In this paper, I will focus on the extension theories of technology. I will identify four influential positions that have been put forward: (1) technology as an extension of the human organism, (2) technology as an extension of the lived body and the senses, (3) technology as an extension of our intentions and desires, and (4) technology as an extension of our faculties and capabilities. I will describe and critically assess these positions one by one and highlight their advantages and (...) their shortcomings and limitations. Along the way, I will explicate some of the differences and similarities between the various approaches. I conclude the paper with some suggestions for future research directions that will be beneficial for advancing theory building and that will drive forward the philosophical refinement of extension theory. (shrink)

Trust is a central dimension in the relation between human beings and technologies. In many discourses about technology, the relation between human beings and technologies is conceptualized as an external relation: a relation between pre-given entities that can have an impact on each other but that do not mutually constitute each other. From this perspective, relations of trust can vary between _reliance_, as is present for instance in technological extensionism, and _suspicion_, as in various precautionary approaches in ethics that focus (...) on technological risks. Against these two interpretations of trust, this article develops a third one. Based on a more internal account of the relations between human beings and technologies, it becomes possible to see that every technological development puts at stake what it means to be a human being. Using technologies, then, implies trusting ourselves _to_ technologies. We argue that this does not imply an uncritical subjection to technology. Rather, recognizing that technologies help to constitute human subjectivity implies that human beings can get actively involved in processes of technological mediation. Trust then has the character of _confidence_: deliberately trusting oneself _to_ technology. (shrink)

Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (1958) demeure une oeuvre singulière dans l'horizon philosophique. Toutefois, tout au long de sa carrière, Gilbert Simondon s'est exprimé sur la technique. L'originalité de ses travaux est d'analyser les machines en tant que matière organisée. Cette orientation renvoie à la divergence entre les recherches française et allemande sur la technique au xxe siècle. Simondon couple la mécanologie à une psycho-sociologie des techniques. En vue d'une réactualisation opératoire, ces deux approches sont mises à l'épreuve du (...) grand collisionneur de hadrons (LHC) et du « halo » psychosocial des nanotechnologies. (shrink)

This work examines Gilles Deleuze’s concept of intensity and the role of this concept in his philosophy of technology. The work has two main objectives. First, it analyses the role of Deleuze’s theory of intensity in his metaphysical system and in his philosophy of technology. Second, on the basis of this theory, it presents an original analysis of the creative potential of technology. The importance of the concept of intensity in Deleuze’s philosophy has been acknowledged, but so far, his views (...) on intensity have not been analysed in terms of a consistent theory. Furthermore, the implications of Deleuze’s theory of intensity for his and Félix Guattari’s analysis of technology have been entirely overlooked. This thesis shows for the first time the pivotal role of intensity in Deleuze’s philosophy and demonstrates the importance of the concept of intensity for the analysis of technicity. Part I explicates Deleuze’s theory of intensity. For Deleuze, intensity is the nature of the gradual variation of material, heterogeneous wholes. Within such wholes, intensity characterises variation in processes of individuation and systemic transformation. Moreover, these intensive processes and transformations take place within a sphere of material immediacy. Part II fleshes out the implications of this theory for a philosophy of technics. It proposes a definition of technics as immediate interaction with material variation. Technics always has an established role as a component of a particular social system, but it also bears a constant undercurrent of creative and transformative potential. Finally, the current dominance of information technology and the potential for technical creativity in contemporary society are examined on the basis of the analysis of intensive technics. The work offers an original and comprehensive analysis of Deleuze’s theory of intensity and demonstrates his contribution to the philosophy of technology. It also clarifies the processual nature of materiality and the nature of systemic transformation. Finally, it offers conceptual tools for fathoming the constraints as well as the creative potential of technics in contemporary culture. (shrink)

According to a chorus of authors, the human life-world is currently invaded by an avalanche of high-tech devices referred to as “emerging,” ”intimate,” or ”NBIC” technologies: a new type of contrivances or gadgets designed to optimize cognitive or sensory performance and / or to enable mood management. Rather than manipulating objects in the outside world, they are designed to influence human bodies and brains more directly, and on a molecular scale. In this paper, these devices will be framed as ‘extimate’ (...) technologies (both intimate and external; both embedded and foreign; both life-enhancing and intrusive), a concept borrowed from Jacques Lacan. Although Lacan is not commonly regarded as a philosopher of technology, the dialectical relationship between human desire and technological artefacts runs as an important thread through his work. Moreover, he was remarkably prescient concerning the blending of life science and computer science, which is such a distinctive feature of the current techno-scientific turn. Building on a series of Lacanian concepts, my aim is to develop a psychoanalytical diagnostic of the technological present. Finally, I will indicate how such an analysis may inform our understanding of human life and embodiment as such. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a Lacanian perspective on football, while notably fathoming its normative dimension. Starting with a defining imperative, the prohibition against ‘handling’ or touching the ball with your hands, diverging football historically from rugby, we will subsequently focus our attention on the role of the foot, the eye (notably the eyes of the audience) and the ‘object a’ (in the context of gender). Against this backdrop, we will address pressing issues such as the troubled position of the (...) referee (as an ‘impossible profession’), the commercialisation of football, and the rising tides of violence, match—fixing and other instances of systemic deviance. As we will argue, football exemplifies modern sport as an arena defined by prohibitions and desire, by inclusion and exclusion, by purity and abuse, culminating in recent challenges involved in gender trouble. Symbolical practices, like modern football, are based on in- and exclusion. Instead of more regulations and dichotomies, we advocate careful attention to the delicate art of handling desire in practice. (shrink)

Despite the prominent role that technology plays in twenty‐first‐century societies, the intersections between spirituality and technology have been poorly analyzed. This article develops a cross‐reflection between these two key anthropological aspects, using a philosophical approach that structures the analysis along three classical categories: transcendence, immanence, and relationality. Drawing from ideas of philosophers, such as Heidegger and Merleau‐Ponty, the article sheds light on problematic aspects of technology that spirituality helps identify and for which it suggests solutions. Symmetrically, the analysis shows commonly (...) inadvertent aspects of spirituality that technology brings to the fore. All in all, spirituality appears as an essential dimension to cultivate in technological societies, while technology might reveal spirituality as richer and deeper than has been apparent in traditional settings. (shrink)

The processes of changing the way of thinking, typical for modern people, and subsequently shaping a new “Homo clicking” individual are analyzed. The authors consider a specific mindset of “Homo clicking” illustrating it with some patterns and modes of action that characterize individuals in the human–machine interface. Under this frame, the influence of modern converging technologies upon human conduct is examined and functional redistribution between human beings and technical devices is outlined. In the literature, the latter phenomenon is referred to (...) as “life outsourcing.” This material is used to introduce several principles that form the basis for a new type of thought and actions of “Home clicking”: snapping, transforming trust into knowledge, and action reduction. Reducing the traditional classic understanding of a human act of thinking to a pattern of a thinking act as a need-satisfying act is described. In the last section, we introduce an extension of Searle’s Chinese room, which can be seen as a possible consequence of intensive exploitation of technologies. (shrink)

Technology Education offers an authentic and invaluable range of skills, knowledge, capabilities, contexts and ways of thinking for learners in the 21st century. However, it is recognised that it occupies a comparatively less defined and more fragile curricular position than associated, but longer established, subjects such as Mathematics and Science. While recognising that no single factor lies behind such a condition, this paper draws upon thinking in the philosophy of technology, technology education and the ontology of artefacts to argue that (...) transformation may be considered as an epistemic source for technology in a similar way to ‘proof’ within Mathematics and ‘interpretation’ within Science. Encapsulating technology's intimate relationship with materials, it is ultimately argued that the transformation of a technical artefact from an ill-defined into a well-defined ontological state constitutes a prime source of technological knowledge for pupils. Moreover, it provides an alternative route into further consideration about the nature of the domain, epistemology and curricular identity of the subject. (shrink)

This essay raises the question of material hermeneutics in Heelan’s philosophy of techno-science. For Heelan, a continental philosophy of technoscience, referring to Husserl and Heidegger and especially to Merleau-Ponty, features hermeneutic contexts of mathematics and measurement as well as laboratory observation, including what the later Heelan spoke of as “portable laboratories,” for the sake of objectivity and “meaning making.” For Paul Feyerabend, this material practice corresponded to the use of both techniques of observation and instrumentation, and not less “propaganda” in (...) the case of Galileo which practice for Heelan included the ontological status of measures and numbers as well as apprenticeship in what Heelan called “contingent local practical cultural milieus.” The essay includes a discussion of Heidegger on mathematics and Bruno Latour on pasteurization. (shrink)

Current Perspectives in Philosophy of Biology.

The relation between organisms and machines is very old. Over a century ago, the French historian and philosopher Alfred Victor Espinas observed that from the Greeks onwards the intelligibility of the organic world presupposed a comparison with technical objects. Aristotle, for instance, associated living organs with mechanical artefacts in order to understand animals ‘movements. In the modern period, Descartes, Borelli and other mechanists defended the idea that organisms are, in reality, machines. Today, philosophers and scientists still argue that the genome (...) is like a software and the brain is like a computer. In this article I reconsider the relation between organisms and machines from the perspective of the German geographer and philosopher Ernst Kapp, one of the founding fathers of the Philosophy of Technology. Breaking with a long and venerable philosophical tradition, Kapp argued that machines are, in reality, “organic projections”. Organisms are not machines; they are an imitation or reflection of the organic world. First of all, I clarify the hypothesis of “organic projection”. Secondly, I consider some of the philosophical consequences that such a hypothesis entails over the debate between machinists and anti-mechanists. Finally, and following the previous considerations, I defend the importance of reconnecting the philosophy of technology with philosophy of biology in order to better understand the development of contemporary biology. (shrink)

Der soziotechnische Wandel bringt neue Phänomene des Zufalls hervor, die sich den üblichen Strategien des Umgangs mit Risiken und Unsicherheit entziehen. Diese Akzidenzphänomene sind prinzipiell unvorhersehbar und in ihrer komplexen Effektgesamtheit jenseits von Kalkulation und Antizipation. Eine allgemeine Verzukünftigung unseres Weltbezuges mit spezifischen weitreichenden Problemen ist die Folge und lässt klassische Agenturen des Risikomanagements und der Unsicherheitsbewältigung an ihre Leistungsgrenzen stoßen. Bruno Gransche zeigt, dass Philosophie und Zukunftsforschung gemeinsam großes Potenzial aufweisen, hier zu helfen.

The existence of a French philosophy of technology is a matter of debate. Technology has long remained invisible in French philosophy, due to cultural circumstances and linguistic specificities. Even though a number of French philosophers have developed views and concepts about technology during the twentieth century, “philosophy of technology” has never been established as a legitimate branch of philosophy in the French academic landscape so far. This book, however, demonstrates that a community of philosophers dealing with various issues related to (...) technology and built up on the legacy of the previous generations has emerged. In gathering scholars with quite diverse theoretical backgrounds and matters of concern, this volume outlines a coherent, albeit heterogeneous, philosophical trend. Five chief characteristics are identified in this introduction: a close connection between history and philosophy, with a focus on the temporalities of technology, the prevalence of the anthropological approach to technology whether it be social anthropology or paleoanthropology, a focus on technological objects that we characterize as a “thing turn” à la française, the dignification of technoscience as a philosophical category, and a pervading concern with ethical issues based on the anthropological interpretation of technology and quite distinct from current trends in applied ethics. (shrink)

Technology Education offers an authentic and invaluable range of skills, knowledge, capabilities, contexts and ways of thinking for learners in the 21st century. However, it is recognised that it occupies a comparatively less defined and more fragile curricular position than associated, but longer established, subjects such as Mathematics and Science. While recognising that no single factor lies behind such a condition, this paper draws upon thinking in the philosophy of technology, technology education and the ontology of artefacts to argue that (...) transformation may be considered as an epistemic source for technology in a similar way to ‘proof’ within Mathematics and ‘interpretation’ within Science. Encapsulating technology's intimate relationship with materials, it is ultimately argued that the transformation of a technical artefact from an ill-defined into a well-defined ontological state constitutes a prime source of technological knowledge for pupils. Moreover, it provides an alternative route into further consideration about the nature of the domain, epistemology and curricular identity of the subject. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Definitions of Technological Artifacts Technological Artifacts in Philosophy References and Further Reading.

Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit Fragen, die die kulturellen Grundlagen der Servicerobotik betreffen. Die Diskussion und Beantwortung dieser Fragen werden im Diskurs über Service-Robotik noch immer vernachlässigt. Zunächst wird erörtert, wie unabhängig Service-Robotik von kulturellen Vorgaben sein kann. Kulturelle Dispositionen haben Auswirkungen auf die angestrebte Adaptivität und Autonomie der Systeme, konkret auch auf deren Sensorik und Aktorik. Service-Robotik muss als kulturell eingebettete Technologie konzipiert werden. Nur in einer physischen und symbolischen Nähe zum konkreten Menschen kann sie zu einem adaptiven und (...) kooperativen System werden. Es werden z.B. nicht nur Organe unterstützt, sondern auch organische Präferenzen, nicht nur Organe überboten, sondern auch kulturelle Vorgaben auf eine höhere Stufe gehoben. Letzteres führt zu einer besonderen Dynamik der Kultur, die sich in neuen Wünschen und Werten artikuliert, die bisher als unerreichbar galten, nun aber eine technische Realisierung erfahren können. Die mit der technischen Aufstufung des gesellschaftlichen Lebens einhergehende Mittelbarkeit der Lebensformen entbindet uns von vielen lebensnotwendigen Verrichtungen, setzt aber zugleich neue kulturelle oder soziale Zwänge. Dienstrobotik trägt dazu bei, die Basis unseres Zusammenlebens neu zu vermessen und nötigt uns diese Basis zu gestalten und reflexiv zu begleiten. (shrink)

Technology Education offers an authentic and invaluable range of skills, knowledge, capabilities, contexts and ways of thinking for learners in the 21st century. However, it is recognised that it occupies a comparatively less defined and more fragile curricular position than associated, but longer established, subjects such as Mathematics and Science. While recognising that no single factor lies behind such a condition, this paper draws upon thinking in the philosophy of technology, technology education and the ontology of artefacts to argue that (...) transformation may be considered as an epistemic source for technology in a similar way to ‘proof’ within Mathematics and ‘interpretation’ within Science. Encapsulating technology's intimate relationship with materials, it is ultimately argued that the transformation of a technical artefact from an ill-defined into a well-defined ontological state constitutes a prime source of technological knowledge for pupils. Moreover, it provides an alternative route into further consideration about the nature of the domain, epistemology and curricular identity of the subject. (shrink)

In this paper, I delineate the first pages of a philosophical genealogy which outlines the cornerstones of a philosophy of bio-technical forms. In so doing, the essay contributes to the philosophical understanding of some key scientific concepts. In particular, it analyses the philosophical and historical preconditions, the epistemic assumptions, as well as the ontological commitments of the concept of form as used in digital design and in bionics. In the first section, I investigate Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technical forms. In (...) the second section, I analyse the emergence of biotechnology, today’s bionics, as an independent technical discipline. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Austro-Hungarian botanist Raoul Heinrich Francé (1874–1943) founded this discipline with the aim of imitating the technical solutions chosen by nature. In the conclusion, I draw broader conclusions about the philosophy of bio-technical forms. Particularly, I argue, first, that the role of materiality and form-intrinsic propriety is of central importance in processes of form design. Second, I define morphology as a theory of possible constructions of forms in space and not, as in evolutionary biology, a science of the changes of forms in time. This characterises what I have called the ontological turn in form-design disciplines: nature operates technically to conceive new forms. (shrink)

This essay explores the lines of thought focused on the relationship between gesture and technique, examining the theories which have conceptualized the transfer of gestural matrices into inert matter, and understood technique as a result of this process. Although associated mainly with the writings of the palaeontologist André Leroi-Gourhan, this thought actually predates his work, and consists of multiple branches: having first taken root at the end of the nineteenth century, it became diffused throughout the following decades in different forms. (...) These nevertheless shared a constant reference to cinema, both as a privileged place that captures gestures, and as a technique that can absorb their quintessence. From Espinas to Simondon, via Jousse and Eisenstein, the theory of gestural transmission breaks down various polarities, such as body and environment, organic and inorganic, animated and inanimate, performativity and inner life. It foregrounds the imaginative logic of the body and the many forms of somatic thinking developed by man. Such forms lie at the heart of the creative processes and have found their highest appreciation in cinema, as a machine that, from its very origins, has been grafted not only on the eye but on the whole body. (shrink)

Diverging definitions of what the human being is or should be polarize the ongoing debate about human enhancement between so-called bioconservatives and transhumanists. This essay seeks to review some of the central issues at stake in this discussion and in a wider sense within current, mostly philosophically oriented approaches that endeavor to understand “human being” or “human nature” in relation to technology. It does so specifically on the basis of a discussion of two recent works that thoroughly grapple with these (...) topics. (shrink)

What can the art of living after Foucault contribute to ethics in relation to the mediation of human existence by technology? To develop the relation between technical mediation and ethics, firstly the theme of technical mediation is elaborated in line with Foucault’s notion of ethical problematization. Every view of what technology does to us at the same time expresses an ethical concern about technology. The contemporary conception of technical mediation tends towards the acknowledgement of ongoing hybridization, not ultimately good or (...) bad but ambivalent, which means for us the challenge of taking care of ourselves as hybrid beings. Secondly, the work of Foucault provides elements for imagining this care for our hybrid selves, notably his notions of freedom as a practice and of the care of the self. A conclusions about technical mediation and ethics is that whereas the approaches of the delegation of morality to technology by Latour and mediated morality by Verbeek see technical mediation of behavior and moral outlook as an answer in ethics, this should rather be considered the problem that ethics is about. (shrink)

In a context of pervasive digitalization of the social world, both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, the field of education has undergone major changes with the development of digital practices and settings. However, the physical presence of the subjects and the body remain something primordial and irreplaceable in traditional educational processes. Thus, it is often assumed that virtuality is opposed to the corporeal reality of the subjects involved in teaching, learning and studying. In this paper we aim to critically (...) challenge this assumption by addressing the phenomenon of virtuality in a more original sense: as a fundamental dimension of corporeality itself. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights, we argue that the experience of the virtual is inherently embodied and fully real. We understand corporeality and virtuality as entangled and multidimensional phenomena. At the same time, this leads us to rethink the digital as only one possible medium in which virtuality can appear as inherent to embodied experience. We develop our phenomenological approach in three instances. First, we question and bracket two common assumptions about corporeality. From our critical perspective, assumptions about a disembodied digitality and a devirtualized corporeality represent extremes within which educational discourses currently move. Second, we address the inherent virtuality of embodied experience. We outline the heuristic concept of the virtual body to describe corporeality and virtuality as entangled and multidimensional phenomena that encompass extension, intercorporeality and intermediality. Finally, we make some remarks on the relationships of corporeality and virtuality considering the challenges of digital education. (shrink)

The conception of the nature of modern technology and the understanding of its history is largely determined by Marx: technology is instrumental appropriation of nature and its development was driven by the bourgeoisie and capitalism. To this familiar conception the article opposes the concept of two technology types, which we find in the early modern engineer Salomon de Caus: useful and enjoyable technology. Enjoyable technology, which serves pleasure and not production, originates in the orientation to curiosities and representation at royal (...) courts, limited neither by guild conservatism nor by considerations of profit. Precisely for this reason courtly technology was particularly creative. Against this historical background the article examines contemporary technological developments in the period of the transformation of capitalism into the aesthetic economy, in which technology development (apart from war) increasingly serves pleasure. Technology becomes plaything and life-style gadget. An explicit consumption of technology has emerged, in which Marx’s ideal obsolescence plays a leading role. (shrink)

Even before turning to instruments, we already have a technical-cultural body, since our body always keeps track of the action of technology and culture. It is indeed thanks to both technology and culture that our body had become what it is, that is a human body, meaning a sort of biological paradox - a body unfit for survival, unspecialized and unadapted, but extremely plastic. This does not imply that the action that current technologies have upon our bodies, with their extraordinary (...) capabilities of manipulation, does not have any consequences or cause concerns. We do nothing alien to our "nature" when we expose ourselves to the action of technology, as well as we do nothing alien to us when we set limits to technology, and not only to it. The continuous process of self-limitation is in fact a necessity for men. And setting limits to the possible is also the only way to safeguard it. (shrink)