The Lunyu 論語 (Analects of Confucius), Daodejing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and Virtuosity) or Laozi 老子 (Book of Master Lao), and the Zhuangzi 莊子 (Book of Master Zhuang) have been broadly classified as representative of Confucianism (Lunyu) and Daoism (Laozi and Zhuangzi). This loose grouping, and the similarities and differences associated with these “schools” include some of the most telling and simultaneously misleading generalizations about Chinese philosophy or thought in general. These articles seek to provide an overview of the (...) relationship between Confucianism and Daoism. The first article begins before with a generalized topics based comparison of the Lunyu, Laozi and Zhuangzi. The latter two texts include their own significant differences, but I will, wherever possible, look for generalities that fit both. The major themes considered in this first part are (1) the perspectives on names (ming 名) and actualities (shi 實), (2) cultivation, learning, and what is considered natural (ziran 自然), and finally (3) conceptions of the person. (shrink)

This work is a thought experiment in re-interpreting the virtue of li or ritual/propriety for the contemporary, multi-cultural, world. Using Zhuangzi, the Lunyu, and Zhongyong as my primary points of departure, I re-interpret the Confucian ideas of hierarchy in terms of the Daoist conception of harmony. Many scholars today argue that Confucianism has a relational ontology, yet at the same time, we find that Confucian values can and do lead to rigid and harmful traditions that have historically oppressed marginalized groups (...) like women. As such, I re-imagine what li might look like if we take relational ontology seriously, Drawing from Zhuangzi, I argue that Confucian harmony and order do not necessarily arise out of hierarchy, and that harmony, the most primary goal of li and of the Confucian project, can be best attained through propriety that is influenced by Daoism and feminist values such as equality. (shrink)

Although contemporary Confucianists tend to view Western liberalism as pitting the individual against society, recent liberal scholarship has vigorously claimed that liberal polity is indeed grounded in the self-transformation that produces “liberal virtues.” To meet this challenge, this essay presents a sophisticated Confucian critique of liberalism by arguing that there is an appreciable contrast between liberal and Confucian self-transformation and between liberal and Confucian virtues. By contrasting Locke and Confucius, key representatives of each tradition, this essay shows that both liberalism (...) and Confucianism aim to reconstruct a society freed from antisocial passions entailing a vicious politics of resentment, and yet come to differing ethical and political resolutions. My key claim is that what makes Confucian self-cultivation so distinctive is the incorporation of ritual propriety ( li ) within it, whereas liberal self-transformation that relies heavily on a method of self-control comes back to the problem that it originally set out to overcome. (shrink)

Research on ethical leadership in organizations has been largely based on Western philosophical traditions and has tended to focus on Western corporate experiences. Insights gained from such studies may however not be universally applicable in other cultural contexts. This paper examines the normative grounds for an alternative Confucian virtue-based ethics of leadership in China. As with Western corporations, organizational practices in China are profoundly shaped by their own cultural history and philosophical outlook. The ethical norms guiding both the practice and (...) theory of leadership in China are underpinned by indigenous Chinese wisdoms imbued in their own traditions and China’s collective psyche. Focusing on three fundamental aspects of Confucian virtue ethics: _ren_ (仁 benevolence), _yi_ (义 righteousness) and _li_(礼 ritual propriety), this paper proposes that an ideal Confucian leader regards self-cultivation as a first priority; status and material gain, whilst important, are not the foremost concern. S/he exemplifies the virtuous role model, exudes moral charisma and influences others by shaping an organization’s ethical culture through the process of ritualization. The paper concludes by claiming that amplifying the explicit discourse around Confucian virtue ethics will help contribute to the development of better ethical leadership in China. (shrink)

This essay attempts a philosophical reflection of the Confucian ideal of “scholar-official” in Joseon Korea’s neo-Confucian context. It explores why this noble ideal of a Confucian public being had to suffer many moral-political problems in reality. It argues first that because the institution of Confucian scholar-official was actually a modus-operandi compromise between Confucianism and Legalism, the Confucian scholar-officials were torn between their ethical commitment to Confucianism and their political commitment to the state; and second, that because the Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucianism vigorously (...) imported and indigenized by Joseon Koreans exalted the family over the state, Joseon neo-Confucian scholar-officials were torn between two competing moral obligations, filiality and loyalty. The essay concludes by discussing whether, given the problems with which the ideal of the Confucian scholar-official was frequently entangled, liberal individualism should be pursued as its normative alternative. (shrink)

This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s understandings of human nature are qualitatively different, which is responsible for the difference in their respective normative political theory of a civil polity. This article has two main theses: first, where Hobbes’s deepest concern was with human beings’ unsocial passions, Xunzi was most concerned with human beings’ appetitive desires ( yu 欲), material self-interest, and resulting social strife; second, as a result, where Hobbes strove to transform the pathological (anti-)politics (...) of resentment into the politics of recognition by creating rational egalitarian citizenship under the all-encompassing constitutional sovereign power, Xunzi attempted to nourish human beings’ basic appetitive desires ( yu 欲) by instituting a li 禮 ordered civil entity. This article concludes by showing how Confucian civility that Xunzi reconstructed by means of the li 禮 can effectively deal with unsocial passions. (shrink)

Confucius associates the good and the beautiful. Li (translated variously as “ritual propriety,” “ritual,” “etiquette,” or “propriety”) embodies the entire spectrum of interaction with humans, nature, and even material objects. I argue that Confucius attempts to introduce an ethical ontology, not of “what,” but of “the way.” The “way” of reality becomes known with the deliberate participation to the Dao. In other words, through interaction. The way people co-exist demonstrates the rationality of the associations of living and functioning together. Li, (...) as an aesthetic-moral principle, embodies the entire spectrum of one’s interaction with humans, nature, and even material objects. Li is a constitutive element of Confucian ethics and politics, highlighting the importance of beauty, and not only goodness, in human action. The worthiness of human action is judged both aesthetically and morally. Moreover, I hold that Confucius’ ethical ontology is not an ontology of “whatness” but of “howness,” according to the Dao, since Confucius primary concern was not to define the Dao, but to restore the Dao of the ancient sage-kings. The morality of the action is dependent on the way it is performed, according to the mandates of the Dao. (shrink)

It is common to criticize certain comments as ‘unhelpful’. This criticism is richer than it might first appear. In this paper, I sketch an account of conversational helpfulness and unhelpfulness, the reasons why they matter, and the utility of calling out comments as helpful or unhelpful. First, some unhelpful comments are or easily could be demoralizing for proponents of projects, and criticizing them as such can diminish, deflect, or defend against that demoralization. Second, some unhelpful comments redirect or derail conversations (...) away from their projects and criticizing comments as unhelpful can steer conversations back. Third, some unhelpful comments are made out of a lack of epistemic effort and criticizing them as such can help maintain epistemic standards, standards of respect for other people and their projects, and can ensure that such comments do not receive more attention and consideration than they deserve. (shrink)

Indirect situationist critiques of virtue ethics grant that virtue exists and is possible to acquire, but contend that given the low probability of success in acquiring it, a person genuinely interested in behaving as morally as possible would do better to rely on situationist strategies - or, in other words, strategies of environmental or ecological engineering or control. In this paper, I develop a partial answer to this critique drawn from work in early Confucian ethics and in contemporary philosophy and (...) psychology. From early Confucian ethics, I lean on the concept of li, or ritual. Ritual represents both a set of situational manipulations that are especially effective at directly producing moral behavior and at indirectly cultivating virtue over time, and also a virtue that consists of facility with and expertise in these situational manipulations. Appealing to the particular example of social power, I then argue that one is justified in attempting to acquire virtue if one knows that one will frequently encounter circumstances in which purely situationist strategies lose effectiveness, if these circumstances also carry moral urgency: the risk of great harm or opportunity for great benefit to others is high, and if utilizing the potent combination of situationist strategies and virtue envisioned by the early Confucians as ritual is possible. (shrink)

A central challenge for early Confucian ethics, which relies heavily on the moral rules, scripts, and instructions of ritual, is to provide an account of how best to deviate from ritual when unexpected circumstances demand that one must do so. Many commentators have explored ways in which the Confucian tradition can meet this challenge, and one particularly interesting line of response to it focuses on “mind-reading”—the ability to infer others’ mental states from their behavior. In this article, I introduce nunchi (...) 눈치, a Korean word meaning a keen social awareness and facility in dynamic social situations, and make the case that it represents a key component in a full account of how to best deviate from ritual. (shrink)

Li 禮 (translated variously as “ritual”, “etiquette”, or “propriety”) plays a central role in early Confucianism, but its complexity is not always fully understood. At first glance, it may seem as if li behaviors are merely attempts to promote conservative practices from the idealized Chinese past. However, by examining the nature and function of li, as described the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and the Xunzi 荀子 (two key texts in the early Confucian tradition), it becomes overwhelmingly apparent that li is a (...) much more complicated phenomenon. Li actually plays key roles within the interconnected fields of Confucian ethics, religion, and politics and often adds aesthetic elements to these areas of thought. As such, it is as much a source of Confucian innovation as it is a tool for promoting reverence for the past. (shrink)

Confucianism has attracted some attention in business ethics, in particular as a form of virtue ethics. This paper develops ideas about Confucianism in business ethics by extending discussion about Confucian ideas of ritual. Ritual has figured in literature about organisational culture, but Confucian accounts can offer additional ideas about developing ethically desirable organisational cultures. Confucian ritual practice has diverged from doctrine and from the classical emphasis on requirements for concern and respect as parts of ritual. Despite some differences of emphasis (...) amongst early writers, classical texts like the Analects and Mencius allow for the importance of ritual as opportunity for interpersonal encounter. These are texts that bring out the flexibility and context-sensitivity of ritual, with associated implications about the need for care and attention to other individuals. They eschew ritual as unthinking repetition, in favour of ritual as meaningful expression. The mutual awareness such ritual can engender is an important part of human existence. Such ritual is a means to solving coordination problems through common knowledge, as opposed to unthinking routine. Undue routinisation can be one problem with organisational ritual, while another can be use of ritual as a means of oppressive control. In organisations, ritual should satisfy general requirements of concern and respect, and should maintain opportunities for mutual encounter. The difference between arrangements which do or do not offer such opportunities may suggest lines of development for virtue ethics in business. (shrink)

Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of (...) Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits. (shrink)

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the (...) Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness. (shrink)

Many scholars note that the Analects, and Confucian philosophy more generally, hold a conception of knowing that more closely approximates ‘knowing-how’ than ‘knowing-that’. However, I argue that this description is not sufficiently sensitive to the concerns of the early Confucians and their focus on self-cultivation. I propose that a particular conception of knowing—knowing to act in the moment—is better suited to capturing the Analects’ emphasis on exemplary lives in actual contexts. These investigations might also contribute to discussions on know-how in (...) epistemology in western philosophy. (shrink)

We put the bifocal stance theory (BST) into dialogue with the Confucian approach to ritual. The aim of the commentary is two-fold: To draw on BST to provide an explanatory framework for a Confucian approach to social learning and, while doing so, to show how Chinese (Confucian) philosophy can contribute to debates in cultural evolution. -/- In response to: Jagiello, R., Heyes, C., & Whitehouse, H. (2022). Tradition and invention: The bifocal stance theory of cultural evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, (...) 45, E249. doi:10.1017/S0140525X22000383. (shrink)

Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices in (...) aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the philosophical thought and moral practice of a Korean neo-Confucian female scholar named Kang Chŏngildang 姜靜一堂, who not only believed in moral equality between men and women and the possibility of female sagehood but actually empowered herself to become a moral paragon. Furthermore, Chŏngildang’s strong faith in moral equality between men and women enabled her to engage in social criticism of the existing educational system and social norms which discriminated against women, not by overcoming neo-Confucianism, (...) commonly understood as essentially androcentric and patriarchal, but by wholeheartedly embracing and further re-appropriating it in the service of women’s moral self-empowerment and moral perfectibility. After explicating why Chŏngildang nonetheless subscribed to gendered roles and female virtue with reference to her neo-Confucian worldview, I suggest that she can be called a harbinger of Confucian feminism. (shrink)

In this article, I probe the nature of Confucian virtue with special focus on ritual propriety (li). I examine two classic, mutually competing accounts of li—as moral virtue and as civic virtue—in early Confucianism by investigating the thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi. My primary aim in this article is to demonstrate how their different accounts of human nature and equally different understandings of the natural state (that is, the pre-li state) led them to the development of two distinctive political theories (...) of virtue in the Confucian tradition. More specifically, they justified the nature of the li on different terms—human/moral on the one hand and civic/political on the other. I conclude by revisiting the contemporary debate on the nature of Confucian ethics from the perspective of early Confucianism represented by Mencius and Xunzi. (shrink)

Early Confucian thinkers have an intense interest in the external aspects of moral exemplars. This article explores this interest by unpacking a complicated relation between silence, speech, and moral cultivation in theAnalects. Situating Confucius’s desire to be silent in a pedagogical context, this article points out a tension between speaking of moral knowledge and personalizing it. It argues that silence is considered a desirable pedagogical practice because it fosters a more intimate relation between people and the moral knowledge they receive. (...) This article then offers a detailed analysis of several difficult pedagogical moments between Confucius and two of his most eloquent students, Zigong and Zai Wo. Their problematic ways of speaking provide cases in point that flesh out the arguments sketched above. This article concludes by reflecting on how silence can also be alienating in moral cultivation, and on how people’s styles of speech may shape who they are. (shrink)

For a while now, there has been much conceptual discussion about the respective natures of knowledge-that and knowledge-how, along with the intellectualist idea that knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that. Gilbert Ryle put in place most of the terms that have so far been distinctive of that debate, when he argued for knowledge-how's conceptual distinctness from knowledge-that. But maybe those terms should be supplemented, expanding the debate. In that spirit, the conceptual option of practicalism has recently entered the fray. (...) Practicalism conceives anew the nature of knowledge-that, as being a kind of knowledge-how. In this paper we enlarge upon this conceptual suggestion. We draw from an ancient Chinese text, the Analects of Confucius, explaining how it lends some support to practicalism. (shrink)

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept _li_ is both central and elusive. While it is often translated 'ritual' or 'the rites,' I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which _li_ is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss _li_ as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well as (...) Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external _aspect_ of _li_, although reasonably understood under the rubric of 'traditional norms,' may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of _li_. (shrink)

This article examines the comic portrayal of Confucius in the Analects and the Zhuangzi, maintaining that there is a humorous aspect to the character of Confucius that is often overlooked. Conventional interpretations of the Analects downplay the pranks and mocking comments that are sprinkled throughout them. Many of the humorous words Confucius utters are directed at ritualistic behaviour which has become mechanistic, suggesting that in order to take ritual seriously, we must also be prepared to take it in jest. Furthermore, (...) Confucius’s situation is poked fun at in both the Analects and the Zhuangzi, since he wanders around desperately seeking a position of influence that eludes him. But while the Zhuangzi relentlessly mocks Confucius for his ritualized arrogance, it also signals his respect for him by making him the mouthpiece of the very Dao that it accuses him of straying from. (shrink)

The role of li, or ritual, in Confucianism is a perceived impediment to interpreting Confucianism to share a similar ethical framework with care ethics because care ethics is a form of moral particularism. I argue that this perception is false. The form of moral particularism promoted by care ethicists does not entail the abandonment of social conventions such as li. On the contrary, providing good care often requires employing systems of readily recognizable norms in order to ensure that care is (...) successfully communicated and completed through one's care-giving practices. I argue that li performs this communicative function well and that the early Confucians recommend breaching li precisely when its efficacy in performing this function is compromised. (shrink)

Li (禮) and yi (義) are two central moral concepts in the Analects. Li has a broad semantic range, referring to formal ceremonial rituals on the one hand, and basic rules of personal decorum on the other. What is similar across the range of referents is that the li comprise strictures of correct behavior. The li are a distinguishing characteristic of Confucian approaches to ethics and socio-political thought, a set of rules and protocols that were thought to constitute the wise (...) practices of ancient moral exemplars filtered down through dynasties of the past. However, even while the li were extensive and meant to be followed diligently, they were also understood as incapable of exhausting the whole range of activity that constitutes human life. There were bound to be situations in life where there would be no obvious recourse to the li for guidance. As part of their reflections on the good life, the Confucians maintained another moral concept that seemed to cover morally upright exemplary behavior in these types of situations. This concept is that of yi or rightness. In this chapter, I begin with a brief historical sketch to provide some context, and will then turn to li and yi in turn. In the end, I will suggest how li and yi were both meant to facilitate the supreme value of social harmony that pervades much of the Analects and serves as its ultimate orientation. (shrink)

This paper takes behavioural propriety as the source of ritual or the ritualistic in indigenous philosophy in the Philippines. Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety is seen in what have been identified as elements or features of indigenous philosophy in the country. These features are stored in pre-hispanic era (pre-16th century CE) maxims or proverbs and myths. In this paper, I engage conception of behavioural propriety in Filipino philosophy with that in Confucian philosophy. In Confucian philosophy, it is “li” 禮 which (...) relates to ritual. Li encompasses ritual propriety and behavioural propriety. It is originally about ritual or ceremony and, as understood in contemporary scholarship, it has the general meaning of proper conduct; it refers first and foremost to rules of proper conduct. In this paper, I address the question of what each understanding offers for the enrichment of the other. I suggest that importantly, Confucian understanding of li offers the view of behavioural propriety as having an ennobling function, and that Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety offers a perspective on the debate in Confucianism about whether it is ren 仁 or li that is more fundamental in Confucius’s thought. A point that appears to be present in the Filipino understanding is that propriety in behaviour cannot be separated from humaneness (ren). The point comes from the view in the proverbs that a person of ren is necessarily a person of li. Accordingly, the perspective which the Filipino understanding offers proposes the view that behavioural propriety is a necessary condition for humanity (ren). (shrink)