Maddy's notion of restrictiveness has many problematic aspects, one of them being that it is almost impossible to show that a theory is not restrictive. In this note the author addresses a crucial question of Martin Goldstern (Vienna) and points to some directions of future research.

Monsters lurk within mathematical as well as literary haunts. I propose to trace some pathways between these two monstrous habitats. I start from Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s influential account of monster culture and explore how well mathematical monsters fit each of his seven theses. The mathematical monsters I discuss are drawn primarily from three distinct but overlapping domains. Firstly, late nineteenth-century mathematicians made numerous unsettling discoveries that threatened their understanding of their own discipline and challenged their intuitions. The great French mathematician (...) Henri Poincaré characterised these anomalies as ‘monsters’, a name that stuck. Secondly, the twentieth-century philosopher Imre Lakatos composed a seminal work on the nature of mathematical proof, in which monsters play a conspicuous role. Lakatos coined such terms as ‘monster-barring’ and ‘monster-adjusting’ to describe strategies for dealing with entities whose properties seem to falsify a conjecture. Thirdly, and most recently, mathematicians dubbed the largest of the sporadic groups ‘the Monster’, because of its vast size and uncanny properties, and because its existence was suspected long before it could be confirmed. (shrink)

What is the source of logical and mathematical truth? This book revitalizes conventionalism as an answer to this question. Conventionalism takes logical and mathematical truth to have their source in linguistic conventions. This was an extremely popular view in the early 20th century, but it was never worked out in detail and is now almost universally rejected in mainstream philosophical circles. Shadows of Syntax is the first book-length treatment and defense of a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics. It (...) argues that our conventions, in the form of syntactic rules of language use, are perfectly suited to explain the truth, necessity, and a priority of logical and mathematical claims, as well as our logical and mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

The weakly compact reflection principle\\) states that \ is a weakly compact cardinal and every weakly compact subset of \ has a weakly compact proper initial segment. The weakly compact reflection principle at \ implies that \ is an \-weakly compact cardinal. In this article we show that the weakly compact reflection principle does not imply that \ is \\)-weakly compact. Moreover, we show that if the weakly compact reflection principle holds at \ then there is a forcing extension preserving (...) this in which \ is the least \-weakly compact cardinal. Along the way we generalize the well-known result which states that if \ is a regular cardinal then in any forcing extension by \-c.c. forcing the nonstationary ideal equals the ideal generated by the ground model nonstationary ideal; our generalization states that if \ is a weakly compact cardinal then after forcing with a ‘typical’ Easton-support iteration of length \ the weakly compact ideal equals the ideal generated by the ground model weakly compact ideal. (shrink)

Introduction to mathematical logic. Part 2.Textbook for students in mathematical logic and foundations of mathematics. Platonism, Intuition, Formalism. Axiomatic set theory. Around the Continuum Problem. Axiom of Determinacy. Large Cardinal Axioms. Ackermann's Set Theory. First order arithmetic. Hilbert's 10th problem. Incompleteness theorems. Consequences. Connected results: double incompleteness theorem, unsolvability of reasoning, theorem on the size of proofs, diophantine incompleteness, Loeb's theorem, consistent universal statements are provable, Berry's paradox, incompleteness and Chaitin's theorem. Around Ramsey's theorem.

A pervasive thought in contemporary philosophy of mathematics is that in order to justify reflection principles, one must hold universism: the view that there is a single universe of pure sets. I challenge this kind of reasoning by contrasting universism with a Zermelian form of multiversism. I argue that if extant justifications of reflection principles using notions of richness are acceptable for the universist, then the Zermelian can use similar justifications. However, I note that for some forms of richness argument, (...) the status of reflection principles as axioms is left open for the Zermelian. (shrink)

This paper develops a (nontrivial) theory of cardinal numbers from a naive set comprehension principle, in a suitable paraconsistent logic. To underwrite cardinal arithmetic, the axiom of choice is proved. A new proof of Cantor’s theorem is provided, as well as a method for demonstrating the existence of large cardinals by way of a reflection theorem.

We give an overview of recent results in ordinal analysis. Therefore, we discuss the different frameworks used in mathematical proof-theory, namely "subsystem of analysis" including "reverse mathematics", "Kripke-Platek set theory", "explicit mathematics", "theories of inductive definitions", "constructive set theory", and "Martin-Löf's type theory".

I propose a new theory of mereology based on a mereological reflection principle. Reflective mereology has natural fusion principles but also refutes certain principles of classical mereology such as Universal Fusion and Fusion Uniqueness. Moreover, reflective mereology avoids Uzquiano’s cardinality problem–the problem that classical mereology tends to clash with set theory when they both quantify over everything. In particular, assuming large cardinals, I construct a model of reflective mereology and second-order ZFCU with Limitation of Size. In the model, classical mereology (...) holds when the quantifiers are restricted to the urelements. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of set theory to say that there is no set of all well-orderings nor a set of all sets. We are implored to accept this due to the threat of paradox and the ensuing descent into unintelligibility. In the absence of promising alternatives, we tend to take up a conservative stance and tow the line: there is no universe. In this paper, I am going to challenge this claim by taking seriously the idea that we can (...) talk about the collection of all the sets and many more collections beyond that. A method of articulating this idea is offered through an indefinitely extending hierarchy of set theories. It is argued that this approach provides a natural extension to ordinary set theory and leaves ordinary mathematical practice untouched. (shrink)

For each natural number n, let C(n) be the closed and unbounded proper class of ordinals α such that Vα is a Σn elementary substructure of V. We say that κ is a C(n)-cardinal if it is the critical point of an elementary embedding j : V → M, M transitive, with j(κ) in C(n). By analyzing the notion of C(n)-cardinal at various levels of the usual hierarchy of large cardinal principles we show that, starting at the level of superstrong (...) cardinals and up to the level of rank-into-rank embeddings, C(n)-cardinals form a much finer hierarchy. The naturalness of the notion of C(n)-cardinal is exemplified by showing that the existence of C(n)-extendible cardinals is equivalent to simple reflection principles for classes of structures, which generalize the notions of supercompact and extendible cardinals. Moreover, building on results of Bagaria et al. (2010), we give new characterizations of Vopeňka’s Principle in terms of C(n)-extendible cardinals. (shrink)

By forcing over a model of with a class-sized partial order preserving this theory we produce a model in which there is a locally defined well-order of the universe; that is, one whose restriction to all levels H is a well-order of H definable over the structure H, by a parameter-free formula. Further, this forcing construction preserves all supercompact cardinals as well as all instances of regular local supercompactness. It is also possible to define variants of this construction which, in (...) addition to forcing a locally defined well-order of the universe, preserve many of the n-huge cardinals from the ground model. (shrink)

We investigate the partition property of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{P}_{\kappa}\lambda}$$\end{document}. Main results of this paper are as follows: (1) If λ is the least cardinal greater than κ such that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{P}_{\kappa}\lambda}$$\end{document} carries a (λκ, 2)-distributive normal ideal without the partition property, then λ is \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi^1_n}$$\end{document}-indescribable for all n < ω but not \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} (...) \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi^2_1}$$\end{document} -indescribable. (2) If cf(λ) ≥ κ, then every ineffable subset of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{P}_{\kappa}\lambda}$$\end{document} has the partition property. (3) If cf(λ) ≥ κ, then the completely ineffable ideal over \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{P}_{\kappa}\lambda}$$\end{document} has the partition property. (shrink)

This paper studies homogeneously Suslin (hom) sets of reals in tame mice. The following results are established: In 0 ¶ the hom sets are precisely the [Symbol] sets. In M n every hom set is correctly [Symbol] and (δ + 1)-universally Baire where ä is the least Woodin. In M u every hom set is <λ-hom, where λ is the supremum of the Woodins.

The forcing construction Pmax, invented by W. Hugh Woodin, produces a model whose collection of subsets of ω₁ is in some sense maximal. In this paper we study the Boolean algebra induced by the nonstationary ideal on ω₁ in this model. Among other things we show that the induced quotient does not have a simply definable form. We also prove several results about saturation properties of the ideal in this extension.

We describe the inner models with representatives in all equivalence classes of thin equivalence relations in a given projective pointclass of even level assuming projective determinacy. The main result shows that these models are characterized by their correctness and the property that they correctly compute the tree from the appropriate scale. The main step towards this characterization shows that the tree from a scale can be reconstructed in a generic extension of an iterate of a mouse. We then construct models (...) with this property as generic extensions of iterates of mice under the assumption that the corresponding projective ordinal is below ω2ω2. On the way, we consider several related problems, including the question when forcing does not add equivalence classes to thin projective equivalence relations. For instance, we show that if every set has a sharp, then reasonable forcing does not add equivalence classes to thin provably View the MathML source Δ1/3 equivalence relations, and generalize this to all projective levels. (shrink)

There exist two known types of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models, both in a certain sense canonical. One of them comes from modal logic and universal algebra, and in fact goes back to Jónsson and Tarski :891–939, 1951; 74:127–162, 1952). Another one The infinity project proceeding, Barcelona, 2012) comes from model theory and algebra of ultrafilters, with ultrafilter extensions of semigroups as its main precursor. By a classical fact of general topology, the space of ultrafilters over a discrete space is (...) its largest compactification. The main result of Saveliev The infinity project proceeding, Barcelona, 2012), which confirms a canonicity of this extension, generalizes this fact to discrete spaces endowed with an arbitrary first-order structure. An analogous result for the former type of ultrafilter extensions was obtained in Saveliev. Results of such kind are referred to as extension theorems. After a brief introduction, we offer a uniform approach to both types of extensions based on the idea to extend the extension procedure itself. We propose a generalization of the standard concept of first-order interpretations in which functional and relational symbols are interpreted rather by ultrafilters over sets of functions and relations than by functions and relations themselves, and define ultrafilter models with an appropriate semantics for them. We provide two specific operations which turn ultrafilter models into ordinary models, establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which the latter are the two canonical ultrafilter extensions of some ordinary models, and obtain a topological characterization of ultrafilter models. We generalize a restricted version of the extension theorem to ultrafilter models. To formulate the full version, we propose a wider concept of ultrafilter models with their semantics based on limits of ultrafilters, and show that the former concept can be identified, in a certain way, with a particular case of the latter; moreover, the new concept absorbs the ordinary concept of models. We provide two more specific operations which turn ultrafilter models in the narrow sense into ones in the wide sense, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which ultrafilter models in the wide sense are the images of ones in the narrow sense under these operations, and also are two canonical ultrafilter extensions of some ordinary models. Finally, we establish three full versions of the extension theorem for ultrafilter models in the wide sense. The results of the first three sections of this paper were partially announced in Poliakov and Saveliev On two concepts of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models and their generalizations, Springer, Berlin, 2017). (shrink)

The axiom of canonicity was introduced by the famous Polish logician Roman Suszko in 1951 as an explication of Skolem's Paradox and a precise representation of the axiom of restriction in set theory proposed much earlier by Abraham Fraenkel. We discuss the main features of Suszko's contribution and hint at its possible further applications.

We define , a square principle in the context of , and prove its consistency relative to ZFC by a directed-closed forcing and hence that it is consistent to have hold when κ is supercompact, whereas □κ is known to fail under this condition. The new principle is then extended to produce a principle with a non-reflection property. Another variation on is also considered, this one based on a family of club subsets of . Finally, a new square principle for (...) cardinals, denoted , is introduced. This principle is proved consistent with κ being supercompact. It is shown to yield a non-reflection result similar to that given by □κ. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We shall defend three philosophical theses about the extent of intrinsic justification based on various technical results. We shall present a set of theorems which indicate intriguing structural similarities between a family of “weak” reflection principles roughly at the level of those considered by Tait and Koellner and a family of “strong” reflection principles roughly at the level of those of Welch and Roberts, which we claim to lend support to the view that the stronger reflection principles are intrinsically (...) justified as well as the weaker ones. We consider connections with earlier work of Marshall. (shrink)

Gupta-Belnap-style circular definitions use all real numbers as possible starting points of revision sequences. In that sense they are boldface definitions. We discuss lightface versions of circular definitions and boldface versions of inductive definitions.

We work under the assumption of the Axiom of Determinacy and associate a measure to each cardinal $\kappa < \aleph_{\varepsilon_0}$ in a recursive definition of a canonical measure assignment. We give algorithmic applications of the existence of such a canonical measure assignment (computation of cofinalities, computation of the Kleinberg sequences associated to the normal ultrafilters on all projective ordinals).

The theory of infinite games with slightly imperfect information has been developed for games with finitely and countably many moves. In this paper, we shift the discussion to games with uncountably many possible moves, introducing the axiom of real Blackwell determinacy \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{Bl-AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document} (as an analogue of the axiom of real determinacy \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document}). We prove that the consistency strength of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} (...) \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf{Bl-AD}_\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document} is strictly greater than that of AD. (shrink)

After showing that \ refutes \ for all regular cardinals \, we present a diamond-plus principle \ concerning all subsets of \. Using a forcing argument, we prove that \ holds in Steel’s core model \}}\), an inner model in which the axiom of determinacy can hold. The combinatorial principle \ is then extended, in \}}\), to successor cardinals \ and to certain cardinals \ that are not ineffable. Here \ is the supremum of the ordinals that are the surjective (...) image of the set of reals \. (shrink)

We extend the results of Laver on using inverse limits to reflect large cardinals of the form, there exists an elementary embedding Lα → Lα. Using these inverse limit reflection embeddings directly and by broadening the collection of U-representable sets, we prove structural results of L under the assumption that there exists an elementary embedding j : L → L. As a consequence we show the impossibility of a generalized inverse limit X-reflection result for X ⊆ Vλ+1, thus focusing the (...) study of L generalizations on L. (shrink)

Under the assumption that δ is a Woodin cardinal and GCH holds, I show that if F is any class function from the regular cardinals to the cardinals such that (1) ${\kappa < {\rm cf}(F(\kappa))}$ , (2) ${\kappa < \lambda}$ implies ${F(\kappa) \leq F(\lambda)}$ , and (3) δ is closed under F, then there is a cofinality-preserving forcing extension in which 2 γ = F(γ) for each regular cardinal γ < δ, and in which δ remains Woodin. Unlike the analogous (...) results for supercompact cardinals [Menas in Trans Am Math Soc 223:61–91, (1976)] and strong cardinals [Friedman and Honzik in Ann Pure Appl Logic 154(3):191–208, (2008)], there is no requirement that the function F be locally definable. I deduce a global version of the above result: Assuming GCH, if F is a function satisfying (1) and (2) above, and C is a class of Woodin cardinals, each of which is closed under F, then there is a cofinality-preserving forcing extension in which 2 γ = F(γ) for all regular cardinals γ and each cardinal in C remains Woodin. (shrink)

The initial motivating question for this thesis is what the standard of rigour in modern mathematics amounts to: what makes a proof rigorous, or fail to be rigorous? How is this judged? A new account of rigour is put forward, aiming to go some way to answering these questions. Some benefits of the norm of rigour on this account are discussed. The account is contrasted with other remarks that have been made about mathematical proof and its workings, and is tested (...) and illustrated by considering a case study discussed in the literature. On the view put forward here one can obtain a manner of informal, rigorous mathematics founded on any of a variety of proof systems. The latter part of the thesis is concerned with the question of how we should decide which of these competing proof systems we should base our mathematics on: i.e., the question of which proof system we should take as a foundation for our mathematics. A novel answer to this question is proposed, in which the key property we should require of a proof system is that for as many different kinds of structures as possible, when the proof system allows a generalization about that kind of structure to be proved, the generalization actually holds of all real examples of that kind of structure which exist. This is the requirement of soundness of the proof system. It is argued that the best way to establish the soundness of a proof system may be by giving an interpretation of its axioms on which they are established as true. As preparation for this discussion, the thesis first investigates the logical and conceptual basis of various arithmetic concepts, with the results obtained used in the final discussion of soundness. (shrink)