John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...) criticizing both empiricism and idealism, and argued for a moderate nominalist view of universals as being in rebus and only ‘apprehended’ by their particulars. His influence helped swaying Oxford away from idealism and, through figures such as H. A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, or J. L. Austin, his ideas were also to some extent at the origin of ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ which defined much of Oxford philosophy until the second half of the twentieth-century. Nevertheless, his name and legacy were all but forgotten for generations after World War II. Still, his views on knowledge are with us today, being in part at work in the writings of philosophers as diverse as John McDowell, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

Paolo Crivelli; VII*—The Argument from Knowing and Not Knowing in Plato's Theaetetus (187E5–188C8), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1.

The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The (...) work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. (shrink)

El artículo pretende mostrar la importancia que reviste el tratamiento ofrecido por Gorgias en torno a la sensación y su relación con el pensamiento y el lenguaje en los dos resúmenes conservados del Peri tou me ontos. Sostengo queallí se postula una fragmentación radical del hombre como polo unificado de la sensación, así como también del objeto en una multiplicidad de aristas que no encuentran momento sintético alguno. El paradigma de la sensibilidad fragmentada es el fundamento central, incuestionado en el (...) tratado que se proyectará a las relaciones entre ser, pensamiento y discurso para abonar la tesis de la imposibilidad del conocimiento y de la comunicación. Más allá de las intenciones gorgianas, se subraya el valor aporético de tales planteos y se sugieren importantes proyecciones de tales aporías en las propuestas de Platón y Aristóteles en torno a la sensibilidad. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues show discourse strategies beyond purely intellectual methods of persuasion. The usual assumption is that linguistic understanding depends on a match of inner experiences. This is partly explained by an underlying engagement with the historical Gorgias on discourse and psychology, as well as Parmenides on philosophical logos. In the "Gorgias" and the "Symposium," speakers cannot understand alien experiences by philosophical conversation alone. There is no developed alternative model of understanding in the Platonic dialogues. The difficulties in bringing 'philistine souls' (...) into Socratic alignment are the result of possessing an inferior soul, suffering misdirected passions, or missing the philosophy bug. (shrink)

Two versions of Peri tou mē ontos ptmo by Gorgias, related by an Anonymous Author MXG and by Sextus Empiricus SE, have been alternatively accredited by scholars according to their disposition to seek a doctrine or a rhetorical- communicational dimension respectively with the first tendency prevailing. Comparing the ptmo to the rest of Gorgiasʼ works, we verify and clearly demonstrate how SE manages to convey a precise modus argumentandi. In effect, SE shows Gorgias’ demonstrative reasoning as employing: 1 the application (...) of demonstrandum and quod erat demonstrandum typical of Gorgiasʼ speeches, reinforced by a substantial and abundant use of verbs of explanation and demonstration, especially in comparison to the rest of the same Against the Logicians’ section. Otherwise, MXG reduces this lexicon to the more generic phēmi; 2 the continuous employment of the reductio ad absurdum, like in all of Gorgias’ works; 3 a very refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction §67, similar to the one seen in Pal. 25. In addition, MXG is accurate in the discussion of some arguments as in the third kephalaion, however, presents as an overcorrected interpreter, more interested in questioning Gorgias than reporting his original text, also directly referring to Zeno, Melissus, and Leucippus. The context of the ptmo in SE’s work the structure presented leads us to believe that SE had the text or at least an accurate summary of the ptmo different from MXG. The aims of this paper are: 1 to demonstrate that SE shows well the Gorgianic demonstrative reasoning and, for this specific reason, he is reliable and valuable resource for us; 2 to hypothesise that SE’s version is based on and independent as yet unknown source. (shrink)

The two extant versions of Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos have been preserved by an anonymous author and by Sextus Empiricus. Both versions have been differently interpreted by scholars who examine either the doctrine or the rhetorical-communicational dimen­sion. When comparing the PTMO with the rest of Gorgias’ works, the present paper aims to demonstrate that S.E. offers a more precise account of Gorgias’ modus argumentandi. Thus, S.E. shows the following, typical features of Gorgias’ demonstra­tive reasoning: 1) application of demonstrandum and (...) quod erat demon­strandum, 2) continuous employment of reductio ad absurdum and 3) a refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction. The MXG, on the other hand, is accurate in the discussion of particular arguments, but presents an interpreter who is more interested in questioning Gorgias rather than doing justice to his thought. Hence, this article concludes that it was S.E., who had the text or at least a relatively accurate summa­ry of the PTMO. (shrink)

My aim is to investigate the link between Plato’s Sophist and Gorgias’s treatise On What Is Not. This relationship is worth examining because Gorgias’s treatise constitutes an essential, but insufficiently studied stage in the intellectual journey leading from Parmenides to the Sophist. My claims are that 1) Plato’s agenda in the Sophist perfectly meets the challenges Gorgias raises in the first thesis of his treatise, that 2) this becomes clear once we focus on Gorgias’s and Plato’s respective use of the (...) verb ‘to be’ and, finally, that 3) Plato is able to overcome Parmenides’s impasse precisely because he deals with Gorgias’s treatise. (shrink)

Assuming that a nihilist reading of Gorgias’ thought is to be ruled out, the issue of ‘not being’ remains one of the thorniest in his philosophy; indeed, it is fair to conclude that Gorgias is deeply concerned with ‘not being’. But what, after all, is Gorgias’ ‘not being’? This paper aims to answer this crucial question, by taking into consideration Gorgias’ main texts. Each of them provides a serious – although not always explicit – account of ‘not being’. Overall, the (...) aim is to show that Gorgias’ account of ‘not being’ is not concerned with ‘non-existence’ at all. It is deeply concerned, however, with falsehood and language. The paper will, therefore, be structured as follows: in part 1, the Treatise and specifically the the first section of the Particular Proof will be addressed and its ‘linguistic’ conception of ‘not-being’ fully exploited; in part 2, the Apology of Palamedes will be taken into account, in order to enucleate its ‘not-being-as-falsehood’ argument; the results from part 1 and part 2 will allow us, in part 3, to provide an analysis of the Encomium of Helen which points at its underlying conception of ‘not-being’. (shrink)