques. Some authors think that the development of new statistical tools will be able to overcome the lack of a shared theoretical perspective on cancer by amalgamating as many data as possible. We think instead (...) that a deeper understanding of cancer can be achieved by means of more theoretical work, rather than by merely accumulating more data. To support our thesis, we introduce the analytic view of theory development, which rests on the concept of plausibility, and make clear in what sense plausibility and probability are distinct concepts. Then, the concept of plausibility is used to point out the ineliminable role played by the epistemic subject in the development of statistical tools and in the process of theory assessment. We then move to address a central issue in cancer research, namely the relevance of computational tools developed by bioinformaticists to detect driver mutations in the debate between the two main rival theories of carcinogenesis. Finally, we briefly extend our considerations on the role that plausibility plays in evidence amalgamation from cancer research to the more general issue of the divergences between frequentists and Bayesians in the philosophy of medicine and statistics. We argue that taking into account plausibility-based considerations can lead to clarify some epistemological shortcomings that afflict both these perspectives. (shrink)

This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.

Social networks merge the real and the virtual in virtual actuality that forms the basis of human networks. In this sense, the anthropology of technology, in conjunction with cyberanthropology, allows the diagnosis of a new identity of human beingsstemming from the phenomenon of social networks. Do the intersubjective relations established in different contexts of publicity and pluralism of meanings emerging from the interface with social networks, which dilute the limits of human communication and boundaries, still allow usto understand the real (...) and the virtual in a dualistic way? Or, rather, what is the immanent logic of the antagonism of unsociable human sociability that allows the scenarios of “outrage and hope” in global self-communication? The following interdisciplinary study aims first to involve cyberanthropology, anthropology of technology and philosophy to show the cultural implications of the identity of human beings connected to social networks. Then, we study the genealogy of the anthropology of techno-science and Kant’s antagonism in unsociable human sociability. Finally, we describe the Hegelian logic of reflexive manifestation between free objectivity and subjectivity, and communication as virtuality. (shrink)

O presente artigo conta investigar o processo de constituição da estética musical a partir da teoria da arte elaborada por F. W. J. von Schelling. Para tanto, espera-se mostrar a maneira pela qual o filósofo alemão procura redimensionar as bases que davam sustentação à chamada estética sistemática para, a partir de uma ponderação extremamente inovadora, caracterizar a música como um objeto original de saber.

Resumo Longe de pretender esgotar possíveis semelhanças entre Nietzsche e Quine, o texto que se segue tenciona mostrar, mediante comparações paradigmáticas e admissíveis convergências metodológicas, como ambos os autores, lançando mão de hipóteses naturalistas para interpretar o conhecimento e a estética, respectivamente, tornam possível pensar num naturalismo menos confinante e mais inventivo, livre dos prejuízos do cientificismo e mais condizente com a sensibilidade artística em geral.Far from intending to exhaust all the possible similarities between Nietzsche and Quine, the following text (...) aims at showing, through paradigmatic comparisons and admissible methodological convergences, how both authors - by making naturalistic assumptions to interpret knowledge and aesthetics respectively - allow us to think of a less confining and more creative naturalism, free from the prejudices of scientism and more compatible with the artistic sensibility in general. (shrink)

RESUMEN Si bien se han sondeado diversas fuentes a través de las cuales la tradición judeo-cristiana ha legitimado el especismo, seria injustamente parcial sostener que Occidente debe únicamente a su religión más popular e influyente el trato lesivo y discriminatorio hacia las demás especies. En diversas variantes, a partir de todo tipo de argumentos y supuestos, las jerarquías discriminatorias de especies no han constituido la excepción, sino más bien la regla. Esta tendencia, que está presente en diferentes cosmovisiones occidentales -y (...) aun entre teorías como las de Darwin, que dejan sin sustento teórico los fundamentos religiosos y metafísicos que suelen avalar tales prácticas especistas-, pone de manifiesto su relación sustancial con el problema de la destrucción en cuanto el ser humano ha explotado y hecho sistemáticamente desaparecer un sinfín de especies sobre la faz de la Tierra. ABSTRACT A wide range of sources is available to support the notion that the Judeo-Christian tradition has been instrumental in legitimizing speciesism. Nonetheless, it would be unfair to claim that the West's harmful and discriminatory attitude to other species proceeds solely from its historically dominant religious tradition. The construction of discriminatory species hierarchies has been the rule rather than the exception, proceeding from a variety of arguments and suppositions. This discriminatory tendency can be found in diverse Western cosmovisions; even in Darwinian theories which reject the theological and metaphysical underpinnings previously used to shore up speciesist practices. This pervasiveness suggests that the speciesist tendency is intimately bound up with the problem of destruction, understood here as the process by which human beings have exploited innumerable species, to the point of systematically rendering them extinct. (shrink)

El presente ensayo se fija como propósito precisar la crítica hegeliana del Derecho natural y del Derecho abstracto y determinar una doctrina propiamente hegeliana del Derecho. En este sentido, nuestra hipótesis es que es en el contexto de la doctrina de la Sittlichkeit,que el Derecho debe ser comprendido según Hegel. En efecto, en sus Lecciones sobre la filosofía de la historia, Hegel define la Sittlichkeit como un “orden de lo sustancial de suerte que todo sujeto singular tiene la universalidad por (...) propósito, por espíritu y por costumbre ética, y que es en y por este espíritu que él quiere, actúa, vive y goza, si bien que es su naturaleza, a saber su naturaleza segunda y espiritual”2. Luego para Hegel la normatividad jurídica debe ser comprendida al interior de este campo, en un sentido social más amplio de normatividad constituido por la praxis de una comunidad que configura un campo inmanente de objetividad que estructura cotidianamente la vida de los individuos. Lejos entonces de una separación de deber y ser, Hegel nos llama a comprender la forma cómo la norma está presente en el corazón del mundo de la vida como reconciliación de lo racional con lo real en la efectividad. (shrink)

This paper defends the doctrine that moral requirements are categorical in nature. My point of departure is John McDowell’s 1978 essay, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, in which McDowell argues, against Philippa Foot, that moral reasons are not conditional upon agents’ desires and are, in a certain sense, inescapable. After expounding McDowell’s view, exploring his idea that moral requirements “silence” other considerations and discussing its particularist ethos, I address an objection that moral reasons, as McDowell conceives them, are fundamentally incomplete (...) in ways only a full-bloodedly Kantian appeal to pure practical reason can remedy. I conclude that the objection fails: ordinary moral reasons do not stand in need of a grounding in Reason. There is no prospect of deriving them from a supreme principle of morality or other canons of rationality. Ordinary reasons are sufficient in themselves, though their significance can be elucidated and illuminated by various strategies — some broadly Aristotelian, some drawing inspiration from Kant’s formula of humanity — in ways that can strengthen and vindicate them. Notwithstanding the failure of the objection, I conclude by reflecting on how Kantian insights can yet play a significant role in a McDowellian view of moral deliberation and moral education. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime is examined in the context of the emergence of the epistemological practice of scientific observation. By focusing on the genre-stylistic and semantic-structural features of the text the authors demonstrate the mechanisms of observation as well as the methods of describing the results characteristic of mid-eighteenth century science. The authors consider Kant’s treatise to be a hybrid text: on the one hand, it attests to the importance of the natural (...) science paradigm and the degree of its influence on the humanities in the modern period; and, on the other hand, it bears witness to the multi-genre character of philosophical treatises, combining as they do the considered and serious wisdom of philosophy, the precision of scientific terminology and the figurativeness of a work of fiction. Kant is perceived not only as a researcher and philosopher capable of bringing out the essence of the particular and changeable captured in observation, but as a writer with a consummate command of the apparatus for keeping the reader’s attention through linguistic devices and practices of image-creating. The authors demonstrate how the categories of the “beautiful” and “sublime” become a general framework for the description of the moral and mental properties of human nature. The authors show that Kant’s use of “aesthetic” wording in the title of his treatise does not announce that his aim is analysis of artistic perception and practices, but mainly refers to the form of his anthropological study and conceptualisation of scientific knowledge. Kant has transferred the technique of visualisation from natural sciences to the objects of philosophical inquiry, thus contributing to the development in the humanities of representative practices, the scientific method of observation as well as the corresponding epistemic and literary genre. (shrink)

Résumé Partant du principe que la philosophie de la connaissance de Poincaré est cohérente, j’essaie de faire voir que son conventionnalisme en géométrie et en physique n’est qu’une conséquence de son intuitionnisme. Après avoir rappelé, dans la première section, ce qu’est l’intuitionnisme et décrit ce que l’intuitionnisme de Poincaré a de spécifique, je montre, dans la deuxième section, comment celui-ci retentit sur la conception de l’espace. Dans la troisième section, j’applique les conclusions précédemment établies à la question très controversée de (...) la découverte de la relativité restreinte en renvoyant dos à dos les historiens : il n’a rien manqué à Poincaré pour découvrir la relativité restreinte, car, cette théorie étant incompatible avec son intuitionnisme, il n’avait aucune raison d’y adhérer.Taking for granted that Poincaré’s epistemology is consistent, I attempt to show that his geometrical and physical conventionalism is no more than a consequence of his intuitionism. After having rehearsed the issues defining intuitionism and describing what is particular to Poincaré’s version in the first section of the paper, I show, in the second section, how Poincaré’s intuitionism influenced his conception of space. In the last section, I apply these now established conclusions to a very contested issue, the discovery of the special theory of relativity. Rejecting the view of historians on both sides of the issue, I argue that Poincaré had everything he would have needed to discover the special theory of relativity, but that since this theory is incompatible with his intuitionism, he had no reason to adopt it. (shrink)

A Crítica da faculdade de julgar foi recebida com entusiasmo pelos filósofos do idealismo alemão. No caso de Friedrich Schelling, as duas partes da obra foram influentes, de modo que não só a estética kantiana, mas também a teleologia foi marcante em sua trajetória filosófica. Observaremos como o filósofo de Leonberg acolhe, na Introdução às Ideias para uma filosofia da natureza, a noção kantiana de organismo como dotado de autocausalidade, mas pensa-a nos quadros de uma filosofia pós-kantiana, buscando prescindir das (...) noções de juízo reflexionante e também da ideia de “natureza como arte” para se pensar o organismo. Como Schelling vincula essa noção com a proposta de se pensar a unidade entre natureza e espírito a partir do próprio sujeito, e não de algo exterior a ele? Como Kant reagiria a tal proposta? The Critique of Judgment was enthusiastically received by the German Idealists. In the case of Friedrich Schelling, both divisions of the work were influent, thus resulting that not only Kantian aesthetics, but also the teleology was a landmark in his philosophical itinerary. We attempt to observe how the philosopher of Leonberg receives, in the Introduction to the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, the Kantian conception of organism as endowed with self-causality, but at the same time thinks it within the frame of a post-Kantian philosophy, leaving aside the reflective judgment and also the idea of nature as a product of art in order to think the organism. How does Schelling connect this notion with the proposal to think the unity between nature and spirit based on the own subject, and not on something external to it? How would Kant react to such a proposal? (shrink)

The Corporate Social Performance (CSP) model (Wood, Acad Manag Rev 164:691–718, 1991) assesses a firm’s social responsibility at three levels of analysis—institutional, organizational and individual—and measures the resulting social outcomes. In this paper, we focus on the individual level of CSP, manifested in the managerial discretion of a firm’s principles, processes, and policies regarding social responsibilities. Specifically, we address the human resources management of employees as a way of promoting CSR values and producing socially minded outcomes. We show that applying (...) the humanist philosophy to the managerial discretion of a business organization leads to the creation of an “autonomy supportive work environment”—as defined by the self-determination theory—which in turn, facilitates the internalization of social values, citizenship behaviors, and cooperation. The objective of promoting self-determination at work (i.e., the core of a humanist management) fits well with the ontology of social responsibility since autonomy and consideration of individuals as moral actors are central tenets. Furthermore, we show that applying humanistic management philosophy to the discretion of managers can lead to socially responsible outcomes. First, intra-organizational stakeholders (e.g., employees) are treated with respect and focus is put on their well-being, satisfaction, and self-actualization at work. Second, as employees’ need of self-determination is addressed by managers, it is likely that pro-social behaviors toward other stakeholders of the organization will be adopted, leading to socially responsible outcomes for extra-organizational stakeholders (Gagné, Motiv Emot 77:58–75, 2003). Thus, this paper ultimately posits that humanistic management applied to the HRM can be a solution for developing and maintaining socially responsible outcomes as determined at the individual level of the CSP model, through managerial discretion. (shrink)

In philology, both 'sincerity' and 'cheng' primarily mean, 'to be true to oneself'. As a philosophical term, 'sincerity' roots in Aristotle's 'aletheutikos'. In medieval Europe, it is regarded as a neutral value that may either serve or disserve for 'truth.' As for Romantics, it is a positive value, and an individualistic concept whose two elements 'true' and 'self' refer to a person's 'true feeling' and 'individuality'. In contrast, both 'self' and 'true' in Confucianism are universalistic concepts, meaning 'good nature' common (...) to all humans, and 'true feeling' distinguishing them from beasts. Cheng itself means to face one's universal self with universal true feeling. (shrink)

Although the literature on Nietzsche is now voluminous one area where there has surprisingly been very little research concerns Nietzsche on the passions. This essay aims to correct this neglect. My focus is on illuminating Nietzsche on the passions in relation to his primary teaching on self-cultivation. To illuminate his position, I focus attention on examining his relation to Stoic teaching on the passions. If for Nietzsche the Christian mind-set involves a disturbing pathological excess of feeling, the Stoic way of (...) living results for him in a petrified of life devoid of movement and growth. After a consideration of his relation to Stoic teaching I then examine his relation to Spinoza on the emotions or affects. Whilst I acknowledge the affinities between the two thinkers and their criticisms of Stoic teaching, I maintain that it is an error to seek to construe Nietzsche and Spinoza as having an identical teaching on the passions. In the final section of the essay, I provide an appreciation of Nietzsche’s recommendation that instead of demonising the passions in the manner of the Christian psyche and its legacy, or extirpating our passions as recommended by the Stoics, we need to learn how to transform them into joys or delights. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the contribution a philosophy of life is able to make to our understanding of morality, including our appreciation of its evolution or development and its future. I focus on two contributions, namely, those of Jean-Marie Guyau and Henri Bergson. In the case of Guyau I show that he pioneers the naturalistic study of morality through a conception of life; for him the moral progress of humanity is bound up with an increasing sociability, involving both the (...) intensification of life and its expansion. In the case of Bergson I show that he also pioneers a novel naturalistic appreciation of morality, one that is keen to demonstrate morality’s two sources and so as to give us a firm grasp of the chances of a moral progress on the part of humanity. I suggest that of the two appreciations of morality Bergson’s is the richer since it contains a set of critical reflections on humanity’s condition that is lacking in Guyau. I conclude by suggesting that Bergson’s idea that modern humanity is confronted with the decision whether it wishes to continue living or not has lost none of its relevance today. (shrink)

A educação, segundo Kant, divide-se em física e prática. A educação física tem em vista os cuidados com o infante, a educação prática diz respeito à formação do sujeito . A formação ou educação prática, por sua vez, se divide, essencialmente, em dois momentos, disciplina e instrução. Pretendemos aqui investigar o papel da Disciplina no projeto filosófico da Educação Prática de Kant. Verificamos o constrangimento ao falar da questão da disciplina no âmbito pedagógico , desse modo, pretendemos elucidar o pensamento (...) pedagógico kantiano, uma tentativa de, ademais, revelar possíveis contribuições da modernidade às discussões contemporâneas. Para o filósofo a disciplina desempenha um papel vital na educação prática – a educação do homem livre. Procurando expor e justificar essa posição, iremos analisar alguns momentos do conjunto de preleções “Sobre a pedagogia”, porém, sem perder os vínculos com o todo do pensamento prático e teórico de Kant. L'éducation, selon Kant, est divisé en physique et pratique. L'éducation physiquevise à prendre soin de l'enfant, l'éducation pratique concernant la formation du sujet . La formation pratique, à son tour, est divisé essentiellement en deux moments, la discipline et l'instruction. Nous avons l'intention ici d’examiner le rolê de la discipline dans le projet philosophique de la éducation pratique chez Kant. Nous vérifions la contrainte pour discuter de la question de la discipline dans l'éducation , donc nous avons l'intention d'élucider la pensée pédagogique de Kant, une tentative, par ailleurs, révéler d'éventuelles contributions de la modernité aux débats contemporains. Pour lê philosophe la discipline joue un rôle vital dans la l'éducation pratique – l'éducation d’être libre. Vous cherchez à exposer et justifier cette position, nous allons examiner quelques instants de la série de conférences «Sur la pédagogie» sans perdre les liens avec toute la réflexion théorique et pratique de Kant. (shrink)

During the coronavirus pandemic, communities have faced shortages of important healthcare resources such as COVID-19 vaccines, medical staff, ICU beds and ventilators. Public health officials in the U.S. have had to make decisions about two major issues: which infected patients should be treated first, and which people who are at risk of infection should be inoculated first. Following Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism, adopted guidelines have tended to value both whole lives and life-years. This process of collective moral reasoning has revealed (...) our common commitment to both Kantian and utilitarian principles. For Kant, respecting people’s rights entails that we ought to value whole lives equally. Therefore we ought to allocate resources so as to maximise the number of patients who survive to discharge. By contrast, the principle of utility has us maximise life-years so that people can satisfy more of their considered preferences. Although people are treated impartially in the utilitarian calculus, it does not recognise their equal worth. Subjecting Kantian ethics and utilitarianism to the process of reflective equilibrium lends support to the idea that we need a pluralistic approach that would accommodate our moral intuitions regarding both the equal value of whole lives and the additive value of life-years. (shrink)

Referring to the phenomenon of structural injustice resulting from unintended consequences of the combination of the actions of many people, Iris Marion Young claims for a new understanding of responsibility. She proposes what she calls a social connection model of responsibility which assigns responsibility to individuals also for participating in ongoing structural and social processes. To remedy structural injustice Young claims for collective action of various actors in society and assigns different degrees of responsibility depending on the agent’s position within (...) the structural process. However, although Young mentions power, privilege, interest, and collective ability as parameters influencing the degree of an actor’s responsibility to contribute to structural change she does not elaborate which responsibilities concern which groups in society. As we will outline in our contribution, we hold the tenet of subsidiarity to be a useful supplement to the conception of Iris Marion Young which would allow for assigning such responsibilities to different layers in society. However, since the tenet of subsidiarity is only a supple principle which does not distinguish between different kinds of duties, we propose to enrich the tenet of subsidiarity by the Kantian conception of perfect and imperfect duties. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo presenta una revisión detallada de la deconstrucción de la subjetividad estética moderna ensayada por Jacques Derrida en su confrontación con la célebre e influyente Kritik der Urteilskraft de Kant y, a la vez, sitúa esta empresa en el contexto mayor del corpus derridiano por medio de la explicitación de la vasta red conceptual que la sostiene. En último término, lo que aquí se explora -siguiendo siempre a Derrida- es una comprensión de la experiencia estética como sustracción, como (...) fractura del campo subjetivo por efecto de la introducción de una presencia irreductible.: This article presents a detailed account of the aesthetic subject’s deconstruction as developed by Jacques Derrida in his confrontation with Kant’s famous and influential Critique of judgment. At the same time, it places this enterprise in the context of Derrida’s corpus by making explicit the vast conceptual network that lies behind it. In the last analysis, what is here explored - following Derrida’s lead - is an understanding of aesthetical experience as subtraction, as a breach into the subjective field through the introduction of an irreducible non-presence. (shrink)

The ideological underpinning that guides our interaction with non-human animals needs revision. The traditional outlook, according to which humans have a higher moral status vis-à-vis non-human animals, is now otiose. If these claims are to be justified, what ideological framework would serve this end? What are the moral implications of endorsing the view that humans possess no higher moral status than non-human animals? This work takes as foundation Charles Darwins theory of evolution, which affirms that humans emerged from the long (...) chain of evolutionary history, where non-human animals have been the carriers of the genes that shaped humans. A revisit to the discourse on the moral implication of humans cruelty to their ancestors and neighbours becomes pertinent. This essay goes against the mainstream and dominant perspective that non-human animals exist to serve human ends and as such can be treated with disdain. The thesis of this paper goes beyond Peter Singers submission that sentience is the basis for conferring moral worth on non-human animals. It affirms that in addition to sentience, good neighbourliness is a factor in determining the moral worth of non-human animals. It submits that cruelty to reared and domesticated animals may produce violent and wild species of these animals kind in a future evolution, thereby endangering the lives of future human generation, through negative alteration of genes. In the end, this paper proposes the principle of biological altruism as a suitable norm for determining the moral worth of non-human animals. (shrink)

Atores com distintas perspectivas educacionais têm utilizado, cada vez mais, o vocábulo autonomia de acordo com os seus interesses. Objetivamos com este artigo, que é uma revisão de literatura, discutir sobre a autonomia a partir de enfoques da Filosofia, da Psicologia e da Sociologia. As contribuições de autores como Rousseau, Kant, Freud, Adorno, Agamben, Piaget, Kamii, Martins, Freire, Barguil, dentre outros, enriquecem uma leitura interdisciplinar da complexa relação entre autonomia e Educação. Concluímos que a autonomia não é uma característica do (...) sujeito, mas uma prática indispensável para o seu desenvolvimento individual e social, bem como para fortalecer o processo democrático. (shrink)