We give a general account of the goals of axiomatization, introducing a variant on Detlefsen’s notion of ‘complete descriptive axiomatization’. We describe how distinctions between the Greek and modern view of number, magnitude, and proportion impact the interpretation of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry. We argue, as did Hilbert, that Euclid’s propositions concerning polygons, area, and similar triangles are derivable from Hilbert’s first-order axioms. We argue that Hilbert’s axioms including continuity show much more than the geometrical propositions of Euclid’s theorems and (...) thus are an immodest complete descriptive axiomatization of that subject. (shrink)

The Craig Interpolation Theorem is intimately connected with the emergence of abstract logic and continues to be the driving force of the field. I will argue in this paper that the interpolation property is an important litmus test in abstract model theory for identifying “natural,” robust extensions of first order logic. My argument is supported by the observation that logics which satisfy the interpolation property usually also satisfy a Lindström type maximality theorem. Admittedly, the range of such logics is small.

We introduce and explore the notion of duality for entailment relations induced by preference orderings on states. We discuss the relationship between these preferential entailment relations from the perspectives of Boolean algebra, inference rules, and modal axiomatisation. Interpreting the preference relations as accessibility relations establishes modular Gödel-Löb logic as a suitable modal framework for rational preferential reasoning.

This paper is a study of higher-order contingentism – the view, roughly, that it is contingent what properties and propositions there are. We explore the motivations for this view and various ways in which it might be developed, synthesizing and expanding on work by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the view makes sense by its own lights, or whether articulating the view requires drawing distinctions among possibilities that, according to (...) the view itself, do not exist to be drawn. The paper begins with a non-technical exposition of the main ideas and technical results, which can be read on its own. This exposition is followed by a formal investigation of higher-order contingentism, in which the tools of variable-domain intensional model theory are used to articulate various versions of the view, understood as theories formulated in a higher-order modal language. Our overall assessment is mixed: higher-order contingentism can be fleshed out into an elegant systematic theory, but perhaps only at the cost of abandoning some of its original motivations. (shrink)

In this paper we develop an Ehrenfeucht‐Fraïssé game for. Unlike the standard Ehrenfeucht‐Fraïssé games which are modeled solely after the behavior of quantifiers, this new game also takes into account the behavior of connectives in logic. We prove the adequacy theorem for this game. We also apply the new game to prove complexity results about infinite binary strings.

The paper starts with an examination and critique of Tarski’s wellknown proposed explication of the notion of logical operation in the type structure over a given domain of individuals as one which is invariant with respect to arbitrary permutations of the domain. The class of such operations has been characterized by McGee as exactly those definable in the language L∞,∞. Also characterized similarly is a natural generalization of Tarski’s thesis, due to Sher, in terms of bijections between domains. My main (...) objections are that on the one hand, the Tarski-Sher thesis thus assimilates logic to mathematics, and on the other hand fails to explain the notion of same logical operation across domains of different sizes. A new notion of homomorphism invariant operation over functional type structures (with domains M0 of individuals and {T, F} at their base) is introduced to accomplish the latter. The main result is that an operation is definable from.. (shrink)

If the computational theory of mind is right, then minds are realized by machines. There is an ordered complexity hierarchy of machines. Some finite machines realize finitely complex minds; some Turing machines realize potentially infinitely complex minds. There are many logically possible machines whose powers exceed the Church–Turing limit (e.g. accelerating Turing machines). Some of these supermachines realize superminds. Superminds perform cognitive supertasks. Their thoughts are formed in infinitary languages. They perceive and manipulate the infinite detail of fractal objects. They (...) have infinitely complex bodies. Transfinite games anchor their social relations. (shrink)

Though my ultimate concern is with issues in epistemology and metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in terms evocative of philosophy of religion: What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor and G6del-for the possibility of omniscience?

In this paper, we give an example of a complete computable infinitary theory T with countable models ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ , where ${\mathcal{N}}$ is a proper computable infinitary extension of ${\mathcal{M}}$ and T has no uncountable model. In fact, ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ are (up to isomorphism) the only models of T. Moreover, for all computable ordinals α, the computable ${\Sigma_\alpha}$ part of T is hyperarithmetical. It follows from a theorem of Gregory (JSL 38:460–470, 1972; Not Am Math Soc 17:967–968, 1970) (...) that if T is a Π 1 1 set of computable infinitary sentences and T has a pair of models ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ , where ${\mathcal{N}}$ is a proper computable infinitary extension of ${\mathcal{M}}$ , then T would have an uncountable model. (shrink)

Should weak forms of the axiom of choice really be accepted within constructive mathematics? A critical view of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, accompanied by the intention to include nondeterministic algorithms, leads us to subscribe to Richman's appeal for dropping countable choice. As an alternative interpretation of intuitionistic logic, we propose to renew dialogue semantics.

This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, (...) we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II. (shrink)

We exploit properties of certain directed graphs, obtained from the families of sets with special effective enumeration properties, to generalize several results in computable model theory to higher levels of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy. Families of sets with such enumeration features were previously built by Selivanov, Goncharov, and Wehner. For a computable successor ordinal α, we transform a countable directed graph into a structure such that has a isomorphic copy if and only if has a computable isomorphic copy.A computable structure is (...) categorical if for all computable isomorphic copies of , there is an isomorphism from onto , which is . We prove that for every computable successor ordinal α, there is a computable, categorical structure, which is not relatively categorical. This generalizes the result of Goncharov that there is a computable, computably categorical structure, which is not relatively computably categorical.An additional relation R on the domain of a computable structure is intrinsically on if in all computable isomorphic copies of , the image of R is . We prove that for every computable successor ordinal α, there is an intrinsically relation on a computable structure, which not relatively intrinsically . This generalizes the result of Manasse that there is an intrinsically computably enumerable relation on a computable structure, which is not relatively intrinsically computably enumerable.The dimension of a structure is the number of computable isomorphic copies, up to isomorphisms. We prove that for every computable successor ordinal α and every n≥1, there is a computable structure with dimension n. This generalizes the result of Goncharov that there is a structure of computable dimension n for every n≥1.Finally, we prove that for every computable successor ordinal α, there is a countable structure with isomorphic copies in just the Turing degrees of sets X such that relative to X is not . In particular, for every finite n, there is a structure with isomorphic copies in exactly the non- Turing degrees. This generalizes the result obtained by Wehner, and independently by Slaman, that there is a structure with isomorphic copies in exactly the nonzero Turing degrees. (shrink)

We defend a set of acceptance rules that avoids the lottery paradox, that is closed under classical entailment, and that accepts uncertain propositions without ad hoc restrictions. We show that the rules we recommend provide a semantics that validates exactly Adams’ conditional logic and are exactly the rules that preserve a natural, logical structure over probabilistic credal states that we call probalogic. To motivate probalogic, we first expand classical logic to geo-logic, which fills the entire unit cube, and then we (...) project the upper surfaces of the geo-logical cube onto the plane of probabilistic credal states by means of standard, linear perspective, which may be interpreted as an extension of the classical principle of indifference. Finally, we apply the geometrical/logical methods developed in the paper to prove a series of trivialization theorems against question-invariance as a constraint on acceptance rules and against rational monotonicity as an axiom of conditional logic in situations of uncertainty. (shrink)

Pour le philosophe intéressé aux structures et aux fondements du savoir théorétique, à la constitution d'une « méta-théorétique «, θεωρíα., qui, mieux que les « Wissenschaftslehre » fichtéenne ou husserlienne et par-delà les débris de la métaphysique, veut dans une intention nouvelle faire la synthèse du « théorétique », la logique mathématique se révèle un objet privilégié.

The most commonly heard proposals for reducing possible worlds to language succumb to a simple cardinality argument: it can be shown that there are more possible worlds than there are linguistic entities provided by the proposal. In this paper, I show how the standard proposals can be generalized in a natural way so as to make better use of the resources available to them, and thereby circumvent the cardinality argument. Once it is seen just what the limitations are on these (...) more general proposals, it can be clearly seen where the real difficulty lies with any attempt to reduce possible worlds to language. Roughly, the difficulty is this: no actual language could have the descriptive resources needed to represent all the ways things might have been. I conclude by arguing that this same difficulty spells doom for any nominalist or conceptualist proposal for reducing possible worlds. (shrink)

For each regular cardinal κ, we set up three systems of infinitary type logic, in which the length of the types and the length of the typed syntactical constructs are $\Sigma _{}$, the global system $\text{g}\Sigma _{}$ and the τ-system $\tau \Sigma _{}$. A full cut elimination theorem is proved for the local systems, and about the τ-systems we prove that they admit cut-free proofs for sequents in the τ-free language common to the local and global systems. These two results (...) follow from semantic completeness proofs. Thus every sequent provable in a global system has a cut-free proof in the corresponding τ-systems. It is, however, an open question whether the global systems in themselves admit cut elimination. (shrink)

Analogues of Scott's isomorphism theorem, Karp's theorem as well as results on lack of compactness and strong completeness are established for infinitary propositional relevant logics. An "interpolation theorem" for the infinitary quantificational boolean logic L-infinity omega. holds. This yields a preservation result characterizing the expressive power of infinitary relevant languages with absurdity using the model-theoretic relation of relevant directed bisimulation as well as a Beth definability property.

Ebbhinghaus, H., J. Flum, and W. Thomas. 1984. Mathematical Logic. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. Forster, T. Typescript. The significance of Yablo’s paradox without self-reference. Available from http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk. Gold, M. 1965. Limiting recursion. Journal of Symbolic Logic 30: 28–47. Karp, C. 1964. Languages with Expressions of Infinite Length. Amsterdam.

We investigate an aspect of defeasibility that has somewhat been overlooked by the non-monotonic reasoning community, namely that of defeasible modes of reasoning. These aim to formalise defeasibility of the traditional notion of necessity in modal logic, in particular of its different readings as action, knowledge and others in specific contexts, rather than defeasibility of conditional forms. Building on an extension of the preferential approach to modal logics, we introduce new modal osperators with which to formalise the notion of defeasible (...) necessity and distinct possibility, and that can be used to represent expected effects, refutable knowledge, and so on. We show how KLM-style conditionals can smoothly be integrated with our richer language. We also propose a tableau calculus which is sound and complete with respect to our modal preferential semantics, and of which the computational complexity remains in the same class as that of the underlying classical modal logic. (shrink)

We define the concept of a logic frame , which extends the concept of an abstract logic by adding the concept of a syntax and an axiom system. In a recursive logic frame the syntax and the set of axioms are recursively coded. A recursive logic frame is called complete , if every finite consistent theory has a model. We show that for logic frames built from the cardinality quantifiers “there exists at least λ ” completeness always implies .0-compactness. On (...) the other hand we show that a recursively compact logic frame need not be ℵ0-compact. (shrink)

When Ken Malone investigates a case of something causing mental static across the United States, he is teleported to a world that doesn't exist.

We define infinitary extensions to classical epistemic logic systems, and add also a common belief modality, axiomatized in a finitary, fixed-point manner. In the infinitary K system, common belief turns to be provably equivalent to the conjunction of all the finite levels of mutual belief. In contrast, in the infinitary monotonic system, common belief implies every transfinite level of mutual belief but is never implied by it. We conclude that the fixed-point notion of common belief is more powerful than the (...) iterative notion of common belief. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to outline the historical background and the present state of the methodology of deductive systems invented by Alfred Tarski in the thirties. Key notions of Tarski's methodology are presented and discussed through, the recent development of the original concepts and ideas.

It is known that a theory in S5‐epistemic logic with several agents may have numerous models. This is because each such model specifies also what an agent knows about infinite intersections of events, while the expressive power of the logic is limited to finite conjunctions of formulas. We show that this asymmetry between syntax and semantics persists also when infinite conjunctions (up to some given cardinality) are permitted in the language. We develop a strengthened S5‐axiomatic system for such infinitary logics, (...) and prove a strong completeness theorem for them. Then we show that in every such logic there is always a theory with more than one model. (shrink)

An idea attributable to Russell serves to extend Zermelo’s theory of systems of infinitely long propositions to infinitary relations. Specifically, relations over a given domain \ of individuals will now be identified with propositions over an auxiliary domain \ subsuming \. Three applications of the resulting theory of infinitary relations are presented. First, it is used to reconstruct Zermelo’s original theory of urelements and sets in a manner that achieves most, if not all, of his early aims. Second, the new (...) account of infinitary relations makes possible a concise characterization of parametric definability with respect to a purely relational structure. Finally, based on his foundational philosophy of the primacy of the infinite, Zermelo rejected Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem; it is shown that the new theory of infinitary relations can be brought to bear, positively, in that connection as well. (shrink)

A theorem on the extendability of certain subsets of a Boolean algebra to ultrafilters which preserve countably many infinite meets (generalizing Rasiowa-Sikorski) is used to pinpoint the mechanism of the Barwise proof in a way which bypasses the set theoretical elaborations.

We study a modal system ¯T, that extends the classical (prepositional) modal system T and whose language is provided with modal operators M inn (nN) to be interpreted, in the usual kripkean semantics, as there are more than n accessible worlds such that.... We find reasonable axioms for ¯T and we prove for it completeness, compactness and decidability theorems.