In “Properties and the Interpretation of Second-Order Logic” Bob Hale develops and defends a deflationary conception of properties where a property with particular satisfaction conditions actually exists if and only if it is possible that a predicate with those same satisfaction conditions exists. He argues further that, since our languages are finitary, there are at most countably infinitely many properties and, as a result, the account fails to underwrite the standard semantics for second-order logic. Here a more lenient version of (...) the view is explored, which allows for the possibility of countably infinite predicates understood as the product of linguistic supertasks. This enriched deflationist account of properties—the Infinitary Deflationary Conception of Existence—supports the standard semantics for models with countable first-order domains, and allows one to prove the categoricity of the second-order Peano axioms. (shrink)

In [14] we used the term finitely algebraizable for algebraizable logics in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [2] and we introduced possibly infinitely algebraizable, for short, p.i.-algebraizable logics. In the present paper, we characterize the hierarchy of protoalgebraic, equivalential, finitely equivalential, p.i.-algebraizable, and finitely algebraizable logics by properties of the Leibniz operator. A Beth-style definability result yields that finitely equivalential and finitely algebraizable as well as equivalential and p.i.-algebraizable logics can be distinguished by injectivity of the Leibniz operator. Thus, (...) from a characterization of equivalential logics we obtain a new short proof of the main result of [2] that a finitary logic is finitely algebraizable iff the Leibniz operator is injective and preserves unions of directed systems. It is generalized to nonfinitary logics. We characterize equivalential and, by adding injectivity, p.i.-algebraizable logics. (shrink)

Everyone working on metaphysical questions about properties or propositions knows the reaction that many non-philosophers, even nonmetaphysicians, have to such questions. Even though they agree that Fido is a dog and thus has the property (or feature or characteristic) of being a dog, it seems weird, suspicious, or confused to them to now ask what that thing, the property of being a dog, is. The same reservations do not carry over to asking what this thing, Fido, is. There is a (...) substantial and legitimate project to find out more about Fido, but is there a similar substantial and legitimate project to find out more about the property of being a dog? Metaphysicians know that there is a straightforward way to motivate such a project, and much of the contemporary debate in the metaphysics of properties is in the ballpark of carrying it out. If we agree that Fido has the property of being a dog, then there is something that is a property and that Fido has. Thus we can ask about what this thing is that he has. How does it relate to Fido? Is it concrete or abstract? Is it fully present in each object that has it? And so on and so forth. Maybe the nonphilosophers are merely not used to asking such questions about unusual entities such as properties, but they are equally legitimate for them as they are for any other thing. However, even metaphysicians sometimes have the nagging feeling that something has gone wrong in the metaphysics of properties, and that a substantial metaphysical investigation into their.. (shrink)

We present Saharon Shelah's Stability Spectrum and Homogeneity Spectrum theorems, as well as the equivalence between the order property and instability in the framework of Finite Diagrams. Finite Diagrams is a context which generalizes the first order case. Localized versions of these theorems are presented. Our presentation is based on several papers; the point of view is contemporary and some of the proofs are new. The treatment of local stability in Finite Diagrams is new.

We give Scott sentences for certain computable groups, and we use index set calculations as a way of checking that our Scott sentences are as simple as possible. We consider finitely generated groups and torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank. For both kinds of groups, the computable ones all have computable \ Scott sentences. Sometimes we can do better. In fact, the computable finitely generated groups that we have studied all have Scott sentences that are “computable d-\” sentence and a (...) computable \ sentence). In [9], this was shown for the finitely generated free groups. Here we show it for all finitely generated abelian groups, and for the infinite dihedral group. Among the computable torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank, we focus on those of rank 1. These are exactly the additive subgroups of \. We show that for some of these groups, the computable \ Scott sentence is best possible, while for others, there is a computable d-\ Scott sentence. (shrink)

Ebbhinghaus, H., J. Flum, and W. Thomas. 1984. Mathematical Logic. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. Forster, T. Typescript. The significance of Yablo’s paradox without self-reference. Available from http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk. Gold, M. 1965. Limiting recursion. Journal of Symbolic Logic 30: 28–47. Karp, C. 1964. Languages with Expressions of Infinite Length. Amsterdam.

When Ken Malone investigates a case of something causing mental static across the United States, he is teleported to a world that doesn't exist.

This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, (...) we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II. (shrink)

We show that the number of types of sequences of tuples of a fixed length can be calculated from the number of 1-types and the length of the sequences. Specifically, if κ≤λ, then sup ‖M‖=λ|Sκ|=|)κ. We show that this holds for any abstract elementary class with λ-amalgamation. No such calculation is possible for nonalgebraic types. However, we introduce a subclass of nonalgebraic types for which the same upper bound holds.

This paper is concerned with extensions of geometric stability theory to some nonelementary classes. We prove the following theorem:Theorem. Let [Formula: see text] be a large homogeneous model of a stable diagram D. Let p, q ∈ SD(A), where p is quasiminimal and q unbounded. Let [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. Suppose that there exists an integer n < ω such that [Formula: see text] for any independent a1, …, an∈ P and finite subset C ⊆ Q, but (...) [Formula: see text] for some independent a1, …, an, an+1∈ P and some finite subset C ⊆ Q.Then [Formula: see text] interprets a group G which acts on the geometry P′ obtained from P. Furthermore, either [Formula: see text] interprets a non-classical group, or n = 1,2,3 and•If n = 1 then G is abelian and acts regularly on P′.•If n = 2 the action of G on P′ is isomorphic to the affine action of K ⋊ K* on the algebraically closed field K.•If n = 3 the action of G on P′ is isomorphic to the action of PGL2(K) on the projective line ℙ1(K) of the algebraically closed field K.We prove a similar result for excellent classes. (shrink)

Labeled transition systems are key structures for modeling computation. In this paper, we show how they lend themselves to ordinary logical analysis (without any special new formalisms), by introducing their standard first-order theory. This perspective enables us to raise several basic model-theoretic questions of definability, axiomatization and preservation for various notions of process equivalence found in the computational literature, and answer them using well-known logical techniques (including the Compactness theorem, Saturation and Ehrenfeucht games). Moreover, we consider what happens to this (...) general theory when one restricts attention to special classes of transition systems (in particular, finite ones), as well as extended logical languages (in particular, infinitary first-order logic). We hope that this puts standard logical formalisms on the map as a serious option for a theory of computational processes. As a side benefit, our approach increases comparability with several other existing formalisms over labeled transition systems (such as Process Algebra or Modal Logic). We provide some pointers to this effect, too. (shrink)

We continue our study of finitary abstract elementary classes, defined in [7]. In this paper, we prove a categoricity transfer theorem for a case of simple finitary AECs. We introduce the concepts of weak κ-categoricity and f-primary models to the framework of א₀-stable simple finitary AECs with the extension property, whereby we gain the following theorem: Let (������, ≼ ������ ) be a simple finitary AEC, weakly categorical in some uncountable κ. Then (������, ≼ ������ ) is weakly categorical in (...) each λ ≥ min { \group{ \{\kappa,\beth_{ \group{ (2^{ \aleph_{ 0 _} ^});^{ + ^} \group} _}\}; \group} . If the class (������, ≼ ������ ) is also LS(������)-tame, weak κ-categoricity is equivalent with κ-categoricity in the usual sense. We also discuss the relation between finitary AECs and some other non-elementary frameworks and give several examples. (shrink)

What''s computation? The received answer is that computation is a computer at work, and a computer at work is that which can be modelled as a Turing machine at work. Unfortunately, as John Searle has recently argued, and as others have agreed, the received answer appears to imply that AI and Cog Sci are a royal waste of time. The argument here is alarmingly simple: AI and Cog Sci (of the Strong sort, anyway) are committed to the view that cognition (...) is computation (or brains are computers); butall processes are computations (orall physical things are computers); so AI and Cog Sci are positively silly.I refute this argument herein, in part by defining the locutions x is a computer and c is a computation in a way that blocks Searle''s argument but exploits the hard-to-deny link between What''s Computation? and the theory of computation. However, I also provide, at the end of this essay, an argument which, it seems to me, implies not that AI and Cog Sci are silly, but that they''re based on a form of computation that is well beneath human persons. (shrink)

Ontology is the study of what there is, what kinds of things make up reality. Ontology seems to be a very difficult, rather speculative discipline. However, it is trivial to conclude that there are properties, propositions and numbers, starting from only necessarily true or analytic premises. This gives rise to a puzzle about how hard ontological questions are, and relates to a puzzle about how important they are. And it produces the ontologyobjectivity dilemma: either (certain) ontological questions can be trivially (...) answered using only uncontroversial premises, or the uncertainties of ontology are really a threat to the truth of basically everything we say or believe. The main aim of this dissertation is to resolve these puzzles and to shed some light on the discipline of ontology. I defend a view inspired by Carnap’s internal-external distinction about what there is, but one according to which both internal and external questions are fully factual and meaningful. In particular, I argue that the trivial arguments are valid, but they do not answer any ontological questions. Furthermore, I propose an account of the function of our talk about properties, propositions and natural numbers. According to this account our talk about them has no ontological presuppositions for its literal and objective truth. This avoids the ontology-objectivity dilemma, and solves the puzzles about ontology. To do this I look at quantification and noun phrases in general, and at their relation to ontology. I argue that quantifiers are semantically underspecified in a certain respect, and play two different roles in communication. I discuss the relation between syntactic form and information structure, the function of certain non-referential, non-quantificational noun phrases, the uses of bare number determiners, and how arithmetic truths are learned and taught. The more metaphysical issues discussed include: inexpressible properties, logicism about arithmetic, nominalism, Carnap’s view about ontology, the problem of universals, the relationship between ontology and objectivity, different projects within ontology, non-existent.... (shrink)

We prove two results on the stability spectrum for Lω1,ω. Here [Formula: see text] denotes an appropriate notion of Stone space of m-types over M. Theorem for unstable case: Suppose that for some positive integer m and for every α μ, K is not i-stable in μ. These results provide a new kind of sufficient condition for the unstable case and shed some light on the spectrum of strictly stable theories in this context. The methods avoid the use of compactness (...) in the theory under study. In this paper, we expound the construction of tree indiscernibles for sentences of Lω1,ω. Further we provide some context for a number of variants on the Ehrenfeucht–Mostowski construction. (shrink)

Though deceptively simple and plausible on the face of it, Craig's interpolation theorem has proved to be a central logical property that has been used to reveal a deep harmony between the syntax and semantics of first order logic. Craig's theorem was generalized soon after by Lyndon, with application to the characterization of first order properties preserved under homomorphism. After retracing the early history, this article is mainly devoted to a survey of subsequent generalizations and applications, especially of many-sorted interpolation (...) theorems. Attention is also paid to methodological considerations, since the Craig theorem and its generalizations were initially obtained by proof-theoretic arguments while most of the applications are model-theoretic in nature. The article concludes with the role of the interpolation property in the quest for "reasonable" logics extending first-order logic within the framework of abstract model theory. (shrink)

In Part I of this paper we argued that the first-order systems HP5 and EG are modest complete descriptive axiomatization of most of Euclidean geometry. In this paper we discuss two further modest complete descriptive axiomatizations: Tarksi’s for Cartesian geometry and new systems for adding $$\pi$$. In contrast we find Hilbert’s full second-order system immodest for geometrical purposes but appropriate as a foundation for mathematical analysis.

Labeled transition systems are key structures for modeling computation. In this paper, we show how they lend themselves to ordinary logical analysis (without any special new formalisms), by introducing their standard first-order theory. This perspective enables us to raise several basic model-theoretic questions of definability, axiomatization and preservation for various notions of process equivalence found in the computational literature, and answer them using well-known logical techniques (including the Compactness theorem, Saturation and Ehrenfeucht games). Moreover, we consider what happens to this (...) general theory when one restricts attention to special classes of transition systems (in particular, finite ones), as well as extended logical languages (in particular, infinitary first-order logic). We hope that this puts standard logical formalisms on the map as a serious option for a theory of computational processes. As a side benefit, our approach increases comparability with several other existing formalisms over labeled transition systems (such as Process Algebra or Modal Logic). We provide some pointers to this effect, too. (shrink)

This is the first part of a study on cardinals that are characterizable by Scott sentences. Building on previous work of Hjorth, Malitz, and Baumgartner, we study which cardinals are characterizable by a Scott sentence $\phi$, in the sense that $\phi$ characterizes $\kappa$, if $\phi$ has a model of size $\kappa$ but no models of size $\kappa^{+}$. We show that the set of cardinals that are characterized by a Scott sentence is closed under successors, countable unions, and countable products. We (...) also prove that if $\aleph_{\alpha}$ is characterized by a Scott sentence, at least one of $\aleph_{\alpha}$, $\aleph_{\alpha+1}$, or $$ is homogeneously characterizable. Based on an argument of Shelah, we give counterexamples that characterizable cardinals are not closed under predecessors or cofinalities. (shrink)

We prove a completeness theorem for Kmath image, the infinitary extension of the graded version K0 of the minimal normal logic K, allowing conjunctions and disjunctions of countable sets of formulas. This goal is achieved using both the usual tools of the normal logics with graded modalities and the machinery of the predicate infinitary logics in a version adapted to modal logic.

This paper ties together much of the model theory of the last 50 years. Shelah's attempts to generalize the Morley theorem beyond first order logic led to the notion of excellence, which is a key to the structure theory of uncountable models. The notion of Abstract Elementary Class arose naturally in attempting to prove the categoricity theorem for L ω 1 ,ω (Q). More recently, Zilber has attempted to identify canonical mathematical structures as those whose theory (in an appropriate logic) (...) is categorical in all powers. Zilber's trichotomy conjecture for first order categorical structures was refuted by Hrushovski, by the introducion of a special kind of Abstract Elementary Class. Zilber uses a powerful and essentailly infinitary variant on these techniques to investigate complex exponentiation. This not only demonstrates the relevance of Shelah's model theoretic investigations to mainstream mathematics but produces new results and conjectures in algebraic geometry. (shrink)

Analogues of Scott's isomorphism theorem, Karp's theorem as well as results on lack of compactness and strong completeness are established for infinitary propositional relevant logics. An "interpolation theorem" for the infinitary quantificational boolean logic L-infinity omega. holds. This yields a preservation result characterizing the expressive power of infinitary relevant languages with absurdity using the model-theoretic relation of relevant directed bisimulation as well as a Beth definability property.

The Craig Interpolation Theorem is intimately connected with the emergence of abstract logic and continues to be the driving force of the field. I will argue in this paper that the interpolation property is an important litmus test in abstract model theory for identifying “natural,” robust extensions of first order logic. My argument is supported by the observation that logics which satisfy the interpolation property usually also satisfy a Lindström type maximality theorem. Admittedly, the range of such logics is small.

The topic of this paper is our knowledge of the natural numbers, and in particular, our knowledge of the basic axioms for the natural numbers, namely the Peano axioms. The thesis defended in this paper is that knowledge of these axioms may be gained by recourse to judgements of probability. While considerations of probability have come to the forefront in recent epistemology, it seems safe to say that the thesis defended here is heterodox from the vantage point of traditional philosophy (...) of mathematics. So this paper focuses on providing a preliminary defense of this thesis, in that it focuses on responding to several objections. Some of these objections are from the classical literature, such as Frege's concern about indiscernibility and circularity, while other are more recent, such as Baker's concern about the unreliability of small samplings in the setting of arithmetic. Another family of objections suggests that we simply do not have access to probability assignments in the setting of arithmetic, either due to issues related to the~$\omega$-rule or to the non-computability and non-continuity of probability assignments. Articulating these objections and the responses to them involves developing some non-trivial results on probability assignments, such as a forcing argument to establish the existence of continuous probability assignments that may be computably approximated. In the concluding section, two problems for future work are discussed: developing the source of arithmetical confirmation and responding to the probabilistic liar. (shrink)

In the the passage just quoted from theDialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume developed a thought-experiment that contravened his better-known views about chance expressed in hisTreatise and firstEnquiry.For among other consequences of the eternal-recurrence hypothesis Philo proposes in this passage, it may turn out that what the vulgar call cause is nothing but a secret and concealed chance.

Mancosu, P., Generalizing classical and effective model theory in theories of operations and classes, Annas of Pure and Applied Logic 52 249-308 . In this paper I propose a family of theories of operations and classes with the aim of developing abstract versions of model-theoretic results. The systems are closely related to those introduced and already used by Feferman for developing his program of ‘explicit mathematics’. The theories in question are two-sorted, with one kind of variable for individuals and the (...) other for classes. The individual variables range over a domain closed under pairing and containing, among other things, natural numbers and operations.All the theories used assume a common group of axioms that insure that the individuals in the domain satisfy the conditions for a partial combinatory algebra with pairing. We also assume a class of natural numbers and a class induction axiom on . Finally there are various class existence axioms. I work mainly with three theories, FMT0, FMT and FMTΩ, which differ from each other both in their class existence axioms as well as in some further applicative axioms.These theories have various interpretations in which every object is explicitly presented by some means of definition as well as classical, or ‘standard’, set-theoretical interpretation. The systems are formulated in a flexible general language which can be used to prove abstract theorems of mathematics , thereby generalizing recursive, hyperarithmetic and admissible versions of classical mathematics.The aim of my work is to give an abstract development of portions of model theory in the afore-mentioned theories, in a way to look as much as possible like classical mathematics. Thus, FMT0 generalizes portions of countable and recursive model theory; FMT further generalizes portions of countable and hyperarithmetical model theory and finally FMTΩ provides a generalization of the classical L-completeness theorem and of an admissible version of L-completeness due to Bruce and Keisler. This continues the development of the program mentioned above, originating with Feferman. (shrink)

We use some notions from computability in an uncountable setting to describe a difference between the “Zilber field” of size ℵ1ℵ1 and the “Zilber cover” of size ℵ1ℵ1.

We prove a topological completeness theorem for infinitary geometric theories with respect to sheaf models. The theorem extends a classical result of Makkai and Reyes, stating that any topos with enough points has an open spatial cover. We show that one can achieve in addition that the cover is connected and locally connected.

A theorem on the extendability of certain subsets of a Boolean algebra to ultrafilters which preserve countably many infinite meets (generalizing Rasiowa-Sikorski) is used to pinpoint the mechanism of the Barwise proof in a way which bypasses the set theoretical elaborations.

In the paper Randomizations of Scattered Sentences, Keisler showed that if Martin’s axiom for aleph one holds, then every scattered sentence has few separable randomizations, and asked whether the conclusion could be proved in ZFC alone. We show here that the answer is “yes”. It follows that the absolute Vaught conjecture holds if and only if every \-sentence with few separable randomizations has countably many countable models.

The languages of finitary and infinitary logic over the alphabet of bounded lattices have proven to be of considerable use in the study of compacta. Significant among the sentences of these languages are the ones that are base free, those whose truth is unchanged when we move among the lattice bases of a compactum. In this paper we define syntactically the expansive sentences, and show each of them to be base free. We also show that many well-known properties of compacta (...) may be expressed using expansive sentences; and that any property so expressible is closed under inverse limits and co-existential images. As a byproduct, we conclude that co-existential images of pseudo-arcs are pseudo-arcs. This is of interest because the corresponding statement for confluent maps is still open, and co-existential maps are often—but not always—confluent. (shrink)

In the the passage just quoted from the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume developed a thought-experiment that contravened his better-known views about "chance" expressed in his Treatise and first Enquiry. For among other consequences of the 'eternal-recurrence' hypothesis Philo proposes in this passage, it may turn out that what the vulgar call cause is nothing but a secret and concealed chance. (In this sentence, I have simply reversed "cause" and "chance" in a well-known passage from Hume's Treatise, p. 130). (...) In the first eight sections of this essay, I develop one topological and model-theoretic analogue of Hume's thought-experiment, in which 'most' ('A-generic') models M of a 'scientific' theory U are both 'eternally recurrent' and topologically random (in a sense which will be made precise), even though they are 'inductively' defined, via a step-by-step ('empirical'?) procedure that Hume might have been inclined to endorse. The last aspect of this model-theoretic thought-experiment also serves to distinguish it from simpler measure-theoretic prototypes that are known to follow from Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law (cf. the Introduction, 5.2, 6.1 and 6.7 below). In the last three sections, I will argue more informally (1) that the metamathematical thought-experiments just mentioned do have a genuine metaphysical relevance, and that this relevance is predominantly skeptical in its implications; (2) that such 'nonstandard' instances of semantic underdetermination and 'pathology' seem to be the metatheoretic rule rather than the exception; and therefore, (3) that metamathematical and metatheoretic 'malign-genius' arguments are quite coherent, contrary (e.g.) to assertions such as that of Putnam (1980), pp. 7-8. In the essay's conclusion, finally, I assimilate (2) and (3) to the familiar datum that 'simplicity', rather than 'pathology', has more often than not turned out to be an anomalous 'special case' in the historical development of scientific and mathematical ontology. (shrink)

We will prove in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without axiom of choice that the transitive hull R* of a relation R is not much “bigger” than R itself. As a measure for the size of a relation we introduce the notion of κ+-narrowness using surjective Hartogs numbers rather than the usul injective Hartogs values. The main theorem of this paper states that the transitive hull of a κ+-narrow relation is κ+-narrow. As an immediate corollary we obtain that, for every infinite cardinal (...) κ, the class HCκ of all κ-hereditary sets is a set with von Neumann rank ϱ(HCκ) ≤ κ+. Moreover, ϱ(HCκ) = κ+ if and only if κ is singular, otherwise ϱ(HCκ) = κ. The statements of the corollary are well known in the presence of the axiom of choice (AC). To prove them without AC - as carried through here - is, however, much harder. A special case of the corollary (κ = ω1, i.e., the class HCω1 of all hereditarily countable sets) has been treated independently by T. JECH. (shrink)